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ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with a relatively unknown
campaign of the War for Southern Independence, the Con
federate offensive into New Mexico.

Its purposes are to

discover the origins of the campaign, the Confederates1
immediate as well as future objectives, to describe the
military campaign itself, to discern the reasons for its
failure, and to make a brief statement as to the possible
effects the campaign might have had on the course of the
war in general had it been a success.
The immediate objective of General Henry Hopkins
Sibley and his "Army of New Mexico" was to seize the
territory of New Mexico from the Union forces.

This was

but the first step in his overall strategy which was to
culminate in the conquest of California.

This paper

deals mainly with the campaign to bring New Mexico into
the Confederate fold.
Even during the period of the campaign, relatively
little attention was paid to it by the bulk of the
Southern and Northern population.

During the latter part

of 1861 and the first half of 1862, great armies were

vi

clashing in the Eastern theatres of war.

The focus of

attention on these momentous events close at home
naturally relegated to obscurity a minor campaign in a
sparsely settled region in which only a few thousand
troops were involved.
Several accounts of the New Mexican venture have
been written from time to time.

In general, these re

lations do not delve into sufficient detail and, in many
instances, they contain inaccuracies.

In this paper,

whenever possible, stress has been given to the use of
primary materials—official records, journals, diaries,
letters, and the like which were written by actual
participants.

Several manuscripts not employed by

previous writers have been used to present as complete
and as accurate a picture as possible.
In retrospect it appears that Sibley's ultimate
aim to capture California, though within the realm of
possibility, was mainly visionary.

The chief obstacles

to overcome before such an eventuality could have come
about precluded defeat.

The New Mexican campaign was a

mere sideshow of the war in the East.

But had Sibley

achieved success in the venture herein described, un
doubtedly the Confederate government would have taken a
keener interest (as would have the Union government), and
a greater part of the war would have been fought on
Western soil.

vii

Brig. Gen. Henry Hopkins Sibley

Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (eds.),
Battles and Leaders of the Civil '/Jar (New
York, lg£52^1888), II, 1^97

CHAPTER I
CONDITIONS IN NEW MEXICO AT THE OUTBREAK OP WAR

At the outbreak of the War for Southern Inde
pendence, the territory of New Mexico, consisting of the
present-day states of Arizona and New Mexico, was a vast
expanse of land which lay between California and Texas.
For the most part, the area was barren and forbidding in
appearance.

Its desolate, and apparently worthless,

nature prompted General William T. Sherman to remark that
he would advocate a new war with Mexico to make her take
back the territory,"*•

The census of i860 gave the population of New
p

Mexico as 93*516.

The overwhelming majority were

Mexicans, seven-tenths of whom lived in small farming
villages north of Fort Craig along the Rio Grande

"'"A. A. Hayes, "The New Mexican Campaign of 1862,"
Magazine of American History, XV (February, 1886), 171.
2Joseph

C. G. Kennedy (camp.), Population of the
United States in i860; Compiled from the Original Returns
of the Eighth Census; Under tfie" Pirec^Ton of the""*Secretary
o F t h e I n t e r i o r ( W a s h i n g t o n , 1 8 6 4 ) , 5fc>7»

1

2
River and its northern tributaries.3

The Mexicans, form

ing the greater bulk of the population, had become Ameri
can citizens only thirteen years before by terms of the
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.^

A few families controlled

most of the landed and commercial wealth, while the mass
of the people worked as laborers or farmed small tracts
of land.^

Long isolated from the rest of the world, the

Mexicans in general had little interest in outside affairs,
£

and were concerned only with their own problems.

Aside

from army personnel, several thousand Americans resided in
New Mexico when war broke out.

Most of these were govern

ment officials, professional men, merchants, traders,
ranchers, or miners.

Though small in number, the Ameri

cans tended to dominate the political affairs of the

7

territory.

^canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 20,
1861, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of~The"17nlon and Confederate Armies, Series I,
Volume IV, 41. Hereafter cited as 0. R. A.; unless other
wise noted, all citations are to Series 17
^Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New
Mexico, 1530-1888 (San Francisco, 1B09J, 442.

5Loomis M. Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional
Controversy, 1846-1861 (Albuquerque, 1944), 3.
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 680.
^Edward D. Tittmann, "The Exploitation of Treason,"
New Mexico Historical Review, IV (April, 1929)* 129J
Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 60.

3
Since many articles of food, clothing, and other
items were shipped from Missouri over the Santa Pe Trail,
the northern, and most populous, section of New Mexico
g
became commercially dependent upon that slave state.
On May 11, 1861, the Mesilla Times reported that "uni
versal opinion and decision among the leading and influ
ential citizens of New Mexico is to abide the choice of
Missouri in the present national difficulties between
North and South."^

In 1858 the Butterfield Overland

Express commenced operations.

Running across Texas and

southern New Mexico to California, this new transportation
development resulted in the southern area of the terri
tory, consisting mainly of the Gadsden Purchase, becoming
more closely associated with Texas."1"0
By terms of the Compromise of I85O, New Mexico
was organized as a territory without reference to slavery.
As a result, this relatively unimportant geographical area
emerged, for a time, as a factor in national politics.
Southern leaders, of course, were anxious to make New
Mexico a slaveholding area.

This, plus the fact that the

Q

Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11,
1861, 0. R. A., I, 606.
^Mesilla Times, May 11, 1861.
10Frederic

L. Paxson, The Last American Frontier
(New York, 1910), 181.

4
negative wording of the Compromise gave tacit approval of
slavery in the territory, caused Northern politicians to
speak critically of the people of New Mexico.

Most of

the territory's political leaders tended to align them
selves with the South, for they knew that by espousing
Southern sentiments they would be assured of Southern
support for statehood.

Miguel A. Otero, territorial

delegate from 1855 to 1861, was probably the most out
spoken in this respect.

Otero received his higher edu

cation in the United States and had become thoroughly
familiar with American life and politics.

His marriage

to a South Carolinian also undoubtedly had an influence
upon his views.
In 1857 the New Mexico legislature passed an act
which stipulated that no free negro could remain longer
than thirty days in the territory.

Those who w^re already

in residence were ordered to post bond as a guarantee of
good behavior.^

The passage of this law was indicative

of the growing influence of Southerners in territorial
politics.

In 1859* due to the influence of Otero's

•^Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Contro
versy, 80, 59-61, l£4.

the Legl

__

Mexico. Passed b£
85b-1857.

.N"

.i \"u
N t>
MAI
OF AMKKICA
K IHi'al divisions

i;k«hi ai'

i

A t las

to Accompany the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies (Washington. 1891-1MTT7
II, plate CLXIV.
'

friends and supporters, the legislature passed a stringent
slave code.Geographically New Mexico was not suited
for African slavery.^"

The census of i860 listed eighty-

five negroes in New Mexico, and only about twenty to
thirty were

slaves.Most

of the slaves belonged to army

officers or government officials and served as domestics.
Though there really was no need for a slave code, its
passage served the political purpose of showing that New
1fl

Mexico was aligning herself with the South.

Though African slavery was virtually non-existent,
two other forms of involuntary servitude were not.

New

Mexicans had for generations engaged in the custom of
enslaving captured hostile Indians.

There were no laws

governing this practice, but it was accepted as just by
the community.•*•?

The system of domestic servitude called

peonage was not technically slavery, but it amounted to
it in fact.

Peonage, unlike Indian slavery, was recog

nized by statutory law.

It was a contract between masters

•^Qanaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Contro
versy, 59.
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 682
•^Kennedy (comp.), Population of the United States
in i860, 567; Ganaway, New Mexico and ffiTe Sectional
Controversy, 76.
•^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 683
•*•7Ibid., 681.

and servants.

For his services the master paid the peon

a small sum of money with which he was to support himself
and his family.

The master generally kept a store where

the servant was obliged to buy every article he wanted.
In this way, and by loans, it was an easy matter to keep
the servant chronically in debt.

By law, the peon had to

remain and work for the master until he had paid off all
his debts.

Even the peon's children were responsible for

his debts.

Since it was virtually impossible for the peon

to become solvent, he was forced to work for his master
for life.

One observer noted that the only difference

between peonage and slavery was that the peons were not
bought and sold in the market as chattels.

Furthermore,

the master was not obliged to maintain the peon in sick
ness and old age.

In reality, peonage gave the master all

the advantages of slavery without any of its responsibillr.
ties.1®
When the crisis of secession came, New Mexico
appeared to be safely in the Southern fold.

This was

deceiving, however, for apathy was a prime characteristic
of the Mexican people and only a few individuals of that
race manifested an interest in national politics.

Local

institutions and extreme regionalism were factors which
caused the native population to be little concerned with

1®William

W. H. Davis, El Gringo; or New Mexico
and Her People (New York, 1857), 231-233.

distant national controversies.

Though there appeared to

be a close bond with the South, many New Mexicans nursed
an underlying hatred of

Texans.-^

This feeling had been

engendered not only by the Texas Revolution, but also as
a result of the efforts of the Texans to make good their
claim to that part of New Mexico which lay east of the Rio
on
Grande River.
Arizona, or that part of the territory which com
prised the Gadsden Purchase, was isolated from the more
populous region of the upper Rio Grande by a stretch of
desert known as the Jornada del Muerto.

The whole area

had been incorporated into the county of Dona Ana with
21
the county seat at Mesilla.
South of the Jornada
stretched the Mesilla Valley which lay principally along
the west bank of the Rio Grande.

Though only about thirty

miles long and from a quarter to two miles wide, this
fertile area
people of

22

contained approximately two-thirds of the

Arizona.The

Mexicans, comprising the great

19
Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico,

68o, 686>

20Ganaway,

New Mexico and the Sectional Contro

versy, 124.
21Rufus K. Wyllys, Arizona, The History of a
Frontier State (Phoenix, 191557T"T3'5•
22Davis,

El Gringo, 385•

23sylvester

Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geo
graphy, History, and Resources of tEe"~Silver RegTon"~oF
fiorVh America f frewTork, 1864),~T3"

9
bulk of the population, were primarily engaged in grazing
and agriculture.

The most important of the small towns

which dotted the valley were Mesilla, Dona Ana, and Las
Cruces.
When the United States acquired the Gadsden
Purchase, the western section was nearly deserted because

24
of the ravages of the hostile Apache Indians.

Americans

coming into this region soon discovered that there was

considerable mineral wealth there, and numerous mining
companies were formed.

Western Arizona shortly gained a
25
reputation as a silver district.
Population tended to
concentrate mainly in the center of the territory, in and
around the Santa Cruz Valley, and along the lower Gila

26

River.

Tucson.

The two most important towns were Tubac and
Tubac, located in the Santa Cruz Valley, though

abandoned when the Americans took over, was repopulated
by the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company.

The Heintzel-

man Mine, the mines of Arivaca, Sopori, and Santa Rita
were within a radius of twenty miles of Tubac and the town

27
became the business center of the silver district. 1

24
Ibid., 17.
25Raphael Pumpelly, Across America and Asia (New
York, 1870), 29.
Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 35*
27Ibid.,

25-26.

10
Shortly before the outbreak of war, this small town of

353 people, which laid claim to being the most refined
and cultured center in Arizona, was also the home of
28
Arizona's first newspaper.
The old village of Tucson lay about fifty miles
29
northwest of Tubac.
It had a fortunate location on the
main road from the Rio Grande to California.

It was also

30
the center of trade with Sonora and its seaport of Guaymas.
The town showed considerable promise, and by 1859 its
31
population was estimated at 1,000.
The Overland Mail began operations in 1858.^

Not

only did this enterprise serve to keep Arizona in closer
contact with the outside world, but it also stimulated
migration and the consequent development of the territory.
In addition to engineers and other professional men who

28W. Clement Eaton, "Frontier Life in Southern
Arizona, 1858-1861," Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
XXXVI (January, 1933), 175.
29Mowry,

Arizona and Sonora, 25.

3°pumpelly, Across America and Asia, 30.
3"hviowry, Arizona and Sonora, 25.
32Paxson, The Last American Frontier, 178.

11
came to work the mines, small numbers of farmers and
ranchers also settled in the various

valleys.^3

An Ameri

can population grew up, with the majority coming from
California and the South.Apparently most of these
people, both settled and floating, were social outcasts.
An observer in i860 noted that the population of western
Arizona, with the exception of a few widely separated
35
ranchers and miners, was made up of outlaws and renegades.
If ever a town epitomized the lawless, wild
frontier, it was Tucson at this time.

On the eve of the

war, it had become a refuge for a heterogeneous population
consisting of traders, speculators, gamblers, horse
thieves, murderers, and nondescript politicians.

Though

the silver mines did much to swell the population, one
writer remarked that the San Francisco Vigilance Committee
did more to populate the new territory than did the mines.
The most desperate class of renegades from Texas, Cali
fornia, and Sonora found Tucson a haven from arrest, and
36
Tucson became the center of vice, dissipation, and crime.

33jy[OWry, Arizona and Sonora, 26-27.
3^Prank C. Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, From
the Spanish Occupation to Statehood (New York, 1932), tfb;
J. Ross Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country (New York,
1869), 22.
*
*•
^Raphael pumpelly, My Reminiscences (New York,
1918), I, 200.
3%rowne, Adventures in the Apache Country, 134,

22.

12
Since there was no semblance of law or of constituted
civil authority, each individual was his own Judge, Jury,
and sheriff.3?

With every man "armed to the teeth,"

scenes of bloody violence in the streets were everyday
occurrences.38

Lack of government was the direct cause

of this chaotic situation.

With no law or protection

from the Federal government, everyone redressed "his own
wrongs with pistol or knife or submitted/ in silence.
The Americans in Arizona had been at odds with the
rest of the Territory for several years before the seces
sion crisis.

The people in the north monopolized the

territorial government at Santa Fe and they paid little
40
heed to the desires and demands of the Arizonians.
This
situation, of course, bred agitation and ill-feeling.

So

opposed were the people of Arizona to continuing as a part
of New Mexico that in the election for territorial delegate
in 1859* five-sixths of the qualified voters chose to stay
away from the pollsAs early as 1856 Arizonians had

37pumpelly, Mjr Reminiscences, I, 200.
38Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country, 22.
39Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 3^.
^°Rupert N. Richardson and Carl C. Rister, The
Greater Southwest (Glendale, 1935)# 264-265.
^Weekly Arizonian, September 15, 1859•

13
unsuccessfully attempted to organize a separate territory.
Conventions had met and sent representatives to Washington
to present their demands.

But sectional animosity had

reached such intense proportions in Washington that
ho

Arizona's pleas could not be answered.
*

*

*

*

*

From the earliest days of the American occupation,
the military had played a prominent part in the affairs of
New Mexico.

Hostile Indians had been, and continued to be,

a menace to the security and development of the whole terri
tory.

In the north the Navajos were the chief danger; in

the south the Apaches wrought death and destruction.
Shortly after the acquisition of New Mexico, the War De
partment set about constructing a chain of military posts

4*3
along the Rio Grande and westward to the Colorado River.
This frontier defense proved to be inadequate for the
majority of the posts were poorly garrisoned.

In addition,

most of the troops were infantry—almost useless in the
pursuit of mounted Indians.

What cavalry detachments were

present proved invaluable, but they were too small in

44
numbers to be effective.

^2Wyllys, Arizona, 135-138.
^A. B. Bender, "Frontier Defense in the Territory
of New Mexico, 1853-1861," New Mexico Historical Review,
IX (October, 1934), 372.

^Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, 55-56.

14
There was a determined effort in 1859 by Colonels
Benjamin L. E. Bonneville and Joseph E. Johnston to re
organize the defense system, but the coming of the war
interrupted such plans.^

Early in i860 the New Mexico

territorial legislature memorialized Congress for the

46
establishment of seven additional military posts.
Perhaps there was another reason, aside from defense, why
the legislature of New Mexico desired additional forces
within its borders.

The New Mexicans had no market for

their surplus products other than that afforded by the
Federal government.

It was also estimated that eighty per

cent of the money in circulation in the territory was
contributed by the civil and military departments of the
United States
When the crisis of secession and war came, the of
ficers of the military forces stationed in New Mexico, as
elsewhere, were divided in their sympathies.

Colonel

William Wo Loring had assumed command of the department

. B. Bender, "Military Posts in the Southwest,
1848-1860," New Mexico Historical Review, XVI (April,
19^1), 135.
2i.fi

Laws of the Territory of New Mexico« Passed
the Legislative Assembly, Session of 1859-lfcfoO.
^Bender, "Military Posts in the Southwest," loc.
cit., 142.

15
h

on March 22, 1861.

O
Loring was from North Carolina.

True to the dictates of his native state, he tendered his
resignation in order to cast his lot with the Confederacy.
On June 11, in anticipation of the acceptance of his
resignation, Loring departed from Santa Fe. Before leav
ing, he turned over his command to Lieutenant Colonel
4Q
Edward R. S. Canby of the Nineteenth Infantry. J Other
officers who left to serve the Confederate States were
Colonel John B. Grayson, Major Henry H. Sibley, Captain
Cadmus M. Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel George B. Crittenden,
First Lieutenant Lawrence S. Baker, Second Lieutenant
Joseph Wheeler,5° Captain Richard S. Ewell,^! captain
Dabney Maury, Captain Andrew Jackson Lindsay, Captain
John Stevenson, and Major James Longs treet.^2

Edward Richard Sprigg Canby was born in Kentucky
in 1819.

He was graduated from West Point in 1339

^Loring to Thomas, March 23, 1861,

anci

served

R. A., I,

599.
^9cariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11,
1861, ib id., 606.
5°m. L. Crimmins, "Fort Fillmore," New Mexico
Historical Review, V (October, 1931)t 329.

5lLydia S. Lane, I Married a Soldier, or Old Days
in the Old Army (Philadelphia, 18937"* 102.
52santa Fe Gazette, May 25> 1861.

16
in the Seminole War in Florida.

Later he was engaged in

removing the Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws to Indian
Territory.

During the Mexican War he was present at the

siege of Vera Cruz and the battles of Cerro Gordo,
Contreras, and Churubusco.

In I855 he became major of

the U. S. Tenth Infantry and was engaged in frontier duty
in western Wisconsin and Minnesota.
was ordered to Fort Bridger, Utah.

Three years later he
In i860 he was ap

pointed commander of an expedition against the Navajos.
When the war broke out, he was post commander of Fort
Defiance.

He became colonel of the Nineteenth Infantry

in May, l86l.~^
Serious problems confronted Canby when he assumed
command of the Department of New Mexico.

For some time

he was unable to receive any word from Washington.
troops had not been paid for months.

His

The money that the

paymasters did have, if distributed, would still have left
many soldiers unpaid for several months of service.

During

the preceding two years near droughts had plagued the

-^James q. Wilson and John Fiske (eds.), Appleton's
C^clogaedia of American Biography (New York, I888-JL90I), I,

5^Ralph E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New
Mexican History (Cedar Rapids, i9i.l-J.9iTT, II, 3^;"~THe
Department of New Mexico was also known as the Ninth
Military District. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New
Mexico, 655.

17
country, resulting in a scarcity of water, crops, and
grass.

Many horses and mules had died and the military

55
forces were seriously short of riding and draught animals.
Hostile Indians continued their depredations,-7

and the

troops were hardly sufficient for the defense of the terri-

57
tory.

Due to the fact that so many officers had resigned

to join the Confederacy, Canby was forced to appoint noncQ
commissioned officers to act as commissioned officers.
In addition to all these problems, the people of
the territory were of great concern, apathy seeming to be
their leading characteristic.^

Although Canby assumed

them to be loyal, he noted that they were far more in
terested in their own personal affairs than in the national
6o
issue at hand.
The situation in Arizona was gravely

^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11,
1861, 0. R. A., I, 606.
56canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 23,
1861, ibid., IV, 44.
57sancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 686.
58Reports of Committees, 37th Congress, 3rd
Session, Senate Report 10b, 370.
^^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 680.
fio
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 65.

18
different, for there the people manifested Southern
sympathies and made no secret of their feeling.

On

March 16, 1861, a "Convention of the People of Arizona"

62

was held in Mesilla.

The sixth resolution which was

passed declared:
Resolved, That we will not recognize the present
Black Republican administration, and that we will
resist any officers appointed to this Territory by
said administration with whatever means in our
power.63
After repudiating the authority of the United States
government, this body pledged its loyalty to the Confeder6k

acy.

A convention was also held at Tucson where the

people of that area also asserted themselves to be a part
of the Confederacy.^

When Arizona declared itself a new

territory and attached itself to the Confederate govern
ment, Canby uncomfortably found himself in command of a
department which was divided within itself.

Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico,

511.
U£1Paul

to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
June 16, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 39.
^^Lucas to Labadi, June 14, 1861, ibid.
^Paul to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
June 16, 1861, ibid.
^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico,

5H.

19
On June 14, Canby received Instructions from the
general in chief of the army to withdraw the regular
infantry force from the department.

Though he considered

this an unwise move at the present, Cariby took measures
to bring in these foot soldiers from the interior and the
fifl

most distant posts.

The colonel was fully aware that

the removal of such forces would leave certain areas,
67
particularly Arizona, open to attack from hostile Indians.
To partially compensate for this, Canby was instructed to
redistribute the remaining regulars in areas which would
afford the best possible protection to the territory.
call for volunteers was ordered.

A

If enough citizen

soldiers could be recruited, perhaps, they would be capable
of filling the gap left by the departure of the regulars.
In accordance with orders, Canby made requisitions upon
the Governors of New Mexico and Colorado for the necessary
men.68
Since the southern part of the territory was
plagued by hostile Indian activity, as well as by the
active secession movement, Canby decided to establish a

CC

Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 63.
^Tcariby to Assistant Adjutant-General, July 29,
1861, ibid., 61.
6®Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, ibid., 63.
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strong force at Fort Fillmore in the Mesilla Valley.

The

colonel considered one mounted and seven infantry compa
nies a sufficient body to protect the governments in
In addition this force would cover the
69
withdrawal of the troops from the interior of Arizona.

terests there.

It soon became apparent that the volunteer forces
could not be relied upon for the defense of New Mexico
unless they were supported by a strong force of regulars.
Canby notified the War Department of this matter in a
special report.

Nevertheless, on July 12, the departmental

commander was instructed to withdraw the remaining regular
troops.

Believing that the general in chief did not fully

understand the situation in New Mexico, Canby sent Captain
Robert A. Wainwright to Washington to present an accurate
picture.

That officer was to point out that if all the

regulars were removed, it would inevitably result in the
abandonment of the territory.

As a country New Mexico

might be worthless, but within its confines was an immense
amount of government property which could not be allowed to
70
fall into the hands of the Confederates.
Canby received reports that a Confederate force was
on the way to occupy Fort Bliss, Texas.

69lbid.

^°Ibid., 64

Since Fort Fillmore,

21
New Mexico, was only about forty miles north of that post,
the colonel reinforced the garrison there with two addi
tional mounted companies.
also strengthened.

Ports Stanton and Craig were

On July 15# Canby informed the com

manding officer at Fort Fillmore that he should take
measures to gather up and prepare to remove all public
property within his jurisdiction.

As soon as the troops

from western Arizona had passed through, he was to abandon
his post.

The first line of defense in the south would

then be Forts Craig and Stanton.

But even at those stra

tegic points the regulars were to be withdrawn just as
rapidly as they could be replaced by inexperienced volun
teers.^1
As Canby anxiously endeavored to ameliorate his
difficult situation, Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn,
Confederate commander of Texas, dispatched four companies
of Texas troops to Fort Bliss.

This small force was to

reoccupy that post and take charge of the public property
72
there in the name of the Confederacy.

71Ibid.
72Sibley

to Loring, June 12, 1861, ibid., 55.

CHAPTER II
COLONEL JOHN R. BAYLOR'S ARIZONA CAMPAIGN

When Texas seceded from the Union and joined the
Confederacy, Major General David E. Twiggs surrendered
the Department of Texas to the commissioners of the Com
mittee of Public Safety.1

The garrison at Port Bliss,

located near Franklin (present-day El Paso), withdrew to
San Antonio as prisoners of war.

Before their departure,

their arms and supplies were turned over to commissioner
James W. Magoffin, contractor and sutler to Port Bliss.
He and Simeon Hart, a mill owner and contractor, and
Josiah P. Crosby, the district judge, were the three most
2
prominent citizens of the area.
Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, the Confederate
commander of Texas, ordered Lieutenant Colonel John R.
Baylor and four companies of the Second Regiment Mounted
Rifles to occupy Fort Bliss.^

During the first week of

•^Rupert N. Richardson, Texas, The Lone Star State
(New York, 1943), 249-250.
2Wllliam

W. Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, I858I898 (Chicago, 1901), 39# ltf.
3van Dorn to Ford, May 27, 1861, 0. R. A., I, 577.
22
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July, 1861, Baylor arrived at Franklin, where he and his
men were warmly received by the American population of
the neighborhood.^

Baylor was born in Kentucky in 1822.

Reared in Indian Territory and Texas, this rugged indi
vidual had no trouble adapting to the rigors of the
frontier.

He had served Texas during trying times when

Mexican invasions and Indian depredations threatened her
settlements.

For a short time he had been a special

Indian agent at Fort Belknap, but he resigned to engage
in farming.

In his spare time he studied law and was

elected to the Texas legislature.

When Texas seceded, he

immediately came to the front as an ardent supporter of
his state.

With the formation of the Second Regiment,

John S. Ford became colonel, and Baylor was designated
second in command.
On assuming command at Fort Bliss, Baylor learned
that Federal forces were concentrating at Fort Bliss.
Since that post was only forty miles away, he assumed that

^George H. Pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New
Mexico and Arizona," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
(New York, 1884-1888), II, 103T
^William A. Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 18461868 (Santa Fe, 1952), 195.
^William W. Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91
Days in the Confederate Army (Marshall, ltS7b), 1WT"
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the Union commander in New Mexico was planning to attack
him.^

Baylor had a total of 375 men, a considerably-

smaller force than that which formed the garrison at Port
Fillmore. But Baylor decided to seize the initiative by
striking first, for to wait until more reinforcements
came to Fort Fillmore might prove fatal.

Before launching

his offensive, the colonel sent Major Edwin Waller with a
detachment to reconnoiter the area around the Federal post.
Waller was to locate the enemy's pickets and to ascertain
whether the Texans could approach the fort undetected.
The major's subsequent satisfactory report prompted Baylor
to leave for Fort Fillmore on the night of July 23. The
O
Confederate invasion force numbered 258 men.
It was com
posed of Captain Isaac C. Stafford's Company E (85 men),
Captain P. Hardeman's Company A (90 men), Captain Bethel
Coopwood's Spy Company (40 men), and a detachment of
Captain Trevanion T. Teel's artillery (38 men). Several
civilians from El Paso and Mesilla also added their
Q
strength to the expedition.

^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
0. R. A., IV, 17.
8Ibid.

^Mesilla Times, July

29,

1861.

Lt. Col. John R. Baylor

4

William C. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the Civil
VJar (Denver, 1906), 29•
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Port Fillmore was located in a basin which was

commanded, and partially surrounded, by chaparral-covered
sand hills.

Under cover of this growth, an enemy could

come to within 500 yards of the post without fear of
detection.

If artillery was placed on the sand hills, the

10
fort would be rendered nearly helpless.

Another weak

ness was that the only water supply was a mile and a half
away.11

Major Isaac J. Lynde had assumed command of Fort

Fillmore and the Southern District of New Mexico on
July 4, 1861. Soon after his arrival, that officer re
ported the defenseless nature of the post to Canby.

After

due observation, Lynde concluded that Fort Fillmore, and
even the whole Mesilla Valley, for that matter, was not
IP

worth the effort to hold it.

Later Lynde was informed

that as soon as the troops from western Arizona had passed
through, he was to abandon the fort and withdraw to the
north.*3

perhaps his knowledge that he would be leaving

soon accounts for the fact that I^rnde took little pre
caution in fortifying his position.

10Lynde

Several of his

to Canby, July 7, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 58.

iiLyinde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7, l86l, ibid., 5.
12Lynde

to Canby, July 7 » 1861, ibid., 58.

"^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, ibid., 64.
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officers suggested that he at least should send away the
103 women and children at the post because in case of an
enemy attack, they would be a serious hindrance to active
military operations.

But Iynde refused to do so.

At this

time a Confederate flag was waving over Mesilla, and the
Union commander did not send a force to haul it down.
Such action would have been a sign of the power and
authority of the United States government and would have
served to keep the secession element overawed.

Since Port

Fillmore was defenseless, Lynde should have sent a con
siderable portion of his supplies northward and occupied
the strong points of Mesilla and Dona Ana.

In case of an

attack upon the fort, the Federals could have rapidly
14
fallen back to these positions.
Taking few defensive,
and no offensive, measures, Major Lynde preferred to
tranquilly remain within Fort Fillmore until the arrival
of Captain Isaiah N. Moore's command from western Arizona.
On the night of July 24, the Texans succeeded in
reaching a position on the river near Fort Fillmore with
out the Federals1 knowledge.

Baylor posted pickets and

cautiously made preparations to take the fort by surprise
at daybreak.

His plan would probably have been a complete

14
Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid.,
13-14.
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success had it not been for a deserter from Captain Teel's
company.

This individual informed the commander of the

fort of Baylor's plans and whereabouts.1^

Lynde immedi

ately ordered the long roll beaten, and the troops fell
into line.1^

With an attack upon his post imminent, Lynde

ordered in two companies of infantry which had been posted
at San Tomas to guard the ford.

Having concentrated all

his forces, Lynde and his men nervously awaited the enemy
17
assault.
But the attack did not come, for Baylor had
heard the roll of the drums.

Knowing that the enemy had

been warned, he moved across the Rio Grande toward

18

Mesilla.

At dawn Baylor's men were at the village of

San Tomas.

The two Union companies which had been

stationed there had, in their haste to get to Port Fill
more, abandoned large quantities of clothing, ammunition,
and other

supplies.^

This materiel, plus seven soldiers

^^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 17.
^Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid., 14.
^Tlflmde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, ibid., 4.
^®Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 17.
"^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861.
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who also had been left behind, fell into the hands of the
Texans.

After interrogation as to the estimated time of
20
arrival of the troops from western Arizona,
the prison-

ers were paroled

21

22

and allowed to return to Port Fillmore.

The Confederates then set out for Mesllla.

Located six

miles from Fort Fillmore, Mesllla was a strategic point.
If occupied by Union forces, it could be easily defended
23
and would enable them to hold the valley.
Baylor was
fully aware of this, and he and his men entered the town
about ten o'clock that morning.

The Confederates were

received with great joy by the citizens, and "Vivas and
24
hurrahs rang them welcome from every point."
When Lynde heard that Baylor had occupied Mesllla,
he decided at last to take the offensive.

About four-

thirty in the afternoon the Federal column, consisting of

20
Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4.
21Mesilla

Times, July 29, 1861.

22

Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4.
2^Baylor

to Washington, September 21, 1861,

ibid., 17.
2%Iesilla

Times, July 29, 1861.
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380 men composed of two companies of mounted rifles and
six companies of infantry, left Port Fillmore.

One

company of infantry acted as artillerymen2^ for the four
12-pounder howitzers.

The band, one infantry company,

and some convalescents remained behind to garrison the
fort.27
Near five o'clock clouds of dust on the main road
leading to Mesilla gave warning that the Federals were on
their way.

Several of the main streets of the town con

verged on the southside, and the houses in that area were
quite scattered.

In addition several corrals and the

proximity of corn fields made the position an excellent
one for defense.

Baylor posted his men on the adobe

house tops and behind the corrals.
wood* s company remained mounted.

Only Captain Coop-

Some of the citizens

also took position in order to assist the Confederates.
Lynde's column advanced to within 500 yards of Baylor's
force and then halted, forming a battle line with their
howitzers in the center, the infantry on each flank, and the
28
cavalry on the wings.
After these preparations had been
2^Lynde

to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4.

^Statement of Captain C. H. McNally, ibid., 14.
27Iynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, ibid., 4.

28flflesilla Times, July 29» 1861.

completed, Major Lynde sent two of his officers under a
flag of truce to demand the immediate and unconditional
surrender of the Texas forces.

The flag bearers were met

by Majors Edwin Waller and P. T. Herbert.

Both of these

Confederates were mounted and armed with double-barreled
shot guns which were carried on the front of their
s a d d l e s A f t e r hearing Lynde's demand, the Texans
retired to relay the message to Colonel Baylor.

Upon

30
their return they informed the Federals
that their com
mander's reply was "that if they wished the town to come
and take it."^
Lynde moved his battery forward, and fired two
shells which fell short of their target.

His command

continued to advance slowly toward the town while the
battery was pushed forward by hand through the heavy
sandAfter firing several more rounds of bombs,

^^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4; James C. McKee, Narrative
of the Surrender oF a Command of U• S. Forces at Fort
FD-more, N. M. ln~7uTy, A. P.,~I85I "(Boston, 1B86;, I5.
IV, 12.

3°Statement of Asst. Surg. J. C. McKee, 0. R. A.,
~
31]yiesilla Times, July 29, 1861.

•52
J Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4.
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grape, and canister, the Federal cavalry began to form for
a charge.33

The cavalry came to within 300 yards of a cor

ral behind which Captain Hardeman's company was stationed.
Hardeman's well directed fire threw the cavalry into com
plete confusion and forced them to retreat hastily, regard
less of the efforts of the officers to rally their men.3^
Three Union enlisted men were killed, and two officers and
four men were wounded.

Since the Confederates were so well

entrenched and with night falling, Iynde discontinued the
attack.

Reforming his men, he returned to Fort

Fillmore.35

As the Federals retreated a wave of cheering and shouting
came from the Confederates.3^

Baylor thought that lynde's

action might be a feint in order to draw him from his
strong position.

Because of this he did not go in pursuit,

but stayed where he was until the next morning.

When the

Union troops failed to appear, Baylor sent out a reconnoitering party which discovered that the Federal forces

33Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 17.
3^Mesilla Times, July 29/ 1861.
3^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
July 26, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 4.
3^McKee, Narrative of the Surrender, 17.
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were busily engaged in throwing up breastworks around
their fort.

In view of this situation, the Confederate

commander dispatched an express with an order for his
artillery to come up from Fort Bliss.

When these rein

forcements arrived, he planned to attack Fort Fillmore.
Through spies Major Lynde was quickly informed
that Baylor had sent for his artillery.
mander was in a quandary.

The Union com

If he sent a large enough force

to intercept the Confederate reinforcements, it would
weaken his post and might even result in its capture if
Baylor attacked with his main body.

Rather than take the

chance of dividing his army, Lynde decided that it was
best to evacuate Fort Fillmore and withdraw to Fort
Stanton.

Most of his officers were in agreement, for the

defenseless nature of the post placed the whole command
in danger if attacked.

Lynde issued orders for the

evacuation and all public property which could not be
OO
transported was to be destroyed.'3
When it came to dis
posing of the hospital whiskey, many of the men emptied

39
their water canteens and filled them with the liquor.

^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
0. R. A., IV, 18.
38Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7, 1861, ibid., 5.

39p. Stanley, Fort Union (Canadian (?), Tex., 1953)>
153. This material is from a manuscript by an anonymous
author, "Notes on the Affair at Valverde and Glorieta in
the Late War of the Rebellion,11 which is reprinted in
Stanley's book.
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A blacksmith shop, bakery, and one of the quartermaster
store rooms were completely burned down.

Most of the

post buildings, however, were uninjured.

A large amount

of ammunition was destroyed as were the hospital stores
and medicines.

Even with this destruction, several

thousand dollars worth of commissary stores and other
40
property were left unharmed.

At one o'clock in the morning of July 27, Lynde
ill
and his entire command set out for Port Stanton.
The
road lay over table lands and foot hills to a pass through

42
the Organ Mountains to San Augustine Springs.

Until day

light the Federal column proceeded without difficulty.
But when the sun rose, it became exceedingly hot, and the
men and teams began to show signs of exhaustion.

About

six miles from San Augustine Springs the trail began to
ascend to the pass.

At this point many men began to fall
21-3

by the wayside from fatigue.

Undoubtedly the hospital

whiskey played a part.
Shortly after daylight, Confederate spies reported
a column of dust off toward the Organ Mountains about

^°Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861.
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 5.

^2Mesllla Times, July 29, 1861.
^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7t 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 5.

35
fifteen miles away on the Port Stanton road. Baylor raced
to the top of a house where, with the aid of a field
glass, he discerned Lynde's whole army on the retreat.
The Confederates quickly saddled up and set out in pursuit.
By a forced march, Baylor hoped to overtake the Federals
at the pass.

When he reached the Rio Grande, the Texas

commander received word that the Federals had put their
fort to the torch, but that the fire had been extinguished
with little damage. Baylor ordered Major Waller to take
a detachment to the post to save as much of the property
as possible.

After leaving an adequate guard, he was to
j|ji
return and overtake Baylor on the march.
When Baylor reached the foot of the Organ
Mountains, he overtook the rear of the enemy.

This was

composed chiefly of stragglers who were trying to make
their way to water.

A number of them were captured and

disarmed, and the Confederates gave them what water they
had.

The Texans were now compelled to proceed to a small

spring to replenish their supply.

At the spring they

discovered twenty-four exhausted and sleeping Federals.
These men were also taken prisoner.

After filling their

canteens, the Confederates started toward the main body
of the enemy which had now passed through San Augustine

^**Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 18.
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Pass.

Baylor was delayed for some time while awaiting

the arrival of Major Waller.

By mistake the major had

taken more troops with him than Baylor had intended.
When Waller finally rode up, the pursuit was quickly
ilR
resumed. v
Completely unaware that the Texans were pursuing
him, Lynde took his mounted troops and pushed ahead of
the main body of his column to San Augustine Springs.

He

intended to secure water which would be carried back to
46
his thirsty troops in the rear.
On his return Captain
47
Alfred Gibbs rode up to report
that eight companies of
cavalry, supported by artillery, and a large number of
48
infantry were approaching the rear.
Gibbs and his party
of thirty-five cavalrymen had come from Fort Craig and
were bringing 100 head of cattle to Fort Fillmore.

Having

been warned that the Texans held Mesilla, Gibbs decided to
turn off the main road and, by a circuitous route, come

45Ibid.

^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7j 1861, ibid., 5-6.
^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 10.
^^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7, 1861, ibid., 6.
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into Port Fillmore from the Port Stanton road.

It was

i|Q
while on this detour that he came upon Lynde's command.
Lynde instructed Gibbs to take his cavalry to the
rear where, in concert with the infantry rear guard, he
was to contest the approach of the enemy.J

Lynde himself

was so exhausted that he could not sit upon his horse.
Instead of taking over personal direction of the defense,
he returned to San Augustine Springs.^

when Gibbs got to

the rear he discovered that the infantry were lying under
bushes, too exhausted to rise or carry their muskets.
Apparently the cavalry was the only force upon which Gibbs
could rely.

At this time the Confederates made their ap

pearance from below a hill. Gibbs formed his mounted
troops in a skirmish line, but his force was too small to
In good order Gibbs1
52
men steadily fell back toward San Augustine Springs.

combat the oncoming Confederates.

This retreat allowed the Texans to advance and capture the
wagons, artillery, and supplies.

When Baylor reached the

summit of the pass, he obtained a clear view of the road

^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 9-10*
5°lbid., 10.

August

^Lynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
lo6l, ibid., 6.
52statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 10.
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to the springs. For five miles the road was lined with
fainting and thirsting soldiers who threw down their arms
as the Texans rode "by.

Major Waller was to charge ahead

until he reached the end of the line of straggling
soldiers.
main body.

He was then to form and cut them off from the
Baylor followed behind, disarming the enemy

as he went.*^
When Lynde first heard that the enemy was approach
ing, he gave the call to arms. But only about one hundred
infantrymen were able to respond.

Gibbs now came in with

his cavalry and reported the capture of the rear guard and
three of the four howitzers.

Under these circumstances

the Federal commander considered it useless to resist.

He

did not believe that honor demanded the sacrifice of blood
after the terrible suffering that his men had already
cli
undergone.
As Waller and Hardeman's forces neared,
Lynde sent for those two officers and informed them of his
desire to surrender.

Baylor was told of this development,

and he rode forward to Lynde's camp.

When asked on what

terms he would allow the Federals to surrender, Baylor

^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 18.
•jLynde to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
August 7, 1861, ibid., 6.
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replied that it must be unconditional.-^

To this Major

Iynde replied, "Colonel Baylor, to avoid bloodshed, I
conditionally surrender this whole force to you, on con
dition that officers and their families shall be pro
tected from insult and private property be respected."
Nearly every Union officer present protested the sur
render, but Lynde stated that he was the commanding of56
ficer and would take the responsibility for this action.
After the articles of capitulation were signed, the order
57
was given for the Federals to stack arms. '
Iynde's command, consisting of seven companies
of the Seventh Infantry and three of mounted rifles,
59
totaled almost 700 men. Baylor's force numbered only 280.

^^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 18.

^Statement of Captain Gibbs, ibid., 11. A
staunch Union man maintained that, either by indifference
or treachery, lynde's subordinate officers aided in
bringing about the surrender. Once that had been ac
complished, they united in charging the whole responsi
bility upon their commander. Mills, Forty Years at El
Paso, 52.
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
0. R. A., IV, 18.
5®Gibbs to Canby, August 6, 1861, ibid., 8.
•^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861.
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The Federals surrendered four pieces of artillery and all
the transportation, arms, ammunition, commissary and
quartermaster's stores,^ 200 cavalry horses, and 270
head of beef cattle.^

The Confederates were delayed for

two days at San Augustine Springs because of the condition
of the Union troops and the lack of transportation.

The

prisoners were marched to Las Cruces where they were
paroled.

Baylor knew that Captain Isaiah Moore's command

of 250 men was due to arrive soon.

With his small army,

it would have been difficult for the Texas colonel to have
fought this force and attempt to guard the prisoners as
well.

Furthermore, Baylor reasoned that by paroling the

prisoners, the enemy would have to take care of them.

If

they remained prisoners of war, the Texans would be
obliged to feed them.
After Lynde's command had been paroled and started
on its way northward, Baylor took up a defensive position
near the village of Picacho.

It was here that the road

from the west struck the Rio Grande and he hoped to lie in
wait to attack the unsuspecting Federal column as it

^°Baylor to

, August 3, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 16.

6^Mesilla Times, July 29, 1861.
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
0. R. A., IV, 19.
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approached.

While Baylor was at Picacho a party arrived

which was composed of about thirty civilians and resigned
army officers who were on their way to offer their
services to the Confederacy.

The most distinguished

member of this group was Albert Sidney Johnston, late
commander of the Department of the Pacific.

As a matter

of courtesy Baylor offered his command to Johnston who,
though with reluctance, accepted it.^

Privately Johnston

remarked to a member of his party that he did not like the
delay, "but that it was like being asked to dance by a
lady—he could not refuse.
Johnston sent Captain Coopwood's Spy Company west
ward to locate the enemy and to watch his movements.

The

scouts discovered Moore's command moving along the
Miembres.^5

From the careless manner in which they were

travelling, Coopwood knew that they had not been informed
of Iynde's surrender.

It seemed that all was going well,

and within a few days the Confederates would spring the
trap at Picacho.

The plan was upset, however, the night

63lbid.

^\filliam P. Johnston, The Life of Gen. Albert
Sidney Johnston (New York, 1878), "287.
^^Baylor to Washington, August 3> 1861,
0. R. A., IV, 19.
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that the Federals stopped at Cook's Spring, about fifty
miles from the Rio Grande.

An express from Port Craig

rode into the Union camp and brought the news of I<ynde's
surrender.

Fearing that the Confederates would soon be

upon them, Moore and his men lost no time in preparing for
a hasty march to the security of Fort Craig.

The men

destroyed their cannon and burned all but eight of their
wagons.

After ridding themselves of all incumbrances, the

infantrymen mounted the draught mules, and the Union com
mand set out directly for Fort Craig 120 miles away.

As

Johnston remarked, "thus 250 infantry and dragoons—U. S.
soldiers—saved themselves from the terrible Texans by an

66

ignominious flight."

Immediately after tendering his military command
to General Johnston, Baylor went to Mesilla where, on
August 1, 1861, he issued a proclamation to the people of
Arizona.

He declared that Arizona was now organized as a

territory under a military government.

As commander of

the Confederate forces in the area, Baylor formally took
possession of the territory of Arizona in the name of the
Confederate States of America.

Geographically, the

territory comprised that part of New Mexico which lay

66
Johnston to wife, August 7, 1861, Johnston, The
Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, 287-289.
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south of the thirty-fourth parallel of north latitude.
Mesilla was designated the capital.

All civil and

military offices which existed before August 1, l86l,
were declared vacant.

However, all laws and enactments

passed before the date of the formation of the territory
which were consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the Confederate States, as well a3 with the proclamation
itself, were to continue in effect.

The government was

divided into two separate and distinct departments: the
executive and the judicial.

The executive authority was

vested in the commandant of the Confederate army in
Arizona.

This meant, of course, that John R. Baylor as

sumed the governorship.

The judicial power was placed in

a supreme court, two district courts, two probate courts,
and several justices of the peace.

In addition, as the

need arose, municipal and other inferior courts might be
established.

The first judicial district composed that

part of Arizona lying east of Apache Pass.

District and

probate court sessions were to be held at Mesilla.

The

second judicial district was made up of the remainder of
the territory with the district and probate courts holding
their sessions at Tucson.^7

Later in August Governor

^Proclamation to the People of the Territory of
Arizona, 0. R. A., IV, 20-21.
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Baylor extended the limits of the territory of Arizona to
the parallel of 36° 301, and from there to the Colorado
68
River, and down that stream to its mouth.
It is in
teresting to note that the mouth of the Colorado River is
well within the border of the Republic of Mexico.

Whether

Baylor was laying claim to part of Mexico, or whether he
was merely ignorant of the actual boundary, is not known.
Baylor established the provisional government of
the territory, proclaimed himself governor, and made ap
pointments to fill the offices he created.

All this was

done, of course, subject to the approval of the Congress
of the Confederate States.

On February 14, 1862, Presi

dent Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation which had been
authorized by the Confederate Congress on January 21,
giving legal sanction to Baylor's accomplishments.^

In

proclaiming a territorial government for Arizona, Baylor,
and later the Confederate government, was but giving
expression to the avowed desire of several years of
70
agitation by the people living in that area.
On March
11, 1862, Malcolm H. MacWillie took his seat in the

^^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23.
69james d. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy including ^Ke
Diplomatic Correspondence""!^ l"-18b5 (Nashville, 1905190b )t i, iur.
7°Charles S. Walker, Jr., "Confederate Government
in Dona Ana County as Shown in the Records of the Probate
Court, 1861-1862," New Mexico Historical Review, VI (July,
1931), 256.
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Confederate Congress as the delegate-elect from the
71
territory of Arizona.'
Within a few days the news of Lynde's surrender
reached Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts, the com
mander of Port Stanton.

That officer was well aware of

his isolated position, and he knew that his small garrison
would be no match against Baylor's men.

In view of the

circumstances, Roberts decided to evacuate his post and
thus save his troops for more important duty elsewhere.
On August 2, he ordered his two companies of infantry to
Albuquerque while he took charge of the two mounted rifle
72
companies and set out for Santa Fe.
The Federals left

in the buildings what supplies they could not carry, and
then they set the post on fire. Shortly after their
departure, a rainstorm extinguished the flames, leaving
most of the materiel unharmed.

Some Americans who lived

nearby took possession of the post and the supplies, but
the Mexicans and Indians of the area demanded the right
to plunder. Since they were greatly outnumbered, the
73
Americans had to agree.
Eight days after Roberts1

^Journal of the Congress of the Confederate
States of America,"T861~i8bb (Washington, 1W-1TO),
V, tfO.
IV, 22.

^Roberts to Canby, August 2, 1861, 0. R. A.,
- - -

73:Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 19.
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evacuation, Baylor was apprised of the situation.

The

Confederate commander sent Captain James Walker with
Company D to occupy the post.

He was instructed not only

to claim the military stores, but also to lend protection

74
to the Americans.

Walker managed to recover part of the

supplies which the Mexicans and Indians had pillaged.
Among the captured articles were four pieces of artillery,

75
two of which were in serviceable condition.
Baylor's spirited campaign to drive the Federals
from southern New Mexico (Arizona) had taken less than a
month.

In summing up his activities in a report to

General Earl Van Dorn, Baylor stated that he had acted in
all matters relating to the acquisition of Arizona entirely
upon his own responsibility.

He could only hope for ap

proval from the Confederate government.^

That approval

came, of course, when the President and Congress recognized
Arizona as a Confederate territory and sustained Baylor as
governor.

^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23.
^Baylor to Washington, September 21, 1861,
ibid., 19-20.

^^Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861, ibid., 23.
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Now that he had taken possession of Arizona,
Baylor hoped that the government would send a competent
man with an adequate force to occupy and hold the terri
tory.

The governor pointed out that the vast mineral

resources of Arizona, as well as the potentiality of its
affording an outlet to the Pacific, made its acquisition
of considerable importance.77

77Ibid.

CHAPTER III
COLONEL EDWARD R. S. CANBY'S EFFORTS
TO STRENGTHEN NEW MEXICO

The disaster of Lynde's surrender placed Cariby
in a most unenviable position.

The southern part of his

department was in Confederate hands, and he still was
not certain whether the War Department intended to retain
New Mexico.

Until he could receive definite instructions,

he speedily reinforced Fort Craig and Fort Union.'1'

The

troops busily threw up earthworks around Fort Craig to
strengthen it from any possible enemy assault.

Fort

Union, located in the northeastern part of the territory,
was moved from its old position under the mesa and rebuilt
about a mile out in the valley.

Here it was converted

2

into a fortification with bomb-proof quarters.

Because

of their strategic locations, Canby considered these two
posts as his key bases for amy future offensive or de
fensive operations within his command.^

-'•Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 64.
2Pettis,

"The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico
and Arizona," loc. citI, 104.
3canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 64.
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Undoubtedly Cariby*s greatest problem was one of
supply.

On August 16, he again Informed the War Depart

ment that New Mexico was sorely lacking in military re
sources and supplies of every description.

The commander

had heard nothing concerning his annual supply of ordnance.
This was of grave concern for there was not enough
artillery in the department to arm a single post properly.
And except for small arms, the supply of ammunition was
exceedingly limited.

The quartermaster department was

unable to secure remounts for the cavalry or draught
animals for its supply trains. Canby urgently pointed out
that if it was the intention of his government to hold New
4
Mexico, supplies would have to be sent as soon as possible.
The native population north of the Jornada del
Muerto were another source of concern which taxed the
strength of the Union commander.

With a few exceptions,

Canby believed the people to be loyal.

But he also real

ized that they were apathetic and would be slow to adopt
any measures for the defense of their country.

In the

colonel's opinion the natives were far more concerned with
their private interests.

By their personal and political

quarrels they were defeating the objectives of the Union

4Ibid.,

64-65
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government.-*

To guard against spies and the treasonable

activities of a few, Canby found it necessary to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus throughout the territory
With such a lethargic attitude on the part of the
people he was obliged to defend, Canby seriously doubted
whether an adequate volunteer force could be raised for
the defense of the territory.

The commander had earlier

received instructions to send the regulars to the East
just as soon as volunteer units could be mustered in to
replace them.

Even if a volunteer force could be raised

in New Mexico, Canby did not believe it would be reliable
unless supported by regular troops.

He contended that

the most that could be expected from the volunteers would
be the occupation of two or three important points.
These would be fortified and held by them until the
government's policy in regard to the territory could be
"settled and expressed."'''
During the first part of July, Canby notified
William Gilpin, governor of the territory of Colorado,

5Ibid.,

65.

/r
Circular, August 8, 1861, ibid., 6 2 .

^Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, August 16,
1861, ibid., 6 5 .

52
that increased Indian hostilities in New Mexico prevented
him from sending any of his volunteer forces to garrison
Port Garland.

That post, though located in Colorado, was

within Canby's jurisdiction.

Canby requested that the

governor raise two companies of infantry for duty there.
Though unable to issue the troops any clothing at present,
Canby promised that arms and equipment for the volunteers
Q
would be forwarded immediately.
Gilpin responded by
raising the two companies (Company A under Captain John
P. Slough and Company B commanded by Samuel P. Tappan)
and ordering them to report for duty at Fort Garland
Prom the Union viewpoint, all was not well in the
neighboring territory of Colorado.

The governor reported

that the results of a recent election, though showing an
overwhelming Union majority, also made it clear that there
was a strong secession element.

Colorado depended upon

supplies from the East. Hostile Indians were a constant
menace to this 800-mile life line.

Because of this

fact, as well as because of the secession element, Gilpin
deemed it absolutely necessary to keep an adequate

®Canby to Governor of Colorado Territory, July 6,
1861, ibid., 53-54.
^Gilpin to Canby,

, ibid., 68.

volunteer .force for home defense.

To arm such a body,

Gilpin asked Cariby to send him 5,000 arms and all neces
sary ammunition and equipment, and enough guns for two
batteries of artillery.10

Obviously Canby was in no

position to meet the governor's request.

He did, how

ever, forward Gilpin's letter to the commander of the
Western Department and asked that such supplies be sent
from Port Leavenworth.

Cariby assured Gilpin that if a

revolt broke out in Colorado, he would send enough
materiel to enable his volunteers to suppress it. But at
present Canby had only enough arms in his department to
equip the volunteers that had been authorized for New
Mexico.11

Meanwhile the War Department notified Canby

that New Mexico's volunteer quota had been increased by
two additional regiments.

The colonel was chagrined for

he still did not believe that they could be raised within
the limits of his department.

As a result, he informed

Governor Gilpin that it might be necessary to ask him to
12
organize four or six more companies in Colorado.

10Ibid.

llCariby to Assistant Adjutant-General,
September 8, 1861, ibid., 68.
12cariby to Governor of Colorado Territory,
September 8, 1861, ibid., 6 9 .
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By September 8, Canby reported that the defensive
works at Port Craig were nearly completed and would be
ready to turn over to the volunteers within a few days.
Since that post could be held easily against a greatly
superior force, Canby intended to let the unreliable
volunteers garrison it.

The regular troops would then be

released from such defensive duty and would be available
for whatever offensive operations Canby might undertake
The volunteer force which the War Department
stipulated should be raised in New Mexico was two regi
ments of infantry (2,092 officers and men) and two regi
ments of cavalry (1,632 officers and men).
service was three years.

The term of

The cavalry could not be secured

for that long a term, so Canby authorized the mustering
in of mounted companies for a period of six months only.1^
As anticipated, the organization of the volunteer forces
proceeded slowly.

In the hope of meeting the War Depart

ment's quota as soon as possible, Governor Henry Connelly
of New Mexico planned to call out the militia.

In this

•^cariby to Assistant Adjutant-General,
September 8, 18b1, ibid., 6 9 .
•^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, September 8,
1861, ibid., b9-70.

Lt. Col. Edward R. S. Canby

Johnson and Buel (eds.), Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, II" 107.
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way, he would force the people to do what they seemed
indisposed to do voluntarily.^

Canby ordered a mounted

force to Albuquerque to arrest a group of citizens who
refused to adhere to the Federal law in regard to the
i f

enrollment of the militia.

By early September the

First Infantry Regiment had been organized.

Even so, 200

men were needed by the companies which had not reached
their quota.

In the Second Regiment, where eight compa

nies had been mustered, 400 enlistees were lacking.

Since

only one company of cavalry had been sworn in, a call was
issued for independent companies of mounted volunteers.
Canby planned to incorporate these independent companies
with the cavalry regiments if the men concerned would
consent to that extension of their term of enlistment.^7
While the Federal commander was feverishly at
tempting to raise an adequate volunteer army, he received
•jo
reports of a possible invasion from the Canadian River.

•^canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, September 8,
1861, ibid., 69.
I6chapin to Rossell, September 27, 1861, ibid., 71.
l^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, September 8,
1861, ibid., 70.
"^Otis to Canby, August 22, 1861, ibid., 6 7 .
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To guard against a surprise move from this direction,
Canby ordered the commander of Port Union to be
constantly on the alert.

Patrols were to be continuously

sent out to bring a timely notice of any movement of the
enemy.19
^
During the first part of October Canby learned to
his dismay that Governor Gilpin had been unable to raise
the volunteer units which were needed at Port Wise.
Gilpin's failure was disappointing.

Canby had counted

upon the regulars at that post, and at Port Garland, to
form part of the force he intended to use in a campaign
against Baylor.

Canby gently rebuked Gilpin for not in

forming him earlier, for had he known, he could have made
arrangements to replace the garrison at Fort Wise from
20

some other quarter.

In an effort to accomplish what

the governor had failed to do, Canby notified the com
mander of Port Wise that he was authorized to raise four

21

companies from Colorado territory.

Monetary problems were still weighing heavily upon
the Ninth Military District.

In the middle of November,

•^Nicodemus to Chapman, October 22, 1861, ibid.,

72-73.
20Canby

to Gilpin, October 11, 1861, Ibid., 72.

21Canby

to Otis, October 13, 1861, Ibid.
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Canby informed the paymaster general that the military
operations in New Mexico for several months had been
greatly "embarrassed" and were now almost "paralyzed" by
the lack of funds.

Many of the regulars had not been

paid for more than twelve months and the volunteers had
not been paid at all.

Aside from the suffering caused

the troops, lack of money had seriously affected the
raising of volunteer units.

Few New Mexicans had the

desire to serve in the army without pay.

One unsuccessful

attempt had been made to borrow money for the government.
Canby reported that a new effort to secure a loan had been
made and it promised to be at least partially successful.
The chief quartermaster, the chief commissary, and the
departmental commander promised that this money would be
repaid in treasury notes bearing 7.3 per cent interest.
Canby, of course, requested that the paymaster general
make arrangements to redeem this promise.

If he failed

to do so, Canby pledged himself personally responsible
22

for the interest.

Hostile Indians continued to ravage the territory.
The Navajos and Mescalero Apaches were the chief offenders,
but the Kiowas and Comanches also made raids along the

22canby to Paymaster-General, November 18, 1861,
ibid., 75.
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frontier.

The Navajos were the chief concern, for that
2^
tribe predominated in northern New Mexico.
From the
earliest times the Navajos and the New Mexicans had been
engaged in hostilities.

When there were intervals of

peace, each side always claimed that the treaty of peace
24
was broken by the other.
Those Mexicans who had stock
stolen, or who could not cultivate their farms in
security, suffered heavily from these Indian raids.

When

retaliatory forays were carried out against the Navajos,
invariably the consequences fell upon the peaceful members
of that tribe.2-*

Pursuing forces apparently assumed that

all Navajos were guilty of the acts committed by a few.
These activities, however, applied to the tribes in and
around New Mexico, and not just the Navajos alone.

Canby

feared that if the situation continued, all the Indians
within his jurisdiction would turn to robbing and plunder-

23canby

to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1,
1861, ibid., 77.
P4
Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22,
1861, ibid., 76.
25
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1,
1861, ibid., 77.

26

Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22,
1861, ibid., 76.
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Some of these Indians raids, if they were not
caused by, were at least encouraged by an unscrupulous
portion of the Mexican population.

These individuals
27
profited by buying the plunder from the Indians.
Ap
parently these people and their acts were not restrained
by the "moral sense" of the population.

Cariby lamented

that as long as these marauders found a ready sale for
their plunder and for their captives, it would be im-

28

possible to prevent the depredations.

The military

commander informed Governor Connelly that the War Depart
ment and the Indian Office had a right to expect that all
good citizens would aid in the enforcement of the laws
and in sustaining the government's policy.

He pointed

out that the army's duty of protection involved a recipro
cal obligation upon the people of New Mexico.

Unless the

citizenry denounced the illegal acts of a "few vicious
individuals" and supported the enforcement of the laws,
military action would be futile.

Meanwhile the colonel

assured the people that he would use all means at his
disposal to protect them from the hostile Indians.

Troops

were posted at key approaches in the Navajo country in an

27Ibid.

28
Canby to Assistant Adjutant-General, December 1,
1861, ibid., 77.
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effort to restrain those Indians, as well as to give ample
warning of the coming of raiding parties,2^
By early December, Canby had made great strides
in getting his forces into fighting form. His regulars
were well-drilled and instructed.

However, there was a

lack of officers and recruits to maintain the company
quotas.
time.

The regulars had the best arms obtainable at the

The infantry was equipped with the Springfield

rifled musket (.58 caliber), and the cavalry had the
Harper's Ferry rifle, Colt's navy pistol, Sharp's and
Maynard's carbines, and a few of the Colt revolving rifles
for experimental use. In regard to the volunteers, the
colonel still maintained that it would be exceedingly dif
ficult to raise the entire force authorized for New Mexico.
He suggested that one or two regiments of volunteers from
the East be sent to replace the regulars when they were
withdrawn.

The volunteers that had been recruited were

slowly improving in discipline and instruction.

But they

were still far from efficient, and in Canby's opinion,
they could not be made so within any reasonable length of
time.

Not only were they without self-reliance and mili

tary spirit, but their ignorance of the English language
and their lack of intelligence were serious obstacles to

29
^Canby to Governor of New Mexico, November 22,
1861, ibid., 75-76.
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improvement.

For Indian or partisan warfare, or for use

in conjunction with regulars or volunteers of American
origin, Canby believed that they might make valuable
auxiliaries.

The volunteers were equipped with older

model firearms: the rifled musket (.69 caliber), the
Harper's Ferry rifle (calibers .54 and .58), the cavalry
musketoon, the carbine pistol, and some smooth-bore
*3Q
muskets ( . 6 9 caliber).
Though in general the troops of both categories
were fairly well-equipped with weapons, there was still
a deficiency of supplementary equipment.

The regulars

were well-clothed, but the uniforms of the volunteers
were of an inferior quality.

Ordnance supplies were in

adequate and the annual supply for the department had been
held up at Fort Leavenworth.

Canby set about buying up

as much ammunition as he could from civilian sources.
Transportation was also a problem.

The horses and mules

of the territory were generally too light for cavalry or
draught purposes, so they had to be purchased elsewhere.
Fortunately some animals had arrived from the East and
more were expected soon.

The subsistence department was

now fairly well supplied.

When money was available, beef,
•ai
flour, beans, and salt were purchased locally.

3°Cariby to Adjutant-General, December 8, 1861,
ibid., 78-80.
33-ibid., 79.

Canby believed that his army was in such good
condition that he could launch an offensive. He desig
nated Fort Craig as his base of operations, for his
objective was to drive Baylor's numerically inferior
force from the Mesilla Valley.

If successful, he might

even be able to occupy several key points in western
Texas.

The regulars formed the backbone of Canby's

force, but picked volunteers were also selected to join
the campaign.

Late in December Canby arrived at Port

Craig to personally take charge of the preparations.

He

still lacked transportation, but he hoped that a scheduled
arrival of mules from the East in a few days would over
come that difficulty.

Canby also let new contracts to
32
furnish a further supply of animals.
As everything approached a state of readiness,
Canby was stunned to hear that the Texans in the Mesilla
Valley had received a reinforcement of 1,400 men.

An

army of 2,000 more were reportedly moving up the Pecos
•a-a

River to attack central and northern New Mexico.A
Union offensive was now out of the question, for the de
partmental commander was faced squarely with the grave
task of defending his far-flung territory from invasion.

32Canby to Adjutant-General, December 14, 1861,
ibid., 80.
33canby to Adjutant-General, December 28, 1861,
ibid., 81.
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The reported Confederate reinforcement in the
Mesilla Valley was larger than Canby had expected.

Even

so, his greatest concern was with the safety of Port Wise
and communication with the East.3^

On January 1, Canby

advised Governor Gilpin that the large Confederate force
made it absolutely necessary that the governor send as
many companies of Colorado volunteers to Ports Wise and
Garland as possible.

If the line of communication with

the East was cut, Canby and his command would be com35
pletely isolated from any aid coming from that direction.
Canby at first had doubted that an invasion might
come by way of the Pecos River.

Now he was certain of it.

He also feared that a cooperating force would move up the
Canadian River.

Canby had heard that the Texans had not

raised as many men as they had hoped.

If this was so,

the expedition up the Canadian might be suspended tempo
rarily.^
As he was faced with the prospect of invasions
from several directions, Canby set about devising a plan
which would best defend his department.

The key points

34Ibid.

•^Cariby to Gilpin, January 1, 1862, ibid., 82.
3^Canby to Donaldson, January 3# 1862, ibid., 8 3 .
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of defense were still Ports Union and Craig.
those posts were rapidly reinforced.

Both of

At an intermediary

point between the two forts, Canby planned to establish
a large force of regulars.

Whichever post was attacked,

this body would march rapidly to its relief.

In addition,

this strategically located army would serve as the nucleus
for the concentration of the regulars and volunteers which
would be drawn from areas which were not threatened at the
07
moment by the enemy.
Canby estimated that all his
available troops, about 1,500, could be concentrated at
the key base within twenty-four hours.

The departmental

commander designated the village of Belen as the best
intermediary point.

If the invasion came from the Pecos,

the Rio Grande Valley could be reached only by the Abo,
Manzano, and Galisteo passes.

Belen was located above

the Abo pass and was centrally situated for concentrating
troops to meet any Confederates marching from the Pecos,
or coming up the Rio Grande to attack Fort Craig.
Canby arrived at Belen from Port Craig on January
11, 1862.

He was accompanied by a detachment of 500 men

consisting of three companies of cavalry, three of
infantry, a battery of light artillery, and four volunteer

•^Canby to Paul, January 7, 1862, ibid.
3®Canby to Adjutant-General, January 11, 1862,
ibid., 84.
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Infantry companies.

With the force of regulars, Canby

established his reserve base, Camp Connelly, at Belen.
The volunteers which had come up with him were to be used
to keep open communications and to convoy supply trains
between Camp Connelly and Fort Craig.

Canby left Port

Craig in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts
and a garrison of 1,400 men.

Roberts had six companies

of regulars, ten of volunteers, one of spies and guides,
and two of militia.

In addition he had subject to his

call six companies of volunteers which could join him
"3Q
within twenty-four hours. ^ Canby assumed that this was
an adequate army to maintain Port Craig if the expected
invasion came from the Pecos.

If it came up the Rio

Grande, however, all available forces would be rushed
40
from Belen.
Patiently Canby waited to see where the Confeder
ates would strike.

The Union troops at Port Union, Santa

Pe, Albuquerque, and Camp Connelly were held in constant
readiness to move in any direction.

Troop transportation

and ten days' supplies were held in reserve to meet any
2ii
emergency.
Canby advised Governor Connelly that all

39ibid.
^°Canby to Paul, January 7, 1862, ibid., 83.
4lIbid.
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arms and ammunition should be collected and held for
instant use by his army.

If powder and lead were taken

from the merchants, receipts should be given.
used the government would pay for it later.

If it was

All citizens

were asked to watch the roads and trails to report the
coming of enemy scouts, spies, or small parties which
might endeavor to enter the territory.

The governor was

asked to make arrangements for the calling of any addi
tional militia units which might be needed.

Part of the

militia would be held in readiness to reinforce Santa Fe

42
and Fort Union.

Canby sent out scouts and spies to

watch all the different approaches to the country.

In

this way, he was assured that he would have at least

43
several days1 notice of the advance of any enemy army.
While Canby was feverishly engaged in strengthen
ing his defenses, new troubles developed.

During the

middle of January, the colonel learned that the army pay
master had been detained at Fort Leavenworth.

As a conse

quence, no funds would come to New Mexico until spring.
Canby was greatly alarmed for he feared that if news of
this leaked out, his volunteer forces would desert and

42
Canby to Connelly, January 1, 1862, ibid., 82.
^30anby to Adjutant-General, January 11, 1862,
ibid., 84.
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the people of New Mexico might become even more apathetic
than they already were.

Cariby knew that the Mexicans

had no affection for the institutions of the United
States, for they manifested a strong, but restrained,
hatred toward, the, Americans as a race.

Canby was afraid

that Confederate agents in the territory would seize upon
the opportunity of this news to arouse the Mexicans to
rebellion.^

When word of the paymaster's delay reached

the Mexicans, Canby's fears were fully vindicated.

A

revolt broke out in a volunteer company at Port Union.
Two hundred miles away at Camp Connelly, two companies of
the Second Regiment of volunteers mutinied.

The first of

these revolts was quickly suppressed by Colonel Gabriel R.
Paul.

The second was not so easily managed, and about

thirty of the mutineers escaped and fled to the mountains.
Only stern measures prevented further outbreaks
Canby still did not have enough commissioned
officers for his army.

Colonels Paul and Roberts sug

gested that regular army officers be appointed to head
volunteer units.

Canby declined to do this.

His refusal

was based on the fact that he needed the regular officers

^Canby to Adjutant-General, January 13# 1862,
ibid., 84-85.
^^canby to Adjutant-General, January 20, 1862,
ibid., 86-87.
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where they were.

Furthermore, and perhaps of more im

portance, the prejudice of the Mexicans toward the
Americans was too great.

If the field officers were

chosen altogether from the Americans, it might seriouslyhinder the organization of the volunteers.

Canby hoped

46
to be able to select outstanding natives for commissions.
Faced with an imminent invasion, and harried by
tremendous internal problems, Colonel Canby's mettle was
put to the test.

At this critical moment, the Union

government was fortunate in having such a capable com
mander in New Mexico.

^Cariby to Paul, January 15 (?), 1862, ibid., 8 5 .

CHAPTER IV
THE FORMATION OP THE "SIBLEY BRIGADE"
AND THE MARCH TO NEW MEXICO

While Baylor was actively engaged in his campaign
in the Mesilla Valley, Henry Hopkins Sibley, a veteran
cavalryman, distinguished in appearance with long side
burns and bushy mustache, was commissioned a brigadier
general in the army of the Confederacy with instructions
to raise a brigade and invade the territory of New Mexico"^
Sibley was originally from Louisiana.

From I838, the date

of his graduation from the United States Military Academy,
until his resignation, Sibley had served with distinction
in the United States army.

As a young lieutenant of the

Second Dragoons, he had taken part in the Seminole wars
in Florida.

Later he fought in the War with Mexico, at

taining the rank of captain in 1847. Sibley was present
at the siege of Vera Cruz, the skirmish of Medelin, the
battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del
Rey, and the capture of Mexico City. Because of his
"gallant and meritorious conduct" at Medelin, Sibley

"^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 688.
70
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received a brevet majorcy.

He was stationed in Kansas

during the anti-slavery conflict, and he later took part
in two Utah expeditions to quell the Mormon disturbances.
He then marched to New Mexico in i860 to engage in a
2

campaign against the Navajo Indians.

While stationed in

New Mexico in 1852, Sibley superintended the building of
Port Union, the post which came to be the most important
3
military base in New Mexico when the war broke out.
Aside from his military exploits, Sibley also achieved
success as an inventor.

He designed the "Sibley tent,"

patterned after the plains Indians' tipis, which was
4
adopted by the United States Army.
When the War for Southern Independence broke out,
Sibley was stationed in New Mexico.

He was elevated to

the rank of major on May 13» 1861, but he resigned the
day he received his promotion in order to join the Con
federate army.5

After tendering his resignation, Sibley

2Theo.

P. Rodenbough (comp.), From Everglade to
Canon with the Second Dragoons (New York, 10/5), 453.
3william C. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the
Civil War: The New Mexico Campaign in 1U62 (Denver,
190b;,"55".
Wilson and Piske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia,

v, 521.
^Rodenbough (comp.), Prom Everglade to Canon, 453.
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left the territory for the capital of the Confederacy.
The stage from El Paso to San Antonio ran semiweekly and
made the journey in six days.

While awaiting transpor

tation facilities at Hart's Mill (near present-day El
Paso, Texas), Sibley wrote to his former commander,
Colonel William W. Loring, who was soon also to cast his
lot with the Confederacy.

Jubilantly he stated that at

last he was "under the glorious banner of the Confederate
States of America" which "was indeed a glorious sensation
of protection, hope, and pride."

When the Federal troops

at Fort Bliss withdrew to San Antonio, much public
property had been left behind.

Sibley suggested that

Loring, as commander of the Department of New Mexico,
remain at his command a little longer, in order to allow
the Texas forces which were already on their way, to take
charge of the property.

Should Loring be relieved of his

command too soon to prevent an attempt on the part of his
successor to recapture the stores, Sibley advised his
former commander to send a notice by extraordinary express
to Judge Simeon Hart, a leading citizen of the area.

In

this same letter Sibley regretted more than ever the
"sickly sentimentality" which had overruled him in his
desire to bring his whole command with him.

Sibley felt

assured that the best of the rank and file of the soldiers
in New Mexico were pro-Southern. By leaving without
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bringing his troops with him, he felt that he had "betrayed
and deserted" his men.^
Prom Hart's Mill, Sibley proceeded to Richmond,
Virginia, where on July 5> 1861, he was commissioned a
brigadier general.^

With such an active and distinctive

background in the regular army, the newly commissioned
general gave the Confederacy every reason to expect great
things of him.
During his tour of duty in the territory of New
Mexico, Sibley had acquired a great deal of information
concerning the resources of the country, the condition of
the Federal forces, and the amount of government stores
and supplies there.

Upon his arrival in Richmond, Sibley

informed Jefferson Davis of these matters and submitted to
Q

him a plan of campaign.
scheme.

Davis approved of Sibley's bold

On July 8, 1861, Samuel Cooper, the adjutant and

inspector general of the Confederacy, instructed Sibley
that "in view of. . ,/K±sJ recent service in New Mexico

^Sibley to Loring, June 12, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 55-56.
^Wilson and Fiske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia,

v, 520.
^Trevanion T. Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican
Campaign—Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure,"
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, II, 700.
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and knowledge of that country and the people, the Presi
dent. . .intrusted. .

with the important duty of

driving the Federal troops from that department, at the
same time securing all the arms, supplies, and materials
of war."

Sibley was further authorized to take into the

Confederate service "all disaffected officers and
soldiers on the original commissions of the former and
enlistments of the latter."

Without delay, Sibley was

ordered to proceed to Texas where, in concert with
Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, he was to organize, "in
the speediest manner possible, from the Texas troops, two
full regiments of cavalry and one battery of howitzers,
and such other forces" as he deemed necessary.^

Later

Sibley realized that two regiments were not sufficient,
and he asked the Secretary of War for more.

Subsequently,

Sibley was authorized to accept any additional armed

10
regiments which the governor of Texas might tender to him.
As far as possible, Van Dorn was to supply from the depots
under his command the materiel for the armament and equip11
ment of Sibley's brigade.

If Sibley was successful in

^cooper to Sibley, July 8, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 93.
10Chilton
11Cooper

to Sibley, September 25# 1861, ibid., 111.

to Van Dorn, July 9, 1861, ibid., 93.

his effort to drive the Federal forces from New Mexico,
President Davis instructed him to organize a military
government within the territory.

The details of such a

government were to be submitted to Davis at the earliest
possible time.

Sibley's instructions were of a general

nature, for it was not considered necessary to confine
him to minor matters which might arise from time to time.
In this respect he was to be guided by circumstances and
12
his own good Judgment.
In other words, Sibley was
practically allowed a free hand in the conduct of his
New Mexican campaign.
The distant and relatively unimportant territory
of New Mexico was not the main objective of this campaignfar from it.

It was merely a means to attaining the real

aim, the conquest of California.^

Not only would the

gold supply from the West, which was valued by the North
as a source from which to pay for the prosecution of the
war,"1*^ be diverted from Washington to Richmond, but the
South would also gain two good seaports on the Pacific
coast.

The remoteness of this coast would have made it

•^Cooper to Sibley, July

8, 1861, ibid.

^•^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.
cit., 700.
1^Carleton to Thomas, September 13, 1863,
Condition of the Indian Tribes. Report of the Joint
Special Committee, Appointed Under Joint Resolution of
March 3, 1865 (1867), 136.
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impossible for the Union navy to have blockaded it.^5
Thus the South would have been assured of a steady flow
of supplies from the West.1^

The factor of prestige in

the conquering of the West might also have been an aid in
the recognition of the Confederacy by a foreign power.
Although the Department of Texas was to supply the
men and some of the necessary equipment and materiel,
Sibley's campaign, in the main, was to be self-sustaining.
Upon arrival in Arizona the brigade was to be furnished
with the arms and equipment out of the supplies already
captured by Baylor and by any additional materiel which
17
might be captured in the course of the campaign. Indeed,
Sibley counted on a rapid conquest of New Mexico's forts
and depots of supplies, so that his army could subsist "on

18
the enemy's country."

Poodstuffs were to be procured from

the Mesilla Valley and the Rio Grande Valley in and around
El Paso.

Negotiations for further supplies, particularly

^Latham Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New
Mexican Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
II, 697-98.
•^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.

cit., 700.
17Ibid.

•^Theo. Noel, A Campaign From Santa Pe to the
Mississippi (ShreveporF, IO05), lTI
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commissary items, were to be opened with the governors
of the states of Chihuahua and Sonora.^
Many factors made Sibley confident of victory.
Baylor's short campaign in the Mesilla Valley had
cleared the way for an invasion to the north.

Sibley,

viewing the Federal forces in New Mexico as insufficient
and inefficient, consequently thought that they would
90

easily fall before the might of his brigade.

There

seems to have been a belief among the Texans that the
Mexican population of New Mexico and Arizona might come to
their aid, or at least not hinder their efforts.

Friends

of the cause reported that the Mexicans could be depended
21
upon for supplies
because they were completely controlled

by Anglo-Americans, most of whom in the El Paso area were
Southern sympathizers.22

It was also assumed that since

New Mexico was commercially dependent upon states of

^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.
cit., 700.
20Noel,

A Campaign, 14.

21A.

A. Hayes, Jr., New Colorado and the Santa
Fe Trail (New York, 1880), 162.
22Mills,

Forty Years at El Paso, 38-39•
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Southern sympathies, especially Missouri and Texas, the
23
people would support the Confederacy.
In addition, the
territory of New Mexico had a slave code, Congressional
Delegate Miguel Otero was a secession advocate, and three
newspapers in the territory (the Santa Fe Gazette, the
Tucson Arizonian, and the Mesilla Times) were pro-Southern.
This assured Sibley and the Texans that New Mexico was proConfederate in its leanings and consequently might be
24
expected to aid a Confederate invasion.
Sibley assumed that once the territory of New
Mexico was conquered and pacified, many men from the West
would flock to his banner.2-*

A large number of the people
26
in the territory of Colorado possessed Southern sympathies,
while the Mormons of Utah were known to have no love for
the Union, particularly after the two military campaigns
waged against them.2?

General Edwin V. Sumner, the Union

2^canby

to Assistant Adjutant-General, June 11,
1861, 0. R. A., I, 6o6.
2^charles S. Walker, "Causes of the Confederate
Invasion of New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review,
VIII (April, 1933), 88.
25Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.
clt., 700.
26whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 36.
2?Hubert

H. Bancroft, History of Utah, 1540-1886
(San Francisco, I889), 538.
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commander in California, estimated that there were twentythousand Southern sympathizers in his state, and that if
the South "should ever get an organized force into this
State, as a rallying point for all the secession element,
it would inevitably inaugurate a civil war here immedi
ately."2®

With such favorable developments on the

horizon, Sibley confidently planned that as soon as New
Mexico was occupied an army of advance would be organized,
29
and "On to San Francisco" would be the watchword.
Sibley left Richmond and arrived in San Antonio,
Texas, in the middle of August, 1861.

Setting up his

headquarters in San Antonio, he was fully confident that
he would be able to raise and organize his brigade within
a short time.

Many unexpected difficulties arose, how

ever, which shattered his dreams of rapidly getting his
command into the field.

The new general was disappointed

in not receiving as much cooperation from Governor Edward
Clark as he desired.

This was not due to any lack of

zeal on the part of the governor.

It was but a "conse

quence simply of the very inefficient system of the State
military organization to which the governor had recourse

2®Sumner

to Townsend, September 7, 1861, 0. R. A.,

L, i, 610.
29Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.
cit., 700.
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to supply the troops."

Governor Clark ordered a suf

ficient number of companies, which had reported to him
as organized, to report to Sibley for duty.

Most of

these units which were called to the colors unfortunately
proved to be either entirely disbanded or so reduced in
numbers that they did not meet the minimum set for the
Confederate service.

Reliance on this method of raising

troops caused the first serious delay.

A further cause

of retardation was the idea, prevalent throughout the
state, that the "Sibley Brigade" would be filled only
with the companies ordered out by the governor.

Conse

quently, other companies not so organized did not offer
their services to the general.

As a result, Sibley was
Qf)
forced to appeal directly to the public,
particularly
31
through the medium of the piatriotic press, for recruits.
Even so it required some time to counteract the effects
of the "misplaced reliance" upon the State system.

Com

petition for men which grew out of the calls for the
several regiments required for service east of the
Mississippi was another cause of delay in filling the

3°Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 141-142.
- - ^Noel, A Campaign, 5-6.
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ranks.32

Apparently a good many men of Texas preferred

glory east of the Mississippi rather than in the desolate
and barren waste lands of Arizona and New Mexico.
Recruiting was but one problem Sibley faced.
Because the people of Texas expected an attack on the gulf
coast, officials were exceeding reluctant to allow war
materiel to be removed from the state.33

Although many

34
recruits in the "Sibley Brigade" brought their own weapons,
every company reported itself short of arms.

"In virtue

of the authority delegated to. . ./Elm/ in the written
instructions of his excellency the President," Sibley
found it necessary to attempt to buy serviceable firearms
and to construct lances.

Since there was not a dollar in

the hands of any of his disbursing officers, the general
resorted to the credit of the Confederate government for
these purchases.35
According to orders, General Earl Van Dorn, as
commander of the Department of Texas, was to have supplied

32Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 141-142.
- - -

33Ibid.,

142.

3ihceleher,

Turmoil in New Mexico, 161.

35sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 142.
~

Sibley with as much materiel of war as possible.

Soon

after Sibley's arrival, Van Dorn was relieved from duty,
and Colonel Henry E. McCulloch temporarily assumed his
office.

General P. 0. Hebert was appointed the new

departmental commander, but he did not immediately come
to headquarters to assume command. Shortly McCulloch and
Major Sackfield Maclin, the assistant quartermaster and
acting ordnance officer of the department, left to meet
General Hebert at Galveston.

For several weeks there was

not an officer within Sibley's reach to whom he could
apply for the issuance of ordnance supplies.

Paced with

this new frustration, Sibley assumed the responsibility
of ordering the remaining subordinates to issue supplies
which were indispensable to the brigade and which could
be spared from the service of the department itself.
Although Sibley had obviously overstepped his authority,
he justified his action on the grounds that to have
awaited the return of a responsible officer would have
Incurred another indefinite delay "which would have
probably paralyzed" his command for the winter.
Sibley's anxiety to get his command on the march
was greatly increased by the arrival of a dispatch from
or
Colonel John R. Baylor-3 stating that the enemy, with a

36lbid.,

143
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force of 2,500 men, was on the march for Dona Ana.

Earlier Sibley had advised Baylor to make a demonstration
against Fort Craig in order to draw the Federals out to
attack his smaller force.

With the Federals lured from

the security of their strong point and with the expected
timely arrival of his troops, Sibley planned to destroy
oQ
or capture the enemy.
The delays which Sibley had en
countered, however, threatened to make his plan backfire.
It might mean the destruction of Baylor's small force, as
well as the loss of territory which Baylor had already
gained for the Confederacy.
The first company to join Sibley was raised in
Guadalupe and Caldwell counties and was commanded by
William P. Hardeman.

On August 27, 1861, this unit,

along with all others in the "Sibley Brigade," was sworn
into service "for during the war."

It was designated

Company A of the Fourth Texas Cavalry Regiment.

By

September 20, the full complement of companies had been
mustered into service.

The Fourth Regiment was organized

without the privilege of allowing the men to elect their
field officers.

Shortly after its organization, which

37;Baylor to Sibley, October 25, 1861, ibid., 132.
38sibley to Cooper, November 8, 1861, ibid.
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was effected at the camp first established by Captain
Hardeman on Leon Creek, the regiment was moved to Camp
Sibley on Salado Creek, five miles from San Antonio on
the Austin roadcolonel James Reily, originally from
Ohio,^® who was the "beau ideal of a gentleman and of
ficer" and "the very counterpart in looks and actions of
Robert E. Lee,"^'1' commanded the Fourth Texas Cavalry.
Regimental officers included:
William R. Scurry, lieutenant colonel
Henry W. Ragnet,42 major
Ellsberry R. Lane, adjutant
H. E. Loebnitz, assistant quartermaster
John Riley, assistant commissary
J. B. McMahon, sergeant major
William Southworth, surgeon
L. H. Jones, chaplain^3
Colonel Thomas Green began organizing the Fifth
Texas Cavalry Regiment at Camp Manassas on Salado Creek

^Noel, A Campaign, 6-7.
^9Denison to Chase, May, 1862, S. H. Dodson
(comp.), "Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase,"
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for
the Year 19(52" "(Washington, 1903)* II# 301.
^Theophilus Noel, Autobiography and Reminiscences
of Theophilus Noel (Chicago, 1904)7 69.
^20ther sources spell this name Raguet. The
0. R. A. version will be used throughout this paper.
^3Noel, A Campaign, 147-148.
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ith
two miles above the camp of the Fourth Regiment.
"Daddy" Green, a.a the colonel was affectionately called,
"was a very fine specimen of the Southern planter."
Never was a "commander. . .more beloved than he by 'his
boys'."

Green was born in Virginia in 1814, but his

family later moved to Tennessee.

In January, 1836, at

the age of 21, Green entered the ranks of the revolution
ary army in Texas and fought his first battle at San
Jacinto.

In 1841 he was engaged in skirmishes and expe

ditions against the Indians, and he served with great
distinction in the forces of the Republic of Texas during
the Mexican invasion of the frontier in 1842.

In the War

with Mexico he fought gallantly in the battle of Monterrey
and his daring aggressiveness in that encounter won for
him commendation as a soldier and a leader.

After the

war, until 1861, he was employed in the office of clerk
of the Supreme Court of Texas.

D

Other important men of

the Fifth Texas Cavalry were:

^Ibid., 6.
H. Williams, With the Border Ruffians,
Memories of the Far West, 1B52-T85» (Toronto, 1^19), 179.
^Clement A. Evans (ed.), Confederate Military
History (Atlanta, 1899) XI, 231-232; Robert F. Kroh, Tom
Green: Shield and Buckler (M. A. Thesis, University of
Texas, 1951)•
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Henry C. McNeill, lieutenant colonel
Samuel A. Lockridge, major
Joseph D. Sayers, adjutant
M. B. Wyatt, assistant quartermaster
J. H. Beck, assistant commissary
Charles B. Sheppard. sergeant major
F. Bracht, surgeon^'
On October 4, 1861, Captain Powhatan Jordan's
company was mustered in as Company A of the Seventh Texas
48
Cavalry under Colonel William Steele.
Steele was born
in Albany, New York, and had graduated from the United
States Military Academy in 1840.

Like Sibley, he had

served with the Second Dragoons in Florida. During the
Mexican War he earned the brevet of captain for his
bravery in the battles of Contreras and Churubusco.

Later

he was stationed in New Mexico, Kansas, Dakota, and
Nebraska where he was engaged in various expeditions
against the Indians.

He resigned his commission in the

United States Army in May, 1861, to join the Confederate
49
Army.
Steele set up Camp Pickett, several miles above
the Fifth, on Salado Creek for the training of his Seventh
Cavalry

Regimental personnel included:

^Noel, A Campaign, 148.
48tv^

7
Ibid.,7*

^Evans (ed.), Confederate Military History,
XI, 257-258.
-*°Noel, A Campaign, 11.
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John S. Sutton, lieutenant colonel-'
Arthur P. Bagby, major
T. C. Howard, adjutant
W. L. Ogden, assistant quartermaster
A. R. Lee, assistant commissary
J. M. Ferguson, sergeant major
George Cupples, surgeon52

With the formation of the three cavalry regiments,
the "Sibley Brigade" formally came into being.

The follow

ing officers composed the staff:
Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, commanding
officer
Major Alexander M. Jackson, assistant adjutant
general
Major Richard T. Brownrigg, chief commissary
Major W. L. Robards, chief of ordnance
Captain William H. Harrison, paymaster and chief
quartermaster
Captain Joseph E. Dwyer, inspector general
Lieutenant Thomas P. Ochiltree, aide-de-camp
Surgeon E. N. Covey, chief surgeon and medical
director53
The rolling hills about San Antonio echoed with
shouts and commands as the eager recruits were trained and
instructed in the art of war.

The training program called

for drilling as infantry in the morning and as cavalry in
the evening.

The troops "had roll calls by morning and by

^•""Sutton had been on the ill-fated Texan-Santa Pe
Expedition. Ibid., 122.
52lbid., 147.
lbId. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Regiments
Texas Cavalry (or Volunteers) were often referred to,
respectively, as the First, Second, and Third Regiments of
the "Sibley Brigade."
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night, as also tattoo and reveille according to the forms
prescribed on page 2299 of the revised edition of the
military statutes."

To make certain that each regiment

was thoroughly drilled on the most improved tactics,
Winfield Scott's Infantry-Tactics and W. J. Hardee's
Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics were consulted on all
occasions.^

The articles of war were read to the men,"^

and the strictest guard and discipline were maintained.^
Within a short time, Sibley's troopers were being whipped
into fighting form.
The brigade was armed with practically every type
of small arm in existence.

There were "squirrel-guns,

bear guns, sportman's-guns, shot-guns, both single and
double barrels,
common rifles.''®

navy revolvers, minie muskets and
Pew armies probably have ever had a

^ Ibid., 7-8; Winfield Scott, Infantry-Tactics
(New York, lb54); W. J. Hardee, Rifle and Light Infantry
Tactics, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1555)•
-^Walter A. Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in
New Mexico; The Journal of William Henry Smith," West
Texas Historical Association Year Book, XXVII (October,
T95iT/Trs:
5^Noel, A Campaign, 7-8.
57Ibid.,

8.

5%>enison to Chase, May, 1862, Dodson (comp.),
"Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," loc. cit.,

301.
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more motley collection of weapons.

In addition to the

small arms, one battery of mountain howitzers was attached
to the Fourth Regiment and another to the Fifth.

Green's

Fifth Regiment had two companies, commanded by Captains
Willis L. Lang and Jerome B. McCown, which were armed
with lances and six shooters.^9

The picturesque lancers,

who were Sibley's pride and joy, bore weapons that con
sisted of three-by-twelve-inch blades mounted on ninefoot shafts^0 that also boasted eight-by-seventeen-inch
red flags.
Recruited largely from frontier areas, Sibley's
men were the flower of Texas youth—"the best that ever
threw a leg over a horse or that had ever sworn allegiance
to any cause.

All-around men, natural-born soldiers, they

were under twenty-five, with a liberal sprinkling of older
ones who had seen more or less service on the frontier."
As the Mesllla Times later expressed it:

59Noel, A Campaign, 11; Evans (ed.), Confederate
Military History?

XI, 15®.

6°0vando j. Hollister, A History of the First
Colorado Regiment of VoIunteers""(Denver, 1853)• Reprinted
as Boldly Tney Rode (Golden, 1949)* 110.
^Noel, A Campaign, 11.
^2Noel, Autobiography, 57.
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The Confederate "Army of New Mexico" is composed
of what is probably the best material for an army
that the world affords. That distinct type of man
kind, the south-western frontiersman, inured to all
hardships, of indominable energy, familiar with the
use of fire-arms, at home on horse-back, and fired
with the love of country and for the redress of
wrongs. There is no conflict which they would not
undertake, and none can occur on these lines in which
they will not be perfectly successful.°3
On October 21, 1861, a brigade review was held,
with Sibley's daughter presenting a battle flag to a
fill

company of lancers.

By the end of October Sibley had

completed the recruiting and training of his brigade.

He

now felt that he was ready to begin the campaign in New

65

Mexico.

Shortly the men were issued a full military

uniform which included a haversack, pants, drawers,

66
pantaloon boots, and a broadcloth coat with brass buttons.
The time had come to take up the seven-hundred-mile march
to Port Bliss.

^^Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862 (Microfilm
courtesy of the New York Historical Society, New York
City).
^Faulkner (contrlb.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 114.

^Sibley to Cooper, November 16, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 143.
- - 66paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 114.

One of Sibley's Texas Rangers

From a sketch drawn by one of Colonel Canby's
subalterns. Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial
History of the Civil War in the United
States -of America ("Philadelphia , 1866-1868) ,
II, 187.
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On November 7 > 1861, "at the usual hour in the
morning, 'hoots and saddles1 was sounded."

The baggage

had been weighed the day before (fifteen pounds to each
man), and the wagons had been loaded.
ness.

All was in readi

Fifteen minutes later "assembly" was heard, and in

a short time the men of Reily's Fourth Regiment were in
their saddles and ready to take up the line of march.
After forming the regiment in a solid square so all could
hear, Reily addressed his men.

He told them that they

were on the eve of leaving a land that many of them might
never see again.

On this day they would "bid adieu to

all friends, home, and happy firesides, to try. . .
/Ehelr/ fortunes in the field in the defense of. . .
^Eheir/ country's honor."

He declared that they were

soldiers together, and that a people, who in after years
would prove grateful to them for their acts, expected much
from them.

After closing his remarks, he removed his hat

and requested all to do likewise. Then in a "solemn,
pious, and fervent tone, he offered up to the High God,
in the behalf of the cause, of those under him, of those
around him, and for himself," a most eloquent prayer.
"Everyone was moved to tears and solemn thoughts.

^Noel, A Campaign, 8-10.
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In a few moments came the command, "By fours from
the right, march 111

And the Fourth Texas Cavalry proudly

marched from Camp Sibley into San Antonio to the stirring
strains of "The Texas Ranger."

The men were again formed

into a solid column in the main plaza of the city.

At

this time a flag was presented to the regiment "in the
name and in behalf of the ladies of Nacogdoches."

Reily

again addressed his men, and then General Sibley, astride
his horse, came forward to speak.

"In a few 'unguarded

remarks111 the old general "convinced all that he was no
orator; yet in his speech, which was short, he displayed
a great deal of originality and much determination."

He

informed the men of the regiment that they were still
"green, green saplings; bending to discipline," but that
they would make the best soldiers in the world and he
was proud of them.

He told the troopers that they would

precede him but a few days and that he did not fear the
result of the campaign with such men to follow him as
were those whom he had the honor to address and the honor
to command.

After bidding the regiment "adieu," three
ftPi

rousing cheers were given for Sibley,
started on the road to Port Bliss.

68Ibid.,

9-10

and the soldiers

"With drums beating
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and flags flying," the gallant force marched away.
"Every man, from the General downwards, /was/ confident
of victory.
The main road to Port Bliss, consisting of about
700 miles of wagon ruts, passed through vast, rolling
plains, bleak and inhospitable deserts, and rugged
mountains.

Most of this route lay within the realm of
70
hostile Indian tribes.'
Since water was too scarce at
many places for a whole regiment to travel together, the
Fourth was divided into three sections.^

Aside from

the wagons which carried materiel of war, two wagons were
allotted to each company to carry the men's baggage.

An

additional wagon was given to each company for the use of
the officers.

Daily travel would be limited by the miles

the beeves could be driven and by the distance between
water holes.72
On November 9, Captain William P. Hardeman led
the first division of the Fourth Regiment on the line of

^Williams, With the Border Ruffians, 201.
^°Noe1, A Campaign, 10.
71Ibld.

^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright (MS., University
of Texas Library).
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march.

The next day Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry

started out with his section, and on the eleventh Colonel
Reily himself brought up the rear detachment.

The regi

ment traveled in this manner until San Felipe Springs was
reached.

At that point Major Henry W. Ragnet arrived and

took command of Hardeman's division.^

As the Fourth

passed by Fort Clark, an express from Colonel Baylor to
brigade headquarters in San Antonio was received.

The

governor of Arizona urgently requested reinforcements.
When Reily learned of the contents of the dispatch, he
ordered the divisions of his regiment to set off on
7l±

"double quick time."

On November 1, Green's Fifth Regiment left Camp
Manassas.

As the troops passed through San Antonio, the

ladies of the city waved their white handkerchiefs "the
same as to say brave boys victory awaits you."

Baylor's

urgent express arrived in San Antonio, and these troops
were also ordered on a forced march to Fort Bliss.

As

the regiment proceeded from San Antonio, General Sibley
reviewed the men from his carriage on a hill a short
distance away.

"The whole regiment shouldered arms and

73Noel, A Campaign, 10.
7li

' Heartsill, Fourteen Hmdred and 9 1 Days, 47.
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marched by in regular order," whereupon "the old General
pulled off his hand and gave them a general salute."75
That night the Fifth camped on the prairie near
Castroville.

The following day as the troops passed

through the town of D'Hanis, the old Mexican women ran to
the road with their butter, eggs, chickens, watermelons,
but none of the soldiers bought anything.

As the command

advanced into Uvalde county, the men of Captain Isaac G.
Killough's company were detailed as ammunition guards.
They were ordered to load their guns and be on a
constant lookout.

This was Indian country and would

continue to be, almost to the very limits of Port Bliss.
On November 17 a private struck Captain Killough.

The

soldier was immediately courtmartialed and condemned to
"be chained hard and fast" to the baggage wagon for the
duration of a month.^

As the regiment passed by Port

Clark, a large number of sick men were left in the hospi
tal there.77

port Clark was situated near the source

^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 115-116.
76lb id.
77Heartsill, Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days, 47.
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of Las Moras Creek about thirty miles north of the Rio
Grande.
Green's men had been marching in a body until
they reached San Felipe Springs.

From that point on to
79
Fort Bliss, the regiment was marched in three divisions.

At San Felipe Springs a general courtmartial was held for
three men who had been found sleeping while on sentry
duty.

Each man was condemned to close confinement on

bread and water for ten days, but the sentences were later
remitted.®0
On November 24, while encamped on Yellowstone
Creek in Maverick County, Major Samuel A. Lockridge, com
manding the first squadron, had the misfortune of losing
all of his beef cattle and work steers.

The following

day, the squadron arrived at Fort Hudson, and on

^ The post was established in 1852 to protect the
southwestern frontier, particularly the road to California,
from the depredations of Mexicans and Indians. Federal
troops abandoned the fort on March 19, 1861. T. H. S.
Hamersly (comp.), Complete Army Register of the United
States: For One Hundred Years, 1YV9 to"1879" (Washington,
lbbl), II, 12bj Circular No. 4, A Report on Barracks and
Hospitals with Descriptions oT Military Posts, War Depart
ment, Surgeon General's Office (Washington, 1870), 203;
Summary of Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502.
^Noel, A Campaign, 11.
®°Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico,11 loc. cit., 117.

December 1, the division reached Fort Lancaster, a
distance of about 333 miles from San Antonio.®1

Port

Lancaster, another in the line of frontier posts, was
situated about a half mile above the junction of Live
82
Oak Creek with the Pecos River.
Six days later the
squadron marched by Port Stockton,^

a

post established

84

in 1859 on Comanche Creek and Comanche Trail

on the

main road across a vast dry and barren prairie. Since
the springs and creek had been a favorite haunt of the
Comanche Indians, the fort was founded to guard the mail
route from San Antonio to El Paso and to form a link in
the chain of forts needed to protect emigrants and

85

merchandise going to Chihuahua and California.

Pass

ing through the rugged Limpia Mountains, a squadron of
8b
the Fifth on December 16, reached Fort Davis
which was

8lIbid.,

117-119.

82pirst garrisoned in 1855, Fort Lancaster was
evacuated by Federal forces on March 19# 1861. Hamersly,
Complete Army Register, II, 140; Summary of Principal
Events, 0. R. A.7 X# 502.
®3paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 120.
®^Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 155.
^Circular No. 4, 223. In April, 1861, the
Federal garrison abandoned Fort Stockton. Summary of
Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502.
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 120-121.
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at the mouth of a three-quarter mile long canyon.

Port

Davis, named in honor of the former Secretary of War,
Jefferson Davis,^ was established in 1854 on Limpia
OQ

Creek, 446 miles from San Antonio

and about 72 miles

southwest of Fort Stockton.The site was chosen be
cause of its location on the road between San Antonio
and El Paso, its fine climate, its defensibility, its
position relative to marauding Indians, and its proximity
to Presidio del Norte which it also served to protect.9°
Since Fort Davis was situated in a mountain fastness, a
guide was obtained to help lead the divisions of the
regiment through the mountain passes.

The command

traveled over "natures beautiful valleys," and many saw
their first mustangs.^1

^Circular No. 4, 227-228.
^Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 152.
^Faulkner, (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 120.
9°Circular No. 4, 227-228. Troops of the U. S.
Eighth Infantry abandoned the post on April 13, 1861.
Summary of Principal Events, 0. R. A., I, 502.
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 121.
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On Christmas day the troops of the squadron ate
a breakfast consisting of biscuits, coffee, and poor
beef—hardly a banquet worthy of the yuletide season.
The same day the men marched a distance of fifteen miles.
Arriving at Port Quitman, about eighty miles southeast of
El Paso, the troops stood "upon the Rio Grande and
looked/ upon the dividing line between the Confederate
92
States of America and the United States of Mexico."
The
post lay on a gradual slope to the Rio Grande which was
about four hundred yards west of the fort.

At this

place hay was obtained for the regiment's horses.

While

there the men of the squadron were read the articles of
war.

Since Mexico was so near, a strong guard had to be

maintained constantly.

"All along the Rio Grande Valley,

the water from the river. . ,/yias/ very unhealthy for
horses, . . .^/and gave/ them the scours."

On New Year's

Day the breakfast was not much better than that of
Christmas: beef, biscuits, curshaw, and coffee without
sugar.

On this same morning, Colonel Green's negro stole

92
Ibid., 122. Fort Quitman was established in
1858. The Federal garrison left the post on April 5*
1861. Hamersly, Complete Army Register, II, 150; Summary
of Principal Events, £. k. A., I, 502.
^Circular

NO. 4, 230-231.
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his horse and apparently fled across the Rio Grande to
Mexico.

The adjutant and several troops, after obtaining

a pass from the local alcalde, went into Mexico to look
for the thief, but the negro was not to be found.^
At last the three divisions of the Fifth arrived
QK
at Fort Bliss where they were reunited.^ Making from
fifteen to twenty miles a day, the arduous forced march
of 700 miles from San Antonio to Fort Bliss had taken the
Fifth Regiment Texas cavalry a little less than two months.
*

*

*

*

*

While the brigade was being formed and trained,
Sibley engaged Judge Josiah F. Crosby and Simeon Hart, two
prominent citizens of the Franklin area, to secure supq6
plies for his command.
Thoroughly familiar with the
inhospitable area of New Mexico, Sibley was aware that his
army could not expect to live solely off the land.

Since

his closest base of supply would be San Antonio the
general's only hope of keeping his brigade succored with
food was to seize such provisions from Federal quarter
master depots in New Mexico, and to have agents, such as

9^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 122-123.
95Noel, A Campaign, 11.
96sibley to Cooper, November 8, 1861, 0. R. A.,
IV, 132.
~ ~ ~
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Hart and Crosby, buy up some of the necessary supplies in
Chihuahua and Sonora.

Failure to secure adequate food

stuffs, of course, would be disastrous.
Late in October Judge Crosby notified Sibley that
he had employed a contractor to proceed to Mexico at once
to buy up corn, beans, and other foodstuffs for the
brigade's use.

As there was still the threat of a Federal

advance from Fort Craig, Crosby stated that none of the
supplies purchased would be brought over to the American
side of the Rio Grande until such time as they would be
97
safe from the enemy.
Simeon Hart, owner of a flour mill near Franklin,
also rapidly took steps to secure adequate provisions.
Hart pointed out that the greater part of these food
stuffs would have to come from Sonora, since there was a
great scarcity of such items in Chihuahua at that time.
Hart purchased in Sonora 10,000 pounds of corn and
300,000 pounds of flour for Sibley.

To facilitate

matters, he sent for his Sonoran agent to discuss the
situation.

It was arranged that with a proper escort

from Colonel Baylor, this agent, with some thirty to
forty wagons, would begin hauling provisions from the
Sonoran border to the Rio Grande.

It was hoped that the

^Crosby to Sibley, October 27> 1861, ibid., 133.
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first wagonloads of supplies would arrive around the
middle of December.

In the meantime, Hart assured Sibley

that his mills would continue to turn out flour for his
brigade from the limited amount of grain that was avail
able in the Rio Grande valley.

Hart surmised that he now

had from 40,000 to 50,000 pounds of flour and would have
about that much more if the Federals did not force Baylor
to fall back beyond Franklin.

As suggested by Baylor,

what flour was already available was placed in the safety
of El Paso, Mexico. Since the supplies from Mexico had to
be paid for in cash, Hart advised Sibley that it was quite
important that the general supply cash funds.

Although he

now had about $40,000 to $50,000, Hart pointed out that
almost all of this had to go immediately to Sonora to pay
98
for supplies already purchased.
At this time there was a rumor prevalent that
General Edwin V. Sumner, commanding in California, was
planning to send an expeditionary force across Sonora and
Chihuahua to attack Baylor's Confederates.

To check the

authenticity of this story, Baylor suggested that Hart
send an express rider to Sonora.

In an effort to kill two

birds with one stone, Hart instructed this express not
only to check the validity of the rumor, but also to buy

98Hart

to Sibley, October 27, 1861, ibid., 134.
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up flour, beans, salt, beef, soap, corn, and other neces
sary items.

In a most reassuring manner, Hart concluded

his report to Sibley by stating, "Be easy about your
supplies; we shall get all we want from Sonora—what this
valley cannot furnish—until such time as you may be in
full possession of New Mexico, and can avail of its re
sources or such part as the hungry Federals may leave for
your command.""
* * * * *

With assurances of adequate provisions and with
two regiments already on the road to Fort Bliss, Sibley
decided that the time had come to "move with. . .^is7
headquarters to assume in person the command of. . .^Tis/
forces in the Territory of Arizona, and to conduct the
military operations there and in New Mexico."

On

November 18, Sibley left San Antonio"*"00 traveling by
coach.

He could make the journey to Fort Bliss in a

fraction of the time that his regiments could, encumbered
as they were by large numbers and slow-moving baggage
wagons.

At Fort Lancaster the lieutenant commanding that

post ordered his company to appear in uniform, armed and

"ibid.
100Sibley

to Cooper, November 16, 1861, ibid., 141.
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mounted, to escort Sibley and to pay him full general's
honors.

When Sibley arrived, he took charge of the

company to see how well it was drilled.
was on the right, marking by two's.

The sergeant

"The command was

given by the Gen'l, 'file left,1 which was of course un
heard, and on they went at a brisk trot,11 ascending a
near-by mountain.

As they disappeared the General turned

around mettering "gone to hell."

In the evening the

company returned, and "found that the General had gone
on his way rejoicing to New Mexico."101
Five companies (A, B, F, H, I) of Steele's Seventh
Texas Cavalry took leave of San Antonio on November 30.
Pour (C, D, E, G) left on December 15 under the command
of Colonel Steele and Major Bagby and Company K remained
in San Antonio to escort Captain William H. Harrison, the
brigade paymaster.

On January 6, Company E was detained

at Port Clark because measles had broken out in that unit
after it had begun its march.

Fortunately the disease
1 C)0
c

did not spread, only fifteen men being lost.

On December 14, 1861, General Sibley assumed
"command of all the forces of the Confederate States on

101Heartsill,
102Noel,

Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days, 49.

A Campaign, 11.
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the Rio Grande at and above Fort Quitman and all in the
Territory of New Mexico and Arizona."103

The troops

under Sibley were designated as the "Army of New Mexico"
104
with headquarters temporarily fixed at Port Bliss, Texas.
The "Army of New Mexico" not only included the original
brigade but also Colonel Baylor's portion of the Second
Regiment Mounted Rifles, now commanded by Major Charles L.
Pyron, and Hunter's and Phillips' battalions of Arizona
and New Mexico volunteers ,-1-05

Although Sibley had de

clared martial lav/ throughout the area under his control,
he did not intend "to abrogate or supersede the powers of
Colonel John R. Baylor."

To be sure, Sibley had taken

charge of all troops, but Baylor was still to continue to
exercise the functions of the office of civil and military
1

governor of the territory of Arizona."

1C3
.Sibley's assumption of command of that part of
Texas "at and above Port Quitman" conflicted with the
jurisdiction of Ben McCulloch, commander of the Western
Military District of Texas. Benton to McCulloch, December
31, 1861, 0. R. A., IV, 164.
"''^General Orders, No. 10, December 14, 1861,
ibid., 157-158.
10^Noel,

A Campaign, 12.

10^General

0. R. A., IV, 159.

Orders, No. 12, December 20, 1861,
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On December 20, 1861, Sibley addressed the follow
ing proclamation to the people of New Mexico:
An army under my command enters New Mexico, to
take possession of it in the name and for the benefit
of the Confederate States. By geographical position,
by similarity of institutions, by commercial interests,
and by future destinies New Mexico pertains to the
Confederacy.
Upon the peaceful people of New Mexico the Con
federate States wage no war. To them we come as
friends, to re-establish a governmental connection
agreeable and advantageous both to them and to us; to
liberate them from the yoke of a military despotism
erected by usurpers upon the ruins of the former free
institutions of the United States; to relieve them
from the iniquitous taxes and exactions imposed upon
them by that usurpation; to insure and to revere their
religion, and to restore their civil and political
liberties.
The existing war is one most wickedly waged by
the United States upon the Confederate States for the
subjugation and oppression of the latter by force of
arms. It has already failed. Victory has crowned
the arms of the Confederate States wherever an en
counter worthy of being called a battle has been
joined. Witness the battles of Bull Run, of Manassas,
of Springfield, of Lexington, of Leesburg, of Columbus,
and the capture in the Mesilla Valley of the whole
force of the enemy by scarcely half their number.
The army under my command is ample to seize and
to maintain possession of New Mexico against any
force which the enemy now has or is able to place
within its limits. It is my purpose to accomplish
this object without injury to the peaceful people of
the country. Follow, then, quietly your peaceful
avocations, and from my forces you have nothing to
fear. Your persons, your families, and your property
shall be secure and safe. Such forage and supplies
as my army shall require will be purchased in open
market and paid for at fair prices. If destroyed or
removed to prevent me from availing myself of them,
those who so co-operate with our enemies will be
treated accordingly, and must prepare to share their
fate.
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It Is well known to me that many among you have
already been forced by intimidation or inveigled by
fraud into the ranks of our foes, The day will soon
arrive when you can safely abjure their service.
When it comes, throw down your arms and disperse to
your homes, and you are safe. But persist in the
service, and you are lost.
When the authority of the Confederate States
shall be established in New Mexico, a government of
your best men, to be conducted upon principles with
which you are familiar and to which you are attached,
will be inaugurated. Your religious, civil, and
political rights and liberties will be re-established
and maintained sacred and intact. In the meantime,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the President
and Government of the Confederate States I abrogate
and abolish the law of the United States levying
taxes upon the people of New Mexico.
To my old comrades in arms, still in the ranks of
the usurpers of their Government and liberties, I
appeal in the name of former friendship: Drop at once
the arms which degrade you into the tools of tyrants,
renounce their service, and array yourselves under
the colors of justice and freedomI I am empowered to
receive you into the service of the Confederate
States; the officers upon their commissions, the men
upon their enlistments. By every principle of law
and morality you are exonerated from service in the
ranks of our enemies. You never engaged in the
service of one portion of the old Union to fight
against another portion, who, so far from being your
enemies, have ever been your best friends. In the
sight of God and man, you are justified in renouncing
a service iniquitous in itself and in which you never
engaged.
Done at headquarters of the Army of New Mexico by
me this 20th day of December, A. D. 1861.
H. H. Sibley,
107
Brigadier-General, Army C. S.

^^Proclamation, December 20, 1861, ibid., 89-90
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Agents distributed copies of the proclamation,
printed in both Spanish and English, throughout the
villages of New Mexico.

According to Governor Henry

Connelly, however, Union citizens gathered them up and
delivered them to the military commander before they
could be circulated among the people.

Connelly scoffed

at the proclamation and maintained that it would have no

10S

effect, even if circulated.

* * * * *

The Fourth Regiment, having preceded the others,
reassembled at Port Bliss and then moved up the valley
to the territory of Arizona.

The troops crossed the

Texas border on December 12. The Fourth established a
camp in sight of the large mountain on the opposite side
of the Rio Grande which marked the international boundary
between Mexico and the Confederate States.

The following

day the men marched to Camp Lesure, where they remained
several days before continuing up the river to within
a few miles of Mesilla.

On Christmas morning Colonel

Reily temporarily turned over the command of the regiment
to Captain A. J. Scarborough, that officer being the next
in rank.

n

Reily then addressed his troops, bidding them

aQ
Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, ibid.,

IX, 640.

Ill
"adieu" and telling them that his country required his
109
services elsewhere.
Sibley had selected the colonel
for a diplomatic mission to Chihuahua.11(^
While waiting for the remainder of his forces to
arrive, Sibley planned to send a raiding party against
the Federals to the north.

Lieutenant Colonel William R.

Scurry was ordered to assemble two companies of the Fourth
and those of Pyron's (formerly Baylor's) Second,111 and
two pieces of artillery.

With this force of about 500

men,^"^ Scurry was to move rapidly up the Rio Grande to
capture the Union outpost at Alamosa, about thirty-two
miles below Fort Craig.11^

News of the intended raid was

relayed, probably by spies, to the Federal commander.-*--1-^

109Noel,

A Campaign, 12.

H°Sibley to Governor of Chihuahua, December 27,
1861, 0. R. A., IV, 168.
li:LNoel,

HP

A Campaign, 13.

Canby to Donaldson, January 3* 1862,

R. A.,

IV, 82.
•^Noel, A Campaign, 12.
11^Canby

IV, 82.

to Donaldson, January 3* 1862, 0. R. A.,
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The Texans left Robledo and, after marching sixty miles
with scarcely a halt, they found themselves "before the
walls of Alamosa.
rounded.1^

The little village was quickly sur

Besides having prior information of the raid,

Union pickets had detected the Confederate approach and
were able to warn the garrison.When Scurry's men
closed in, they were disappointed to discover that the
Union troops had already fled and had left only a few
Mexicans behind.

Before departing, the Federals had

scattered their flour, sugar, rice, coffee, and beans
over the area so as to prevent the Texans from seizing
117
them.
"Failing in their object, the Texans retired
rapidly by the same road.

*1 *1 Q

°

On January 12, a band of Indians, probably
Mescalero Apaches, under cover of night stole forty head
of horses and sixty head of beef cattle from the Fourth
Regiment11^

while

115Noel,

it

was encamped at Willow Bar.

At

A Campaign, 13.

H6canby to Donaldson, January 3, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IV, 82.
^^Noel, A Campaign, 13.
^^Cariby to Donaldson, January 3» 1862, 0. R. A.,
IV, 82-83.
119Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862.
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eight o'clock the next morning Major Henry W. Ragnet set
out with Company A in hot pursuit.

By ten o'clock that

night the command was in the Organ Mountains, about fifty
miles away.

Next day at 11 o'clock Ragnet had reached

San Augustine Springs, but the Indians had too great a
]PO
head start so the chase was given up. c
The Fifth Regiment arrived at Fort Bliss on or
about January 3.

Shortly after, the advance squadron of

the Seventh was due to arrive.

For over a week the men
121
of the Fifth rested from their long and weary journey.

With the bulk of his brigade having arrived from San
Antonio, Sibley issued the following:
GENERAL ORDER — No. 2.
Head-quarters Army of N. M.,
Ft. Bliss, Tex., Jan. 9th, 1862.
The General Commanding expresses to the Troops
under his command, his high appreciation of the
patience, fortitude, and good conduct, with which,
in spite of great deficiences in their supplies, they
have made a successful and rapid march of seven
hundred miles, in mid winter, and through a country
entirely devoid of resources.
The General congratulates his troops upon the
prospect of early and important services, for the
successful accomplishment of which, their past

120Noel,

A Campaign, 13.

•^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loo. cit., 124.
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conduct is an ample guarantee; and he is assured that
he will never be disappointed in his early boast,
that "We could go any where, and do any thing."
By order of
Brig. Gen. H. H. Sibley.
122
Tom. P. Ochiltree, A. de C. & A. A. At. Gen., A.N.M.
A general courtmartial was held at Port Bliss on
January 8.

Private T. M. Harvey of Captain Jerome B.

McCown's company of lancers was charged with the murder
of one of his comrades.

Lieutenant Colonel H. C. McNeill

acted as president of the court and Aide-de-Camp Tom P.
Ochiltree served as judge advocate.

The prisoner was

found guilty and condemned to be shot.

On January 10,

12*5
J

the whole Fifth Regiment was drawn up to witness the
Ipii
execution.
Harvey met his death with extraordinary
nerve and firmness.

He pinned a white paper on his breast

as a mark to "those compelled to perform the disagreeable
duty of executioners, and exorted them 'to die as bravely
as he did.'"125

122Mesilla

Times, January 15, 1862.

123ibid.

^^Paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 124.
l25Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862.

115
The Fifth Regiment set out from Fort Bliss for
Arizona.
Cruces.

On January 12, Green's men passed through Las
Here they were welcomed with music by the band

of the Second Regiment, and by numerous citizens.

The

editor of the Mesilla Times observed that the Fifth was
"a fine looking body of men of that material of which
there is no better for soldiers."^26

pifth continued

on to Willow Bar where it encamped, for the Fourth had
127
recently vacated this place and had moved farther north.
Discipline among the soldiers of the "Sibley
128
Brigade" was apparently quite lax,
and the officers
were unable to exercise complete authority over their
men."^

The individualism that had always been charac

teristic of the frontier made it difficult for Sibley's
men to submit completely to authority.

Lack of discipline

was particularly evident when the brigade was in the
Mesilla Valley.

Although the men had orders not to graze

their horses in the green Mexican wheat fields that
abounded in this area, hundreds did so anyway.

The

126Ibid.

•^^Noei, a Campaign, 11.
iS^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign,"
loc. cit., 700.
129Robertson

L, i, 1012-1013.

to Wright, April 18, 1862, 0. R. A.,
- - -
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excuse generally was "M^r horse got loose and I could not
find him."

Although a reprimand would follow, with

sometimes a day or two of extra duty, this did not com
pensate the Mexicans whose fields had been damaged.
While it had been the policy of Baylor and Sibley to
treat the Mexicans with "kindness and justice," many of
the brigade acted otherwise.

Pew soldiers had tents, so

when the weather turned cold, many moved into the Mexi
cans' adobe houses.

Often the family was crowded into

1*30
one room, or driven out altogether. J

Since the Texans

had few supplies, they stole "blankets, onions, wine,
and everything" they could lay their hands on.

Females,

either in or out of their homes, were not safe, according
to one Union correspondent

A Texas soldier maintain

ed, however, that the women were "appropriated" only with
their consent.

At any rate, the behavior of the men of

the "Army of New Mexico" enraged the whole Mexican com-

1^2
munity and caused intense feelings of hostility. u

Had

the brigade been well-supplied and well-disciplined, such
a situation would never have been able to develop.

•^^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.
•^Robertson to Wright, April 18, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 1013.
- - •^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.
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Sibley's lack of foresight arid adequate planning
henceforth began to manifest itself.

True, the general

had hoped to reach New Mexico early in September. When
he found he could not arrive that early, he should have
taken measures for a winter campaign.

The middle of

January found him still at Port Bliss with only two and
too
a half regiments. J~' These were not only poorly armed
and lacking in sufficient ammunition,but also badly
clothed and poorly fed.^35

"Forage there was none; com

missary supplies were getting scarce; the cold season was
coming; clothing was being needed; all of which the
country afforded none.1'^"^

There was not a dollar of

quartermaster's funds on hand to supply the daily and
pressing needs of the brigade.

What the Mesilla and Rio

Grande valleys could produce had been long consumed by
Baylor's force.

Because of these factors, the credit of

the government was not as available a resource as it
might otherwise have been."1"^

•^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
DC, 507.
~ ~
•^-^Denison to Chase, May, 1862, Dodson (comp.),
'toiary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase," loc.
cit., 301.
135Mesilla Times, January 15, 1862.
136
Noei,

& Campaign, 12.

137sibley

IX, 507.

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~ ~ ~
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Apparently the commissary supplies Hart and
Crosby had gathered were not sufficient, and the expected
foodstuffs from Mexico were not forthcoming.

Sibley's

greatest blunder had been in banking too heavily on
capturing everything that he would need from the garrisons
at Port Craig, Albuquerque, and Santa Pe.

As a result, he

did not think it necessary to start from San Antonio with
more provisions than would actually be needed to subsist
the command en route. Sibley was confident that he would
be able to move into the territory of New Mexico without
resistance and take possession of all its garrisons,
forts, and depots of supply.

This was truly a gambler's

dream, for Sibley had failed to realize that perhaps in his
absence a vigorous Union commander might have reinforced
his fortifications and' called up additional troops, and
thus challenge him every foot of the way.

A more able and

cautious commander would have taken cognizance of possible
changes in the military set-up of the enemy.

In addition

he would have better equipped and supplied his forces
before undertaking such an arduous campaign.

It is true,

however, that Sibley had tried to get more arms and equip
ment for his brigade but had failed.

Since one of the

reasons for the campaign in the first place had been to

"^Noel, A Campaign, 12-14.

119
seize the supply depots of the enemy, Sibley should not
be blamed too harshly. But in any perspective, the New
Mexican campaign was a gamble—victory or disaster lay
uneasily in the hands of fate.
The ranks of the "Sibley Brigade" ivere daily
being thinned by "those two terrible scourges to an army"
smallpox and pneumonia."^9

Smallpox had broken out among

Baylor's men several weeks before the arrival of Sibley's
regiments and by the middle of January the Second Regi
ment reported 104 cases with six deaths.

Hasty efforts

were made to vaccinate all men who had not yet contracted,
the disease.Winter weather and lack of adequate
clothing and blankets accounted for the great number of
pneumonia cases.
Sibley established a general hospital at Dona
Ana, and then "determined to move forward with the force
143
at hand.
The advance guard set out for old Fort Thorn.
Port Thorn had been deserted since I859 when the Federal
army had evacuated it because of the prevalence of sick142
ness there.
Baylor had earlier taken possession of

139sibley

IX, 507.

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
- - -

^°Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862.
•'•^•'•Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 507.
- - 142
House Executive Documents, 33rd Congress, 2nd
Session, No. 1, Part 2, bO; Senate Executive Documents,
36th Congress, 1st Session, No. 52, 222-225.
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the post, but since it was of no importance, he had
143
evacuated it.
After treating his escort to a basket of cham144
pagne, Sibley set out from Port Bliss on January 12.
Smallpox was then prevailing at Fort Fillmore,so when
146
Sibley and his staff arrived at Mesilla two days later,
the men of his escort were vaccinated,-^7
now included a new member.

Sibley's staff

In the absence of the chief

quartermaster, who was still in San Antonio, Judge J. F.
Crosby, general agent of the government, was chosen to
assume his duties as acting chief quartermaster.
January 21, the staff arrived at Fort Thorn where
149
temporary headquarters was established.

•^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 125.
lZ^Ibid.,

124.

•^Noel, A Campaign, 14.
1^6jy[esilla Times, January 15, 1862.
1^7Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 124.
148]v[esilla Times, January 15, 1862.
1^9Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 129.

On
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The Fourth Regiment proceeded northward from
Mesilla.

By this time the beef cattle were so poor that

they could barely stagger along.
tough and difficult to eat.1^0

Their meat was coarse,

When the Fourth reached

Fort Thorn, camp was set up on the east side of the Rio
Grande, opposite the post.

The Fifth Regiment came up

two days later and encamped about three miles below the
Fourth.

The first five companies of the Seventh Cavalry

arrived"1"^ on February 4.

The other five companies were

still some three hundred miles behind.^52
Sibley allowed a sutler train which came with
the Seventh to set up within the fort its "stock of
goods, wares and chattels for sale. . . .

stock

in trade consisted chiefly in liquors of all brands,
preserved fruits of all sorts, candy, raisins, tobacco,
pipes, and on an average of one pair of pants to every
ten men in the Fourth regiment, for which regiment they
were alone appointed."^-53

"^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.
•^"'"Noel, A Campaign, 15.
"^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 129.
153

Noel, A Campaign, 15.
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While at Port Thorn "with a view to the pro
tection of the important and growing interest, chiefly
mineral, in Western Arizona, and for the further purpose
of opening communications with Southern California,11
Sibley ordered Captain Sherod Hunter of Company A, Second
Regiment Mounted Rifles, to take post at Tucson.15^
Hunter made the 280-mile march as rapidly as possible and
arrived in Tucson on February 28.

His timely arrival was

hailed by a majority, if not the entire population of the
"Old Pueblo."155
Sibley was now ready to move up the Rio Grande to
begin his long-awaited New Mexican campaign.

1^Sibley

to Cooper, January 27, 1862, (). R. A.,

155Hunter

to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid.,

IV, 170.

IX, 707.

CHAPTER V
COLONEL JAMES REILY, C. S. A., DIPLOMATIC AGENT TO
CHIHUAHUA AND SONORA

"In view of the importance of establishing satis
factory relations with the adjacent Mexican" border states,
Sibley deemed it expedient to send a diplomatic agent to
the governors of Chihuahua and Sonora.^

Not only did the

Confederate commander wish to buy supplies, but he had
heard reports that the Central Mexican Congress had issued
a decree granting the North the privilege of transporting
troops and munitions across northern Mexico to attack the
p

Confederates.

Sibley was anxious to learn from the

governors whether or not this was true.
He chose as his representative his second in com
mand, Colonel James Reily of the Fourth Regiment.

This

was no random choice, for prior to the war, Reily had
achieved recognition in the field of diplomacy.

In 1841

President Sam Houston had appointed him charge d'affaires

1Sibley

to Cooper, January 3> 1862, 0. R. A.,

IV, 167.
2Sibley

to Governor of Sonora, December 16, 1861,
ibid., L, i, 767.

123

124
to Washington.

While acting in this capacity, he and

Daniel Webster had negotiated the Treaty of Amity and
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and
Texas.

In 1844 Reily had been selected again to be the

Texas representative to Washington, but his nomination
was not confirmed because of his known opposition to
annexation.

During the administration of James Buchanan,
•5
he had served as United States minister to Russia.
It
is interesting to note that in sending this diplomatic

mission to Mexico, Sibley, a field commander, was acting
on his own authority and initiative.

The Department of

State of the Confederate States government had no part in
the proceedings.
Reily was instructed to proceed first to Chihuahua
City and deliver a letter from Sibley to the governor.
L

Sibley's note,

aside from assurances of cordial and

friendly relations between the Confederacy and Mexico,
dealt with three main points: an interrogation concerning
the rumored convention between the United States and the

3walter P. Webb and H. Bailey Carroll (eds.),
The Handbook of Texas (Austin, 1952), II, 459.
Sibley's letter has not been found, but its
contents can be reasonably ascertained from Terraza's
reply. Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IV, 172.
- - -
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Central Mexican government relative to the passage of
United States troops and munitions through northern
Mexico, a proposition for the mutual crossing of the
frontier in "hot pursuit" of hostile Indians, and a re
quest to allow Confederate agents to buy supplies and

5
provisions in Chihuahua.

Reily was also to ask the

governor of Chihuahua to order the customhouse official
at El Paso to remit the duties paid by the Texans who had
transported their goods across the international border
for pvirposes of safety when it had appeared that a Union
invasion from New Mexico was imminent.

Sibley's letter

gave only a general outline of the policy and nature of
the questions at hand.

Reily's chief and primary duties

were "to unfold that policy and to explain /Vao/

ob-

ject^/ives/ in detail, to further their accomplishment, to
counteract any adverse influences, and to obviate any
possible objections."

The manner of discharging these

diplomatic duties was left to his own judgment and dis
cretion.^

7
On January 2, 1862, Colonel Reily, accompanied
Q
by Sibley's volunteer aide-de-camp, Captain G. Dwyer,

5lbid.
^Jackson to Reily, December 31* 1861, ibid., 168.

"^Sibley to Cooper, January 3> 1862, ibid., 167.
8jackson to Reily, December 31* 1861, ibid., 168.
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and escorted by six Mexicans, set out on the three-hundredmile journey to the capital of ChihuahuaThe fact that
Sibley sent his second in command and his aide-de-camp
on this diplomatic mission attests to the importance which
he attached to it.

Six days later Reily arrived in

Chihuahua City where he took up quarters at Riddell's
hotel, and notified Governor Luis Terrazas of his arrival.
The next day Carlos Moyo, the governor's brother-in-law,
called upon Reily to accompany him to the governor's
palace.

Reily, dressed in the uniform of a colonel in the

Confederate cavalry and carrying his dress sabre, was
cordially received by the governor.

After presenting his

letter of credence and the letter from General Sibley,
Reily was introduced to the secretary of state and other
high officials.

Since Sibley's note was written in

English, the governor asked that he be given time to have
it translated so that he could give it due and intelligent
consideration.

Accordingly, an appointment was made for

twelve o'clock the next day.

Before the audience closed,

the Mexicans asked Reily many questions concerning General
Sibley, the number and character of the Confederate troops
under his command, and the war between the North and South.

9Reily to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid.,
L, i, 826.
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Upon taking leave of the governor and the other officials,
Reily was escorted hack to the hotel by Moyo.

Moyo re

mained for some time, and Reily "found him quite a friend
of the South."10
The next day Carlos Moyo again accompanied Reily
to the governor's palace.

Upon arrival, Reily found that

only the Secretary of State and a member of the Supreme
Court were present with the governor.

Shortly Joaquin

Durand, who had been requested by Reily because of his
fluency in the English language, made his appearance.
The group then almost immediately began discussions con11

cerning the points in Sibley's letter.

In regard to the supposed convention between the
United States and Mexico allowing United States troops
and munitions to cross northern Mexico, Terrazas main
tained that he had heard nothing about such an agreement.
In his formal letter to Sibley, the governor pointed out
that his government would not respect such a convention
unless it had been entered into legally under Article 72,
Part 16, of the Mexican constitution.

Under this article

only the Congress of the Union could exclusively grant

10Reily

to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid.,

IV, 173.
i:LIbid.,

173-174.
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"the privilege of permitting or denying the entrance of
foreign troops in the territory of the confederation
and of consenting to the stationing of squadrons of
other powers for more than one month in the waters of
the republic

Terrazas, however, personally informed

Reily that "if even the assent of the President had come
to him, sanctioned by the act of Congress, he did not
think he would permit Federal troops to pass through the
territory of Chihuahua to invade Texas.
The group next discussed the issue of the "hot
pursuit" of Indians across the international frontier.
Reily maintained that "hot pursuit" was a recognized
legal principle in international law.

As an illustration,

he informed the governor that in I838 Texas troops had
invaded the United States as far as Shreveport, Louisiana,
while in "hot pursuit" of a band of Caddo Indians, and
that this invasion had not been considered a wrongful one
by the United States government.

He pointed out further

the precedent of Revella who, in 1858, while governor of
Chihuahua, had granted the United States the right to

14
pursue Indians, even into the city of Chihuahua itself.

12Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, ibid., 172.
•^Relly to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 174.
l^Ibid. Under instructions from General Garland,
then commanding in New Mexico, Judge Simeon Hart had made
this application to Governor Revella in I858. A check of
the records of the War Records Office of the National
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Reily's arguments on this point bore little fruit, though,
for in his official reply to Sibley, Terrazas stated that
"by that constitutional principle which it is not lawful
to violate in any way nor for any consideration whatever,11
he could not allow the crossing of foreign troops into
Chihuahua.

Should the Indian depredations continue, and

if he became convinced of the advantages of Sibley's
plan, Terrazas promised to "take the steps necessary to
act upon it before the Congress of the Union.
As to the right to purchase supplies in Chihuahua,
Terrazas made assurances that it would be allowed and that
there would be no "official intervention whatever."

The

governor also ordered the customhouse dues remitted, and
asked Reily to deliver the letter of instruction to the
appropriate official at El Paso on his return journey.
Reily noted that the governor "appeared to be
anxious to have the best relations established and con
tinued between" Chihuahua and the Confederate States.
Terrazas even went so far as to state that "at all times

Archives has failed to produce documentary evidence of
the treaty.
•^Terrazas to Sibley, January 11, 1862, ibid.,

172.
•^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 174.
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whenever necessary he would be pleased to afford pro
tection to the persons and property of the citizens of
17
the Southern Confederacy."
As a colonel in the Confederate army, Reily had
been "recognized, received, entertained, addressed, and
1 ft
recredited" by Governor Terrazas. 0 The governor had
invited Reily to his private residence where he was
introduced to many leading citizens, and he had dined
with the governor at Carlos Moyo's home."^

Only Reily's

sudden departure at the conclusion of his mission pre
vented him from receiving a public testimonial of the
20
kind feelings of the people of Chihuahua.
Flushed with
such favorable treatment, Reily concluded his report on
his,.diplomatic mission to Chihuahua by congratulating
Sibley for having been instrumental in obtaining the first
official recognition of the Confederate States of America

21

by a foreign government.

Reily's exhuberance in this

17Ibid.

•^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., 171.
^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid., IJb.
20Reily

to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid.,

170-171.

21Ibid., 171.
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matter was obviously not valid, for Terrazas had merely
accepted Reily as a foreign agent, and it was not within
the governor^ power to recognize a foreign government.
Armed with a letter of introduction and recom22
mendation from Terrazas to Governor Pesqueira of Sonora,
Reily left Chihuahua City to return temporarily to
Sibley's interim headquarters.

His mission to Chihuahua,

encompassing a six-hundred-mile round trip—parts of
which took him through Apache country—was accomplished

23
in twenty-one days.
After about a month's stay at Fort Thorn, Reily
set out again to continue his diplomatic mission to
Sonora.

His route took him through Tucson, and he and

his two subalterns and escort of twenty troopers arrived
in that town on March 1, 1862, the day after Captain
Sherod Hunter had occupied it for the Confederacy.

Dur

ing his two-day stay in the "Old Pueblo," he delivered a
speech in the public plaza as part of the celebration of

24
the raising of the Confederate flag.

22Ibid.,
23Reily

170.

to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid.,

L, i, 826.
^Carleton to Wright, March 22, 1862, ibid., 944.
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Reily carried a letter from Sibley to Ignacio
Pesqueira, governor of Sonora, which was similar in most
respects to the one he had delivered to Terrazas.

After

assuring the governor of the Confederacy's desire for not
only peaceful relations, but amity and good will toward
Mexico, Sibley again approached the question of the con
vention of the United States and the Mexican government
which purported to allow the passage of United States
troops through northern Mexico.

Sibley asked for con

firmation of such a treaty, and if one existed, he wanted
to know if the governor recognized and honored it.

If

he did, and if the United States government took ad
vantage of it, Sibley implied that appropriate Confederate
action would be taken.

Again as in the letter to Terrazas,

Sibley suggested mutual cooperation in action against the
Indians.

Sibley proposed that the troops of either the

Confederate government or the Sonoran government should
be at liberty to pursue hostile Indians within the juris
diction of the other, as long as the pursuing force re
ported as early as practicable their purpose and strength
to the nearest military post of the country within which
they entered.

Sibley surmised that only through such

concerted action could the hostile Indians be brought
under control.

The Confederate general also asked

Pesqueira for the privilege of buying supplies for his
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forces in Sonora.

Realizing the value of a port on the

Pacific, Sibley asked the governor for the right to
establish a depot at the port of Guaymas, and the right
of transit from that port through Sonoran territory to
Arizona.

Sibley assured the Mexican governor that he was

prepared to give him, in any form that he might suggest,
the amplest guarantees that such privileges would not be
abused.2^
At this time the capital of Sonora was the city
of Ures.

On March 14, 1862, Reily arrived in Hermosillo

on his way to the capital, but learning that the governor
was at that moment in the city, he immediately made con26
tact with him.
While in Hermosillo, Reily happened to
discover the February 14, 1862, issue of the San Francisco
(California) Herald and Mirror.

This newspaper contained

an article which dealt with the Mexican-American convention
dealing with the occupation of Guaymas by Federal troops.
Besides desiring a reply to the letter from General Sibley
which he delivered, Reily also asked for confirmation and
the position of the governor in regard to the terms of the
27
convention as stated in the newspaper article.

25sibley

to Governor of Sonora, December 16, 1861,

ibid., 766-768.
2^Reily

to Pesqueira, March 14, 1862, ibid., 1031.

27Reily

to Pesqueira, March 16, 1862, ibid.,

1031-1032.
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On March 17, three days after his arrival in
Hermosillo, Reily received answers to his own notes as
28
well as to the official letter of his commander.
The
letters which Pesqueira sent to Reily have not been
found, but if the account of an American with strong
Union sympathies can be trusted, Reily, before returning
to his command in New Mexico, apparently boasted that he
had obtained all the privileges asked for, and even more.
Reily also reportedly asserted that Pesqueira was friendly
to the Confederates and their cause and was only restrained
from more open demonstrations of his good will by the op
position of his people and their fears of the designs of
the Confederates
Union civilians in Sonora speedily reported the
activities of the Confederate diplomat to Brigadier
General George Wright, the Union commander of the Depart
ment of the Pacific.

W. G. Moody, a correspondent for the

San Francisco Evening Bulletin, and a friend, P. H. Water30
man,
were in Ures attending to some private business

with the government of Sonora when they learned that

oO

Reily to Pesqueira, March 18, 1862, ibid., 1032.
2 ^Waterman
3°Ibld.,

to Wright, April 7* 1862, ibid., 989.

988-989.

135
Colonel Reily had arrived with despatches from General
Sibley for the governor.

Through the acquaintance of

Manuel Escalante, a confidential friend of the governor
and a deputy from Hermosillo to the Sonoran legislature,
the two Union men were able to learn the content of
Reily's despatches.

Since Governor Pesqueira could ap

parently not read English, Reily's letters were given to
Escalante to be translated.

Moody, learning of this,

asked Escalante for permission to receive copies of the
letters.

Permission was granted and all the Confederate

correspondence was copied down by the Union men.
Escalante even assured the two men that copies of
Pesqueira's replies would be furnished them as well.

It

appears, however, that Pesqueira learned of Escalante's
generosity and disapproved of his action.

While the two

Union men remained in Ures two days beyond their schedule
to receive copies of Pesqueira's replies,^ they were in
formed in a note penned by Escalante that Governor
Pesqueira had asked him to write to the two Union gentle
men for the purpose of telling them "that it would be very
convenient not to publish the copies" of Sibley's and
Reily's correspondence which they already had in their

^Moody to Alden, April 7> 1862, ibid., 990-991.
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possession.32

Copies of Pesqueira's replies to the

Confederates were not made available, but Escalante in
formed the two that Pesqueira had denied the Confederates
the privileges of pursuing Indians into Sonora, and of a
depot at Guaymas.

Escalante also stated that the governor

had declined to answer Sibley's question concerning his
respect for the convention between the United States and
the Central Mexican government.33
As soon as Brigadier General George Wright re
ceived copies of Sibley's and Reily's letters to
Pesqueira, he wrote his subordinate, Colonel James H.
Carleton, then at Port Yuma, that he intended to write
Pesqueira immediately concerning the matter.

Although

Wright assumed that Pesqueira had refused Sibley's re
quests, and that any Confederate designs on Sonora had
been deferred, he nevertheless authorized Carleton to
cross into Sonora should Sibley's forces invade that
state.3^
Although Wright's letter to Pesqueira was
couched in friendly language and expressed confidence
that the governor had granted nothing to the Confeder
ates, Wright clearly stated that he "need not point out

32Escalante to Moody, April 4, 1862, ibid., 990.
33waterman to Wright, April 7, 1862, ibid., 889.
3^wright to Carleton, April 30, 1862, ibid.,

1042.
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to. . .His Excellency the utter ruin and devastation
which would inevitably befall the beautiful State of
Sonora should the rebel forces obtain a foothold within
its limits."

In such an event, Wright assured the

governor that he had "an army of 10,000 men ready to
pass the frontier and protect. . ./Ehe Sonorar^7 government and people.

35

Carleton, stationed at Port Yuma just a short
distance from the frontier of Sonora, appeared anxious
to march his troops into Sonora if Pesqueira had granted
the Confederates extensive privileges.

Since the Central

Mexican government at this time was in such dire straits
with foreign powers, he even suggested that it would be
a "kind act" to move in and hold Sonora until the Central
government could claim it.

"Ethically," he philosophized,

"we have the right, and I doubt very much if it is not our
duty to do this.As had his superior officer, Carleton
also wrote to Pesqueira and, though expressing full con
fidence that the Sonoran governor had granted nothing to
the Confederates, he warned the uneasy official of the
dangers of allowing the Confederates any concessions with
in his state.37

35v/right to Pesqueira, May 3> 1862, ibid., 93.
36carleton to Drum, May 14, 1862, ibid., 1071.
37carleton to Pesqueira, May 2, 1862, ibid.,
1044-1045.
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After receiving these not-so-veiled threats from
the Union commanders, Pesqueira deemed it wise to allevi
ate any "misapprehensions" they might have.

He informed

Wright that he had nothing but friendly and sincere
sympathies for the American Union, and he hoped that the
Union commander would have the opportunity to see his
communications to Sibley (which, incidentally, he had
forbidden the two Union civilians in Sonora to have) so
that he could easily ascertain that through his "cautious
management, the chief of the Southern Confederacy could
not calculate upon ^Tis7 sympathies to carry out his
plans."

Pesqueira staunchly maintained that any move

ment of Confederate troops into Sonora, for any purpose
whatsoever would "be considered as an invasion by force
.,38
of arms.
In answering Carleton, Pesqueira stated that his
government considered "the assertions circulated by Mr.
Reily as exaggerated, or perhaps badly interpreted."
Although Reily had been offered due hospitality and the
Confederacy had been given all the rights of the

3 Pesqueira to Wright, August 29, 1862,
93. By the time of the writing of this letter,
Confederate cause in Arizona and New Mexico was
This, no doubt, accounts for Pesqueira's firmer
Union stand.

ibid.,
the
lost.
pro-
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neutrality circular which Mexico had been compelled to
adopt, Pesqueira maintained "that no arrangement nor
agreement was entered into between the forces or authori
ties of the States called Confederate and. .

,,39
government.
There is little doubt that Pesqueira had been
quite conciliatory and friendly with Reily, and this
attitude probably served as the basis for Reily's "boast
ing" of having obtained favorable concessions.

On the

other hand, Pesqueira's letters make it appear that he
was quite favorably inclined toward the North.

The

governor of Sonora probably cared neither way, but he was
in an uncomfortable situation.

Finding himself wedged

between the Federals in California and the Confederates
in Arizona, he sought to conciliate both.
Although Reily's mission to the Mexican states
had been one of avowed peace and amity, Reily personally
related that "there are no such mines in the world as
are within sight of Chihuahua City,and that "these
mines and their soil need^/ed/ the inducement of capital,
energy, and enterprise, which. . .^/could/ only be induced

QQ

Pesqueira to Carleton, June 2, 1862, ibid., 1118.

^°Reily to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid., 826.
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. . .by a stable and enlightened constitutional govern
ment."^*

Exhuberantly, Reily proclaimed that these

lands "would improve by being under the Confederate
flag," and "with Sonora and Chihuahua. . .^Ehe South
would/7 gain. . .^aja/ California, and by a railroad to
Guaymas, render. .
way of nations J

.,ho

./the/

State of Texas the great high-

Personally Reily and many other Con

federates may have nursed imperialistic ambitions and
have desired to acquire Mexican territory.

But annex

ation was not the policy of the Confederate government
at this time^ because it would have brought a decla
ration of war from the Juarez government, and would have
incurred the displeasure of the European powers, particu
larly Spain and France.^

Furthermore, neutral Mexico

served as an agency through which supplies from abroad
could be shipped to the Confederates who were feeling
the pinch of the blockade.

Annexation of Mexican terri

tory would have extended the blockade to those now free

^Reily to Sibley, January 20, 1862, ibid.,
IV, 174.
^2Relly to Reagan, January 26, 1862, ibid.,
L, i, 826.
^3president Davis had refused the offer of
Vidaurri to annex to the Confederacy the two Mexican
border states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila which he
controlled. Richardson (comp.), Messages and Papers of
the Confederacy, II, 78.
^Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago?
1931), i23=T2T.
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ports.

If the Confederacy planned to expand eventually

into Mexico, it would have to wait a while, for it was
now engaged in a war for its very existence, and it
could not afford to waste its strength by assuming the
burden of defending additional territory.

J

Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico
(New York, 1931), 232.

CHAPTER VI
THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE UP THE RIO GRANDE

When Colonel Canby received intelligence which
definitely showed that any proposed Confederate invasion
would come up the Rio Grande, he took immediate steps to
bolster the garrison at Fort Craig.

True to his plan,

Canby, with 1,500 men, left his intermediary base of
Camp Connelly and rapidly proceeded downstream.

He ar

rived at Fort Craig on or about January 31
On January 25* Governor Henry Connelly called up
all the available militia in the territory. Though the
legislature still had five more days before its session
ended, Connelly decided not to remain in Santa Fe while
exciting developments were brewing farther south.

Since
2

the militia contained the territory's best citizens —
"the elite yeomanry of the country"^—Connelly believed

•^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 640.
- - 2Connelly

to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid., 644.

^Connelly to Seward, February 5> 6, 1862, ibid.
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that his presence at Fort Craig would set an example
which would bolster popular feeling.

In addition, he

took into account the fact that militia units which were
coming from the northern counties might hesitate to march
south if he, the governor, were to remain safely behind
in Santa Pe.

At any rate, there were only a few unim

portant laws left to pass, and since most of these were
later sent to him and signed before the legislature ad
journed, Connelly did not feel that he had neglected his
4
civil duties as governor.
On January 26, after leaving
the major general of divisions of the militia actively
engaged in organizing and sending into the field all the
available militia forces in the territory,

Governor

Connelly, accompanied by Major James L. Donaldson, and
James L. Collins, the territorial Indian agent, set out
for Port Craig^ and the "theater of war.

^Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid.
^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, ibid., 640.
^Collins to Dole, January 25* 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Selected Documents Concerning
the Administration of Indian Affairs in Texas and New
Mexico, 1861-1862. Record Group 75, National Archives,
'Washington.
^Connelly to Seward, January 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 640.
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Connelly's party proceeded as far as Socorro.
Here they tarried for three days while awaiting the
coming of the first column of militia called out by the
governor's recent order.

When that unit arrived,

Connelly and the others jubilantly accompanied it to
Port Craig.®

The governor was very optimistic upon his

arrival.

He observed, or at least felt, that Canby had
q
the entire confidence of the army and of the country.
Intelligence reports stated that the Confederates,

though 3j000 strong, were seriously hindered by lack of
adequate supplies,10 as well as having their ranks thinned
by smallpox.More and more Federal militia units were
arriving daily.

With an assurance of superior numbers,

the governor was even more confident of a decisive Union
victory.

Happily he commented that the spirit of the

people was good,12 and the militia had "displayed a

®Connelly to Seward, February 5* 1862, ibid., 643.
9connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid.,
644.
^Connelly to Seward, January 31> 1862, ibid.,
643.
1]-Connelly

to Seward, February 5> 1862, ibid.,

12Connelly

to Seward, February 5* 6, 1862,

641.
ibid., 644.
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commendable spirit in the present emergency."^

Indian

Agent Collins had earlier stated that there had been
some doubt concerning the courage of the Mexicans when
coming into contact with the Texans.

One of the main

reasons for his and the governor's coming to Port Craig
was to give them encouragement and "every possible
incentive" to acquit themselves creditably

He now

observed that the Mexican volunteers and militia had
turned out with a spirit that was "truly commendable."
With the morale of the Union forces at such a high level,
Collins had no doubt of the result.Equally impressed
by this spirit, as well as by the number of troops at
the fort, Connelly felt assured that the territory was
safe.

Only if the enemy received reinforcements—and

this was highly unlikely—could there be any danger of a
"great disaster" to the Union forces.The governor
triumphantly averred that the Federals would "conquer
the Texan forces, if not in the first battle, it. . .

•^Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, ibid.
•^Collins to Dole, January 25, 1862, Records of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
•^Collins to Dole, February 11, 1862, ibid.
^Connelly to Seward, January 31# 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 640.
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^would]? be done in the second or subsequent" encounters.^7
Though Canby also observed that the Mexican
troops appeared to be animated by a "very good spirit,"^
he did not share the enthusiasm of Connelly and Collins.
Recent experiences with the native troops had taught him
to be cautious concerning their possibilities on the
field of battle.^
The bulk of the Confederate forces were mounted.
Canby therefore expected that Sibley's main efforts would
be directed toward crippling his means of transportation
by attacking his wagon trains, impeding the operations
of his troops by stampeding their animals, or in subject
ing his forces to night attacks.

The Federal commander

attempted to impress upon his men the fact that night
attacks were to be feared only when they succeeded in
"throwing a portion of the command into confusion and in
forcing their way within the lines."

In repelling such

attacks, the colonel cautioned that firing should be
avoided, since it probably would more "endanger their
friends than enemies."

An old infantryman himself, Canby

^Connelly to Seward, February
ibid., 644.

6, 1862,

1®Canby to Adjutant-General, February 14, 1862,
ibid., 632.

"^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 488.
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pointed out that in any encounter with the Texas cavalry,
the main reliance of the infantry should be in their
clubbed muskets or bayonets.

According to Canby, an

infantryman who was cool was more than a match for a
horseman, and in groups, foot soldiers were safe against
any number.

In preparation for any emergency, the colonel

ordered that four days' rations were to be constantly car
ried in the company wagons and the remainder placed in the
20

supply train.

As speedily as was possible, Canby had concen
trated all his available forces at Port Craig.

When they

were finally assembled, he had an army of 3*810 men.

Of

these, about 1,200 sturdy, reliable regulars composed
five companies of the Fifth, three of the Seventh, and
three of the U. S. Tenth Infantry; two companies of the
First and five of the U. S. Third Cavalry; and two bat
teries of howitzers.

The native New Mexican troops con

sisted of the First Regiment New Mexico Volunteers (com
manded by Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson), seven
companies of the Second, seven of the Third, one of the
Fourth, two of the Fifth, Graydon's Independent Spy
Company, and about 1,000 "hastily-collected and unorgan
ized" militia.2^"

In addition, one company of Colorado

^Memorandum, No. 116, January 28, 1862, ibid.,
626-627.
2^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 488.
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Volunteers, commanded by Captain Theodore H. Dodd, had
arrived at the fort.

Dubbed the "Foot Volunteers," this

unit eventually became Company B of the Second Regiment
Colorado Volunteers.22

With his forces all assembled and

apparently in a high state of morale, Canby was ready to
face the "Army of New Mexico."
While still at Port Thorn, General Sibley sent
Captain Daniel H. Ragsdale with a party of fifty men to
reconnoiter the general area around Port Craig.

Ragsdale

was to make a check of the terrain and to secure as much
information as he could.

On the basis of this report,

the Confederate staff would decide the best method of
attacking the enemy stronghold.

On the same day that

Ragsdale left, January 22, news arrived that six Union
spies had been caught in the Mesilla Valley while on their
way to bring information to Port Craig.

Meanwhile a

Federal lieutenant, who had deserted his company at Fort
Craig, brought the Texans cheering news.

Although ad

mitting that Canby had in the neighborhood of 1,400 New
Mexican volunteers under his command, the lieutenant
pointed out that they were "badly dissatisfied," and did
"not want to fight the Southern people."23

22Whitford,
23Faulkner

Colorado Volunteers, 44.

(contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 126.
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Though it was bitterly cold, the morning of
January 29 dawned beautifully over the Confederate en
campment at Port Thorn.

The distant hills, whitened by

snow, presented a picturesque sight.

The Rio Grande had

risen considerably during the past few days, making that
stream more treacherous than ever.

Two Indians were sent

to Santa Fe as spies, and the Fifth regiment was ordered
to begin the forward movement to Fort Craig. Sibley's
campaign had finally begun.

Sickness, principally

pneumonia, was still rampant, and the Fifth had to leave
one company behind.

Traveling up the valley on the west

side of the river, the Fifth stopped on February 1 for a
few days, so as not to get too far ahead of the rest of
the brigade.

While in camp, many of the troops were

busily engaged in washing their clothes in the river,
grazing their horses, while some were "complaining, some
sick, some cooking, some cursing the army, some cursing
the Confederacy, some playing cards, some hunting, while
others. . .^were/ reading their Bibles."

A strict routine

was followed: roll call was set at four o'clock in the
morning, retreat was sounded at sundown, and another roll
call was held at eight o'clock at night.

After staying

in camp five days, the Fifth resumed its march up the
river.

The biting winter weather caused one soldier to

complain that it was "as cold as any I ever felt in any
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land or country."

Under such circumstances it is no

wonder that Sibley was losing many men to the ravages of
pneumonia.

By February 9 the regiment had pushed to

within thirty miles of Port Craig.

Expecting an attack

from the Federals at any time, the troopers were warned
to graze their horses carefully and to keep their weapons
p4
loaded at all times.^
On the night of February 5* Union spies reported
25
to Canby that Sibley's forces were moving upon Fort Craig.
Earlier in January a body of Texans had made a raiding
p6
foray against Alamosa.
In order to discover whether or
not the reported force was just another raid, Canby as
sembled a considerable number of his regulars and volun
teers to make a reconnaissance down the river.

In high

spirits the force set out on February 8, but after march
ing as far south as Adobe Walls and "not finding the
enemy in the desired place," the reconnoitering party
returned to Fort Craig to await further developments.2'''

24Ibid.,

129.

25connelly

to Seward, February 5> 6, 1862, jO. R. A.,

IX, 644.
2f^Canby

to Donaldson, January 3* 1862, ibid.,

IV, 82.
27"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, Port
Union, 156.
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Shortly after this, Federal scouts captured two
men whom they believed to be spies a few miles below the
post.

The pair were Germans and could hardly speak

English.

On being interrogated they insisted that they

were deserters from Sibley's force and had come to join
the Federal army.

Governor Connelly and his territorial

staff were then at the fort, and two members of that
staff were Germans.

These two, Major Charles E. Wesche

and Adjutant General Charles Clever, decided to see what
information, if any, could be gotten from the prisoners.
"They put large quids of tobacco in their mouths, rolled
up their trousers inside the boots, /and/7 commenced talk
ing aloud in angry tones about the G— D— Yanks."
Speaking in German, the two played their roles so well
"as to make the approaching prisoners believe that they
were ushered into the presence of some distinguished
Texans who also had the unfortunate experience of being
captured."

Being completely "taken in," the prisoners

soon began giving out information concerning Sibley's
army.

Unfortunately, an officer, "not being aware of the

plot to gain the desired information, called out: 'Hello,
General'Clever.

What are you doing with the prisoners?'"

Immediately the captives perceived the deception and
pQ

nothing more could be "pumped" from them.

28Ibid.,

156-157
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By February 10, Green's Fifth Regiment, leading
the Confederate advance, had come to within twenty-two
miles of Fort Craig.

Three companies tinder Major S. A.

Lockridge were sent out to spy around the post while the
remainder of the regiment set up camp in a cottonwood
thicket.

The Texans were "daily and hourly" expecting

an attack by the Federals.

Camp was laid off in battle

form, making two ranks, and the howitzers were placed in
a commanding position on a nearby hill.

The men remained

inactive during the twelfth, but the following day, camp
was broken and the regiment proceeded twelve miles up the
river.

The terrain continued to be rough and mountainous.

One observant Texan noted that "this country will be a
tax to any government to which it may belong."

Federal

troops drawn up in a skirmish line, were sighted ahead.
Immediately the Texans drew up in battle formation to meet
them.

"The men and captains all seemed cool and anxious

for a fight. Some were cursing the Yankees, some were
careless and unconcerned, while others were almost praying
for an attack."

The expected battle did not materialize,

however, for the Federals withdrew in the direction of
Fort Craig.

2%aulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 133-13^.
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Farther down the river the bugle sounded at
twelve o'clock at night and the men of the Fourth and
Seventh Regiments saddled their horses and took up the
line of march for Green's camp.

At eight o'clock on

the morning of February 14, the "Sibley Brigade" was
united.

It had been a most unpleasant march for the

Fourth and Seventh.

The men had been facing a north

wind with sleet and snow falling so hard "as to almost
pelt the skin off" their faces.3°
The assembled "Army of New Mexico" consisted of
the Fourth Regiment under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel William R. Scurry, the Fifth Regiment led by
Colonel Thomas Green, five companies of the Seventh com
manded by Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Sutton, five companies
of the Second Regiment Texas Mounted Rifles under Major
Charles L. Pyron, and three independent companies.

In

addition there was a battery of light artillery officered
by Captain Trevanion T. Teel and a light howitzer battery
commanded by Lieutenant John Riley.3"*"

Accompanying the

brigade was a supply train of three hundred and twentyseven wagons.32

Based on the rolls and returns of the

30journal of Ebenezer Hanna (MS., University of
Texas Library).
31cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 488.

32Brown to Wife, April 20, 1862, Hollister, A
History of the First, 169•
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brigade, this made an aggregate of nearly three thousand
men.

However, by the time that Sibley's army had made

its appearance before Port Craig, it had been reduced by
disease and the posting of detachments to about 2,600
JJ
men.33

On February 15> the brigade came in sight of Fort
Craig. From their camp the Texans could see "the stars
and stripes waving."

Major Lockridge jokingly boasted

that he intended to make his wife a shimmy out of that
flag, and if he could "get a wife as easy as he. . .
/could/ get that he. . ,/yovXdJ never sleep by himself
34
any more."
At a council of war that night the Confederate
staff decided to attempt to engage the Federals in battle
the next day.

Sunrise of the sixteenth found the Second,

Fourth, Seventh, and five companies of the Fifth drawn up
in battle formation^ about a mile or so south of Fort
36
Craig. Challenging Canby to a battle on the open plain,

33canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 488.
^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico,11 loc. cit., 134.
35ibid.; Noel, A Campaign, 16.
36sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862;. ,0. R. A.,

ix, 507.
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Sibley and his men eagerly awaited the Federal com
mander's reaction.

The Texas right wing rested on the

Rio Grande, the center stretched across the plain, and
the left (west) spread out over a range of low hills.
The artillery, with a few hundred sharp-shooters armed
with double-barrelled shot guns as support, was kept in
reserve.

The tension of the long, anxious moments was

broken when suddenly from around the bend of the river a
courier came dashing up to the lines yelling "They're
coming, boys I"

Immediately bugles sounded, and the army

galloped ahead on the "double-quick."

The command of

"right dress" was issued to keep the skirmish line even
while moving forward.

The Texans pressed ahead until

they reached the bend of the river and the "blue coats"
came into view.

In the distance the Confederates heard

"the rumbling sound of wagons; then a blast of the
enemy's bugle."37
When it became evident to Canby that Sibley was
not planning to attack the fort, the colonel decided to
send out a force to meet him.

This consisted of the

various companies of the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth regu
lar infantry, the First and Second Regiments of volunteers,

37}joel, A Campaign, 16-17.
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two cavalry detachments, and a battery of six guns.38
Soon the Federals had unlimbered their artillery
and begun firing into the Confederate line.
was wounded by this action.

One Texan

After sending every tenth

man to the front "where they were ordered to stay at all
hazards," the Confederate battle line was withdrawn out
of range of the enemy's guns.

With this, the Federals
on

"ceased firing, limbered up, and drove to the rear."
While the rest of the Union troops remained behind,
Major Thomas Duncan was ordered to move forward with his
squadron of cavalry.

Duncan's advance was quickly cut

short, however, for the Confederate guns which had been
concealed in a ravine, opened up and sent him scurrying
back.^®

It was obvious that the Federal forces did not

want to engage in a full-fledged battle .

Most of the

troops were kept well concealed in a bosque above the
hi
fort and within its walls.
About sundown, after leav
ing a strong picket line, the few Union troops withdrew

3^collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.

39Noel, A Campaign, 16-17.
^Collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 507.
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to the safety of the fort.

The Texans also posted a

large force of pickets and then retired to their camp
lio
which was about five miles below Fort Craig. J

ho

Had Cariby desired, he could have accepted
Sibley's challenge to battle.

However, since he had "no

confidence in the militia and but little in the volun
teers, " Canby was determined from the beginning to bring
on a battle in a position where the New Mexican troops
would not have to maneuver "in the presence or under the
fire of the enemy."

The open plain south of Fort Craig

certainly was not the desired place for a battle under
those circumstances
During the seventeenth and eighteenth, a furious
southeastern wind raised such a cloud of sand and dust
that active operations by either side were impossible
For several days General Sibley had been suffer
ing from ill-health and had been confined to his ambu
lance.

The subsequent operations of the brigade, though

^Noel, L Campaign, 17.
^3collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 488.
^^collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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approved by him, were actually carried out by Colonel
Thomas Green.

As reconnaissance had shown the futility

of frontally assaulting Port Craig—the Confederate
artillery was far too light—the only hope of success was
to force the enen^r to come out from his post and fight a
battle in the open.

It was decided that the brigade

should withdraw a few miles down the river and cross to
the east side of the Rio Grande.

In this way, the fort

could be by-passed in safety and a battle for the recrossing of the river above could be forced upon the
Federals.

To do this involved "the hazardous necessity

of crossing a treacherous stream," as well as the proba
bility of having to make a "dry camp" once the river was

46
forded.

Engineer, sapper and miner corps who were sent

out to reconnoiter the area,found a suitable ford
|iQ
several miles down the river at Paraje.
Early on the morning of the nineteenth, the bri
gade retired down the valley to the ford and by evening
iiq
v

had safely crossed the river.

Camp was set up on the

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 507.
^Noel, A Campaign, 17.
^Connelly

to Seward, March 1, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 637.
^Noel, A Campaign, 17.
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heights about two miles above ParajeThe troops were
ordered to cook three days' rations, that night, but
since food was short, many men had almost none at all.
Constantly on the alert, the men slept with their arms
and kept their horses saddled. Daylight found the "Army
of New Mexico" in the saddle, and the forward movement
was begun.

For the utmost protection, the wagon train

was placed in the middle of the column.

Veering away

from the river valley, the command turned up a large
ci
ravine and continued on its way to by-pass Port Craig.J
The route the Texans chose was a very difficult one.
Rugged and roclqr pedegral and heavy sand made the going
52
difficult, and the teams became easily exhausted.
Meanwhile great anxiety prevailed among the Union
troops, and many were the conjectures made by officers
and men as to Sibley's intentions.

Did Sibley plan to

completely by-pass the post, or was he going to select
the favorable ground opposite the fort and shell the
garrison?

"Many expressed an unfavorable opinion about

50collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
^Noel, A Campaign, 17-18.
52Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.
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the willingness of Colonel Cariby to fight his brotherin-law."

Had not the colonel been reluctant to fight

the day before, even though everyone, including the raw
recruits, "had clamored to be led into battle?"

About

noon the Texans1 long wagon train came into view as it
moved up the country.

"'So the Texans intend. . .to cut

us off was heard from every mouth."

The troops were

soon called to arms and orders were quickly given for
the men to carry one day's cooked rations in their haver
sacks and to have a new supply of ammunition in each
cartridge box.

Company after company "marched down the

steep bank and crossed the Rio Grande to get to the
bluffs on the other side."^

By four o'clock the Texans

had reached a position where Canby thought he could at
tack them, even though the ground before him was exceed
ingly rough for the operations of cavalry and artillery.
Cautiously advancing into the general area of the ravine
up which the Confederates were moving,

cii

and where they

were forming their camp for the night,55 cariby threw his
skirmishers forward to draw the fire of the Texan

^"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley,
Port Union, 157-58.

5^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 488-489.
55sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 507.
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batteries to locate their position.^

Immediately the

Texans, with "spirit and courage," formed a battle line,
and their field pieces boomed and echoed throughout the
mesa.57

colonel Miguel Pino's men of the Second Regiment

New Mexico Volunteers were "thrown into such utter con
fusion by. . ./these/' few harmless cannon-shots that it
was impossible to restore them to any kind of order."58
Even though his batteries "showed his whereabouts and
extent of his front," Sibley had the best position by
far, for his whole line was out of sight behind the mesa.
The Confederate wagon train continued to roll along un
disturbed, and Canby was unable to form a good battle line
since his men had to be kept crouched behind rocks on the
steep decline to evade "being picked off."59

This con

dition and the approach of nightfall convinced Canby that
further action was inexpedient.

In order to cover his with'

drawal and to keep the Texans in their position as long as
possible, Canby ordered Colonel Roberts, with all his

5^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 489.

ibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 507.
5^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 489.

59"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley,
Fort Union, 158.
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cavalry, to make a demonstration upon the Confederate
right flank.

While this feint was being carried out,

the Union forces were withdrawn.

The infantry was then

posted on the strategic mesa which commanded the view of
Port Craig, and the artillery and cavalry then crossed
O
the river to the fort.
Since most of the infantrymen
had waded the chilly Rio Grande in water up to their hips,
they suffered intensely from the cold.

Their wet uniforms

were made of wool, and it took a long time for them to
dry.

Passing "the night in damp clothes, most of them

without overcoats, or blankets; no warm cup of coffee to
put life into their chilled bodies and spirits," the
troops were a desolate and downhearted lot.^"1"

The Texans

remained in their "dry camp" in the sand hills directly
opposite to, and within sight of, Port Craig. Prom a
62
distance of less than two miles,
the Federals could
"count their numerous camp fires in the stillness of the
night and with the wind from that direction they could
hear the loud noises of the rebels."^3

6°Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 489.
61"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley,
Port Union, 158-159.
62pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New
Mexico and Arizona," loc. cit., 105.
63"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley,
Fort Union, 157.
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No further action occurred that night except for
the raid of Captain James "Paddy" Graydon, probably the
most colorful figure of Canby's command next to "Kit"
Carson.

Though he appeared to be ordinary, his looks

were deceiving.

Long a resident of New Mexico, he was

64

well acquainted with the country and its people.

Be

fore the Federal troops evacuated Arizona, he had oper6c;
ated a saloon at Fort Buchanan, J and when war broke
out, Graydon recruited a company of Union men who had
been dispossessed and driven north by Southern sympa
thizers. To them the war was more of a personal affair
and they "fought from the heart."

Graydon's Independent

Spy Company served the four-fold purpose of "spy, scout,
police and forager."

Enterprising and fearless, "Paddy"

and his men were always "hovering around the foe, watch
ing with eagle-eye for a chance to strike a telling
blow."

They soon won a name in New Mexico which was

equalled by few.^

6^Hollister, A History of the First, 96.
65james B. O'Neil, They Die But Once, The Story
of a Te.jano (New York, 1935)> O5>
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 96. In the
latter part of 1862 Graydon diecT~from a bullet wound
received in a duel at Fort Stanton. Santa Fe Gazette,
November 29# 1862.
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After receiving Canby's permission, Graydon ob
tained a couple wooden boxes in which he placed half a
dozen 24-pounder howitzer shells with the fuses cut.
The boxes were then securely lashed to the backs of two
old mules.

With three or four of his men, the captain

crossed the river just below the fort and proceeded
through the darkness toward the Confederate camp.

Gray-

don's plan was to get the "torpedo mules" within sight
of the Confederate picket line without being discovered.
If this could be accomplished, the fuses would be lighted
and the mules driven into the outpost.

The captain and

his men came to within 150 yards of the Texans.

The fuses

were lighted, and after the mules were driven forward, the
party began a hasty retreat.

Upon looking back, Graydon

was horrified to see that the mules, instead of going to
ward the enemy, were following him.

Soon the shells

began to explode, bringing the Confederate camp quickly
to arms. Graydon and his men were unharmed and made their
67
way back to Port Craig, needless to say, without the mules.

^^Pettis, "The Confederate Invasion," loc. cit.,

105-106.

CHAPTER VII
THE BATTLE OP VALVERDE

General Sibley and his staff concluded that Port
Craig was too strong to be taken by assault and that
Canby could not be decoyed into a showdown battle.

The

Confederates, therefore, decided to by-pass the Union
stronghold and continue their northward march.

In order

to do this, they would have to cross the river to the
west bank.

Perhaps then Canby might contest their cross-

ing and bring on a general engagement.
For several days Sibley had been ill.

Neverthe

less, though still weak, he took the saddle at dawn on
the morning of February 21, to personally direct the
operations of the brigade.

Colonel Thomas Green's Fifth

Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Sutton's battalion
of the Seventh, and Captain Trevanion T. Teel's battery
were ordered to make a threatening demonstration against
Fort Craig.

Under the cover of this feint, Lieutenant

Colonel William R. Scurry's Fourth Regiment, well-flanked

•^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 507.
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by Major Charles L. Pyron's command on the left., was to
move cautiously up the river to the Valverde ford.

This

movement was unfortunately delayed because of the loss
P

of several hundred of the Fourth Regiment's mules.

About midnight the mules, frantic from lack of water, had
broken for the river in spite of all the guards could do.^
Most of these draught animals were captured by the Feder
al
als and brought into the post.
Rather than give up his
plan, Sibley abandoned a number of his wagons containing
the entire kits, blankets, books, and papers of the Fourth
Regiment.^

With 180 men, Major Pyron set out early to recon/r
noiter the road leading to the ford near Valverde.
The
air was crisp and cold and the sky cloudy as the advance

7 The route Pyron

Confederate unit started on its way.

2Ibid.,

507-508.

^Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 489.

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
^Pyron to Jackson, February 27, 1862, ibid., 512.
"^Faulkner (contrlb.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 135*
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followed passed through the rough pedregal on which they
had made camp the night before and continued northward
about two and a half miles.

At this point was the Mesa,

del Contadero. Formed by the action of an extinct
volcano, this basaltic eminence, which rose to a height
of about 300 feet, was about three miles long and two
wide.®

Pyron passed around the eastern end of it and

then turned westward toward the river.

As he approached

the Rio Grande the terrain immediately sloped down into
the valley.

The river had changed its course, and the

dry arroyo of the old channel formed more or less the
western edge of the valley at this point.

Rows of small

hills and sand ridges ran, not far back from the river,
northward for over a mile to another, but lower, mesa.
A grove, or bosque, of large cottonwood trees covered a
considerable part of the valley area.

The river here

broadened out and could be easily forded.
small village named Valverde.

Nearby was a

The Valverde ford had

played a part earlier in the history of New Mexico.

In

1846 after Stephen W. Kearney had occupied New Mexico
and was on his way to California, he was met at Valverde
by "Kit" Carson who brought the news that California had
Q
Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 488.
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already been taken.

As a result, Kearney sent Colonel

Doniphan down the valley to Chihuahua while he took the

9
remainder of his forces on to California.

Sixteen

years later Valverde would again become prominent in the
history of the West.
Upon reaching the Rio Grande, Pyron saw no enemy,
so he dispatched a note to Sibley informing him that the
road was clear.

He and his men then leisurely proceeded

to the river, for their horses had had no water for
twenty-four hours.
By eight o'clock the Fourth Regiment had taken
up the line of march.

Scurry's objective was to take and

hold some point on the river above Fort Craig.

Captain

George M. Frazier and his company of the Second Regiment
(Pyron's command) acted as the Fourth's guide.

Scurry

assumed that his regiment was leading the advance, but
because of the poor command system, the colonel had not
been informed that Pyron had preceded him.

As a security

measure, Scurry ordered Major Henry ¥. Ragnet to take
four companies, including Frazier's, and proceed as the

g

Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 58.

10Pyron

DC, 512.

to Jackson, February 27> 1862, 0. R. A.,
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advance guard.

At the same time, frontal and flank

patrols were sent out.

Within a short while, Scurry-

learned that Pyron had already gone ahead.

There was

now no need for an advance guard, so Ragnet's force was
recalled and reunited with the rest of the command.
While en route, Pyron's message that the road was clear
of the enemy arrived.

Confidently the Fourth continued
11
its march to the north side of the Mesa del Contadero.
From across the river, Canby easily saw through
the feint which the Confederates were making against his
post.

Around eight o'clock, the Union commander noticed

that a column of Texans was proceeding northward in the
direction of Valverde.
were obvious.

The intentions of the Confederates

In order to prevent the enemy from reaching

the ford, Canby dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S.
Roberts up the western side of the Rio Grande.

He was to

cross over to the east bank and hold the ford before the
IP
Texans could get there.
Roberts' force consisted en13
tirely of cavalry detachments numbering about 220 men:

•L1Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 513.
^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 489.
1-^Reports

of Committees, 37th Congress, 3rd
Session, Senate Report lOti.
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Four companies (C, D, G, K), U. S. Third Cavalry,
Major Thomas Duncan. Company G, U. S. First Cavalry,
Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin, but attached to Duncan's
command.
Four companies, Third Regiment, New Mexico Volun
teers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jose M.
Valdez

Shortly after Roberts' departure, Canby ordered
additional forces to his support.

These consisted of

two sections of Captain Alexander McRae's provisional
battery (composed of companies G, Second, and I, Third
U. S. Cavalry) and two of Lieutenant Robert H. Hall's
24-pounders, supported by Captain David H. Brotherton's
company of the U. S. Fifth Infantry, Captain Charles H.
Ingraham's company H of the U. S. Seventh Infantry, and
two selected companies of volunteers (Captain William
Mortimore's of the Third Regiment and Captain Santiago
Hubbell's of the Fifth).

Captain "Paddy" Graydon's Spy

Company and 500 mounted militia, under Colonel Miguel
Pino and Robert H. Stapleton, had already gone to the
eastern side of the river opposite the fort.

Here they

were instructed to watch the enemy's movements, as well
as to threaten his flanks and rear, and otherwise impede
his movements as much as possible.^

1^tDuncan

to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 497; Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862, ibid.,
493-494.

•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 489, 493.

172
After Roberts had marched a short distance, he
instructed Major Duncan to take four of his companies
and rapidly advance to the ford.

If the Texans had not

arrived, he was to cross the river and hold the bosque
on the other side.

When Duncan reached the ford, he

discovered that Valdez' two companies of volunteers had
gotten there ahead of him.

With these, as well as his

own command, Duncan crossed the frigid waters of the Rio
Grande.

No sooner had he gotten to the other side than

he saw Pyron's force passing through the cottonwoods a
few hundred yards to his front.

Immediately he sent

Lieutenant Claflin with Company G to go up the river to
see what the Texans were doing.

In a few minutes this

officer returned to report that Pyron's cavalrymen had
reached the river about 1,000 yards above, had watered
their horses, and were now returning.
Upon seeing Claflin's company, Pyron gave chase.
As the Federals retired, Pyron followed until he reached
the bank of a slough.

There he found himself in front

of the rest of Duncan's command.

Hastily he formed his

17
men along the bank, and the action commenced.

Duncan

^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 497.
•'•fpyron to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid.,
512-513.
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had already dismounted his men and had the horses taken
back behind a low sand ridge for protection. His men
deployed behind sand hills, logs, and a few scattered
trees.

Duncan was determined to hold his position until

Roberts with the artillery and infantry could cross to
1o
support him.

Upon encountering the enemy, Pyron dispatched
Captain John Phillips to carry the news back to the main
command.

On his way Phillips met Scurry and informed him

of the developments ahead.

Since Pyron's force was small,

Scurry feared that that officer would be overpowered be
fore he could come to his support.

With Phillips as

guide, the Fourth Regiment galloped ahead as rapidly as
their horses would carry them.^

About nine o'clock
90

Scurry approached the scene of conflict.

The men

quickly dismounted and advanced to take position behind
the low sand bank on Pyron's right.

Captain Prazier and

his company rejoined Pyron's command.

Lieutenant John

Riley's howitzers were unlimbered and commenced firing
91

into the Federal line.

The fighting now began in

l^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid., 497.
•^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid.,
513-51^.
20Ragnet

to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 516.

21Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.
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earnest.

Perhaps this battle would be decisive.

If so,

it could easily decide whether New Mexico would remain
in the Union or become a part of the Confederacy.
Roberts remained on the east bank of the river to
await the artillery and reinforcements which Canby had
sent.

From his position, the colonel observed that a

large force of Texans, with a piece of artillery, was
moving down through the cottonwoods toward the Mesa del
Contadero.

The Confederates obviously intended to turn

Duncan's right flank, while extending their own left to
the river.

Roberts quickly notified Duncan and ordered

him to throw some skirmishers into the heavy timber to
drive the enemy back.

Duncan had sent Captain Edward

Treacy's Company D into the bosque as skirmishers to
keep out small reconnoitering parties which had been
seen to his right before Roberts' came over to tell him
of the enemy movement in that direction.

Duncan dis

patched Captain George W. Howland's Company C to rein
force Treacy.

After a spirited skirmish of several

minutes, the Texans were driven back, but they soon
rallied and vigorously renewed their assault.

Though

repulsed several times, they continued to return, but
22

finally Duncan was able to clear them from the area.

22Duncan

ibid., 498.

to Meinhold, February 23, 1862,
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This enabled Roberts to set up the batteries on the west
bank to cover the crossing of reinforcements, as well as
to shell the Texans in the heavy timber
When Canby observed from Port Craig that the
Confederate movement toward the upper ford was becoming
more determined and might develop into a full-scale
battle, he ordered more reinforcements to Roberts1 com
mand.

The regulars consisted of Captain Henry R. Selden's

battalion of the U. S. Fifth Infantry, including the
battalions of Captains Benjamin Wingate and P. W. L.
Plympton.

In addition there was one company of Colorado

volunteers captained by Theodore H. Dodd.

Colonel "Kit"

Carson's First Regiment New Mexico Volunteers (eight
.
24
companies) followed immediately afterwards.
About ten o'clock McRae's and Hall's batteries
reported to Colonel Roberts

They were unlimbered on

the west bank and began pouring a heavy barrage of shot
and shell into the bosque where the Texans were en
trenched.

As the howitzers blasted the woods, Duncan's

^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 494.
2^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 489.
25Roberts

ibid., 495.

to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
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command and Captain David H. Brotherton's company of the
Fifth Infantry, which had come to his support, raked the
area with small-arms fire.

This combined artillery and

rifle fire drove the Texans back.

u

Twenty minutes after the Federal battery's first
shot, the Texans set up more of their guns which replied
with well-directed blasts of shot, shell, and grape.
Though they were making a determined effort to drive
Duncan from the ground which he had taken, the gunners
soon came to devote all their attention to the Union
batteries across the river.

Though Duncan's small-arms

fire was intense, McRae's and Hall's guns were doing far
more damage.

For nearly two hours this duel of artillery
27
1

and rifles continued.

Finally Scurry realized that

Riley's light howitzers were no match for the heavier
metal of the enemy.

He thereupon ordered Riley to with-

?8
draw with his guns to the rear tinder cover.

Though the

Texans were fighting desperately, the superior fire of
the enemy had, by around noontime, driven them back from

^^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23> 1862,
ibid., 498.
2^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 495.
pQ

Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.
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the original line they had held.29
All during the morning Colonel Green continued
Of)
his unsuccessful feint against Port Craig.
Attached
to Green's command was Captain Teel's battery of
howitzers, but with the conflict at Valverde assuming
greater proportions, Sibley ordered Teel's guns to the
front.^

One section of the battery was at the head of

the wagon train.

After leaving instructions for the

other guns in the rear to rush ahead as fast as possible,
Teel came to the head of the train to take charge of that
section.

Teel and the guns set out at a gallop and

reached the battlefield around noon.

The two guns were

set up in the center of the Fourth Regiment's line and
commenced blasting the Federal left.

From across the

river, the Union batteries opened a furious fire upon
Teel's artillery.

So heavy was their barrage that the

captain soon found himself with only five men to work
•ap
his two guns.
To add to the confusion, a bomb exploded

^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 495.

3°Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519.
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
32Teel to Jackson, February 27, 1862, ibid., 524.

178
nearby and set the grass on fire.

Undaunted, the sturdy

captain stayed with his pieces and seized a rammer to help
his men load the guns.

Seeing that his reduced force

could not maintain both howitzers, Teel asked Scurry for
additional men.3^

Lieutenant Riley and his cannoneers

were immediately sent to Teel's relief.35

Lieutenants

Jordan W. Bennett and Joseph H. McGinnis arrived on the
field with the rest of Teel's artillery and the captain
ordered them to place their section in battery.

Within a

few minutes their guns were raking the enemy line.

Since

Pyron was hard-pressed on the left, Lieutenant Bradford
took one gun and went to his support.3^
Near noon Sibley ordered Colonel Green to discon
tinue the feint and take his Fifth Regiment to the scene
of battle.37

since the wagon train, which was moving

northward, was stretched out for miles, and a large
Federal force (probably Pino and Stapleton) threatened

33scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.
3^Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524.
35scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.
3^Teel to Jackson, February 27> 1862, ibid., 524.
37sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
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it, Green saw the need of leaving a sufficient protective
force.Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Sutton's battalion of

the Seventh Regiment and Companies C and H of the Fifth
were ordered to remain behind.39

with the other eight

companies of his regiment, Green hastily set out for
Valve rde

Major S. A. Lockridge was sent ahead with
2n
three companies.
At the field he reported to Scurry
2ip
who instructed him to support Pyron on the left.
Shortly Green's other companies arrived and took position
between Pyron on the left and Scurry on the right.

Green

ordered Lieutenant Colonel H. C. McNeill to take three
companies to drive the enemy from the north point of the
mesa where they were annoying the left and threatening
the wagon train.^3

Sibley, finding himself completely

exhausted and unable to stay in the saddle, sent his
aides and other staff officers to report to Green. From

3^Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519*
39Jordan to Sibley, February 27* 1862, ibid., 523.
^°Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519.
^Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 516.
^2Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.

^3(}reen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519.
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this point on, Green was to command the Confederate
forces at Valverde
Around twelve o'clock Captain Selden's battalion
of regular infantry, including Wingate's and Plympton's
battalions, and "Kit" Carson's regiment reported to
Colonel Roberts.

Roberts directed Selden to ford the

river higher up and move against the Confederate right
with the bayonet.

The colonel received information that

five hundred enemy cavalry had crossed the river above
and threatened his rear.

In order to check any such pos

sible movement, Roberts ordered Carson's regiment to take
position in a bosque higher up the west bank near the
main road leading to Valverde.^5
To prevent the enemy from flanking him on the
right, Scurry had extended his line a considerable
distance.^6

The Confederate artillery was rearranged so

as to provide the whole line with a more effective sup
port.

Lieutenant Bradford with one gun had already gone

to Pyron's assistance on the left.

Lieutenant McGinnis,

in command of one gun, took position on the right of

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 495.
^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 514.
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Lockridge's companies of the Fifth, and Lieutenant
Bennett set up in the center of Scurry's Fourth.

Another

piece was sent to bolster the extreme right flank.

From

time to time throughout the battle, the guns changed
hi

positions as circumstances dictated. '
Up to this time, the Federal forces had been
hitting the Confederate left the hardest.

As soon as

Captain Selden got his men across the river, he reformed
il8
them and attacked the Confederate's right.
Selden's
men sent a galling fire into Scurry's ranks as they pushed
ahead.

At this moment Captain Willis L. Lang of the Fifth
49
Regiment formed about forty of his lancers for an attack.
The point which Lang chose to assault was defended by
Ford's company of Colorado Volunteers.

They were dressed

in gray like the New Mexico militia, and the Texans proba
bly mistook them for Mexican troops.50

Lang's mounted

SI
lancers launched a gallant and furious charge.-'

The

47Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524.
48Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 495.
49Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 519.
5°Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 57.
5lGreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 519.
~ ~
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Coloradoans reserved their fire until the lancers came

52
into close range and then poured a heavy fire into them.
Twenty-nine horses lost their riders.

Lang's desperate

charge was ineffectual against the overwhelming superior
ity of the enemy, and his company suffered more loss of
life than any of the brigade.

Though the lancers were

completely repulsed and nearly decimated, their charge
did have the effect of bringing the Federals within range
of the Confederate guns.

Two pieces of Teel's artillery

and the small-arms fire of two of Scurry's companies
drove the advancing Federals back, thus securing the
Confederate right flank.^
Meanwhile on the Confederate left, Duncan's com
mand was sending a hot small-arms fire into the enemy
line.

Bradford's gun had been put out of action and was

now in an exposed position.

Major Lockridge called

Ragnet's attention to the piece and he immediately dis
patched a body of men to retrieve the gun.

Since all the

horses which belonged to the weapon had been killed or

-^Mills, Forty Years at El Paso, 57.

53Noel, A Campaign, 19.
5^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 514-515.
- - -
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wounded, the men had to pull the gun back by hand.

The

enemy vigorously shelled the group while they were en
gaged in this operation.

Though the fire from the

Federal artillery was extremely hot, only one man was
killed and several wounded.

The howitzer was used by

three of Riley's company until Ragnet ordered it silenced
due to the lack of gunners.

The piece was left double-

shotted to await an anticipated enemy charge.^
The Federals continued to threaten the Confederate
left in such great numbers and with such a heavy fire that
Lockridge and Ragnet sent messages to Green for reinforce
ments.

When these did not arrive, Lockridge considered it

wise to fall back to a new position.

After the artillery

and the wounded had been removed, the Confederates re
tired, by companies, to a sand bank about 100 yards to
their rear.-^

The whole Texas line was now situated be

hind this sand bank which formed the left side of an old,
dry channel of the river.

This position was one of great

natural strength, for not only did it afford the men and
guns protection from Union fire, but it also concealed to
a considerable degree the Texans1 movements.^7

55Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 517•
56 ibid.
^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 490.

Atlas t o Accompany the Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies, I, plate XII, map 1 .
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After Seidell's and Duncan's attacks, Colonel
Roberts felt secure in crossing his artillery to the east
bank.

McRae's battery was posted on Selden's right.

The

guns were supported by Captain David H. Brotherton's and
Captain Charles H. Ingraham's companies of regular in
fantry and Hubbell's and Mortimore's companies of volun
teers.^®

At Duncan's request Hall's 24-pounder (one of

Hall's howitzers had been disabled) was sent to bolster
his command on the right.^9

The Federal batteries now

opened fire again, forcing the Confederates to change the
positions of their artillery.
were responding with gusto.

Within a short time, they

Before long, however, the

Texas batteries ceased firing and a lull ensued.

About

this time Roberts learned that Canby was on his way to
the field with reinforcements.

Since his soldiers had

been fighting for five hours or more, Roberts allowed
his fatigued troops to eat lunch while awaiting the com
mander's arrival.

In addition, the respite allowed the

men to replenish their ammunition.^0

^Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 495.
59ouncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid.,
498; A. W. Evans, "Canby at Valverde, Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War, II, 699.
6°Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 495-96.
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Shortly after noon, Cariby decided to go to the
scene of operations to personally assume command of his
fighting forces.

Enemy detachments were still threaten

ing Port Craig from across the river, so before leaving
his post, Canby detailed two companies of volunteers,
Colonel Manuel Armijo's regiment of militia, and some de
tachments of regulars to serve as a protective garrison.
Colonel Manuel Pino's regiment was recalled from the east
ern bank and ordered to the battleground.

Canby set out

for the field of Valverde accompanied by Company G of the
First Cavalry and the remaining section of McRae's battery.61
Canby reached the scene of operations about three
o'clock and relieved Roberts of command.

The lull in

the fighting allowed the commander to spend nearly an
hour^ in conference with his field officers and in making
a personal reconnaissance. He was convinced that a direct,
frontal attack upon the Texans1 new, strong position would
not only prove costly, but might even end in failure.
After taking all matters into careful consideration, Canby

^Cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 490.
62Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 496.
63Hollister, A History of the First, 111.
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devised a plan to envelope the Confederate left.

Using

his own left as a pivot, Canby's tactical scheme was to
send the center and right of his line smashing into the
Texans1 left.

Once the left had been shattered and

doubled back, the Federals would be able to enfilade the
Confederate position behind the old river bed.

Thus

64
enveloped, the Texans would be driven from the field.
The day was growing short and Canby quickly began
ordering his troops into position to carry out his en
veloping maneuver.
left,

McRae's battery, forming the pivotal

was moved about two hundred yards to the left.

The battery's support was increased by Plympton's bat
talion of four companies of regulars and Dodd's company
of Colorado Volunteers.

Colonel Pino's Second Regiment

New Mexico Volunteers, which was just approaching, was
ordered to cross the river to serve as the reserve for the
left as well as an additional support for McRae's guns.
"Kit" Carson's First Regiment was instructed to ford the
river where that body and Selden's regular infantry were

fill
Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 490.
65lbid.

^Evans, "canby at Valverde," loc. cit., 699*

188
to serve as the center.

Hall's 24-pounder, with its in

fantry support and Duncan's dismounted cavalry, formed
the Union right.

Captain R. S. C. Lord, uniting his

company with Claflin's, was to act as the cavalry re
serve.

In addition Valdez' volunteers were to be held

in reserve.

But hardly had Canby begun the movement of

his troops when Colonel Green took the offensive
While the Union commander was devising his plan
to attack the Confederate left, Lieutenant Colonel John
S. Sutton arrived on the field with reinforcements.

That

officer had been engaged in protecting the wagon train,
but as the conflict increased in severity, he was ordered
to the battle.

Sutton detached Companies A and F of the

Seventh and C of the Fifth to remain with the train and
with the remainder of his command, Companies B, H, and I
of the Seventh and F of the Fifth, he set out at a gallop.
Major Lockridge met the battalion on the field and ordered
them to take position on the left.
With the Federal batteries again sending a furious
fire of round shot, grape, and shell into his ranks, Green

6?Canby

to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 490.
Jordan to Sibley, February 27# 1862, ibid., 523.
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concluded that only by a daring frontal assault all along
the line could the Confederates win the day.

Since the

main emphasis of the charge would be directed toward the
Union guns, the attack would be in two parts.

Under cover

of the sand hills, Green began to gather and reform his
troops for the attack.

The drive from the right, directed

at McRae's battery, would be composed of dismounted troops
of the Fourth and Fifth Regiments, parts of Sutton's and
most of Pyron's battalions.

In addition Teel's, Riley's,

and Wood's batteries would lend their support. This com6°
bined attacking party numbered about 750 men. J Teel was
instructed to place his guns on the
as a reserve.

extreme

right flank

If the charge was unsuccessful, he would

be in a position to shell the enemy as a cover for the
70

retreating Confederate troops.

Simultaneously with the

attack on the right, Major Ragnet (Lockridge had been in
command on the left, but had now gone to the right to en
gage in the attack on that wing) was ordered to lead four
companies of the Fourth and one company of the Fifth in a
cavalry charge against Hall's battery."^1

Ragnet's command

^Qreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid.,
519-520.
7°Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524.
f^-Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 5I9.
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consisted of approximately two hundred men composed of
the companies of Captains Charles Buckholts, Marinus von
Heuvel, W. L. Alexander, A. J. Scarborough of the Fourth
and Daniel H. Ragsdale of the Fifth.

When Captain J. E.

Dwyer brought Green's instructions for the assault,
Ragnet ordered his men to mount and align themselves in
a single row.^2

Anxiously the troops awaited the signal

to charge.
When Duncan learned of Canby's plan to turn the
Confederate left, he requested that another c-ompany of
infantry be sent to join Brotherton's company as a sup
port to Hall's battery.

With this addition, he would be

then able to throw all of his dismounted cavalry forward.
Canby promptly sent Ingraham's company of regular in
fantry to Duncan's command."^
With a hail of small-arms fire and rebel yells,
Ragnet's cavalry came charging down upon the Union right.
Taken completely unaware, Canby hastily dispatched Wingate's battalion of the Fifth Infantry to aid in repelling
the attack.

"Kit" Carson's regiment, which had just

crossed the river to take position, was attracted by the

72Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 517.
f^Duncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid.,

498.
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firing and rushed toward the right.^

When Ragnet's men

came to within about 150 yards of the Union line, Duncan
sent a destructive small-arms fire into their midst.

In

addition, Graydon's company and Carson's regiment added
more fire.75

as the enemy charged diagonally in front of

his column, about eighty yards to his right, Carson order
ed his men to fire a volley into the Confederate cavalry.
This fire, combined with the explosion of a well-aimed
shell from Hall's howitzer, completely smashed the Conry/*

federate assault.

As Major Ragnet looked back toward

his men, nothing but confusion met his eyes.

The squeals

of wounded horses and the groans of the wounded who had
tumbled from their saddles were evidence enough.

As his

men reeled back in great disorder, Ragnet ordered his
command to retreat to the sand bank from which they had
started.

The rout was complete.

So great was the Con

federate flight that most of the cavalrymen did not stop
at the first sand bank as ordered, but continued on to
others farther to the rear.77

7^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 490.

75ouncan to Meinhold, February 23, 1862, ibid.,
499.
7^Carson to Nicodemus, February 26, 1862, ibid.,
502-503.
77Ragnet to Jackson, February 23* 1862, ibid.,

517.
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Ragnet's cavalry charge, made against far
superior numbers, had been a costly failure in one
respect.

Nearly one-fifth of the men and horses in

volved had been either killed or wounded.Captain
Heuvel—"one of the most distinguished heroes of the
day"—was lost during the action.

Colonel Green proba

bly meant this offensive on the left to be only a feint.
At any rate, it did serve a valuable purpose by divert
ing the attention of the enemy from the Confederate
right,^9 for the Union center had rushed to the support
of Duncan's command and Hall's battery.

In their pursuit

of the retreating Confederates, they left a great gap in
the center of the Union line.

This gap would prove fatal

o0

to Federal arms that day.
Almost simultaneously with Ragnet's charge on the
left, the main body of the Texans charged on the right.
The enemy lay seven hundred yards ahead over an open area
which was thinly interspersed with cottonwood trees.

At

the command, "Up boys, and at them!" 750 determined
Texans leaped over their protective sand bank.

78Ibid.,

With

518.

79Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520.
®°Anderson, "Canby's Services in the New Mexican
Campaign," loc . cit., 699.
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ringing shouts and rebel yells they bravely dashed for
ward, paying but little heed to the storm of grape,
canister, and musket balls which the enemy sent against

them.®*'"
Canby saw the attack coming.

Fearing that

Captain Plympton, whose command formed part of McRae's
support, was unaware of the new development, Canby
hastened in person to warn him.

Before Canby could make

defensive arrangements, rebel yells and the onward surge
of the "terrible Texans" proved too much for the volun
teers.®^

Hubbell's and Mortimore's

companies,^ who

were

also part of the battery's support, broke and fled in
wild confusion.

Canby did all he could to stop the flight

and bring the volunteers into action.

Even Captain McRae

temporarily left his guns to plead with the men to come to
his aid.

84

All such efforts were to no avail.

In their

race to the river, the volunteers passed through Plympton's

^Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, 0. R. A_.,
IX, 515.
S^canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862, ibid.,
490-491.

®3Edwin L. Sabin, Kit Carson Days, 1809-1868
(New York, 1935), II, 691.
^Collins to Dole, March 1, 1862, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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battalion, carrying part of that unit with them in their
panic.

Most of Plympton's regulars maintained themselves

and rushed to the battery to engage in a desperate effort
to repel the enemy.

Their actions drove back the advance

of the Confederate assault.

Captain R. S. C. Lord's

cavalry, which was in reserve, came up from the right at
this time.

Canby ordered Lord to charge, but as this

mounted force neared the battery, it became exposed to
both Union and Confederate fire and was forced to fall
back.

The Confederate storming party deployed as

skirmishers and enveloped the left, front, and a part of
the right of the battery with an arc nearly half a mile
in length.

Armed with double-barreled shot-guns and

pistols, the Texans sent a destructive fire into the
battery and silenced the guns.

The Union gunners with

their revolvers and the infantry with their muskets now
85
engaged in a bloody, hand to hand battle with the Texans.
Colonel Sutton, while leading his men, fell mortally

86

wounded about twenty paces from the guns.

Captain

87
McRae and Lieutenant Mishler were killed at their pieces.

85canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 490-491.
^Jordan to Sibley, February 27, 1862, ibid., 523.

87Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 496.
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Major Lockridge fell almost at the muzzle of the enemy's
guns.®®

Completely overwhelmed, the defending Federals

were driven from the field, but not until they had lost
in killed, wounded, and captured, nearly half of their
numbers.®9
At this juncture Wingate's battalion arrived on
the scene from the right.

The fire of his infantrymen

threw the Confederates into such confusion that Canby
thought that he might yet win the day.

However, the

Texans quickly rallied and captured the guns.

Colonel

Roberts, in command of the Union right, ordered the troops
to speed to the left.

They had pursued Ragnet's Confeder

ates such a great distance, however, that they were unable
to be of any assistance.

Pino's regiment, which had been

ordered to cross the river as part of the reserve, failed
to do so.
orders.

Only one company and part of another followed

The refusal of this unit to obey orders was an

other cause of the loss of McRae's battery.

It did not

take Canby long to see that a prolongation of the battle
would only increase the casualties without changing the
result.

Selden was to cover the retreat on the left, and

®®Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520.
®9cant>y to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 491.

197
the commanders on the extreme right were instructed to
fall back and cross the river.
As soon as the Texans had seized McRae's battery,
they turned the six pieces around and began using them
on their fleeing enemy.

Captains Hardeman and Walker

manned several on the right while Lieutenant Ragnet of
Riley's battery took charge of another.

Ragnet had no

rammer, so he used a flagstaff in its place.91

Within a

few minutes Teel came forward with his guns and joined in
the cannonading.^2

After crushing the Union left, Green

turned his attention to the right.

But the Federals were

already in retreat, and the forces sent against them only
increased their flight across the river.^3
Canby reported that Selden's four companies of
the Fifth Infantry, though under heavy fire, successfully
covered the retreat on the left.

Under the personal

supervision of Roberts, the columns on the right were also
crossed over.

On the west bank the volunteers and militia

that had escaped from the battle were greatly scattered

9°Ibid.
91scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515.
92Teel to Jackson, February 27* 1862, ibid., 524.
93Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 520.
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and disorganized.
wildest confusion.

Pino's Second Regiment was In the
No efforts of Its officers, nor of

Cabby's staff, could restore that unit to order.
than 100 men from that body had deserted.

More

According to

Canby, the regulars, in contrast, were easily formed and
marched to the fort.

Under the protective cover of

Selden's infantry, and later of the regular cavalry, the
Federal stragglers were collected and returned to Port
Craig.9^
After the enemy had crossed the river in full re
treat, Major Ragnet, having rallied part of his forces,
arrived on the scene.

It had been his intention to join

in the final charge on the right.

Fresh mounted companies

under Captains Denman W. Shannon, Isaac Adair, W. L.
Alexander, Charles Buckholts, and Lieutenant A. S. Thur
mond rode up.

Scurry received permission from Green to

cross the river with these companies to pursue the foe.
But when the head of the column reached the opposite bank,
it was ordered to return,95 for a flag of truce had ar
rived from the Union commander.9^

por two hours the

9^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,

ibid., 491.
95scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515*
9^Ragnet to Jackson, February 23, 1862, ibid., 518.
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Confederates thought this meant that Canby intended to
surrender.

The flag had, however, been dispatched for

the purpose of removing the dead and

wounded.97

had now settled over the field of Valverde.

Darkness

In the first

full-scale encounter with the Federals, the "Army of New
Mexico" had emerged victorious.
Sibley reported that the Confederate forces on
the field had not exceeded 1,750 in number (Fourth Regi
ment, 600; Fifth Regiment, 600; Seventh Regiment, 300;
Second Regiment, 250).9®

At all times the Texas officers

had been in the thickest of the fight, and field and
staff officers alike had served as sterling examples to
their men.

Throughout the engagement Scurry's cheering

voice was heard above the din of battle.

The bravery of

Green, Lang, Pyron, McNeill, Heuvel, Ragnet, Ochiltree,
Lockridge and a host of others marked February 21 as a
day of valor.99

Proudly Sibley informed the adjutant

general that "For the first time, perhaps, on record
batteries were charged and taken at the muzzle of doublebarreled shot-guns, thus illustrating the spirit, valor,

97sibley

to Cooper, May 4, 1862,

ibid.,

508.

98ibid.
99(jreen to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid.,
520-521.
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and invincible determination of Texas troops.

Nobly have

they emulated the fame of their San Jacinto ancestors.1,100
Sibley admitted that the victory of Valverde should
have resulted in the capture of Fort Craig, but that
Canby's flag of truce had prevented further action that
day.10'1'

It seems, however, that the main reason why the

Texans did not follow up their victory was the extreme
exhaustion of the troops and the coming of nightfall.
The battle of Valverde had been won at a heavy
cost.

The Texans lost thirty-six killed, 150 wounded, and

one missing:
Second Regiment, Major Pyron commanding: 4 killed,
17 wounded, 1 missing.
Fourth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Scurry: 8 killed,
36 wounded.
Fifth Regiment, Colonel Green: 20 killed, 67 wounded.
Seventh Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton: 2 killed,
26 wounded.
Teel's battery: 2 killed, 4 w o u n d e d .
The losses sustained caused Sibley to write the adjutant
general for reinforcements.

The general suggested that

lOOsibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 506.
lOlSibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
102Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 521.
Scurry reported that he had lost 8 killed and 56 wounded.
Scurry to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 515. Teel
reported that he lost 4 killed, including 2 who died the
next day, and 6 wounded. Teel to Jackson, February 27,
1862, ibid., 524-525.
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these be sent mainly from Texas, and as soon as possible.
The Federal losses were even greater than those
of the Confederates.

Three officers and sixty-five en

listed men had been killed.

Three officers and 157 men

had been wounded.Captain William H. Rossell, Tenth
Infantry, was a prisoner-1-^ in addition to thirty-four
enlisted men.^-0^

Hundreds of militia and volunteers had

deserted.Canby asserted, though, that his troops
were "not dispirited" by the reverse at Valverde and that
all believed that the ultimate result of the contest
would be in their favor.3-0®

•^Ssibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 5°6.
^O^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 493.
•^^sibley to Cooper, February 22, 1862, ibid., 506.
•^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 493.
10^Chapin

to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid.,

634.
10®Canby

ibid., 487.

to Adjutant-General, February 22, 1862,

CHAPTER VIII
ONWARD TO ALBUQUERQUE AND SANTA FE

In their hasty retreat from the battlefield,
many Union soldiers had discarded their small arms and
other equipment.

Even Hall's 24-pounder had been

abandoned in the Rio Grande.

Under the flag of truce

granted after the battle, and under another the next day,
the Federals sent detachments with wagons to remove their
dead and wounded.1

Many Confederates "confidently as

serted and believed" that the enemy violated the truce by
gathering up large numbers of small arms and carrying
2

them off in their dead wagons.

While Sibley maintained

that the Federals sent a force which recovered the
howitzer from the river,^ Green reported his certainty
that a company flag and a guidon from his regiment had
been picked up from the field during the cessation of
hostilities.^

Since most of these reputed violations of

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 508.
2Green

to Jackson, February 22, 1862, i b i d 5 2 1 .

3sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
^Green to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 522.
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the truce had occurred during darkness,5 the Confederates
had been unable to prevent them.
Sibley and Canby agreed to a two day truce the day
after the battle to allow ample time to care for the
wounded and to bury the dead.

On February 22, Sibley

sent Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry, of the Fourth,
and Captain Denman W. Shannon, of the Fifth, under a white
flag, to demand the surrender of Fort Craig.

These "of

ficers and gentlemen"^ informed Canby that "very honorable"
terms would be granted, but the Union commander refused to
Q

capitulate.

During the course of the interview, Canby

referred to the flags from the Fifth Regiment as "trophies
of the fight.Colonel Green, upon learning of this,
surmised that Canby must not have been aware of how they
had been obtained, "as he would not have spoken of stolen
flags as trophies."*^

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 638.
^Sibley to Canby, February 22, 1862, ibid., 632.
^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 638.
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 508.
10Green

to Jackson, February 22, 1862, ibid., 522.
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Prom Valverde on, much disaffection came to reign
within the Confederate ranks.

The Texans found themselves

in the "midst of a population of 80,000 souls possessing
no very friendly spirit" towards them, and in a country
"nearly or quite exhausted as regards forage and other
army supplies."

Northward at Port Union was a strongly

entrenched enemy force of nearly 1,000.
Canby's army was determined to hold out.

At Port Craig
If the Confeder

ates continued up the river, Canby's men would cut off all
communication with, and all hope of supplies from the
Mesilla Valley.^

A cardinal feature of Sibley's strategy

was to seize needed supplies and materiel from the Federal
army.

Alas!

The Texans had won a victory at Valverde,

but the resources of Port Craig were not forthcoming.

Ap

parently Sibley had not counted upon such a possibility.
At any rate, the horizon appeared bleak for the "Army of
New Mexico."
Added to these problems was a spirit of "insub
ordination and prejudice" directed against their command
ing officer.

This feeling, though possibly Intensified by

the fact that Sibley was not a Texan, arose primarily be
cause the general had failed to continue commanding his

•^Steele to Cooper, March 7* 1862, ibid.,
LIII, 793.
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troops during the battle.
coward,^

Some spoke of him as a

while others went so far as to accuse him of a

"deliberate plan" to deliver his army into the hands of
the enemy.With morale at such a low ebb, it would
obviously be difficult to maintain discipline and keep
the men in a fighting mood.
The Union soldiers, aside from small arms and
miscellaneous equipment, also had abandoned large numbers
of their haversacks and canteens.

These contained food

and drink, and the half-starved Texans "sumptuously ate

15
on Yankee light bread and other most delicious eatables."
But even with this addition to their diet, the men had
only "five days' scant rations" left."^

12Ibid.

•^•3v/right to Greer, September 7, 1927* "Confeder
ate Reminiscences of 1862," New Mexico Historical Review,
V (July, 1930), 321.

•^Steele to Cooper, March 7, 1862, 0. R. A.,
LIII, 793.
•^Noel, A Campaign, 20.
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A
IX, 508.
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Paced with such grave problems, the Confederates
held a council of war to determine their course of
action."^

According to some Texas deserters, the more

daring officers favored an attack on the fort.

Others

maintained that their army was too small to conquer the
territory and that they should retreat to the Mesilla
*1 Q

Valley.

Scurry and Shannon, having been inside Port

Craig under a flag of truce, asserted that the post was
too strongly defended to be taken either by assault or
siege.After all views had been presented and dis
cussed, the council reached a decision.

The "Army of New

Mexico" would continue its northward march, leaving Port
Craig unmolested, for Sibley and his officers believed
20
that adequate supplies could be captured farther north.
Such an eventuality would lessen disaffection within the
ranks and would also render possible the continuance of
the campaign.

To have turned back now would have meant

17Ibid.,

509.

•^Connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862,

ibid., 639.
^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 68.,
20Sibley

508-509.

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX,
- - -
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the end of Sibley's dream after a fruitless expenditure
of time, money, and men. Prom the first the campaign had
been a gamble, and the decision to continue the advance
was another calculated risk.
Leaving the graves of their fallen comrades behind
them, the Texans began their northward march on February
23.

By taking prompt action, the Confederates prevented

a party of Federals from taking their cannon up the road
under a white flag.

As the Texans moved along, every

Mexican house which they passed displayed a "white flag
p*l

sticking upon the top.1

In this conflict between the

North and the South, the native population apparently
preferred to remain neutral.

While the bulk of the army

remained in camp during February 24, Lieutenant Colonel
H. C. McNeill took five companies of the Fifth Regiment
and rapidly set out on the road to Albuquerque as the
pp

advance guard.

McNeill's force consisted of about four
23
hundred men and two pieces of artillery.
* * *

*

^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 135.
22Noel,

A Campaign, 20-22.

23connelly

IX, 639.

to Seward, March 1, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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Meanwhile on the night of February 22, Colonel
Nicolas Pino, Second Regiment New Mexico Volunteers, set
out from Fort Craig with 280 men for Polvadera. Success
fully circumventing the Texans, Pino's force reached
Socorro—about thirty miles north of Fort Craig—on the
twenty-fourth.

While en route, many volunteer and militia

deserters were picked up and added to the command.

A

dispatch rider, overtaking the party at Limitar, brought
orders for Pino to fall back and station his men in and
around Socorro.

Pino paused briefly to rest his horses.

He ordered Major Ramon Sena y Rivera to continue north
ward with the deserters, while he and the main detachment
countermarched.

Reaching Socorro about dusk, Pino set up

his headquarters, and ordered a mounted guard of fourteen
men to take post south of the town.

At the same time a

strong guard took the column's animals out to graze.
Scarcely five minutes had elapsed after these arrange
ments had been made before Captain Cruz Gutierrez, in
charge of the mounted guard, sent word that Texas pickets
were approaching.

Quickly Pino ordered two companies to

reconnoiter on foot, while the animals were ordered back
and placed under guard in a nearby corral.

Below the

town, Lieutenant Colonel Baca posted his two companies
under the cover of some adobe walls, and then sent
Captain Gutierrez to dislodge the enemy pickets.
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Gutierrez had advanced but a short distance when the
Confederates fired a shot.

Baca's party thereupon dis

charged their rifles in the direction of the flash, and
it appeared that the Texans retired to their main body.
This action was immediately reported to Colonel Pino who
cautioned the officers of his command to keep their men
under arms in anticipation of immediate action.

As an

added security measure, the colonel sent small parties
pii
to cover the most important defensive points.
Lieutenant Colonel McNeill had not been idle; he
stationed the bulk of his forces on a strategic elevation
southwest of the town while Captain Prazier circled around
Socorro to cut off any possible retreat of the Federals
on the road north.

At about 8 o'clock p. m., McNeill

ordered a cannon ball fired over the town as a warning.
This was a wise move, for from that moment on, the New
Mexican militia and volunteers began "to desert and to
hide themselves away."2^

It was obvious that they had

had enough of the "terrible Texans" at Valverde.
As the New Mexican troops rapidly began to dis
integrate, Major Charles Wesche, a member of Governor

2^Wesche
25lbid.

to General, May 5# 1862, ibid., 605

2X0
Connelly's staff and now attached to Pino's force, sent
an urgent appeal to Camp Connelly for reinforcements.
Accompanied by the adjutant, Major Wesche visited the
homes of some of the influential Mexicans in a vain ef
fort to "make them take up arms in defense of their
Government, their homes, and firesides."

His entreaties

fell on deaf ears, and one Don Pedro Baca probably best
summed up the Mexicans1 sentiments when he replied that
"the United States Government was a curse to. .

./the/

Territory, and if the Texans would take and keep pos
session of New Mexico the change could only be for the
better."

Disheartened, Wesche returned to Pino's head-

26
quarters to relate the attitude of the citizenry.
After Wesche had returned, the alcalde (mayor)
of Socorro arrived to tell Colonel Pino that a Confeder
ate officer had come to his house to ask him to seek out
the Federal commander for an interview.

Instead of going

himself, the colonel sent Wesche to see the Texan.

The

major was conducted to the alcalde's home where he was
presented to Lieutenant William Simmons, C. S. A.
Simmons informed the major that Lieutenant Colonel
McNeill had instructed him to demand the unconditional
surrender of the town, and as such, he wished to be taken

26Ibid
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before the commanding officer.

Although Wesche assured

the lieutenant that Pino would not consent to such a
demand, Simmons was adamant.

The Texan was thereupon

conducted to Pino's headquarters where the demand for the
unconditional surrender of the town was again voiced.
Pino refused to capitulate, so Simmons reminded him that
failure to comply would mean an attack upon the town with
the consequent imperilling of the lives of innocent
families.

Pino was as anxious to spare the innocent

families as was McNeill, so he proposed that his force
meet the Confederates at daybreak to give battle on the
plain south of the town.

Simmons promised to inform

McNeill of that proposal and to return with his com
mander's answer.

Wesche mounted his horse to accompany

Simmons through the Union lines, and on the way he was
chagrined to find that the Federal pickets had all dis
appeared and that the Texans had advanced to "the very
houses of Socorro."

Shortly Wesche and Simmons came upon

Colonel McNeill and several other Texas officers.

After

listening to Lieutenant Simmons' report, McNeill decided
27
it would be best if he himself went to see Colonel Pino.
At the Federal headquarters, a conference was
held between Colonel Pino, Lieutenant Colonel Baca, and

27Ibid.,

605-606.
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Major Wesche for the Union, and Lieutenant Colonel
McNeill, Major Ragnet, and interpreter Stewart for the
Confederates.

Pino reiterated his desire not to expose

Socorro to battle, and he again proposed that his forces
meet the Texans the next morning on the open field.

The

Federals were trying to play for time, for they were
desperately hoping that their message for help would get
through.

Governor Connelly, General Hovey, and Adjutant

General Clever were thought to be at Polvadera, and it
was hoped that they would come to their relief with the
volunteers stationed at that place.

While the discussion

was still in progress, several Federal officers inter
rupted and asked to see Pino alone.

Once outside the

building, the officers informed the commander that all
their men had deserted.

Pino returned to the room, and

taking Major Wesche aside, asked him to find out the
state of affairs at the quarters.

As the major approached

the building, he discovered that a captain had to serve
as sentinel since all his men had left.
only about thirty-seven men.

Inside there were

The New Mexican troops had

all but completely disappeared.

Quickly Major Wesche re

turned to headquarters and quietly informed his colonel
of the hopeless state of affairs.

The conference con

tinued and McNeill made it clear that he would not wait
until morning.

The Texan maintained that he knew he had
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the advantage at the moment and, therefore, he demanded
the immediate surrender of the town.

Finally the Con

federate commander did offer somewhat of a compromise.
If Colonel Pino could give his word of honor that no one
of his command had written to anybody or otherwise given
notice of the approach of the Confederate troops, he would
agree to refrain from hostilities until daylight.

Since

Pino replied indirectly to this, the Texans considered
28
the conference at an end.
Several times throughout the discussion, McNeill
had invited Pino to visit his camp to see for himself that
his forces greatly outnumbered the Federals, thus making
resistance futile.

Colonel Pino now decided to accept the

invitation, and in company with Baca and Wesche, he rode
with the Texans to their camp and there saw "the long line
of rebels."

With apparently no relief coming from Camp

Connelly, Colonel Pino clearly saw the handwriting on the
wall.

He surrendered his command, or what remained of

it, at two o'clock a.m. on February 25.

After the sur

render had been negotiated, many Union militiamen came
out of their hiding places, and at least I50 took the
oath of neutrality that morning at ten o'clock.

Colonel

Pino, Lieutenant Colonel Baca, and Major Wesche were

28jbid., 606
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paroled.^

Successfully and bloodlessly, McNeill's ad

vance guard had cleared the way for the arrival of the
rest of the brigade.
McNeill's advance temporarily halted in Socorro
in order to set up a hospital to receive the brigade's
sick and wounded.

Searching about the village, a few

supplies were found and a large quantity of medicines
and "hospital necessaries" were located.

The medical

purveyor, Dr. E. N. Covey, acting as chief surgeon,
formally established the general hospital.
During the battle of Valverde many of the Fourth
Regiment's horses had been killed, leaving that body
"half foot and half mounted."

Lack of forage and over

work also had caused the loss of a great number of
mounts.

In order to make the brigade as a whole more
Q1
efficient,
the men of the Fourth were asked to turn
over their horses to the quartermaster so they could be
reapportioned to those needy units which were to remain
cavalry.

Since the horses were the private property of

the soldiers, it was necessary to receive their permis
sion before such a change could be made.

g9lbid.,

Colonel Scurry,

606-607.

3°Noel, A Campaign, 20.
31Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,

ix, 509.
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verbally backed by General Sibley, promised his men that
the government would reimburse them for their mounts at
their appraised valueScurry pointed out that since
the horses would probably die from the rigors of the
campaign, it would be a wise measure to get rid of them
33
now while they could receive compensation.
The
colonel's words had the desired effect.

According to

Sibley, "without a dissenting voice" this proud cavalry
regiment took the line of march as a strong and reliable
regiment of infantry

The battalion of the Seventh

had also lost many of its mounts, so it, too, voluntarily
dismounted.

The animals were distributed to the Fifth

Regiment and to the two batteries, Captain Teel's and
the one captured from the Federals—the "Valverde Bat
tery."

By this action the largest part of the "Army of

New Mexico" became infantry.^
Contrary to what Sibley reported, the men did
not take kindly to becoming infantry.

There was probably

nothing more degrading to a proud cavalryman than to be

32Noel, A Campaign, 20.
33Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.

ix,

3^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,

509.
35Noel, A Campaign, 21.
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reduced to the status of a foot soldier.

In addition,

the Texans were not accustomed to walking.

Loaded down

with gear, the troops found that a march of ten miles
made them so sore and tired that they were scarcely able
to drag themselves along.

The fact that Green's men

rode while the rest walked caused much resentment and
unrest.3^

On February 27» the main body of the brigade ar
rived in Socorro, pausing only to deposit the sick and
wounded, before moving on.

Foodstuffs were rapidly being

used up, and the men were facing the prospect of having
•37

to eat nothing but beef.

Such a situation could do

nothing but increase the dissatisfaction among the troops.
At Albuquerque was located a Federal depot.

This base

was known to have large quantities of supplies and if it
could be captured, perhaps all would soon be well.

Colonel Green, at the head of 400 cavalry, crossed to
the east side of the river, while Colonel McNeill, with
an equal number, remained on the west bank.

McNeill's

force, reinforced by part of Pyron's command and Company
A of the Seventh, was ordered to move with "all possible
haste" to Albuquerque.

Green, with his cavalry detachment,

3%eminiscences of H. C. Wright.
37paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 136.
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was to move with him on the opposite side of the Rio
Grande.3®
* *

*

*

After the defeat at Valverde, with the Texans
still occupying the battlefield, Canby saw three possible
courses of action. (1) He could attack the Confederates
again, and thus submit his portion of the Federal army in
New Mexico to the chances of battle. (2) Fort Craig
could be abandoned and the troops there rapidly marched
northward, circumventing the Texans.

Once above the Con

federates, Canby could then impede their northerly
progress.

In such an action, Canby could also join forces

with the Federal forces in the northern part of the terri
tory.

This course would involve the loss of many of the

supplies then at Fort Craig, the abandonment of an im
portant strategic point, as well as necessitate the leav
ing behind of the sick and wounded who could not be trans
ported. (3) Canby could retain Fort Craig while awaiting
the arrival of the reinforcements that had previously been
asked for.

Upon their arrival, concerted operations in

the direction of the Pecos and Rio Grande could be launched
in the effort to defeat the Texans.

Success would force

the Confederates to retreat down the Rio Grande and the

3%ioel, A Campaign, 22.
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troops at Port Craig would then be able to cut off their
escape.

Also while Sibley was involved further north,

the Federals at Fort Craig would be in a position to
launch an attack against the small Confederate force left
in the Mesilla Valley.
plan was the best.

In Canby's judgment, the last

In a council of war this was agreed

to "by the several commanders and functionaries of the
Territory," including the governor, who were consulted.
39
Measures were immediately taken to put it into effect.
After refusing to yield Fort Craig to the Con
federate emissaries, Canby expected the Texans to assault
40
his post when the truce period had terminated.
To
strengthen his position, the commander "disembarrassed"
himself of the militia by sending them away.^

This left

him with a force of about 2,000 Americans and about 1,500
New Mexican Volunteers.^2

Before the militia's departure,

Canby instructed the officers of those units to hinder the
operations of the Confederates as much as possible.

39canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 633.

^°connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 638.
^Canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 633.
^2connelly to Secretary of State, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 639.
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Should the Texans attempt to move up the river, the
militiamen were to obstruct their movements as well as
cut off their supplies by removing from their route the
cattle, grain, and other goods in private hands which
would aid the enemy.

All the government-owned animals

which were not required for immediate use at the fort
were also sent away since there was not an adequate supiiQ
ply of forage for them at the post. J
Canby set about organizing a partisan force com
posed of picked men from the volunteers whose purpose was
to harass the Texans by operating on their flanks.

The

night after the battle, Canby sent instructions to his
subordinate officer commanding in the north to remove or
destroy any public property which might possibly fall
into the hands of the Confederates.

Major James L.

Donaldson, chief quartermaster, volunteered to carry out
the above order.

During the night of February 22, he set

out with the militia.

Donaldson was "charged with the

duty of superintending the removal of the public property,
procuring supplies, and collecting troops for future
operations.Canby authorized the major to use his name
to take such steps as he deemed best.^5

if the Texans

^3canby to Adjutant-General, February 23, 1862,
ibid., 633.
44Ibid.,

633-634.

^^Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636.
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should decide to advance northward, Canby planned to send
part of his regular cavalry at Fort Craig to reinforce
the troops in the northern part of the territory.

After

making all these preparations, commander Canby averred
that "If there be any consistency of purpose or per
sistence of effort in the people of New Mexico, the enemy
will be able to add but little to his resources from a
temporary occupation of the country.
Governor Connelly, seeing that his "presence out
of the capital would be of no further utility," decided
to accompany Donaldson and the militia force.

During the

night march, the great bulk of the militia deserted and
headed for their homes.

As a result, Donaldson and

Connelly were left with only a handful of men.

On the

morning of their arrival on the river, Donaldson heard
that McNeill's advance guard was on its way to capture
the depot of supplies at Polvadera.

To prevent this, the

provisions were hastily gathered up and sent off.

Governor

Connelly, in company with a few militia officers, arrived
47
in Santa Fe on February 27.
When Canby learned that the Confederates had begvui their northward march and did not plan to attack the

^6canby to Adjutant-General, February 23* 1862,
ibid., 633.
^Connelly "to Seward, March 1, 1862, ibid.,
638-639.
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fort, he ordered a full dress procession to pay military
honors to the deceased Union soldiers.
place at nine o'clock on February 25.

The parade took
The firing party

was composed of a section of the battery and an infantry
battalion of four companies. Each regiment which did not
furnish a portion of the firing squad was represented in
the procession by one of its companies.

During the cere

monies the remainder of the troops which did not take
part in the procession, paraded under arms at their ap
propriate stations.

Canby solemnly asked his men to

"join him in the prayer that He who tempers the wind to
the shorn lamb will deal tenderly with the bereaved rela
tives and friends of the brave dead, and that they will
unite with him in commending their memory to the respect
and admiration of our countrymen.11

"While sorrowing

for. . ./£he7 dead and sympathizing with. . .^his/ wounded
comrades," Canby expressed his "heartfelt admiration of
the gallant conduct and heroic acts of all who were en
gaged in the desperate struggle of the battle."

The

commander assured his men that what had been "lost with
out loss of honor. . .^/would/7 yet be gloriously retrieved,
and that the battle of Valverde. . .^A7ould7 be ranked as
one in which all its actors were entitled to the gratitude
and respect of their country."2*®

The deceased were

^General Order No. 11, February 24, 1862, ibid.,
513-514.
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interred in the post cemetary just a short distance from
the fort and located on a slight bluff overlooking the
Rio Grande.
On the afternoon of March 1, Captain Herbert M.
Enos, Assistant Quartermaster at Albuquerque, received
reliable information that a body of about four hundred
Texans had reached the town of Belen, thirty-five miles
below.

The captain, in command of twelve regulars and

several militia and volunteer companies, quickly made
preparations to destroy all the public property and
supplies which could not be carried off.

About six

o'clock that night an express rider brought the news
that a party of about fifty Texans had reached Los Lunas
and had captured a civilian-owned wagon train which had
been carrying government supplies.

Enos had already

loaded what ammunition and ordnance stores Bronson, the
ordnance agent, considered important enough to carry
away.

These were started on the road to Santa Fe.

eight or nine teams remained.

Some

Enos ordered them harness

ed and made ready to move at a moment's notice for they
were needed to carry his troops'

baggage.^

The night passed without the Texans making an
appearance.

But believing that they would be arriving

^9Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862, ibid.,
527-528.
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soon, and not hearing of any Federal troops coming to his
support from Santa Fe, Enos gave the order to burn the
public property at six-thirty on the morning of March 2.
The destruction would have been complete had it not been
for the Mexican men, women, and children of the town.
They had been up all night waiting anxiously for the op
portunity to seize any government supplies they could.
The only property which was not burned consisted of
molasses, vinegar, soap, and candles in the subsistence
department.

In addition there were a few saddles,

carpenter's tools, and office furniture in the quarter
master's department.

Most of these articles were carried

off by the Mexicans.

As it would have been impossible

with his small force, as well as the short time at his
disposal, to have removed the property from the buildings,
Captain Enos found it necessary to set fire to those
structures housing the- supplies.

Enos believed that even

had he been able to carry the goods out to be burned, the
natives would have overpowered him and saved the property
for the enemy.5°

it was later reported that the fire

spread and destroyed several privately-owned buildings.5^

5°ibid., 528.
5^-Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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The last five wagons which left Albuquerque for
Santa Pe were escorted by volunteers and militia.

While

in camp near the Indian village of Sandia, about twelve
miles north, the train was attacked by deserters from the
militia and volunteers.

The escort was thrown into such

confusion that the bandits were able to carry off three
wagons and some of the mules.

It was mainly because of

wagon-master Reilley that the bandits did not get the
other two as well.

Six wagons and teams which had been

sent to the mountains for fuel on the morning of March 1,
and later ordered by Enos to move on to Santa Pe by way
of Galisteo, were also attacked by Mexican bandits and
52
carried off.
* * * *

As the "Army of New Mexico" pushed up the Rio
Grande Valley, the country continued to appear barren
and forbidding.

Grass and wood were scarce and in one

instance, the Texans forced the alcalde of a small village
to furnish fire wood.

One soldier's opinion, probably

typical of most, was that this country was "never intended
for white folks."

In fact, he disgustedly commented that

the first man that ever came to this land should have been
killed by the Indians.

On the night of March 6, the

52Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 528.
- - -
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Confederates held a council of war to determine whether
or not the officers were willing to continue.

Paced with

near starvation, and with the enemy behind and before
them, a majority were opposed to going on.

They were

overruled, however, and the advance to Albuquerque was
continued.
As Major Charles L. Pyron's men led the advance
toward Albuquerque,^ three large columns of smoke in the
distance told the tale of Enos1 destruction of most of
the supplies there.

Shortly after their arrival in town,

a man by the name of Richmond Gillespie arrived with
dispatches from a Dr. F. E. Kavenaugh who was "commanding"
the temporary post of Cubero, sixty miles to the West.
Gillespie reported that the depot was well supplied and
he urged the importance of sending a small Confederate
force there without delay.

In compliance, Major Pyron

dispatched Captain A. S. Thurmond with Company A of the
Seventh Regiment to Cubero with instructions to "occupy
the post and send forward as rapidly as possible all
supplies and stores that might fall into his hands at that
place."55

53Paulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 136-137.
3^Noel, A Campaign, 23.

55lbid.
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Dr. Kavenaugh operated a store at the village of
Cubero, and he and Richmond Gillespie, George Gardenhier,
c6
and R. T. Thompson were the only white inhabitants.-^
Being men of pronounced Southern sympathies, they daring
ly planned to seize the Federal depot there.

The post

was commanded by Captain Francisco Aragon, whose force
consisted of forty-two native New Mexicans and three
Americans, and an American surgeon, Dr. Boyd.

Fully aware

of the attitude of the Mexicans toward the war, Dr.
Gillespie "in command of his three companions,11 bravely
notified Captain Aragon at 9:00 a.m. on March 3, to sur
render his post to them in the name of the Confederacy.
Aragon was given ten minutes to reach a decision.

At the

end of the allotted time, Aragon had not returned an
answer, so Kavenaugh sent one of his party to demand an
immediate reply.

Having no desire to fight for a cause

in which he had no interest whatsoever, Aragon decided to
surrender his command to the four Southerners.

"Upon

taking command of the post Dr. Kavenaugh sent Richmond
Gillespie to Albuquerque to bring the news before the
Confederate commander so a sufficient force could be sent
to occupy the post."

The area between Cubero and Albu

querque was hostile Navajo Indian country, and Gillespie's
lone mission across that sixty miles was very dangerous.

56ib id.
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Dr. Gillespie furnished Captain Aragon and his company
with sufficient arms and transportation to take them
safely to Albuquerque.

Upon arrival at that town they

promised to "deliver the Government property furnished
them to the Confederate States Army officer commanding
there."

A "large and valuable lot of quartermasters,

commissary, and ordnance stores" were seized at Cubero,
as well as a large amount of needed medicines and other
medical supplies.

"There was not less than 60 arms and
cy
3,000 rounds of ammunition surrendered."-^
Captain Thurmond and his company of twenty-five
men arrived at Cubero at 2:00 p.m. on March 5* and the
following day Dr. Kavenaugh formally turned over the
command to him.5®

Thurmond immediately gathered up the

stores, and twenty-five wagons carried the goods to
Albuquerque.59

George Gardenhier, one of Kavenaugh's

party was especially helpful in acting as assistant
quartermaster and commissary.

Thurmond was also much

impressed by another of Kavenaugh's "command," R. T.
Thompson.

According to the captain, Thompson had, "not

^^Thurmond to Officer Commanding C. S. Forces,
March 19, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 529.
58lb id.
59Noel, A Campaign, 23.
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only at the capture of the post, but always been truly
Southern, being a Virginian by birth, and certainly his
services were most efficient in carrying out the duties
of adjutant, treating the enemy always with much
leniency, but with the sternness and decision of a true
Southern gentleman."

Dr. Boyd, the Federal surgeon, ap

parently manifested Southern sympathies, for Thurmond
remarked that he "is also among us, a gentleman of high
medical attainments, and was at the time doing the
Texans valuable service," as Thurmond had quite a number
of cases of pleurisy in his company.^0

Kavenaugh,

Gillespie, Thompson, and Gardenhier rendered the Con
federates a great favor by capturing and securing these
desperately needed supplies.

It is no wonder that

Captain Thurmond praised these gentlemen most highly in
his official report.
On March 7, the bulk of the brigade arrived in
Albuquerque

Sibley and his staff set up temporary

6P
headquarters, and the town was formally occupied. 41

At

a ceremony in the plaza, thirteen cannons roared a

^Thurmond to Officer Commanding C. S. Forces,
March 19, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 529-530.
^^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit137.

6^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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salute as the Confederate banner was raised to flutter
in the cool New Mexican breezeIn an effort to gain
the support of the people as well as to weaken the
Federal forces in the Territory, Sibley issued the fol
lowing proclamation:
TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW MEXICO:

The signal victory which crowned our arms at
Valverde on the 21st of February proves the truth of
the assertions contained in my first Proclamation in
regard to our powers and ability to accomplish the
purposes therein declared. Those of you who volun
teered in the Federal service were doubtless deceived
by designing officials and interested citizens. The
militia were driven to the field by force of arms.
Under these circumstances I deem it proper and but
just to declare a complete and absolute amnesty to
all citizens who have, or may within ten days lay
aside their arms and return to their homes and
avocations.
The conduct of this army since its entrance into
the Territory of New Mexico attests the honesty and
integrity of our purpose, and the protection it has
and can afford to the citizens of the country.
Return then with confidence to your homes and
to your avocations, and fear not the result.

Given at Albuquerque under my hand this 13th day
of March 1862.
(Signed) H. H. Sibley
Brig. General^.
Commanding. 4
Sibley observed that the wealthy Mexican citizens
of Albuquerque "had been completely drained by the Federal

^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 137.
6^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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powers, and adhering to them, had become absolute
followers of their army for dear life and their invested

dollars."^

indeed, the Santa Fe Gazette reported that

many had fled their homes when the Texans were reported
to be nearing.

Sibley believed that although political

ly the Mexicans had no "distinct sentiment or opinion" on
the secession issue, it was power and interest alone which
controlled the "expression of their sympathies."
and Manuel Armijo were two notable exceptions.

Rafael

When

Sibley entered Albuquerque, they boldly came forward, ex
pressed their Southern sympathies, and placed their
stores, containing goods amounting to $200,000 at the
disposal of the Texas troops.^

The Armijo brothers were

among the wealthiest native merchants and ranchers in the
territory.

Manuel had been governor of New Mexico under
fiPt

the Mexican Republic.

He had also been in the militia

and had been "compulsorily" present at the battle of

65sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
DC, 511.
^Santa pe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
^Tsibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 511.
~
^^Edward D. Tittmann, "The Exploitation of
Treason," New Mexico Historical Review, IV (April, 1929)»
138.

231
6<3

Valverde. ^

Rafael owned stores in several villages, as

70

well as having heavy investments in and around Mesilla.

The Confederates confiscated the contents of the
stores of Clark and the Spiegelberg brothers as these men
were sutlers for the Union army.

All persons who had

taken any public property before the arrival of the
Texans, were ordered to turn it over to Confederate
authorities.

At Carnuel Pass a small party of Confeder

ates captured a train of twenty-three wagons which was
loaded with provisions destined for Canby's command at
Port Craig.H

The supplies secured at Cubero, Albu

querque, Carnuel Pass—and those later taken in Santa
Fe—gave the brigade about a three-month supply.

Albu

querque was selected as the supply depot for the "Army
of New Mexico."^
* * * *

During the first few days of March, Major James
L. Donaldson, now commanding the District of Santa Pe,

69sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
DC, 511.
~
7°Tittmann, "The Exploitation of Treason,11
loc. cit., 138.
71santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
72sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0, R. A.,

ix, 509-510.
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had decided to abandon the capital.

The major reasoned

that Santa Fe was not defensible since it was bounded on
all sides by hills.

His only alternative was to fall

back to the safety of Fort Union.

The most valuable

stores in the department—about a quarter of a million
dollars' worth—were loaded into 120 wagons and sent to
Fort Union on March 3.

The train required all the availa73

ble troops in the district as an escort.

On February 27> Canby had sent Captains R. S. C.
Lord and George w. Rowland, each with fifty cavalrymen,
to Santa Fe to observe the enemy as well as to bolster
the defenses there.

Even with these additional troops,

Donaldson did not have a strong enough force to hold the
74
town.
The major's small army was also augmented by the
arrival of Captain James II. Ford's company of Colorado
75
Volunteers.
Companies A and B, which were to eventually be
come the nucleus of the Second Regiment, Colorado Volun
teers, had been organized in the fall of 1861.

Ford's

company was ordered to Fort Garland where, on December 24,

73Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, ibid., 527;
Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
74paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 646.

75whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 43-44.
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it was mustered into service for three years.

Captain

Dodd's Company A—the "Foot Volunteers"—had received
marching orders earlier and had reached Port Craig in
time to engage in the battle of Valverde.

On February 4,

Ford's company was instructed to proceed rapidly to Santa
Fe and there await further orders
After drawing ten days' rations, Company B set
out on probably one of the most perilous marches of the
war.

Three wagons, each pulled by a yoke of six oxen,

carried the provisions and supplies.

The company first

planned to take the shortest route across the San
Antonio Mountains, but as the command progressed, the
snow became deeper and the road worse.

Scouts were

dispatched ahead to see if it was possible to get
through, and they returned with the discouraging news
that the mountain pass was impassable since in places it
was blocked by forty feet of snow.

The Coloradoans had

to backtrack to the Rio Grande where they crossed over
to take the more southern route through the Taos Valley.
Even on this new road the going was hard and some days
the command could progress only about two miles.

Night

snows covered up tents, wagons, and all traces of the
road, and squads of soldiers had to be sent ahead to

76Ibid.
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"break the track."

Others with shovels preceded the

teams to clear the way for the oxen and wagons.

Ac

companying the company on this most difficult trek was
the wife of the bugler and her two small children.

Her

baby boy "was most of the time in the arms of one or
other of the soldiers, his comrade relieving him of his
gun."

Riding in the wagons was impossible, since to re

main inactive was to expose oneself to the possibility
of freezing, or to risk rolling down the mountainside,
"as one misstep of the poor toiling oxen might have
hurled the wagons down into the deep ravines burying all
out of sight in the snow."^
At Santa Fe, Donaldson and his officers became
alarmed when the Coloradoans did not arrive.
were sent out to find them.

Scouts

Once they were located,

Donaldson sent mules to relieve their jaded oxen,^ for
it was all important that they join the garrison at
Santa Fe before the town was abandoned.

After a harrow

ing adventure of twenty-eight days, Company B arrived in
the New Mexican capital on March

4,

the very day that

Donaldson planned to leave for Port Union.79

77Ellen Williams, Three Years and a Half in the
Army (New York, 1885), 8-lTI
78Ibid.,

13.

79whitford, Colorado Volunteers,

44.
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The major ordered that all supplies which could
not be carried to Port Union were to be destroyed.

Two

storehouses which contained large quantities of flour
were burned.

Donaldson made certain that little was left

for the Texans, except two large hay ricks which were in
the government corral.

These were left untouched, since

to have set them afire would have endangered nearby build
ings.

Even the flag pole was cut down so the Confeder

ates would "never have the chance of raising their flag
on it."81
On March 4, Donaldson called his troops into line
and set out for Port Union.82

With the capital undefend

ed, and its capture by the Texans imminent, Governor
Connelly decided to accompany the troops.

He later

established the executive department at Las Vegas, about
thirty miles west of Port Union.

The command of about

two hundred men8^ consisted of Captain W. H. Lewis'
company of the Fifth Infantry, Lieutenant Sidney Banks1
Company E, Third Cavalry, Captain Ford's Colorado
company, and two howitzers under Lieutenant C. J. Walker,

8oSanta

Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.

8lWilliams,
82lbid.,

15.

83connelly

IX, 645.

Three Years, 30.

to Seward, March 11, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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Second Cavalry.

Some volunteers commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Manuel Chavez also accompanied the party.

But

by the time the column had safely arrived at Port Union,
all the volunteers except Chavez and a few officers had
OJi
deserted. H
The Federal soldiers' wives, including Colonel
Canby's wife, were not allowed to accompany their
husbands to Fort Union.

Before leaving, Donaldson's

men gathered up all the supplies they could find for the
use of the women.

When the troops departed, the Mexi

cans lost no time in plundering what had been left be
hind.

For several days the white ladies feared that the

Mexicans might harm them.

Fortunately, the Mexicans had

a "scare" put into them by the arrival of two Texans.
These men had been previously arrested in Santa Fe as
spies and had been released after the Federal troops had
concentrated at Fort Union.

Since the Mexicans stood in

"great fear" of Texans, the warning "Tejanol Tejanol"
was shouted throughout the town.®5
Sibley's men were having a difficult enough time
trying to feed themselves, let alone their prisoners.

^Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, ibid., 527.
85williams, Three Years, 15-17.
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When the main body reached Albuquerque, the Texans re
leased eight prisoners of war that had been captured at
the battle of Valverde.

The men, an officer and several

privates of the regular army, and one or two of Dodd's
Colorado company, made their way northward and entered
Santa Fe "weary, worn, and footsore.11

They planned to

continue on to their respective commands at Port Union,
but Mrs. Canby talked them into staying for a few hours
to rest.^
* * * *

Major Charles L. Pyron's advance guard did not
remain in Albuquerque.

The force continued northward to

Santa Fe to occupy the capital and to secure any sup
plies which might be found.

On March 10, eleven Con

federates rode into Santa Fe.

Most of this advance group

were not actually Texans, but were New Mexicans or Arizonians who had gone to Mesilla to join Baylor earlier in
the war.®7

These men began to seize all they could lay

their hands on in the town and from the soldiers' wives.
The officer in command of this contingent was Captain
Battles.

Fortunately, the wife of a Colorado captain was

acquainted with him, and she requested that he put an end

86Ibid.,

19.

®7santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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to the plundering.

The captain complied and, as far as

the women were concerned, the "scare was at an end."®®
On March 13* Major Pyron, with seventy of his command,
entered Santa Fe®9 and the second oldest town in what is
novi the United States was formally occupied in the name
of the Confederacy.
The Santa Pe Gazette, which at one time had been
a pro-Southern newspaper, had since become staunchly
Union in sentiment.9^

On March 22, Pyron seized the

Gazette office after the delivery of the following letter
to the editor:
SANTA FE NEW MEXICO
March 22th 1862.
Mr. John T. Russell
Sir. You deliver to the barrer the keys of the
printing of the Santa Fe Gazett.
C. L. Pyron C. S. A.
Maj. Comd'g Santa Fe .91
While Pyron was on his way to Santa Fe, Sibley
sent a detachment of the Fifth Regiment to patrol the

88v/illiams, Three Years, 19.
89santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.

9C>Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 386.
9-^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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mountain passes to the east.

This was a security measure

designed to report any intended junction of Canby's
forces with those at Fort Union.

As the force proceeded

toward the mountains, the country appeared to be more
desolate than ever.

One soldier described it as "en

tirely worthless--unfit for anything at all."

Apparently

the officers of this detachment were as disgusted with
the situation as their men, for they were "drunk all the
time, unfit for duty."^2
The detachment encamped for awhile on Spruce M.
Baird's Ranch.

Baird, an outspoken Southerner, was a

lawyer who had come to New Mexico as the representative
of Texas when that state was claiming New Mexico to the
Rio Grande.

After the boundary settlement, Baird settled

down in the territory.

Some sheep, which were described

as being almost unfit to eat, were butchered for food.
A heavy snow fell upon the camp on March 13t and without
tents or shelter of any kind, the men suffered severely.
The following day the sun melted the snow and everything
became wet and sloppy, forcing the soldiers to spend most
of the day busily engaged in drying their blankets and
clothing.

At this time the troops were issued new

garments to replace their worn and tattered ones.

92Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 137.

The
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mountains were still covered with snow, and the wind,
which "blew from the east, was bitterly cold.

On March 18,

while the detachment was encamped at Sour Spring, Major
John S. Shropshire was ordered to take Companies A, B, C,
and D of the Fifth Regiment and proceed to Santa Fe to
reinforce

Pyron.93

Shropshire, with his approximately
. 04
200 cavalrymen, reached the capital on March 24.
The
95
remainder of the detachment returned to Albuquerque.-^
The Confederates had been in Albuquerque for
several weeks.

Having secured all the available sup

plies in the area, Sibley now decided to move against
Fort Union.

Colonel William R. Scurry, in command of

the Fourth Regiment and the battalion of the Seventh
under Major Powhatan Jordan, was sent forward by way of
Galisteo.

Colonel Green's Fifth Regiment, "being some

what crippled in transportation," temporarily stayed in
Albuquerque to check any movement which might come from
Fort Craig.^

Captain Bethel Coopwood's company of

Arizona Rifles and Captain William P. Hardeman's company

93rbid., 137-138;

Noel, A Campaign, 2 3 .

9^Santa Fe Gazette, April 2 6 , 1 8 6 2 .
95Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 138.
96sibley
ix,

509.

to Cooper, May 4 , 1 8 6 2 , 0 . R. A.,
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of the Fourth were to garrison the post at Albuquerque.97
Sibley knew that Fort Union was the key to the
entire territory.

If that post should fall, invaluable

supplies would be seized, Canby would be helplessly cut
off from aid, and virtually the whole of New Mexico
would lay prostrate at his feet.
California, of course, was the ultimate goal of
the campaign, but what of the territories of Colorado
and Utah?

It is not certain what the Confederates

planned to do after the capture of Fort Union.

Did

Sibley intend to march directly into Colorado from that
post, or did he plan to backtrack southward, force
Canby's surrender, and then return to invade Colorado?
Perhaps he thought of moving to California immediately
after the capitulation of Fort Craig, for he may have
concluded that victory in New Mexico would inspire an
adequate number of recruits from Colorado to join his
forces, thus making an invasion of that territory un
necessary.

Realistically, however, it would have been

dangerous to leave Colorado behind without first
pacifying the area.

In marching to the Pacific coast,

Sibley's supply lines would be longer than ever.
retention of Colorado by the Union would allow the

9^Noel, a Campaign, 25.
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Federals to send reinforcements to the territory from
Port Leavenworth, forces which could descend to threaten
the Confederate lifeline.

Whether or not he planned to

deal with Canby first, it is reasonable to assume that
Sibley intended to march into Colorado from Fort Union.
The occupation of that area would not only assure the
securing of his line of communication in his ultimate
movement toward California, but it would also mean the
gaining of new recruits and control over the valuable
gold fields there.

From Colorado the Confederates could

send agents to Utah to enlist new soldiers, or they could
march in with a sizeable force to accomplish their ends.
In addition, both Colorado and Utah would be valuable for
supplying the Texans with needed provisions and material.
Once his army was augmented by volunteers and
supplies from Colorado and Utah, Sibley would be in a
position to move against California.

The Confederates

probably intended to invade that state through the
southern route, following the Butterfield Trail.

If

Canby had not already surrendered, Sibley's greatly in
creased army, returning southward after being in Colorado
and Utah, could easily have overwhelmed the garrison at
Fort Craig.

The way to California would then be open.

At the moment, however, everything in the Confederate
timetable depended upon the fall of Fort Union.

CHAPTER IX
THE ARRIVAL OP THE COLORADO VOLUNTEERS IN NEW MEXICO

After the disaster of Valverde, Colonel Gabriel
R. Paul, the commander of Port Union, assumed command of
"all troops, posts, and depots" in New Mexico which were
not immediately under the command of Colonel Cariby.-1Paul was the second ranking officer in the department.
The action did not imply that Paul was superseding or
even equating himself with Canby in authority.

Since the

commander of the department was cut off from regular com
munication, Paul was merely assuming authority in the
northern district as Canby's subordinate.
A Union soldier described the commander of Fort
Union as follows:
Col. Paul of the Fourth New Mexican is a sterling
officer—one of the few never cursed by the soldiers.
The best tactician in New Mexico and a strict disci
plinarian, he yet combines so much judgment and tact
in the discharge of his duty as to seldom give of
fense. His pluck is indomitable, as was proven on
the bloody fields of Mexico, and his men place all
confidence in his thorough devotion to the cause of
the Government. Of a medium size, the severe regu
larity of his features, his silvery hair and gentle
manly carriage compel respect. He dresses in

•'•Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, O.R.A.,
IX, 645-646.
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citizen's clothes, puts on no unwarrantable airs,
but quietly attends to his own affairs. Prom close
observation I caught the impression that Paul is a
man of deep and earnest convictions, endowed with
the courage to follow wherever they lead—as a
soldier, brave and true, quick to decide and prompt
to execute.
As the Confederates continued their northward
advance, Paul reported that the state of affairs in the
Department of New Mexico had been daily going from bad
to worse.

The bulk of the militia and considerable

numbers of the volunteers had deserted and "taken to the
mountains."

Robbery and plunder seemed to be the order

of the day.

Although he was probably exaggerating, Paul

maintained that there was "general panic in the country,
and people. . .^/were/ flying from their homes."
The native New Mexican troops had proven sorely
disappointing.

Major James L. Donaldson, who was

exasperated by their conduct, maintained that no reliance
could be placed on either the militia or the volunteers.
He advised that they be formally disbanded.

According to

the major, they had a traditional fear of the Texans and
would not face them in the field

2Hollister,

Captain Gurden Chapin,

A History of the First, 102.

3paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 645-646.

Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636.
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Cabby's assistant adjutant, after observing that the
militia had run away and that the volunteers were desert
ing in large numbers, expressed much the same attitude.
To him the native troops were "worse than worthless;
they. . ./were/ really aids to the enemy, who. . .
/paught/ them, . . ,/too\£/ their arms, and. . ,/^old/
them to go home.From Port Craig, Canby warned his
£

subordinates, "Do not trust the Mexican troops."

Even

Governor Connelly, who had written glowing letters about
the merits and spirit of the New Mexican troops before
the battle of Valverde, had changed his mind.

Dejectedly

he reported that the militia had all dispersed and had
gone home to prepare their lands for the coming harvest.
Connelly admitted that this was by far the best use that

7 The actions and attitude of the

could be made of them.

native New Mexican population made it quite clear that if
the Union was to successfully hold the territory, it
would have to do it with white troops.
Even before the battle of Valverde, Colonel Canby
had sent urgent appeals to the governor of Colorado for

^Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid., 634.
^Canby to Donaldson, March 7> 1862, ibid., 647.
^Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, ibid., 645.
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reinforcements.

Though only one company of Colorado

volunteers had arrived in time to take part in the en
counter, Cariby's pleas had some effect.

On February 10,

Major General David Hunter, commander of the Department
of Kansas, to -which Colorado was - attached, instructed
Acting Governor Lewis Weld to send all the available force
at his disposal to reinforce Canby and to keep open his
line of communication through Port Wise.
to act promptly.

Weld was urged

Basing his decisions upon the latest

information, he was to take whatever measures he deemed
necessary, and to send the Colorado troops

where

they

8

would do the most good.

Governor William Gilpin, who earlier had taken
measures to raise sufficient volunteer forces in Colorado,
had failed to obtain Federal appropriations for the de
fense of the territory.

He therefore resorted to the un

authorized issuance of drafts on the United States
Treasury.

The drafts were used to buy ammunition and

supplies for the equipping of the volunteer companies
which were being organized.9

jf any citizen refused to

^Hunter to Acting Governor of Colorado, February
10, 1862, ibid., 630.
9percy S. Fritz, Colorado, The Centennial State
(New York, 1941), 202.
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accept these "Gilpin drafts," he was informed, "Now this
is only a question of whether you will take them as an
evidence of indebtedness or whether we take the property
without any evidence of it.
$375*000 were issued.^

Drafts to the amount of

When they were at first not

recognized by the Federal government, financial distress
ensued and a strong faction in the territory demanded the

IP
governor's removal.

Gilpin was recalled to Washington

to explain his conduct.

While he was away, Lewis Weld,

the territorial secretary, assumed the duties of the
governorship.
Weld attempted to notify the commander of the
Department of New Mexico that he had ordered seven
companies of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers to
march to Santa Fe.'1'^

Since Canby was still at Fort Craig

and cut off from regular communication, Major Donaldson,

•L0John M. Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment
(MS., Bancroft Library, University of California).
llpritz, Colorado, 202.
^Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Nevada, Colorado,
and Wyoming (San Francisco, 1890J, 426^27^
•^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 53, 75.

l^Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, £.R.A_.*
IX, 631.

/
/
/
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commanding in Santa Fe, received the notice of the send
ing of reinforcements.

Quickly he dispatched a trusty-

messenger to Canby to tell him of the coming of the
15
Colorado regiment.
Three companies of the First Colorado were
stationed at Fort Wise, Colorado.

Since Weld believed

that Canby would want these troops also, the acting
governor notified Lieutenant Colonel Samuel F. Tappan to
consider himself under Canby's orders.

Fort Wise was an

important post in holding open the line of communication
with the east.

Weld suggested that the post might be

held by a detachment of New Mexican troops, thus freeing
1fi
Tappan's men for field duty.

Acting for Canby, Donald

son lost no time in instructing Tappan to join the other
companies of his regiment which were coming to New Mexico
by way of Fort Garland
After ordering all the available troops in his
territory to the aid of Colonel Canby, Weld expressed the
hope that the Colorado Volunteers would prove to be ef
ficient and would ably support the Union cause in New

1^Donaldson

to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636.

^Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, ibid., 631-632.
•^Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636.
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Mexico.

The governor "trusteed/ that their enthusiasm

and patriotic bravery. . .^AFould7 make amends, and more
than that, for their lack of active service in the
past."1^
Although the Colorado troops were known to be on
their way, several of Canby's subordinates believed that
more reinforcements would be necessary.

Captain Gurden

Chapin sent a dispatch to Major General Henry W. Halleck,
commanding the Department of the Missouri.

The captain

explained that he would have sent his communication to
General Hunter, a nearer military commander, but he
feared that Hunter would be absent in the field when his
letter arrived.

Chapin asserted that New Mexico was in a

critical condition, and though aware that a force of
Colorado volunteers was on the way, he feared that the
regiment might not arrive in time to save the Federal
forces in New Mexico from immediate danger.

To Chapin

*!

the conquest of the territory by the Texans was a "great
political feature of the rebellion."

It would gain the

Confederates a name and prestige in Europe and operate
against the Union cause.

The invasion should therefore

not only be checked, but it should in the future be

"^Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, ibid., 632.
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"rendered impossible."

The captain believed that the

Texans would not rest with the forces that they already
had with them.

He believed that they would attempt to

get large additions to their army in New Mexico in order
to extend their conquest toward Mexico and southern
California.

Chapin begged "in the name of Colonel Cariby,

who. . .^/wa£7 fighting two to one, and laying valuable
lives upon this issue, to send at once—lose not a day—
at least two regiments infantry and a battery of rifled
cannon to Port Union.
could serve no

According to Chapin these troops

better way than by saving New Mexico for

the Union.^
Before abandoning Santa Fe, Major James L.
Donaldson had also sent out urgent pleas for more rein
forcements.

The major notified General Lorenzo Thomas,

adjutant general of the army, that he considered Cariby's
situation as critical, and advised that no time be lost

20
in sending reinforcements.

Donaldson also wrote to

General Halleck and informed him that although a regiment
of Coloradoans was on the way, the snow was deep on the
Taos Mountains and he feared that the men would not get

"^Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, ibid.,
634-635.
20Donaldson

to Thomas, March 1, 1862, ibid., 636.
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through in time.

Donaldson "urgently recommended" that

four regiments of infantry, some cavalry, and a battery

Pi
of rifled cannon be sent at once to Port Union.
Colonel Paul at Port Union was also impressed
with the gravity of the situation.

He urged that a re

inforcement of 4,000 men, two batteries of rifled cannon,
and six siege pieces be sent to New Mexico immediately.
To insure an adequate consideration of the territory's
plight, Paul ordered Major Donaldson to go to Washington,
D. C. "to represent the interests and wants of the depp

partment" and to "enter more fully into details."
As the Confederates continued their northward
advance, Colonel Paul began concentrating the Union troops
in the northern district at Port Union.

At that post he

began organizing and equipping a column with the intention
of marching southward to form a junction with Cariby's
forces.

Once the Union troops in the territory were

united, Paul believed that the Federals would be able to

2*3
drive the Texans out.

On March 9> Paul sent a dispatch

to Canby in which he unfolded his plan to unite the
forces.

According to this arrangement, Paul would move

^Donaldson to Halleck, March 1, 1862, ibid., 637*
22Paul

to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862,

ibid., 646.
23Ibid.
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southward from Port Union on March 24.

By taking a back

road, avoiding the Rio Grande Valley and the Texans, he
and his column of 1,200 troops and four guns, expected
to arrive two days later at the village of Anton Chico.
Here he would await the arrival of Canby's men, which, if
they left on March 20, could arrive five days later.
Should the Confederates threaten either his position or
that of Canby's before the junction was made, Paul planned
to continue his southward march, until he met Canby's
column.

Paul suggested that in order to confuse the

Texans as to his true intent, Canby should send his
mounted men with two guns to a point about thirty or
forty miles up the river from La Joya.

This feint would

make it appear that the Federals planned to attack the
Confederates in the rear.

While the Texans were being

deceived, Canby's main column could proceed safely to
Socorro and across to Abo Pass and Punta del Agua.

With

a mountain range between him and the Rio Grande Valley,
Canby could easily reach Anton Chico without fear of
24
molestation.
In a dispatch dated March 14, Canby ap
proved of Paul's plan, and the commander of Fort Union
25
hastened to complete the organization of his column.
* * * *

2^Paul to Canby, March 9, 1862, ibid., 653.
25paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862,
ibid., 652.
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During the latter part of August, 1861, the First
Regiment Colorado Volunteers was organized.

The nucleus

was two volunteer companies which had already been raised.
John P. Slough, the captain of Company A, was appointed
colonel.

Samuel P. Tappan, captain of Company B, became

lieutenant colonel, and John M. Chivington was commis-

26

sioned a major.

After the organization of the regiment,

the women of Denver City presented the unit with a "hand
some" silk flag.2?

on the Platte River, two miles from

the center of Denver City, barracks were erected and the
encampment was named Camp Weld, in honor of the territorial
secretary.2^
The regiment may have been composed of good
material in the main; but it nonetheless contained a large
number of undisciplined and restless men.

Most of the

volvinteers had enlisted with the idea of serving actively
in the eastern campaigns and were disappointed with the
inactivity of Camp Weld.

As a result of this idleness,

the men became dissatisfied and reckless.29

2^Hollister,
2?Rocky

A History of the First, 5»

Mountain News, August 21, 1861.

2®Hollister,

29Ibid.,

There were

7.

A History of the First, 6.
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as many as two or three companies at a time who were
stripped of their arms and placed under arrest with their
•2Q
officers for mutiny.
Discipline was very difficult to
maintain, and the citizens of Denver City had to have an
extra police force to protect their property from the

"31
nocturnal forays of the drunken and rowdy soldiers.
The men were publicly accused of being "chicken thieves,
jayhawkers, turbulent and seditious, a disgrace to them•32
selves and the country."
Three companies of the regi
ment were sent to help garrison Fort Wise; but these men
were no better pleased there than they had been at Camp
Weld.33
Early in January an express arrived from New
Mexico bringing the news of the Confederate advance and
a call for assistance.3^

Since Colorado was within the

jurisdiction of the Department of Kansas, permission from
the commander of that department had to be received before

3<^Chivington,
31Bancroft,

The First Colorado Regiment.

A History of Nevada, Colorado, and

Wyoming, 421.
32Hollister,
33Bancroft,

A History of the First, 7.
A History of Nevada, Colorado, and

Wyoming, 421.

^Hollister, A History of the First, 36.

Colonel John P. Slough

VJhitf or d, Color ado Volunteers in the Civil VJar, 46.
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the troops coulcl be sent to New Mexico's aid.

Gilpin had

already departed for Washington, and Acting Governor Weld
applied to General Hunter for authority to send the regi
ment to New Mexico.^

Major Chivington also wrote to

Hunter and asked for marching orders.

He maintained that

unless the men were put into the field, they would desert
in the spring.^
was given.

1

quite relieved

Finally the long desired order to march

No doubt the citizens of Denver City were
vihen

Hunter's order arrived, sending the

First Regiment on its way.
The day after the battle of Valverde, February 22,
Colonel Slough left Camp WeId with seven companies.3^
Nine days later the other three companies, under Tappan,
set out from Fort Wise.

On March 4, while Tappan's men

were encamped at Bent's Fort, Captain A. F. Garrison ar
rived by special coach from Fort Union.

Unaware that the

regiment had already begun its march, Garrison had been
ordered to Fort Wise to urge the volunteers1 immediate
advance.

In order to move ahead as rapidly as possible,

^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 75 •
•^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment.
^Hollister, A History of the First, 36.

^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 75.
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Tappan ordered his men to carry only a change of shirts
and a pair of blankets.

No longer incumbered by their

baggage wagons, the three companies were able to march
considerably faster.

On March 5, Tappan left the

Arkansas River and headed toward the Purgatoire, some
seventy-five miles away.

When en route, Lieutenant B. N.

Sanford, of Company H, arrived from Slough's command to
inform Tappan that the seven companies had crossed the
Arkansas River at Pueblo the morning before.

The two

detachments would unite at the crossing of the Purgatoire
39
River.
On March J, the three companies arrived at the
headwaters of the Purgatoire half an hour after Slough
and the bulk of the regiment had come in.^0

The rendez

vous was at Gray's Ranch, near the present-day city of
41
Trinidad.
That evening the camp of the reunited regi
ment had the "bustle and hum of a small town."

The as

sembled regiment "'fell in' and gave the Colonel three
cheers and a tiger.
speak."

He raised his cap, but did not

Colonel Slough apparently did not properly

3%ollister, A History of the First, 45-46.
^°Ibid., 46.
^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 77.
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understand human nature.

Although he had a noble ap

pearance, the men seemed to lack confidence in him.
"His aristocratic style

savor/ed/

more of eastern

society than of the free-and-easy border to which he
should have become acclimated."

He had been the regi

ment's colonel for six months and during that period he
had never spoken to his troops.

He failed to understand

that on the eve of an important expedition, a few words
42
from him were indispensable to a good understanding.
On March 9, an ambulance from Port Union met the
43
Coloradoans on the southern slope of the Raton Moimtains.
The officers informed Slough that they had abandoned Santa
Fe and urged him to march ahead as fast as possible.
Colonel Paul had reportedly mined Port Union and was preiiii

paring to abandon the place if the Texans appeared.

Upon

receipt of this news, the regiment "added wings" to its
speed.

By three o'clock the volunteers had reached the

Red River where they halted and ate both donner and supper
at onceMajor Chivington lined up his men and asked,

^Hollister, A History of the First, 47.
**3ibid., 48.

44

Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment.

^^Hollister, a History of the First, 48.
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"All who will make a force march for the night to save
Port Union, step two paces to the front."
46

stepped out.

Every man

After leaving behind everything except

their weapons and a pair of "blankets, the men started
out with all "possible and impossible speed" for Fort
Union, some eighty miles distant.

The baggage was left

in charge of a corporal's guard and would be brought on
later
With the wagons emptied of most of their loads,
many men climbed aboard to ride. Some three or four
hundred were still left to walk.
hours of morning did. .

"Away into the wee

tramp, tramp, tramp, the

gay song, the gibe, the story, the boisterous cheer, all
died a natural death.

Nothing broke the stillness of the

night but the steady tramp of the men and the rattle of
the wagons."

The overworking of the draught animals

proved to be unwise for many began to "drop and die" in
their harnesses.

Had the regiment not attempted to drive

the animals so hard, they probably could have made Union
without a halt.

The next morning the Coloradoans arrived

at Maxwell's Ranch on the Cimarron River, thirty miles
from Port Union.

The owner was kindly disposed toward the

Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment,
^Hollister, A History of the First, 48.
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Union soldiers, and several companies were given quarters
to sleep in that night.

He also supplied the troops with

160 pounds of sugar and 100 pounds of coffee.

The effects

of the heavy driving had played heavily upon the stock.
Fifteen or twenty animals were sick and many died.

This

forced the regiment to travel more slowly or face the
hQ
alternative of losing them all.
The First Coloradoans
had traveled sixty-seven miles continuously since the
morning before, and a total of ninety-two miles in the
iiq

previous thirty-six hours.

As the regiment approached Fort Union, the ter
rain became "uniformly descending."

The valley in which

the fort lay was about four miles wide and was bounded on
the east and west by timbered ridges.

Through the valley

ran a little stagnant, alkali stream.

On a gentle swell

within a mile of the west side of the vale was the fort.
It was a simple fieldwork of moderate size with bastioned
corners surrounded by a dirt parapet and ditch, with a
slight abattis at exposed points.

Although the armament

was poor, consisting mainly of howitzers, the supply of
ammunition was considered adequate for any emergency.
Forming part of the works were bomb-proof quarters

^Ibld., 48-50.
^9vmitford, Colorado Volunteers, 78.
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capable of housing 500 men and all the fort's supplies.
Under a two hundred foot "precipitous and rocky ridge"
which bounded the valley on the west., lay the old post.
It was built of adobes, logs, slabs and lumber "without
any apparent order of system."-'0
The First Regiment arrived outside Fort Union on
51
March 11.
Colonel Slough had earlier gone ahead by
52
coach, and he came out to meet his command.
About
dusk, the men had finished unloading their wagons.

They

were formed in a column and marched into the post with
drums beating and colors flying.

The volunteers halted

in front of Colonel Paul's quarters where, "in rather un
intelligible words," both he and Governor Connelly
welcomed them.
/the

"They commended the zeal with which. . .

Colorado Volunteers/ had accomplished the march from

Denver, but said nothing of the battle of Val Verde or of
the whereabouts of the enemy at present; subjects that
might naturally be supposed to slightly interest" the
newly-arrived troops.

Apparently the men were unimpressed

5°Hollister, A .History of the First, 5I-52.
^1Ibid., 52.

52john M. Chivington, The Prospective (MS.,
Bancroft Library, University of California).
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with the welcoming oratory.

One trooper remarked that he

"thought they might as well have permitted the boys,
hungry and tired, to go to their camp near the fortifi
cation as to have perpetrated this farce."

The regulars

at the post, numbering about 400, were also glad to see
the Coloradoans "for they had been whipped in the fight
below, and it was an undisguised fact that the Texans
were having it their own way in the Territory."

Within

a few days the quartermaster department began issuing the
Volvinteers arms and clothing in preparation for the coming
trial with the Texans. ^
As in any army camp rumors "flew thick and fast"
and when a dispatch arrived from Colonel Canby on March
14, speculation arose among the men as to the contents.
"Madame Rumor. . .kindly furnished the news as follows:
Canby. . .^iTad/7 captured a large train coming from below,
with an escort of one hundred and fifty men.
Sibley. .

,/yja.s/

at Santa Pe, and recruits. .

rapidly swelling his ranks.

Gen.
,/yievoj

His number. . .^was7 various

ly estimated at from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred."
Rumored reports were also "rife every day of the near

5%ollister, A History of the First, 52, 54.
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approach of any desired or undesired, number of Kansas
troops, but, like the Advents' Messiah, the date of their
arrival. . .^/wasT" postponed from time to time to suit the
prophet.
Soon after the arrival of the Colorado troops, an
incident occurred in the Volunteers' infantry camp which
was "but the natural consequence of the lawless tone of
public sentiment in the regiment."

Sergeant Philbrook of

Company K had overindulged in spirits and when Lieutenant
Gray of Company B attempted to arrest him for being drunk
and disorderly, the sergeant fired five shots at him.
One ball struck the officer on the bridge of the nose and
glanced down and lodged in the lower part of his face.
Though he must have suffered intense pain, Gray was not
seriously injured.

Officers who were standing nearby

emptied their revolvers at Philbrook, but he managed to
elude their aim.

Later that night he was captured and

confined to the guard house.

This event caused great

excitement among the men, and Company B demanded "instant
justice by lynch process."

Company K attempted to tone

down the incident by circulating several versions of the
affair which were favorable to their sergeant.

Only the

quick and firm action of the officer of the day, Captain

34Ibid.,

54.
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Sanborn, saved the prisoner from "Judge Lynch."

He was

safely locked up while the "excited passions of all
parties" was allowed time to cool.

During the month of

April, Philbrook was tried by a general court-martial and
executed by a firing squad.55
Other events indicated that at least certain
members of the First Colorado left much to be desired.
When Captain Pollock left for Denver City with the wagons
which had transported the regiment to Fort Union, public
property was discovered missing at the post.

Suspiciously

sounding like Pollock's men had helped themselves, a
detail of twenty men under Sergeant Wilson was hastily
dispatched at sundown to overtake the train and bring back
the stolen goods.

On the night of March 21, a group of

the Volunteers broke into the sutler's cellar and "gobbled
a lot of whiskey, wine, canned fruit, oysters, etc."^^
Apparently the men of the regiment were behaving no better
at Fort Union than they had in Denver City.
When Colonel Slough arrived at Fort Union, post
commander Paul "had the mortification to discover" that
the Coloradoan's commission was senior to his.

By virtue

of this seniority, Slough assumed command of the Union

55ibid., 53-54, 86.
56ibid., 54-55.
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forces in the northern district and planned to carry out
the junction with Canby according to Paul's original plan.
VIoefully, Paul wrote the adjutant general that he had
been deprived of a command which he had taken "so much
pains to organize and with which.' .
reap laurels."

expected to

Paul pointed out the injustice of an in

experienced officer of only six months' service taking
precedence over him who had many years' service and who
had frequently been tried in battle."

In order to pre

vent any such future occurrence, Paul "modestly" asked
the War Department to bestow upon him the rank of
brigadier general of volunteers.57
While Slough was completing the details for the
coming march southward, a dispatch, dated March 16, are;8
rived from Colonel Canby on March 21.
Canby had
changed his mind about the date of the proposed junction.
Apparently he believed that Port Union was too valuable a
post to be abandoned at this time.

He made it clear that

all other points in the department were of no importance
compared to Port Union.

Not only was it essential to

maintain that post, but the line of communication with the

-^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 646.

58Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862,
ibid., 652.
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East had to be kept open at all costs.

If it became

evident, that B'ort Garland could not be held, Canby
ordered Paul (Canby did not know that Slough had assumed
command) to abandon and destroy it and concentrate all
the troops in the northern part of the department at Fort
Union.

Here he was to remain until reinforcements from

Kansas, Colorado, or California arrived.

While awaiting

these anticipated forces, Canby suggested that Paul
harass the Texans with partisan operations.

This would

involve relatively small units which would obstruct the
Confederates1 movements and remove or destroy any sup
plies which might possibly fall into the Texans1 hands.
Should sufficient reinforcements arrive, giving Paul a
large enough army to operate directly against the enemy,
Canby ordered Paul to notify him immediately of his plans
so that he could cooperate from Fort Craig.Later when
Canby learned that Slough had assumed command, he sent
essentially the same instructions to that officer.^0
Canby intended to retain Fort Craig as long as
possible, for it was ideally situated to cut off any sup
plies coming to Sibley from the Mesilla Valley.

It also

might serve as a strategic point to cut off any contem
plated Confederate retreat down the river.

There was no

59canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, ibid., 653.
^°Canby to Slough, March 18, 1862, ibid., 649.
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need to send any immediate help to Fort Craig as it was
stocked with enough food and supplies to last until
April 10.

Should Cariby consider it necessary to abandon

the fort, however, it would mean that his forces would
have to unite with Paul's troops as soon as possible.
All supplies which could not be carried would be destroyed
and the sick and wounded would be left at Limitar.

Thus

relieved of these incumbrances, Canby's column could move
rapidly northward to junction with the forces from Port
Union.

When the decision to abandon the post had been

made, Canby planned to send several messengers, by dif
ferent routes, who would verbally inform Paul of the route
and point of uiion.

But until such information was re

ceived, Paul was instructed not to move from Fort Union
for the purpose of forming a junction.
Differences of opinion soon developed between
Slough and Paul over the interpretation of Canby's in
structions.

The matter was undoubtedly intensified by

Paul's jealousy and Slough's apparent lack of tact.
Garrison duty at Port Union certainly was not improving
the restless and undisciplined nature of Slough's men.
His awareness of this fact, as well as his desire to
"reap laurels," too, were probably the main reasons which

^Canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, ibid., 653.
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motivated him to loosely interpret Canby's instructions.
The Coloradoans had come to New Mexico to fight, and
Slough made it known that he planned to move against the

62
enemy.
Paul vigorously opposed Slough's decision to move
in force from Fort Union.

The colonel addressed a letter

to Slough and informed him that he had originally turned
over his command to him for the purpose of carrying out
the plans approved by Canby "for the relief of and
junction with his forces, to the end that when united the
entire force should be used to drive the enemy from the
Territory."

But now Canby's dispatch of March 16 ordered

that the movement from the post be delayed until further
instructions.

Paul believed that Slough's decision to

move toward the enemy was contrary to Canby's orders; but
if that officer was determined to move toward the enemy,
Paul requested that he do so with his own regiment, two
sections of artillery, and the regular cavalry which had
already been sent out ahead as scouts.
units of artillery and Captain

VI.

The remaining

H. Lewis' company of

infantry were in Paul's opinion the smallest forces which
could garrison the post securely.

But even this would not

6^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862,
ibid., 652.
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be sufficient should Slough meet with disaster or advance
so far as to be unable to rapidly return to the fort's
relief if it was attacked.^
In reply to Paul's protests, Slough insisted that
Canby's instructions were not only "to protect Fort Union,
but also to harass the enemy."

Slough reasoned that by

moving his command to the vicinity of Bernal Springs,
forty-five miles from Fort Union, both ends could be ac
complished.

At that point the Federals would be between

the enemy and Fort Union, and thus the post would be as
much protected as if the troops remained there.

At

Bernal Springs the Union army could "better operate for
the double purpose of harassing the enemy and protecting
Santa Fe from depredation.11

An officer had reported that

the Texans at San Antonio (New Mexico) were weak, and the
Coloradoan asserted that, such being the case, the troops
under his command would be "sufficient to control their
action and to defeat them in case of an attack."

In con

cluding his reply, Slough stated that he needed every
available man and therefore he could not consent to leaving
behind the units which Paul deemed necessary for the de
fense of Fort Union.^

^Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, ibid., 654.
6^Chapin to Paul, March 22, 1862, ibid.
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Deeply chagrined by Slough's reply, and "be
lieving that the best interests of the Government demand
ed it," the commander of Fort Union once again addressed
6^
a note to the Coloradoan, ^ urging him to reconsider his
decision and to submit to the plan of the department com
mander.

Indignantly Paul stated that Slough must have

been "aware that no part of the regular force of this
district would have been turned over to. .

had the

instructions of Colonel Canby of the 16th instant been
received twelve hours earlier."

Again he stressed the

fact that Slough's contemplated move was in direct con
flict with Canby's orders and the possible attack upon
the Texans at San Antonio was "most certainly" in vio
lation.

If that attack proved unsuccessful, it would re

sult in "the entire loss of the Territory, at least for
a time, and render its reconquest much more difficult."
Paul pointed out that Canby must have had good reasons to
change the plan he had at first approved, and his anxiety
to have the change made known was indicated by his sending
duplicates of his instructions by different messengers,
"in the name of the department commander, of the best in
terests of the service, and of the safety of all the troops

^Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862,
ibid., 652.
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in this Territory,11 Paul implored Slough to reconsider
his decision.^
Colonel Slough, either because he did not have
time or because he did not consider it worth his while,
did not bother to answer Paul's last letter.

He had made

up his mind to move southward and he had no intention of
changing his plans.

Paul was so upset that he wrote the

adjutant general about the situation in order "to throw
the responsibility of any disaster which. . .^/might/ oc
cur on the right shoulders."

Fearing the worst, Paul

asked for reinforcements to the amount of 4,000 men and
Cry

several batteries of the best cannon. '
Governor Connelly was fully aware of the "little
discord in relation to the movement. . .from Union," but
since he was anxious for offensive action against the
Texans, he sided with Slough.

Connelly reasoned that

Slough's movement "would curtail the limits of the enemy,
and mayhap lead to the expulsion of the enemy from the
capital" which was now reported to be occupied by one
hundred men with two pieces of artillery.

Connelly

averred that this "slight" difference of opinion between

6^Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, ibid., 655.

67paui to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862,
ibid., 652-653.
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the two officers would "lead to no unfavorable result,
as Colonel Slough. . .^would/ advance upon the road that
the enemy. . .^fould/ necessarily have to march to reach
Union, should an attempt be made upon that place."

An

other reason for Connelly's stand that Slough's action
was justified was his guess that the Texans were "prepar
ing for a precipitate retreat from the Territory by way of
Port Stanton on the Pecos River."

His belief was given

credence by the fact that the Texans were making a "sudden
and mercenary demand for money" from the inhabitants of
the territory.

According to the governor, the Confederates

had not "behaved with the moderation that was expected, and
. . .desolation. . .marked their progress on the Rio Grande
from Craig to Bernalillo.

Exactions and confiscations. . .

^/were/ of daily occurrence, and the larger portion of those
who. . .^Tad/ anything to give or to lose. . .left their
houses and contents a prey to the invaders" and sought
refuge within the Union lines.

To Connelly this effort on

the part of the Texans to secure as much money and goods
as possible from the people was a clear indication that
they were preparing to leave.

Had the Confederates planned

to remain in New Mexico, he reasoned that they surely would

68

not antagonize the native population in such a manner.

68connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, ibid., 651-

652.
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About noon of March 22 Colonel Slough and his
command sallied forth from Port Union, leaving that post
practically ungarrisoned.

The column consisted of the

First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, 916 men; Captain
W. H. Lewis' battalion of the Fifth Infantry and Captain
James H. Ford's independent Colorado company, 191 men;
Captain George W. Howland's detachment of the First and
Third Cavalry, 150 men; Captain John F. Flitter's battery
of four guns, 53 men; and Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin's
battery of four small howitzers, 32 men. Slough's com
bined force consisted of 1,3^2 men.^9
The next day the Federal column approached the
town of Las Vegas, now the temporary Union capital of the
territory, and set up camp for the night.

At a distance

the village had appeared to be a "clump of bushes or
rocks, and. . .^/Tmproved7 but slightly on closer ac
quaintance.

The buildings. . .^/were/7 not above nine feet

high, with flat, dirt roofs, built of adobes and generally
plastered with mud."

The buildings which surrounded the

plaza, about an acre in extent, were "ornamented with
porticos and thick coats of whitewash in front.

The

church. . ./was? a building of more pretensions. . .one
and one-half stories high, with a shingle roof and an

^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534.
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abortive attempt at a steeple surmounted by a small
wooden cross.

It. .

decidedly the most civilized

looking object in town."

The streets were "tolerably

regular and straight; courts and corrals. . .^/occupied/'
the vacant portions of squares, and there. . ,/yias"/ not
a spire of grass nor a green thing to be seen within the
70
town limits.11
Las Vegas may have appeared to be un
appealing and desolate to the men from the green terri
tory of Colorado, but the town itself was quite typical
of the majority of the Mexican settlements throughout New
Mexico at that time.

On March 24 Slough's force left Las Vegas and
started on the road to Bernal Springs.

Soon after leaving

the town the road began to wind "around, between and over"
numerous foothills.

"Blocks of mountains. .

scat

tered about, of every conceivable shape and running in all
directions.

Some. . .^/were/ bare and rocky—others covered

with the white cedar and small pinion pines; the openings
also. . ,/Ka.&7 some scattered timber, though no underbrush
of account.

The ground. . ,/via.s/ smooth and covered with

the usual close-cropped turf; the road rough and stony."
Near noon the Federals came to the village of Tecolote

^Hollister, A History of the First, 56-57.
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which was located on a muddy branch of the Pecos.

From

there the column continued on to Bernal Springs where
71
the men encamped for the night.
Ironically, the camp
was named Camp Paul in honor of the commander of Fort
72
Union.
Company F of the Colorado Volunteers was ordered
to continue on eight miles to San Jose, a small town
located on the Pecos River.

At that point the Colo-

radoans encountered Captain Iiowland in command of three
companies of regular cavalry numbering about 150 men.
Howland's force had been sent ahead earlier for scouting
purposes.

Since Company F had left their "grub, blankets,

and even. . .^/Uheir/ saddle-bags" behind at Camp Paul,
they had to borrow some rations from the regulars and
were forced to crawl into a hay-mow to sleep.

The next

morning, March 25, the men were ordered to cook two days'
rations and be ready to march at a moment's notice.^
Slough had reached the strategic point from which
he was to operate with the dual purpose of protecting

71Ibid.

?2Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 53^.

f^Hollister, a History of the First, 58-59.

277
Fort Union and harassing the enemy.

He maintained that

74
he was adhering to Cariby's instructions,1 but what the
commander of the Department of New Mexico considered
compliance to his orders might be another matter.

^Chapin to Paul, March 22, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 654.

CHAPTER X
THE SKIRMISH OF APACHE CANYON

While occupying Santa Fe, Pyron heard that a
Federal column was marching toward the capital.

Rather

than await their arrival, the major,^ with a force esti
mated at 250 to 300, set out on the Santa Fe trail to
p
meet the foe.
The road, running through the southern
extremity of the Sangre de Cristo mountains, passed
through an elevated, corridor-like canyon known as La
Glorieta Pass.

The pass was several miles long, narrow

at both ends and about a quarter of a mile wide at the
middle.
Canyon.

The western part of the pass was called Apache
When the command reached Apache Canyon the

horses were worn out by hard riding, so the men dismounted
and their horses, under guard of one company, were sent to
a nearby ranch.

The remainder of Pyron's men went into

camp at Johnson's Ranch, which was located at the mouth
of the canyon.

On the morning of March 26, Pyron received

•J-Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 509.
Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862; Walker to
Macrae, May 20, l&b2, 0. R. A., IX, 531.
2Santa

3whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 23.

278

279
word that the Federals were coming "In the shape of two
hundred Mexicans and about two hundred regulars.11

Quickly

he assembled his men and marched down the trail, expecting
4
an easy victory.
*

* *

*

About three o'clock in the afternoon of March 25,
Major John M. Chivington left Bernal Springs with a de
tachment of Colorado Volunteers.^

Chivington was a color

ful character. Born in Warren County, Ohio, on January 27,
1821, he moved to Illinois in 1848 and joined the Illinois
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He later
transferred to the Missouri Conference and was a missionary
to the Wyandotte Indians in Indian Territory.

He came to

Colorado in i860 and became the presiding elder of the
£

Rocky Mountain District.

When the First Regiment was

being formed, Governor Gilpin offered him the post of
chaplain of the regiment.

Chivington refused, stating that

if he went into the army, he had to have a "fighting" commission.

7

As a result he was given the field rank of major.

**Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A History
of the First, 167. Evidence indicates that part, or all of
"OTis letter was a forgery.
^Chivington to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 530.
^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment.
^Chivington, The Prospective.
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Chivington had heard that the Texans in Santa Pe
numbered only about a hundred men with two pieces of
o
artillery.
His plan was to make a rapid march on the
place and take the enemy by surprise.9

when the major

arrived at San Jose, he augmented his force with Company
P and Howland's regular cavalry which had been sent there
the day bef ore .-L<~)

Chivington's column totaled 418 men

consisting of 268 Colorado Volunteers and 150 regular
cavalry:
Company A, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Edward W.
Wynkoop, 60 men.
Company D, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Jacob
Downing, 60 men.
Company E, Colorado Volunteers, Captain Scott J.
Anthony, 60 men.
Company P, Colorado volunteers (mounted), Captain
Samuel H. Cook, 88 men.
Company E, Third Cavalry, Captain Charles J.
Walker, 50 men.
A detachment of the Third Cavalry, Captain George
W. Howland, 50 men.
Sections of Companies D and G, First Cavalry,
Captain R. S. C. Lord, 50 men.H
Chivington continued his forward movement until he
12
reached Kozlowski's Ranch about twelve o'clock that night.

^Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, 0. R. A.,

ix, 651.
^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, ibid., 530.
^Oflollister, A History of the First, 59.

l^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 530.
3-2lbId.
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This ranch, located near the Pecos Indian ruins, twentyseven miles from Santa Fe, for many years had served as
a hostelry.
the ranch.

The trail itself crossed the Pecos River at
Near the main house was a grove of cotton-

wood trees which shaded a fine spring of pure water which
flowed from crevices in the sandstone rock.

In the back

of the ranch was a small scrub cedar covered rise where
the Federals set up their camp, named Camp Lewis in honor
1^
of Captain William H. Lewis of the Fifth Infantry.
At Kozlowski's Ranch Chivington learned that Con
federate pickets were in the vicinity.

In fact, the

owner of the ranch informed the major that they had
14
visited him earlier that evening.
Chivington also re
ceived intelligence that the Texans1 advance guard, esti
mated at 600 men, had set out from Santa Fe and was near
by."1"-'

In order to secure more information, the major

ordered Lieutenant George Nelson of Company F to take
twenty men and capture one of the enemy's pickets.

The

lieutenant set out on his mission at two o'clock in the
-i /:
morning.
The Confederate pickets were supposed to be

•^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 84.
14
Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment.
•^^Hollister, A History of the First, 59.
•^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 530.
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at Pigeon's Ranch* five miles ahead, but when Nelson ar
rived there he discovered that they had gone to another
ranch.

Nelson thereupon decided to give up and return

to Kozlowski's Ranch.

As luck would have it, the Federals

had gotten between the Confederate pickets and their main
force.

The well-armed and well-mounted Texas pickets mis

took Nelson's party for their own men, for they rode into
the midst of the Coloradoans before they realized their
mistake.

Thus, at ten o'clock that morning, the Federals

were able to capture all four of the enemy pickets without
firing a shot.

One of the captured Confederates, Mclntire,

had been on Canby's staff at the battle of Valverde, but
he had left the Union ranks to join Sibley.

Another,

Captain Hall, had been well-known in Denver City before
leaving to join the Southern army.

An outraged Colorado

Volunteer maintained that "being a Northern man, I can
conceive no excuse for his conduct. He never should be
allowed to taint the fair soil he has disgraced by his
silly and despicable treachery.
About eight o'clock in the morning of March 26,
Chivington's column set out on the road to Santa Fe.

The

infantry led the advance, while the cavalry, in the order
of their rank, brought up the rear.

As the men leisurely

^Hollister, A History of the First, 59.
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made their way along, scouts reported back to confirm the
iQ
intelligence that the Texans were somewhere ahead.
Near
19
two o'clock the Federals patssed by Pigeon's Ranch,
the
largest hostelry on the trail between Santa Fe and Las
20

Vegas.

Ghivington's men did not stop at the ranch, but

continued on down the canyon about a mile and a half" where
21
they reached the summit of the divide.
On descending
the slope, the advance guard passed through a narrow gulch
to where the trail made a short turn. Here in the midst
22
of a thicket of trees and bushes,
the Federals unexpect
edly ran into the advance guard of the Texans. The Con23
federates, numbering two lieutenants
and thirty men, were
taken completely by surprise and surrendered without firing
24
a shot.
One of the captured lieutenants was in charge
of Pyron's artillery.

A Union picket took one of the

l8Ibid.,

61.

•^Walker

to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 531.
20Whitford,
2-LHollister,
22Whitford,

Colorado Volunteers, 85.
A History of the First, 61.
Colorado Volunteers, 87.

23chivington

to Canby, March 26, 1862, _0. R. A.,

IX, 530.
2^Chivington,

The Prospective.
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Texas officers and came rushing back to Chivington's
force with him shouting, "We've got them corraled this
time.

Give them hell, boys, Hurrah for the Pike's

Peakers.
Immediately the Federals closed their ranks, the
cavalry took open order by fours, and the soldiers rushed
forward on the double for about three-quarters of a mile.
Knapsacks, canteens, overcoats and clothing of all kinds
were flung along the road as the troops stripped for the
encounter.

On turning a short bend, the Federals entered

Apache Canyon proper and came face to face with the main
26
body of the Texans
who were about 400 to 500 yards
27
ahead.
The Confederates had marched a distance of four
?8
miles since leaving their camp at Johnson's Ranch.
The
capture of Pyron's advance guard resulted in the major's
not knowing that the Federals were so near. Though taken
completely by surprise, the Texans quickly halted and set

25Hollister, A History of the First, 61.
g6lbid.

2^Walker

DC, 531.
2®Brown

to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~ ~

to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister,
A History of the First, 167.
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up their two pieces of artillery which soon began throw
ing grape and shell among Chivington's men.2^

The battery

was supported by a company of mounted troops who displayed
a red flag emblazoned with a white star, the emblem of the
•50
Lone Star State.-*
The blasts from the Confederate mountain howitzers
thundered throughout the canyon and temporarily threw the
Federals into confusion, for Chivington's men had never
been under fire before.

As soon as a battle line across

the canyon had been formed, the major attempted to calm
his men by addressing them on the importance of the con
test.

Just then a shell came screaming through the air

and a hundred voices cried, "Look out there, Major, the
damned rebels are shooting at you with their cannon."
Chivington made a polite bow as the first missile passed
over his head, and his men laughed at his chivalry.
Captain Wynkoop's Company A and Captain Anthony's Company
E were ordered to deploy to the left and up the side of
the canyon.

Captain Downing was ordered to take his

Company D and skirmish to the right and up the mountain
side.

Since the Federals had no cannon, it was necessary

29chivington

IX, 530.

to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~ ~

3®Hollister, A History of the First, 61-62.
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for Chivington to send his men up the sides of the
canyon for in this way they would get beyond the possible
elevation of the enemy cannon, and would be in a position
to fire into the midst of the Texans.

Chivington in

structed the cavalry to retire to the rear where they were
to hold themselves in readiness to charge whenever it ap•31
peared that the Confederates might retreat.
Captain
Howland's cavalry company hastily filed to the rear in
disorder, leaving Company F, Colorado Volunteers, in
front.

Several shells whizzed over the heads of Company

F and the men crowded to the left to get out of range.
"All was confusion.

The regular officers in command of

the cavalry plunged wildly here and there, and seemed to
have no control of themselves or of their men.
was talking—no one talking to any purpose.

Every one

Major Chiving

ton was placing the infantry in position, and Cook's
cavalry awaited orders, while the shells went tearing and
Op
screaming over them."J
The Confederate battery maintained its fire for
only five or ten minutes.

Though the gunners had close

range, the rough, rocky, and wooded terrain greatly less
ened the effectiveness of the howitzers, and thus caused

^chivington, The Prospective; Chivington to
Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 530-531#
32Hollister, A History of the First, 62.
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the Federals little damage.33

Taken by such complete

surprise, the Texans were not able to form an adequate
battle line.3^

Chivington's men who had deployed up the

sides of the canyon were soon up out of range of the
cannon and began pouring a galling fire into the Con
federate ranks.

Pyron was forced to order a retreat and

the gunners quickly limbered their howitzers and withdrew
with the rest of the Texans

following.35

The Union

cavalry failed to charge as Chivington had earlier in
structed them.3^

As the Confederates fell back the first

phase of the skirmish of Apache Canyon came to a close.
Pyron's men rapidly retreated down the canyon for
about a mile where the two howitzers, supported by the
mounted company, halted to check the Federals while the
rest of the detachment continued on for about another
mile.37

Pyron now chose a strong, natural position to set

33walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 531.
3^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A
History of the First, 167.
35chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 531.
" " 3^Chivington, The Prospective.
3^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister, A
History of the First, 167.
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up his line of defense.

In a narrower part of the

canyon which wound abruptly to the left and then resumed
its old course, a high, steep, rocky bluff blocked the
path of the approaching Federals.

On this bluff, which

was like the bastion of a fort, Pyron posted a full
company to support the two howitzers which he planned to
set up on a smaller mound at its base.

The ground in

front of this small knoll was not suited for the action
of cavalry, for the approaching road was rough, narrow,
oO
and crooked.
About forty Confederates were stationed
in and around some houses which were about 700 to 800
yards to the right of the trail, while the rest of the
detachment was drawn up in line of battle across the
39
road.
The same arroyo which had run through the first
battlefield also continued down into the second.

About

fifteen feet deep and as many wide,**0 the arroyo ran
alongside the road with the road occasionally crossing
it.

This natural impediment made it impossible for the

Federals to approach the battery's position except head

3®Hollister, A History of the First, 63.
39srown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister,
A History of the First, 167.
^°Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 89; Chivington,
The First Colorado Regiment.
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4l

on by column.

In addition, the Texans had torn up the
42
bridge across the arroyo.
No sooner had Pyron com
pleted his defensive arrangements than up came his
4*3
howitzers with the Federals at their heels. J
When the Confederates withdrew from the first
field, Chivington assembled his men and cautiously
followed down the canyon until he came to within an
eighth of a mile of the Confederate line.

Here he halted

his men behind a projecting point while all the infantry
units were collected from the hills

After a hasty

survey, Chivington decided to employ the same successful
enveloping tactics which he had used before.

All the

cavalry, except Captain Cook's Coloradoans, were dis
mounted and ordered to join the infantry as skirmishers.
Company D was again deployed to the right, and Companies
A and E to the left.
each.

A regular cavalry company joined

Cook's mounted force was ordered to remain in re

serve preparatory to charging the line the moment the
Texans gave way before the fire of the infantry.^5

^Hollister, A History of the First, 63.
^2Chivlngton, The First Colorado Regiment.
^^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister,
A History of the First, 167.
^Hollister, A History of the First, 62.
^5chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 531.
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As the battle commenced, Major Chivington was un
doubtedly an inspiring sight to his men.

"With a pistol

in each hand and one or two under his arms

chawed

his lips with only less energy than he gave his orders.
He seemed burdened with new responsibility, the extent of
which he had never before realized, and to have no thought
of danger.

Of commanding presence, dressed in full regi

mentals, he was a conspicuous mark for the Texan sharp
shooters."

A Confederate officer who was later taken

prisoner stated that he had emptied his revolver three
times at the major and then made his company fire a volley
at him.

As if possessed of a charmed life, Chivington

galloped unhurt through the storm of bullets.

Discouraged,
lifi

the Texans turned their attention to something else.
The battle raged for nearly an hour.

Chivington,

seeing that the Confederates were weakening, ordered that,
simultaneously with the attack on the flanks, the cavalry
should charge the center.

The howitzers commanded the

road, but again the rocky and scrub-covered terrain made
47
the cannons far less effective than they should have been.

^Hollister, A History of the First, 62.
47lbid.,

63.
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Captain Downing, leading the skirmishers on the right,
had nearly flanked the Texans and was in a position to
48
cut off their retreat.
The time had come. As soon as
the order to charge left Chivington's mouth, Captain
Cook's ninety-nine mounted "Pike's Peakers"^ with swords
Kf)
and revolvers drawn,
eagerly plunged ahead. As the
cavalry neared the steep, rocky bluff, the Confederates,
using old style musket cartridges containing an ounce
ball and three buckshot, began firing into them.

These

bullets zipped by the heads of the cavalry so sharply that
many took them for shells, and strained their eyes to see
where "the spiteful bull-dogs were."

The Confederates,

however, had limbered up their howitzers again and were
retreating down the canyon.

The cavalry continued to be

pelted by a "redoubled shower- of lead, rained on. . .
/them/

from the rocks above."

Captain Cook was hit in the

thigh by a ball and three buckshot, but he was able to
stay in his saddle.

About forty rods further down, how

ever, his horse stumbled and fell on him, badly spraining

^Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
EC, 531.
^Hollister, a History of the First, 63-64.
5QBrown

to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 167.
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his ankle.

He was shot again in the foot, but he was

able to limp to one side and escape further injury.
Lieutenant Nelson now assumed command of the cavalry
charge.

When the company came to the bend in the road

where the small arms fire was heaviest, the men "halted
slightly," fired a few shots from their revolvers at the
51
rocks above, and then dashed around the point.
Ahead
lay the fifteen foot wide arroyo.

It was a sight to be

hold as the Colorado cavalry undauntedly charged onward
and leapt over the gulch into the midst of the enemy.
Of the ninety-nine horses, only one failed to make the
jump.

As George Lowe's horse fell, his knee was badly

wrenched, but he quickly got up and ran to a bank to gain
cover.

Here he was confronted by a stalwart Texas captain

who, with a cocked pistol bearing on him, "guessed Lowe
was his prisoner."

Lowe sprang on him like a cat.

After

a violent struggle, the captain was disarmed and marched
to the rear.^
The lightening charge of the "Pike's Peakers"
crashed through the Confederate center and trampled down
their reserve.

All but two rear sections of the cavalry

5-LHollister, A History of the First, 64.
52chivington, The Prospective.

^nollister, A History of the First, 64.
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swept on down the canyon after the artillery. But the
Confederate howitzers were too "fleet-footed" and after
a short chase, the main body returned to the scene of
battle to help Lieutenant Marshall's two rear sections
clean out the reserve.

The Texas reserve had been

stationed in the road.

Though at first confused and

scattered by the thundering cavalry charge, they had taken
54
cover and now stood like a "tiger at bay."
By this time
the infantry under Captain Downing and Lieutenant Bernard
of the Third Cavalry, poured a sharp fire into the reserve.
This drove them up a small canyon on the left side of the
main one where companies A and E were able to take a large
number of prisoners.^

The Colorado infantry came down

on them like a "parcel of wild Indians, cheering at the
top of their lungs, regardless of the shower of bullets
raining among them."

The cavalry charge and this final

infantry assault completely crushed resistance and the
Confederates broke and fled in every direction.
Some of the Texans were stationed in the houses
to the right of the road.

Undaunted by the arroyo in

5^lb Id.
55chivington to Cariby, March 2b, 1862, 0. R. A_.,
EC, 531.

^Hollister, A History of the First, 64.
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front of the houses, part of the Colorado cavalry leaped
over and charged upon the defenders.

After a brief hand

to hand encounter, the Texans had had enough and sur
rendered.*^

Two "Pike's Peakers," Boone and Dixon, took

fifteen prisoners from a house which "could have been
held against fifty."

As the Texans were being disarmed,

someone cried out, "Shoot the sons of bitches."
immediately bellowed, "No, I'm damned if you do!
didn't take 'em.

Boone
You

I took these prisoners myself, prisoners

of wah.

Pall in thar, prisoners! Forward, double quick,"
e;8
and away went Boone to the rear with them.
As the
prisoners were marched off the field, they "saw some men
with their heads nearly shot off, some with their arms
or legs shot off, and one poor man. . .lying against a
,,59

tree with his brains all shot out.

Even in remote New

Mexico war was hell.
Many of the "Pike's Peakers" had been unhorsed in
the charge, some of the mounts escaping completely.

This

did not impair the effectiveness of the assault, however,
for half an hour after the charge, the Texans had disfin
appeared and the firing had ceased.
It was now sundown,

5?Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 168.
^Snollister, A History of the First, 64.
59]3rown to Wife, April 30, 1862, ibid., 169.
6°Holllster, A History of the First, 65.

295
and "not knowing how near the enemy's reenforcements
might be, and having no cannon to oppose theirs,"
Chivington decided not to pursue the Texans any further.
As stillness settled over the battlefield, the dead and
wounded, including several of the Texans', were gathered
up.

Chivington's command then returned to Pigeon's R-anch

where a hospital was set up and the men made arrangements
/T *1
to encamp for the night.
Acting as a rear guard,
Captain Walker's Company E, Third Cavalry, remained on
the field until 9:30 that night before retiring to join
the main body.

When Chivington's men reached Pigeon's

Ranch, a reinforcement of five hundred men and a howitzer
battery arrived at the same time.

"The woods rang for

half an hour with their cheering.
After being overwhelmed in the brief encounter,
Pyron fell back to his camp at Johnson's Ranch.

Late

that evening he dispatched to Chivington a flag of truce
asking that there be a cessation of hostilities until
8:00 a.m. of March 28, in order to allow for the burying
of the dead and the caring of the wounded.

^Chivington

IX, 531.

Chivington

to Cariby, March 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~ _

^2Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532.

63}jolllster, A History of the First, 66.
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agreed, and the next day was spent in carrying out these
64
acts of humanity.
Pyron's detachment had been soundly beaten by
superior numbers—the first defeat the Confederates had
suffered since they had begun their campaign.
the Texans had fought

valiantly.

Even so,

Captain John Phillips'

company of "Brigandes" (independent volunteers) lost one
man killed and two wounded.

"On this occasion, as on

every previous one, this company showed a devotedness to
the cause which. . .elevated them and inspired confidence
/T p
throughout the army." 3 Pyron had lost four men killed,
67
six wounded,
and seventy or so prisoners.
Seven of
these prisoners were commissioned officers.

Completely

64scurry to Jackson, March 31# 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 542-543; Connelly to Seward, March 30, 185*2, ibTd.,
657.
^sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 509.
Sibley made references to Pyron's report of the skirmish
of Apache Canyon. The report must have been lost, for it
is not in the Official Records nor in the War Department
collection of Confederate records.
66journal of Ebenezer Hanna (MS., University of
Texas Library).
^Hollister, A History of the First, 67.
Chivington gave the ConfederateTosses as 32 killed, 43
wounded, and 71 prisoners. Chivington to Canby, March 26,
1862, 0. R. A., IX, 531. Slough lists the Confederate
casualties as" 20 to 25 killed, more wounded, and about 70
prisoners. Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534.

68Hollister, A History of the First, 67.
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routed and with a quarter of his original force prisoners
of the victorious Yankees, there was truly no joy at
Johnson's Ranch that night.
The Federals lost five men killed, fourteen
69
wounded, and three missing.
Captain Cook, who had been
wounded in the foot and thigh, "was all shot to pieces,
but his usual fortitude remained with him.

The ghastly

smile with which he endeavored to make light of his wounds
to cheer his boys betrayed his agony."

Lieutenant Marsh

all of the Volunteers had accidentally shot himself while
breaking a prisoner's loaded rifle which he foolishly had
held by the muzzle.

Marshall died within a few hours and

"his cruel, unfortunate death cast a shadow athwart the
glories of the day."7°
So ended the skirmish of Apache Canyon.

"The

action, though small, was conducted with great spirit and
judgement."

The "green" Colorado Volunteers had proven

their mettle and had taken on a new feeling of confidence.
One Volunteer maintained that darkness alone had kept
them from making their victory even more decisive.71

^^Ibid., 66. Chivington lists his casualties as
5 killed and 14 wounded. Chivington to Canby, March 26,
1862, _0. R. A., IX, 531 • Slough gives the Union losses
as 3 men TcilTed in battle, 2 since died, and 8 wounded.
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 534.
7°Hollister, A History of the First, 67.
T^Ibid., 66.
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During the morning of March 27, the Federals
buried their dead in an open field a quarter of a mile
72
down the canyon from Pigeon's Ranch.
After the burial,
some teams were sent out to bring in a quantity of flour
73
and corn which the Texans had stored
a few days before
in a building a short distance from the ranch.

This was
74
quickly converted into breakfast by the hungry troops.
The well at Pigeon's Ranch proved to be inadequate to
meet the needs of both the men and their horses, so
leaving his wounded behind in the hospital, Chivington
fell back to Kozlowski's Ranch where the water was plenti
ful.

Prom here Captain Lord's cavalry company escorted
7S
the captured Confederates to Port Union.1^

f^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 96.
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 67.
T^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 97.

75nollister, A History of the First, 67.

CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OP GLORIETA

In pursuance of Sibley's plan to move upon Port
Union, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry was to pro
ceed by way of the Galisteo road.

He had under his com

mand the dismounted Fourth Regiment and Major Powhatan
Jordan's mounted battalion of the Seventh.1

Company A

of the Fourth remained behind in Albuquerque to guard
2
the depot and the hospital.
On March 20, all the sick
of the Fourth were sent to the hospital in Albuquerque
and rations were distributedScurry was now ready to
move out.
The following day the Fourth started on its way
and after traveling seven miles encamped for the night.
The Seventh came up the next morning and brought some of
the Fourth's supplies which had been left behind.

Scurry

was taking the road by the mountains which was a fairly
difficult route, but since the timber was heavier, fire
wood would be available.

Though the weather was

•'•Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 509.
2Noel,

A Campaign, 23.

^journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
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beginning to turn milder, it was still very cold at
night.

On March 23, the command marched ten miles and

camped that night at a small Mexican town.

The road

continued to be rough, and the next day the footsore
soldiers made only fifteen miles.

That afternoon around

two o'clock the command stopped to rest.

The air was

clear and the men could see the beautiful scenery which
abounded around them.

In the distance some could see a

banner waving in the breeze.

At first it appeared that

it might be the enemy, but upon closer look, it proved
to be only a white flag.

Undoubtedly a Mexican had
l\

placed it over his house as a sign of neutrality.

Probably the most interesting town in which the
men encamped was Real de Dolores.

This village possessed

a mill for the smelting of gold and silver, although it
was not now in operation.

All around the bases of the

nearby mountains were ore diggings and no doubt the
imaginations of many were fired by these sights.

On

March 25, the Fourth set out in an easterly direction.
Part of the way the road ran up the course of a small
stream which emptied into the Rio Grande.

As the command

neared Galisteo, the country became barren and level
again which was in contrast to the distant snow-capped

4Ibid.
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mountains which presented "quite a picturesque scene."
That evening the Fourth arrived at Galisteo where the
troops set up their camp.

This small Mexican village was

about twenty-five miles south of Santa Pe. The Seventh
Regiment was following behind and did not reach Galisteo
5

until late the next day.

The troops were still suffering from lack of
adequate food, and the basic diet remained flour and
water.

There was not an ounce of meat of any kind, nor

even an "eye of grease."

On March 26, the day of the

skirmish in Apache Canyon, the men rested while remaining
7

in their camp1 which had been set up on a ranch near the
edge of a prairie.

To the delight of the Texans, the

ranch hands began butchering large quantities of sheep
for their use, the mutton being as fat "as anyone could
wish for."

It was late in the evening as the men happily

thought and talked about the feast they would soon have.
In high spirits they began placing their mutton over the
fire when suddenly a cloud of dust was seen approaching
from across the prairie.

As it came nearer, it proved

5Ibid.
^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927# "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 316.

^journal of Ebenezer Hanna.

Lt. Col. '..'illiam R. Scurry

Whitfor d, Colorado Volunt eers in the Civil War,

303
to "be a man on horseback.

The rider had a paper in his

hand as he loped up to Colonel Scurry's tent.

The ap

pearance of this express naturally aroused the interest
of the rank and file and for a moment at least, the
men's minds wandered from their supper. Shortly after
the messenger had delivered his dispatch, the colonel
gave him another, and the rider was off again.

One

soldier who was standing nearby candidly surmised that
"Hell is brewing and not a mile off."®
The messenger had come from Major Pyron who was
engaged in a sharp conflict with a "greatly superior"
force of the enemy about sixteen miles away in Apache
Canyon.

The major urged Scurry to come immediately to

his relief,9 and no sooner had the express left than
Scurry went into action. He came down the line with his
cap in his hand, bellowing, "Pack up, boys, Major Pyron
has been fighting 600 Yankees with 300 men for two days
and has got a truce until 8 o'clock tomorrow and we must
10
go to him." Immediately the order came to fall in line and

^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 316-317.
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 5^2.
lOHalcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317. The author mis
spelled Major Pyron's name and he gave the number of Con'
federates as only twenty. Time had undoubtedly clouded
his memory concerning the number of men engaged in the
skirmish of Apache Canyon.
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within ten minutes, Scurry's column was formed and ready
to move out.^

It was sunset"1"2 as the main column began

its march directly across the mountains to the scene of
conflict.All packing and loading of the wagons was
left to the teamsters

Since the direct route would

be too difficult for the wagons to follow, the baggage
train, guarded by 100 men under Lieutenant John W. Taylor,
was ordered to proceed by the longer road to a point about
six miles in the rear of Pyron's position.
The night was cold, so the men marched along as
fast as possible to keep warm.

In one instance, the road

ran up a very steep mountain grade.

The jaded horses were

unable to pull the artillery to the top, so the men them
selves had to accomplish this task.

Long ropes were tied

to the cannon and after an hour or so of tedious labor,
16
the pieces were pulled over the crest of the mountain.

•'••'•Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862,
IX, 542.

R. A.,

•^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
•^Scurry
IX, 542.

t0

Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,

•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317.

•^scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 542.
~ ~

•^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
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About three o'clock in the morning Scurry reached Pyron's
17
encampment at Johnson's Ranch. ' Soon after their ar
rival, the men set about gathering wood to build fires
1 ft
to warm their chilled bodies.
Weary and exhausted,
the troops lay on the ground to sleep until daylight.^
Pyron and Chivington had agreed to a cessation
of hostilities until eight o'clock that morning, so as
soon as daylight permitted, Scurry thoroughly examined
the terrain in and around Johnson's Ranch.

His recon

naissance convinced him that the area he held was a
20

naturally strong defensive one.

After breakfast he

formed his men in a battle line across the road a few
hundred yards below Johnson's Ranch where the canyon made
a bend.

Scurry planted his artillery on a hill in front

of the ranch.

The canyon walls were so steep here that
21
an attack could only come from down the canyon.
By
eight o'clock, the colonel had completed his defensive

•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 542.
nO
Journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. c l t 3 1 7 .
20Scurry

to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 542-543.

21Journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
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arrangements and he was now ready to receive the ex22

pected Federal onslaught.

About noon the wagon train arrived.2-^

Eagerly

the hungry troops began unloading the wagons with the
hope of finding the mutton which they had not had a
chance to eat the evening before.

Alas I

No mutton was

found, so the soldiers had to be content with their regu24
,
lar flour and water diet.
However, even this food put
them in a better mood, for they were still greatly ex25
hausted from the previous night's march.
The Texans
remained in battle formation, and throughout the remainder
of the day and during the night, they vainly awaited the
enemy.26
The next morning, March 28, Scurry had come to
the end of his patience.

If the Yankees would not come
27
to him to fight, he would go after them.
When his

22Scurry

to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 543.
2*5
^Journal of Ebenezer Hanna.
p]l
Halcomb to Greer, August 5* 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317.
25journal
2^Scurry

IX, 5^3.
2?Ibid.

of Ebenezer Hanna.
to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
~
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troops had finished breakfast, they were told to put what
remained in their haversacks, for they were moving out
28
and would not be back until that night.
After posting
a small guard for the wagon train, Scurry set out on the
2Q
Santa Fe Trail through Apache Canyon. y
*

* * *

Near noon of March 27, Colonel John P. Slough left
Camp Paul at Bernal Springs with the remainder of his
troops.

About two o'clock the next morning he arrived at
•50
Kozlowski's Ranch where his forces were reunited.

Chivington had informed Slough of the previous day's en31
counter and the Coloradoans "could not be restrained."
The Federal commander learned from his spies that
the Confederates

who

were in Apache Canyon and at John

son's Ranch were about 1,000 strong.

In order to recon-

noiter the position of the enemy, Slough decided upon a
two-columned movement.

Chivington, with a detachment of

about 430 men, was to move off on the Galisteo road and

pO
Halcomb to Greer, August 5> 1927# "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862,11 loc. cit., 317.
^9scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 5^3.
3°siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534.

•^Chivington, The First Colorado Regiment;
Hollister, A History of the First, 68.

308
push forward to Johnson's Ranch.^

He was to "attain

the principal heights upon the side of Apache Canyon,
and occupy them," while Slough with the main body of
about 870 men moved directly into the deep, narrow, and
thickly wooded canyon.^3

There can be little doubt that

Slough was anxious to engage the Texans in battle.
of course, was contrary to Canby's instructions.

This,

In his

official report to the commander of the department,
Slough justified his aggressive actions by maintaining
that he was reconnoitering in force with the intention
only of "ascertaining the position of the enemy and of
nS4
harassing them as much as possible. ^
Between eight and eight-thirty o'clock on the
morning of March 28, Slough's column left Camp Lewis and
set out on the road to Santa Fe.

v

Captain Charles J.

Walker's Company E, Third Cavalry, led the

advance,3^

S^siough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 533.
33siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534; Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 1862, ibid.,

3^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 535.
35slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533;
Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid., 538.
36walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532.
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while the baggage train of one hundred wagons brought up
the rear.^

At nine-thirty, about two miles down the

road, Chivington's detachment parted from the main column
and set out on the Galisteo trail which ran to the left
oQ
of Apache Canyon and nearly parallel to it.
Slough's
force continued on to Pigeon's Ranch—about three miles
further—and by ten-thirty, all of his command had ar-

39
rived.
Pigeon's Ranch was the largest and most con
venient hostelry on the trail between Santa Pe and Las
Vegas.

It was called "Pigeon's Ranch" after the nickname

given to its Franco-American owner, Alexander Valle, who
had a peculiar style of dancing at fandangos.

The ranch

was situated in a narrow defile, and the buildings, the
trail, and an arroyo took up practically all the space
in the canyon.

In back of the main living quarters was

a double corral in which loaded wagons were brought in
for protection.

Attached to it were sheds with stalls

for draft animals.

A formidable adobe wall ran from the

sheds back up to a ravine and then surrounded a yard in

3^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 537.
38chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.,
538.
39siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534.
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which teams were kept and fed.^°

After the skirmish of

Apache Canyon, Chivington had fallen back to the ranch
where he established a hospital for his wounded before
moving on to Kozlowski's Ranch
The various detachments of Slough's force halted
upon reaching Pigeon's Ranch.

The cavalrymen, leading

the advance, had gotten to that point first and were
able to rest about an hour and a half before the main
lip
column came in.
Some of the soldiers rested while
others visited the wounded in the hospital.

Many filled

their canteens with water from the well, for there was
not another spring except at the western end of the pass
where the Texans were reported to be encamped.

As the

men leisurely passed the time, they were completely uniio
aware that the enemy was approaching nearby. J
* * * *

Colonel Scurry had proceeded about six miles down
the canyon from his camp when his advance guard reported

^°Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 85.
^Hollister, A History of the First, 67.
^2Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 532.
- - -

^Hollister, A History of the First, 68.
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that the enemy was ahead in force.

Immediately the

colonel came to the front of his column to reconnoiter
the Federals' position.

He found that the most advanced

44

units were about one mile west of Pigeon's Ranch.

The Confederate commander had under his command
parts of all three regiments of the Sibley Brigade.

Major Henry W. Ragnet was in immediate command of the
dismounted Fourth.

This regiment consisted of portions

of nine companies (B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and K)
officered by Captains George J. Hampton, Charles M.
Lesueur, W. W. Foard, James M. Crosson, Julius Giesecke,
V/. L. Alexander, Charles Buckholts, and J. M. Ode11.
Captain A. J. Scarborough of Company B was ill, so
Lieutenant James B. Holland had assumed his duties.
Major Powhatan Jordan's mounted battalion of the Seventh
was composed of four companies (B, E, F, and I) com
manded by Captains Gustav Hoffman, J. W. Gardner, J. F.
Wiggins, and Isaac Adair.

Major John S. Shropshire was

in charge of companies A, B, C, and D of the Fifth Regi
ment whose company officers consisted of Captains Denman
Shannon and Daniel H. Ragsdale, and Lieutenants Pleasant
J. Oakes and John J. Scott.

In addition there was

44
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Captain John Phillips1 company of Arizona volunteers
Both Shropshire's and Phillips1

called "Brigandes."

mounted troops had taken part in the skirmish of Apache
Canyon.

Scurry also had three pieces of artillery com

manded by Lieutenant James Bradford.

In all the Con

federate commander had eighteen companies of troops.
This would have made a force of approximately 1,000 men.
According to Scurry, however, details "and other causes"
had reduced this actual number until there were not "over
600 men fit for duty."45
Scurry's mounted troops had been marching at the
head of his column.

Immediately he ordered them to re

tire slowly to the rear where they were to dismount and
then come into action on foot. The colonel ordered his
three pieces of artillery forward to a slight elevation
in the canyon.

When the howitzers had taken position,

they at once opened fire with grape and shell.

The

infantrymen were rapidly deployed into a line which ran
across the canyon from a fence on the left up into a pine
46

forest on the right.

The canyon at this point was nothing more than a
deep gorge with a narrow wagon road running along the

J|5lbid.

^6Ibid.
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bottom.

The ground rose precipitously on each side with
47
huge boulders and clumps of stunted cedars interspersed.
The fighting began somewhere between ten-thirty and
eleven o'clock.

48
It would not stop until six hours later.
* * * *

When Chivington's force was detached, Slough had
about 850 men left.

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel P. Tappan

was assigned to the immediate command of the battalion of
Colorado infantry.

This consisted of Companies C (Captain

Sopris), D (Captain Jacob Downing), G (Captain William P.
Wilder), I (Captain Maile), and K (Captain Robbins).

At

tached to Tappan's command was Captain John F. Flitter's
battery of two 12-pounders and two 6-pounders, and
Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin's battery of four 12-pounder
mountain howitzers.^9

The remaining units were cavalry,

composed of Company P, Colorado Volunteers, and Captain
George V/. Howland's detachments of the First and Third
U. S. Cavalry.

47pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico
and Arizona,11 loc. cit., 109.

48scurry to General, March 30, 1862, _0. R. A.,
IX, 541; Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1F62,
ibid., 534.
^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536.

5°siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 534.
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When Slough arrived at Pigeon's Ranch he ordered
Captain Gurden Chapin, Cariby's assistant adjutant general,
to proceed ahead with Captain Howland's cavalry to reconnoiter.

The cavalry had advanced no more than 600 or

700 yards when the pickets fell back on them to report
51
that the Texans were in position in the timber just ahead.
Captain Walker's company was leading the advance, and as
soon as he learned the location of the Confederate guns,
he moved into the pine forest on his left.

Here he dis

mounted his men in order to skirmish on foot.52
Meanwhile the bulk of the Federals were still
resting at Pigeon's Ranch when news came that the Texans
were about 800 yards

away.53

immediately the bugles

sounded assembly, and the startled men seized their

54

weapons and fell into line.

Slough ordered Tappan's

battalion and the batteries forward.

The men rushed

ahead on the "double-quick" about 400 yards to take
position.But before Slough could complete the arrange

ment of his

56 the Texas artillery had opened up

forces,

53-lbid.

5^v/alker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532.
53iappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536.
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cnr

and had begun "cutting the tree tops" over their heads.
The Confederates had taken the Union troops by complete
surprise and from the beginning of the battle to its end,
158
Slough would have to fight a defensive action.
The Union batteries were sent to a slight ele
vation in, and to the left of, the

road.-^

Ritter's

guns had come up just about the time that Walker's
cavalry had commenced skirmishing.

They were set up on

his right^® and soon began returning the Confederate fire
"with great spirit."

Colonel Slough came to the front,

and in a hoarse voice, gave his orders.^1

Downing's

Company D deployed to the left, while Maile's Company I
started for the right.

These units were ordered to oc

cupy the hillsides as skirmishers.

Captain Sopris'

Company C was instructed to protect Ritter's guns, while
Company K under Captain Robbins was to support Claflin's
62
battery.

These supporting units were stationed in the

^Hollister, A History of the First, 68.
58siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 535.
59Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536.
^^Walker to Macrae, May 20, 1862, ibid., 532.
6%ollister,

History of the First, 68.

^2Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 536.
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road where they were sheltered by the brow of the hill.
Slough also ordered the cavalry, most of which was now
dismounted, to support the field pieces

Company G

was about a mile away acting as rear guard.^
About the time that Colonel Scurry had gotten
his men into position, he observed that Tappan's infantry
was advancing in separate columns upon his right and left
fronts.

Hurriedly he dispatched Major Pyron to check

them on the right.

After placing the center of his line

in command of Major Ragnet, Scurry hastened to the left
with the remainder of his men.^

As the battle opened

and became general, the deafening roar of the artillery
and the imceasing rattle of small arms was accompanied by
all kinds of yelling and cheering by the men.^
When the Federals of Company I deployed to the
right, they passed an open field which was commanded by
Scurry's artillery.

Though they suffered severely from

63Hollister, A History of the First, 68.

^Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0, R. A.,
IX, 533.
^Hollister, a History of the First, 68.
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 543.
67Hollister, L History of the First, 68-69.
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their fire, the Coloradoans reached the position assigned
/TQ

them.

. Company I was composed of Germans and, though

Captain Maile was the commanding officer, the unit was
now in charge of Lieutenant Charles

Kerber

.^9

After

Scurry had taken position on his left, he saw the men of
Company I moving down a gulch which ran up the center of
the enclosed field on his left.

The "Pike's Peakers"

were proceeding under its cover past the Confederate left
flank with the apparent purpose of gaining the Texans1
rear.

As rapidly as possible. Scurry and his men crossed

the fence and though under a heavy enemy barrage, they
advanced about 200 yards across the open field to the
70
gulch to engage the Federals.'
Lieutenant John Baker had
led the forward division of Company I until he had reached
a point almost opposite the Texas battery which was on the
higher ground to his left.

Drawing and waving his saber,

he shouted, "Let's capture the guns!"
Baker was struck down.^

At that moment

With "pistol and knife in hand,"

6&rappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 536.
69whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 106.
7°Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 543.
~

71whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 107.
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Scurry's men dashed into the gulch in the midst of the
Germans and for a few moments, a desperate and deadly
hand to hand conflict raged.
before the

Finally the Federals broke

"steady courage" of the Texans and fled "in

the wildest disorder and confusion."

Meanwhile Fyron

had checked the enemy on the right, and Ragnet's force
had charged down the center.^
The Confederate charge forced the Federals to
fall back about

300

or

400

yards to a new position in

front of, and near, Pigeon's Ranch.
been going on for half an hour.

The battle had now

In forming the new line

of defense, Claflin's battery took position on an
eminence to the left^^ and Company F, Colorado cavalry,
was posted on a rocky point opposite Claflin.

This sup

porting unit was now dismounted, and the troopers' horses
were taken behind Pigeon's Ranch for protection.^

Ritter

75
set up his guns farther to the rear and south of the road.
Captain Wilder's Company G, which had been acting as rear

72Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 543.
~
^Tappan

to

Chapin, May

21, 1862,

ibid.,

536.

7^Hollister, A History of the First, 69.
75Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 540.
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guard, heard the "rumpus" of battle and came up on the
"double-quick.

The company was assigned with Company

C to support Ritter.

Subsequently, Slough ordered Wilder

to take his first platoon and hurry to the support of
Downing,^ while Lieutenant Hardin, in command of the
other, remained with Ritter.
Ritter was not to stay in his new position, for
he was exposed to a galling fire and his ammimition
wagons were too far away.^

The Texans were taking ad

vantage of the terrain, for as they advanced, they would
"creep along up from tree to tree, and from rock to
rock."

ftn

Because of this Ritter's guns could not efOn

fectively harm them.

With the exception of Hardin's

Qp
platoon,

c

the battery's supports had been ordered to

other locations, so under these circumstances, Ritter

7%ollister, A History of the First,

69.

77Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 536.
~ ~
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"deemed it proper" to return to the road.

But before

this decision could be carried out, Lieutenant Peter
McGrath was fatally wounded.

After firing a few rounds,

Ritter extricated himself from this precarious location
and moved to a point in front of Pigeon's Ranch.

One

6-pounder was placed in the road, while, two at a time,
the limber boxes were sent to the rear to be refilled.
It was here that one of Ritter's guns disabled a Con
federate piece by striking it "full in the muzzle" with
a round shot.

A Texas limber chest was also blown up

when a case shot struck it.

This excellent Union marks

manship was due to the skill of Private Kelly of Company
E, Fifth Infantry.companies D and I picked off the
Confederate gunners and, combined with Kelly's deadly
accuracy, the Texas artillery was temporarily put out
84
of commission.

Lieutenant Bradford, commander of the

Confederate pieces, was wounded and carried from the
field.

Since the Texans had no other artillery officer

present, the three guns were withdrawn to the rear before
Scurry became aware of it.®5

Actually, the artillery was

^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 5^0.
®**Hollister, A History of the First, 69.

^Scurry to Jackson, March 31# 1862, _0. R. A.,
IX, 5^3.
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not of great importance in this battle except in the
center of the line.

Owing to the "rough, hilly, rocky

and timbered" nature of the terrain, the effectiveness
of field pieces was considerably reduced.

86

The charac

ter of the country made this engagement of the "bush
whacking kind, "87 and it soon became evident that rifles
"must decide the contest."®®
After the Confederate charge had driven the
Federals back to their new position, Scurry paused in
order to regroup his somewhat scattered and disorganized
forces.

The colonel also ordered the two serviceable

guns brought to the front again.

Private W. D. Kirk of

Phillips 1 "Brigandes" took charge of one piece while
Sergeant John W. Patrick of the artillery handled the
other.

After Scurry had assembled his men and was ready

to advance again, he discovered that the enemy had fallen
back and had taken cover.

The colonel was unable to dis

cern whether the main body of the Federals was stationed

o/r
Hollister, A History of the First, 69.

®?Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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behind a long adobe wall that ran nearly across the
canyon, or had taken position behind a large ledge of
rocks farther to the

rear.^9

soon the two Confederate

guns were "playing a lively tune,"9° for Scurry was
using them in an effort to locate Slough's new line of
defense
While the Federal batteries were still occupying
their second position, Colonel Slough asked Captain
Chapin and Colonel Tappan to accompany him up the hill
on his right to reconnoiter.

After viewing the battlefield

from that point, the colonel's two subordinates suggested
that the hill on their left should be occupied to prevent
the Texans from flanking them in that direction.

For if

the Confederates were successful in that quarter, they
would be in a position to gain the Federal rear and
destroy the wagon train.

Skirmishers on this hill would

also serve the purpose of supporting the batteries below.
Slough agreed to these suggestions, and Tappan was
ordered to detach twenty men from Sopris 1 Company C to
take position there.

Later Tappan did not consider this

®9scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 543-544.
^Holllster, A History of the First,

69.

9^Scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 544.
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force large enough, so he also took the police guard of
seventy men.

He stationed his ninety infantrymen on the

summit of the hill in front of, and to the left, of the
batteries.

His skirmish line extended for nearly three-

quarters of a mile in a half circle, and at nearly a
right angle from the road where the Federal wagon train
was drawn up.

The colonel's position commanded the valley

in part, and the "irregularities of the surface" afforded
excellent protection from the fire of the enemy.

Tappan

remained in this strong location during the rest of the
battle—nearly four hours.

Occasionally small parties

of

Texans would attempt to ascend the hill, but they would
be repeatedly driven

back.92

From his vantage point, Tappan saw Scurry as
sembling his men after the first big Confederate charge.
Believing that they were preparing to attack the batteries
below, Tappan came down into the valley to inform his com
mander.

After returning to his position on the hill,

Tappan received information from Slough that the Con
federates were probably intending to attack his position.
In view of this possibility, the colonel ordered Tappan to
hold his line at all costs, for "all depended on it."

"^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 536-537
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Slough also Informed his second in command that he
expected that Chivington would momentarily attack the
Texans in their rear.

When this occurred, Slough planned

to charge in front while Tappan attacked the enemy's
flank.jf this maneuver were successful, perhaps all
of Scurry's command would be either annihilated or
captured.
While the Confederate battery was firing in an
effort to locate the enemy, Scurry ordered Major Shrop
shire to proceed to the right and move up among the
pines to find and attack the enemy.

Major Ragnet, with

similar orders, was dispatched to the left.

As soon as

he heard the sounds of their guns, Scurry planned to
charge in front with the remainder of his forces.9^
About half an hour after Tappan had received
Slough's communication, a group of soldiers dressed in
the uniform of the Colorado Volunteers approached Tappan's
line.

They requested him not to shoot as they were his

own men.

Since Slough had informed him that Chivington

would be attacking soon, and probably some of the Coloradoans would be coming into his skirmish line, Tappan was
reluctant to fire on approaching parties until their

93 Ibid.,

537.

9^Scurry to Jackson, March

31* 1862,

ibid., 544.
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identity was definitely established.

As such, these

soldiers were allowed to come within a few paces of his
men.

When they could not give satisfactory answers to

questions in reference to their commanders, Tappan
recognized them to be Texans.

Immediately he ordered his

men to open fire, and the enemy fled, leaving several
dead and wounded behind.^5
Meanwhile, Scurry sent Major Pyron to assist Major
Ragnet on the left.

Leaving instructions for the center

to charge when the firing began on the right, Scurry went
to that section of his line to discover what was delaying
Shropshire's assault.

Following his commander's in

structions, Major Shropshire had set out to find the Union

q6

line in the pine forest.- 7

Both he and Captain Denman

Shannon were at the head of their column as it approached
Tappan's center.

When they had unsuspectingly come to

within a few paces of the Union skirmishers, Private
Pierce of Company F, Colorado Volunteers, killed and dis
armed Shropshire and took Shannon prisoner.

Tappan's men

opened up against the still advancing Confederate column,
and their effective fire drove the Texans back with the
loss of several killed and wounded.

Private Pierce

95Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 537.
^Scurry to Jackson, March 31j 1862, Ibid., 544.
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returned to the main body below and delivered his

97

prisoner to Captain Chapin.

During these assaults,

Lieutenant Colonel Tappan inspired his men with his
bravery.

As one soldier described it, "Lieut. Col.

Tappan sat on his horse during the charge, leisurely
loading and firing his pistols as if rabbit hunting."9®
When Scurry discovered that the gallant Major Shropshire
had been killed, he took command of the right himself and
immediately attacked the enemy whose line formed in front

QQ
of the ranch. ^
Before the renewed Confederate onslaught, Captain
Chapin ordered Ritter's battery to cross the ravine to
the right side of the canyon to a new location.
mountain howitzers

joined Ritter.' 1 ' 00

Claflin's

Majors Ragnet and

Pyron, commanding the Confederate left, ordered their men
to charge the batteries.

"Encouraged and shouted on by

as brave officers as live," the Texas began their assault.
"Some in squads, others singly, taking advantage of the

^Tappan to Chapin, May

21, 1862,

ibid .,

9%ollister, A History of the First,
^Scurry to Jackson, March
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R. A.,
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timber as much as possible."

The Federal gunners waited

until the "terrible Texans" came to within fifty yards
of them and then opened fire "like a regiment of Mexican

dogs roused by the stranger at midnight.

One man shoved

in a charge with his arm, another fired her off, and the
four pieces played the liveliest Yankee doodle ever
heard."

The

"thud, thud, thud" of bullets hitting the

ground from the mountainsides added to the intensity of
battle.

The Federal artillery's

"salute" apparently

astonished the advancing Texans, and when that ceased,

the battery's supports fired volley after volley into
their faces.

The Texans now concluded that they were

"going the wrong way," and temporarily reeled back."^"*"
Soon some Confederates got on a rocky hill on Ritter's

right flank and began pouring a destructive rifle and
musket fire into his midst.

One of his men was killed

and three others were wounded.

killed.

Two horses were also

Forced out of this position, the battery
102

limbered up and fell back some distance.

Meanwhile

the Confederates had rallied and charged again, but when
they closed in on the spot where the batteries had been,

10^Hollister,

A History of the First, 71.

102Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0. R. A.,

IX, 5^0.

328
they found only a few dead and wounded Federals
Flitter's battery had taken a new position, selected by
Chapin, in front of a deep ravine.

This new area af

forded the battery's supports complete shelter from
enemy fire.

The supply train was in the road about forty

yards from the left of the battery

Though Tappan was

still holding his position firmly, the main Federal line
had now been driven from the ranch to a ledge of rocks.
It was here that the

"Pike's Peakers" made their final

and most desperate stand.* 1 ' 0 ^
As the Confederates savagely pressed forward, the
Union batteries of eight guns opened a furious fire of
grape, canister, and shell.

"Heedless of the storm," the

Texans surged on, determined if possible to capture these
pieces as they had McRae's at Valverde.

A large body of

Union infantry came in to save the artillery, and here
the conflict reached its peak!

"inspired with the un

alterable determination to overcome every obstacle to the
attainment of their object," the Texans madly fell upon
the enemy.

The Confederate right and center had now

l°3Hollister, A History of the First, 71.
•^^Ritter to Chapin, May 16, 1862, 0, R. A.,
IX, 5^0.

^°5scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 5^.
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united on the left.

"The intrepid Ragnet and the cool,

calm, courageous Pyron had pushed forward among the
rocks until the muzzles of the guns of the opposing
forces passed each other."

But the iron courage of

the Federal infantry temporarily repulsed the Confederate
attack,

and the Union artillery had time to escape

with a number of its wagons.

When the Union batteries

had gotten safely away, the infantry broke ranks and fled
from the field.

So rapid was their flight that they cut

loose their teams and set fire to two of their wagons.

108

Tappan had stubbornly maintained his skirmish
line on the hill, but the main column had now been driven
down the valley a considerable distance.

With the Texans

continuing to advance, the colonel considered it extremely
hazardous to remain where he was any longer.

The enemy

was now in a position to gain his rear and cut him off
from the retreating main body.

Quickly Tappan ordered

his men to retire and close in on the rear of the beaten
Union column.

This was accomplished at a point nearly

two miles back from the battlefield." 1 ' 0 ^

lo6 Ibid.

•'•OfRitter to Chapin, May

16, 1862,

ibid.,
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The Confederates attempted to renew their pursuit,
"but they were forced to halt from "extreme exhaustion. 11
They had been engaged for six hours in the hardest con
test that "it had ever been. . .^curry's/ lot to wit-

110

ness."

As Alexander Valle, the owner of Pigeon's

Ranch, later said,

". . .ze foight six hour by my vatch,

and my vatch vas slowI
After the Federals had left the battlefield,
Colonel Scvirry came galloping up on his horse and asked
his men for a white handkerchief.

He wanted to send a

flag of truce to tell "them damned Yankees" to come back
and pick up their dead and wounded.

Since no one had a

white handkerchief, the old colonel bellowed,

"God Damn

it, tear off your shirt tail, we have got to have a white
flag."

One Texan had just picked up a beautiful, white

silk handkerchief from the field, which apparently a
"Pike's Peaker" had lost in his haste to leave the area.
The soldier looked about him and decided that there was
not a shirt tail in the crowd that would do for a white
flag.

In fact, most of them would have been better suited

for battle flags I

In view of this situation, the Texan

H°Scurry to Jackson, March 31, 1862, ibid., 544.
Apparently the Texans had been too severely repulsed to
renew their assault upon the retreating Union force.

•'••^Hayes, New Colorado, 169.
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walked up and reluctantly handed the prized handkerchief
to his colonel. Scurry said that it was just the thing
and that the soldier would get it back later. But in
his reminiscences the soldier lamented that that was the
last he saw of it.

The white flag messenger had to

gallop all the way back to Kozlowski's Ranch before he
could find any Union officers in sufficient command to
stop the retreat and send back details.

Within a few

hours a detachment of Union soldiers returned and, work
ing all night long, they removed their men from the field
IIP

and cared for their wounded.

Slough and Scurry had

agreed to an armistice of eighteen hours

battle had been savagely fought, and Colonel

The

Scurry did not hesitate to commend the valor of the enemy.
He maintained that these Federals, composed of "Pike's
Peak miners and regulars," were "the flower of the U. S.
Army. "•'-•'-4

All of the Texas field officers upon the ground

had been either killed or "touched."

Major Pyron had had

his horse shot from under him, and Scurry's "cheek was

•'•^Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927*
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 317-318.
"^Hollister,
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twice brushed by a minie ball, each time

just drawing

blood, and . . .^Tis/ clothes torn in two places." 11 "*

In

this encounter the Confederacy lost four of the most
"brave and chivalrous officers as ever graced the ranks
of any army."

Major Shropshire had been killed earlier

in the day, and "brave and chivalrous" Major Ragnet had
fallen mortally wounded from his horse while engaged in
the last and most desperate charge of the battle.

Ragnet

survived long enough to "know and rejoice at. . ,/T5he/
victory, and then died with loving messages upon his
expiring lips."

Captain Buckholts and Lieutenant Mills

conducted themselves with distinguished gallantry through
out the fight and they, too, fell near its close.
the living," Scurry asserted with pride that it was

"Of
"only

necessary to say all behaved with distinguished courage
and daring.
In his official report, Scurry asserted that the
battle of Glorieta had proven conclusively that few mis
takes had been made in the selection of the officers of
his command.

"They were ever in the front, leading their

men into the hottest of the fray." 11 ^

Scurry himself was

•^^Scurry to General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 5^2.
•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 5^5.
11 ^Ibid.
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a sterling example to his men.

During the course of the

battle, he moved among his troops encouraging them and
telling them to give the enemy "hell."

As one soldier

later recalled, "if he called using bullets Hell they
were getting plenty of it."

3.13

Major Pyron was also

distinguished by his calm and intrepid bearing through
out the engagement.

Scurry also acknowledged the

"courage and activity" which Adjutant Ellsberry R. Lane
displayed in the discharge of his official duties, and
for the manner in which he carried out his orders .-^9
Colonel Scurry proudly proclaimed that the battle of
Glorieta was another victory which would be "added to
the long list of Confederate triumphs."

120

From the

field of Glorieta, he issued the following:

HEAD-QUARTERS, ADVANCE DIVIONS,
ARMY OP NEW MEXICO.
Canon Glorieta March 28 1862.
General Order
No. 4
Soldiers—You have added another victory to the
long list of triumphs won by the Confederate armies.
By your conduct you have given another evidence of
the daring courage and heroic endurance which actuate

1;L %alcomb

Reminiscences of

to Greer, August 5 » 1927#
loc. cit., 318.

"Confederate

1862,"

"^Scurry to Jackson, March 31, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 545.

120Scurry

to General, March 30, 1862,

-

-

ibid .,

541.
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you in this great struggle for the independence of
your country,
you have proven your right to stand
by the side of those who fought and conquered on the
red field of San Jacinto.
The battle of Glorieta—
where for six long hours you steadily drove before
you a foe of twice your numbers over a field chosen
by themselves, and deemed impregnable, will take its
place upon the roll of your country's triumphs, and
serve to excite your children to imitate the brave
deeds of their fathers, in every hour of that
country's peril.
Soldiers--I am proud of you.
Go on as you have
commenced, and it will not be long until not a single
soldier of the United States will be left upon the
soil of New Mexico.
The Territory, relieved of the
burdens recently imposed upon it by its late op
pressors, will once more, throughout its beautiful
valleys, 'blossom as the rose 1 beneath the plastic
hands of peaceful industry.
By order of Lieut. Col. W. R. Scurry,
C ommanding. -1-21

Unfortunately the poetic Scurry had won at best
a pyrrhic victory.

Though the Confederates may have

driven the Federals from the field and forced them to re
tire in great disorder, the party under Chivington was
about to strike a blow which, in the words of a con
temporary reporter, would pierce the Confederate "vitals
and. . .^Traw/' from thence the life blood."^22
As previously related, Slough had decided upon a
two-columned movement against the Texans who were reported

•^Isanta Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
122jjolllster, A History of the First, 72.
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to be at Johnson's Ranch.

While Slough moved down the

canyon with the main column, Chivington's detachment was
to proceed along the rim until the Confederate camp was
reached." 1 ' 2 ^

Presumably this was intended to be a co

ordinated movement.

As it turned out, however, Chiving

ton 's force moved on independently and failed to join
Slough in combatting Scurry's main army.
At nine-thirty in the morning, Chivington left

124
the main colvtmn and took the trail which led to Galisteo.
Although Slough listed the number of soldiers Chivington
had as "about 430 officers and picked men,
figures total only

357.

the major's

The detachment was composed en

tirely of infantry and was divided into two battalions.
Captain W. H. Lewis, Fifth U. S. Infantry, assisted by
Captain Asa B. Carey, commanded the first battalion,
consisting of the following units:

"^Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 534.
-'-'^Chivington to General, March 28, 1862,
ibid., 538.
-l-25siough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533*
In listing the units involved, Chivington was seemingly
careless regarding the numbers in the first battalion.
It is possible that the members of Ford's company were
not included. Chivington to General, March 28, 1862,
ibid., 538.
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Companies A and G, Fifth U. S. Infantry commanded by
Lieutenants Samuel L. Barr and Stevens T. Norvell,
60 men.
Company B, First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, in
charge of Captain S. M. Logan and Lieutenant
Edward A. Jacobs, 78 men.
Captain James H. Ford's company of the Second Regi
ment Colorado Volunteers. Ford was assisted by
Lieutenant Cyrus H. DeForrest .126
The second battalion, composed entirely of the
Firs t R e g i m e n t C o l o r a d o V o l u n t e e r s , w a s u n d e r t h e c o m 
mand of Captain Edward W. Wynkoop.

It was composed of

the following:
Company A commanded by Lieutenant James A. Shaffer,
60 men.
Company E in charge of Captain Scott J. Anthony and
Lieutenant J. A. Dawson, 71 men.
Company H officered by Captain George L. Sanborn and
Lieutenant B. N. Sanford, approximately 80 men.127
Since Chivington was completely unfamiliar with
the territory, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chavez was
selected to guide the detachment.

Chavez was a member of

an old and distinguished native family.

He had won

honors in fighting Apaches and he had been with Canby at

128
the battle of Valverde.

When Donaldson evacuated

Santa Fe, he was one of the few New Mexican volunteers

•^6chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.
127lbid.

•U2£3whitford, g0i0raa0 volunteers, 116.
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who did not desert on the way to Port Union.jn
addition to Chavez, James L. Collins, Superintendent of
the Indian Office in Santa Fe, also accompanied the force
as a guide and interpreter.

Collins had become Slough's

volunteer aide-de-camp.

By his own request, and with
1"2Q
Slough's approval, he had joined Chivington's party. J
Though a civilian, Collins had taken part in the skirmish
of Apache Canyon.

He had been in the lead of a party of

flankers on the mountain side, but in advancing too
rapidly, he had been surprised and captured by four
Texans.

He was a prisoner for only a short time, for

when Captain Cook made his cavalry charge, the stunned
1^1
Confederates released him. J
The detachment continued down the rough and rocky
Galisteo trail for about eight miles and then left the
road.^32

Proceeding "with no regard to obstacles,

routes, or ought else save direction, "^-33 ^he column

^^Donaldson to Paul, March 10, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 527.
to General, March 28, 1862,
ibid., 539.
•*-31santa Pe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
132chivington to General, March 28, 1862,
0. R. A., DC, 538.

^Spjoiiig-ter, A History of the First, 72.
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wended its way eight miles more toward Johnson's Ranch.
About one-thirty in the afternoon, the Federals arrived
at the edge of an eminence which overlooked the Con
federate encampment

a Texas picket who was

stationed on the crest was immediately captured.

About

1,000 feet below lay Johnson's Ranch with the wagon
train drawn up in the canyon.^35

"you are on top of

dem!" Chavez pointed out to his commander.^36
The Texans were totally unaware of the Federals'
presence, and Chivington was able to spend nearly an
hour observing the situation below.

From his position,

everything was in plain view: the ranch house, the Santa
Fe trail, the ravines running to the right and to the
left, the small hills, the wagon train, and the few
soldiers who were leisurely walking about.

Chivington

observed that a field piece was set up on one of the
higher hills"1"^? and that there were about 200 men guard
ing the camp."*"-^

After discussing the matter with his

•^^chivington to General, March 28, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 538.
•L35whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 116.
•l^Hayes, The New Mexican Campaign of 1862,
loc. cit., 180.
137whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 116-117.

^Sghivington to General, March 28, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 539.
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officers, Chivington agreed to attack.

Captain Lewis

was placed in immediate command of the assault, for
apparently Chivington was to remain on the mountain dur
ing the action.

The major feared an ambush, so before

Lewis left, Chivington informed him that should that
possibility develop, he would sound recall.
set out, he remarked to Carey that

As Lewis

"they would never

loq
y

hear that signal."

Rapidly the men started down the steep mountain
side.

When they had gotten about a quarter of the way,

the crashing of loosened rocks rolling down the precipice
aroused the unsuspecting Texans below.

The Confederate

field piece was soon firing into the descending troops,
but because of the nature of the terrain, its shots were
ineffectual.

Cheering and yelling, the Federals reached

the bottom and reformed themselves into ranks, preparatory
for action.

Taken completely unaware, many of the Texans

seized what horses and mules they could and dashed off.
Others disappeared down the Santa Fe trail toward
Glorieta.- 1 -^

Captain Wynkoop took thirty men and deployed

^•39Hayes, The New Mexican Campaign of 1862, loc.
cit ., 180. The Santa Fe Gazette stated that it took two
hours for Chivington to make up his mind to attack.

Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.

"^Sjhitf ord, Colorado Volunteers, 118.

Fiajor

John

M.

Chiving ton

Photograph courtesy of the State Historical
Society of Colorado.

3^1
to the mountainside to disable the 6-pounder by picking
off its gunners

Three Texans were instantly killed
142
and several wounded by a volley from Wynkoop's rifles.
At the same time Captain Lewis and his men fearlessly
charged up the hill and captured the piece after it had
fired five shots at them.-^3

After taking the gun,

Lewis spiked it with an iron ramrod, jammed an iron ball
into the muzzle, and then sent it tumbling, carriage and
all, down the hillside.

A quantity of the gun's am144
munition was also set afire.
Meanwhile the bulk of

the Federal command had surrounded the wagons and the
ranch buildings.^5

During the height

of the assault

the Confederate chaplain of the Fourth Regiment,
Reverend L. H. Jones, was shot and severely wounded even
though he displayed a white flag in his hand.^^

Within

a short v/hile the Texas rear guard had been scattered,
and the wagons and camp were securely in the Federals'
hands.

"'"^•'"Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0. R. A
IX, 539.

l

Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 119.

•^Schivington to General, March 28, 1862, _0. R. A
IX, 539.

•'•^WiiLtford, Colorado Volunteers, 119-120.
•^Schivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0, R. A
IX, 539.
•^Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 544.
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It is entirely possible that Chivington over
estimated the number of Texans (200) who were guarding
the train and camp."1"^

Many of the Confederates there
lilft
were either sick, wounded, cooks, or drivers.
The

captain in charge of the camp later maintained that two
companies of German soldiers which had been assigned as
guards had left earlier.

Upon hearing the reverberating

thunder of the cannons down the canyon, they could not
restrain themselves, so they left their post to join the
fight.

As they put it, they had "enlisted to get glory
149
by fighting, and not in guarding mules and provisions."

Had these two units remained behind at the camp to un
leash their bellicose feelings against the attacking
Federals, Chivington's raid might have ended in failure.
The Confederate wagons were all heavily loaded
with ammunition, clothing, subsistence, forage,^® of
ficers' baggage,^51

and

surgical supplies.^52

-j-n fac-b,

•^Tchivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.,
538-539.
148Wright

to Greer, September 7, 1927* "Confeder
ate Reminiscences of 1862, loc. cit., 322.
•^9whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 119.
^Ochivington to General, March 28, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 539.
151slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533.
l^Hayes, New Colorado, I 6 9 .

343
the train contained everything which Scurry's command
possessed.

Chivington was not in a position to carry

away the captured materiel, so all the wagons, most of
which had been hastily

overturned,

"^3 were set afire and

burned on the spot, or otherwise rendered useless.

Dur

ing the pillage, one of the wagons which contained
ammunition exploded and severely injured Private Simon
Ritter of Company A.

He was the only Union casualty.^54

Chivington's men retook five Federal privates
who had been taken prisoner during the forenoon at
155
Glorieta.
They had been sent to the rear by Scurry and
1^6
arrived during the action at the ranch. J

It was from

these men that Chivington and his commanders received
their first information concerning the general engage
ment down the canyon.

During this brief engagement, the

Federals killed three Texans and wounded several others.
Seventeen prisoners, two of whom were officers, were also

^53vjhitford, Colorado Volunteers, 120.
^-^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, £. R. A.,
IX, 539* There was a difference of opinion concerning tKe
number of wagons in the train. Chivington listed the
number as eighty. Slough gave the number as only sixty.
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, ibid., 5 3 5 .
•^chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.,

539.
•^scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 544.
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captured.

In addition, the command took about thirty-

horses and mules which were in a nearby corral."1"-^
After accomplishing the destruction of the train,
Chivington ordered his men to ascend the mountain pre
paratory to leaving.He had heard that a large Con
federate force was approaching from Galisteo, and he did
not want to risk being caught in the canyon.

On the way

up the mountainside, it was discovered that four heavily
loaded wagons were hidden behind a hill outside of the
main camp.

These had been overlooked during the burning

of the main train, so to complete the destruction, four
volunteers returned to burn them.

Within an hour the men

had completed their task.-3-59

•^Tchivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.,
539* Although he makes no mention of it in this report,
Chivington in his manuscript The First Colorado Regiment
(written in 1884) asserts that his men bayoneted 1100
mules which had pulled the Confederate wagon train.
Scurry makes no mention of this in his reports. H. C.
Wright denies it emphatically. Wright to Greer, September
7, 1927* "Confederate Reminiscences of 1862,11 loc. cit.,

322.
^•58chivington to General, March 28, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 539.

"^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 122. VJhitford
asserts that while the Federals were burning the train,
a Confederate messenger galloped out of the ravine in
back of the ranch house, and sped down the canyon toward
Pigeon's Ranch. It is Whitford's contention that the
arrival of this messenger was the cause of Scurry's send
ing in a flag of truce. Scurry's official reports make no
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The seventeen Texas prisoners were carried off
with the command.

Chivington, undoubtedly showing his

worst nature—a trait which would later crop up in the
infamous Sand Creek Massacre—ordered that the prisoners
should be shot in case they were attacked by Scurry on
their return march.

Greatly outraged, Colonel Scurry in

his official report scathingly criticized the Federal com
mander for this order as well as for the shooting of the
defenseless chaplain.

As Scurry put it, "These instances

go to prove that. . ./the Yankees/ have lost all sense of
humanity in the insane hatred they bear to the citizens
of the Confederacy, who have the manliness to arm in de
fense of their country's independence."1^0

reference to any such messenger, nor do they state that
the flag of truce was sent in upon learning of the
destruction of the train. Scurry to General, March 30>
1862, 0. R. A., IX, 541-542; Scurry to Jackson, March 31#
1862, iblcT., 542-545.
It was also contended that the rear guard attack
caused a rumor to spread among the Confederate troops at
Glorieta that they were being attacked in the rear by
Canby's column. This supposedly caused a panic among part
of their force, and prevented an effective pursuit of
Slough's defeated troops. I have found no evidence to
verify this contention. Anderson, "Canby's Services,"
loc. cit., 6 9 9 .

IX, 544.

Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, 0. R. A.,
~

3^6
After the command had reached the summit and had
marched three or four miles, Lieutenant Alfred S. Cobb
rode up with a dispatch from Colonel Slough.

The Federal

commander ordered Chivington to return immediately to
support the main army which was steadily being driven
back by the

Texans."^1

Cobb also informed the major that

the enemy was in possession of the trail he was following.
It was exceedingly dar'k and it would have been next to
impossible for Chivington to have found his way back to
camp.

Chavez was unwilling to accept the responsibility

of guiding the party over any other trail than the one
they had used.

At this point Padre Ortiz, a Roman

Catholic priest who had joined Chivington's force at the
top of the mountain, came forward.

The priest, who was

from a small village near the Pecos ruins and familiar
with the mountainous territory, offered to lead the
Federals to Kozlowski's Ranch.

Chavez was acquainted

with Padre Ortiz and he advised Chivington to accept his
services.

In almost, total darkness the priest, riding a

white horse, led the column over a pathless route through
the mountains.

Chivington had dismounted and stumbled

along while leading his horses.

n ^n

It was a difficult march

Chivington to General, March 28, 1862, ibid.,
539; Chivington, The Prospective.
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as the band made its way through the rough and thicket
covered mountains.

At last the column reached the main

road near the Pecos ruins.

Chivington then set out down

the trail to Camp Lewis at Kozlowski's Ranch.

^

Near ten o'clock that night the column came in
sight of the Federal camp fires.-^3

<phe major was not

certain whose camp it was, so he called his men to a
halt.

"Pall in, every man in his place, fix bayonets,"

cautioned Chivington, "I don't know whose /camg? it is,
but if it a'nt ours we'll make it so.
close."

Forward, keep

On coming within hailing distance of the guard,

however, Chivington found it to be Slough's.

Tired and

weary, Chivington's men rejoined their comrades and
"reserved their hostility for other occasions. "•'•64

•^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 122-123.
•^^chivington to General, March 28, 1862,
0. R. A., DC, 539.
•^Hollister, A History of the First, 72.
Chivington, in his The First Colorado Regiment, written
in 1884, says essentially the same thing. However, in
The Prospective, also written in 1884, Chivington states
that he first encountered Slough's pickets who were
doubtful of his identity. After convincing them that he
and his men were part of the Federal command, Chivington
marched into camp.
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Chivington's rear guard foray more than com
pensated for Slough's defeat on the main battle field.
The destruction of the wagon train was -undoubtedly the
165
most decisive action of the whole New Mexican campaign.
Already seriously "short of needed supplies, Sibley would
now be forced to discontinue his plans to assault Fort
Union.

It must have been discouraging, indeed, when the

Texans learned that, though they had won the battle of

166
Glorieta, they had lost the victory at Johnson's Ranch.

-L^5slough maintained in his report to Canby that
he had received notice of Chivington's successful action.
He gave this as one of the reasons for his abandoning
the field of Glorieta. This appears doubtful. Undoubt
edly Slough wrote this in an effort to smooth over the
fact that he had engaged the Texans in force—an action
contrary to the departmental commander's instructions.
Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 533.
l66Many New Mexicans asserted that Chivington
unjustly received the credit for the burning of the
enemy supply train. In Santa Fe some contended that
James L. Collins, the Indian superintendent, was the
individual who suggested the idea to Chivington.
Keleher, Turmoil in New Mexico, 181. In 1864 the Terri
torial Legislature of New Mexico passed a resolution
which asked the President of the United States to confer
upon Captains William H. Lewis and Asa B. Carey the rank
of major for their "meritorious and distinguished
services in attacking the rear guard of the rebel army."
No mention was made of Chivington. New Mexico Laws, 1864,
124. The March 8, 1864, issue of the Rio Abajo Press
scathingly denounced Chivington and objected to His
"strutting about in plumage stolen from Captain William
H. Lewis, 5"th U. S. Infantry." The editor pointed out
that it took two hours to convince Chivington to attack
the train, and then he remained safely behind on the hill
while the attack was carried out under the direction of
Captain Lewis. Rio Abajo Press, March 8, 1864.

3^9
The battle of Glorieta, referred to by the Union
commanders as the battle of Pigeon's Ranch, was a rela
tively small engagement, but the casualties attested to
the ferocity with which it was fought.

Scurry gave his

losses as thirty-six killed and sixty wounded.

Of the

killed, twenty-four were of the Fourth Regiment, one
from the Fifth, eight from the Seventh, and one from the
artillery.^7

In addition, the Federal commander stated

that his men had taken twenty-five Confederate prisoners.

There is considerable disagreement concerning

the Union casualty figures.

Colonel Slough reported

twenty-nine killed, forty-two wounded, and about fifteen
prisoners.-^9

Tappan stated that in his command alone

he had twenty-nine killed, sixty-four wounded, and
thirteen missing.

Nine later died of their wounds, so

this raised the number of dead to thirty-eight.1'''0
Hollister in his account of the campaign lists forty171
six killed, sixty-four wounded, and twenty-one prisoners.

"^^Scurry to Jackson, March 31> 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 5^5.
- - •^Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862, ibid., 533.
l69s.lough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
ibid., 535.
•^Tappan to Chapin, May 21, 1862, ibid., 538.
^f^Hollister, A History of the First, 75-76.

CHAPTER XII
THE DECISION TO EVACUATE NEW MEXICO

At eight o'clock on the morning after the battle,
Slough ordered a small guard to take all the horses back
to Fort Union.

The horses, weary and jaded, were in such

poor condition that Slough considered them an incumbrance.
News of the commander's order quickly spread throughout
the camp, and it was interpreted as meaning that the
colonel was planning to move against the Texans again.
Great was the dismay of many of the men, and "it was some
what amusing to see the various aches, ills, etc., with
which some of the boys. . .were instantly attacked."

Ap

parently the lure of Santa Fe had lost its charms to many,
for "any sacrifice of manhood" was preferable to the risk
ing of another battle with the Texans.

Before the horses

were ready to start, however, the order was countermanded,
and the men breathed freely once again.^

Slough, believ

ing that the Texans were too strongly entrenched in the
canyon to be attacked by his force, decided to move back

•hiollister, A History of the First, 73.
350
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to Bernal Springs—the keypoint, so he thought, for
2
protecting Port Union and for harassing the Texans.
The Federals were busy the morning of March 29
bringing in their wounded and burying their thirty-five
dead on the battlefield.

During the day Colonel Scurry

sent in another flag of truce asking for a continuation
of the armistice until eight o'clock the next morning.
The Texan maintained that it would take that long to
provide adequately for the needs of his wounded.

Slough

agreed, for it made little difference how many armistices
were accepted since he had already decided to fall back
to Bernal Springs.

After completing arrangements for

providing for the comfort of the wounded, Slough's column
set out on the road to San Jose about two o'clock that
afternoon.

Company F, the mounted Colorado unit, acted

as rear guard.

Fresh graves and a crowded hospital at

Kozlowski's Ranch attested to the horrors of the battle
of the day before.^
The road from Kozlowski's Ranch to San Jose passed
through beautiful scenery, running between the base of a

O
Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30* 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 535.

3Hollister, A_ History of the First, 7^.
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mountain and the Pecos river.

"The ground. . ,/yia.sf

smoothly outlined, bearing a handsome pine forest inter
spersed with beautiful openings."

But most of the men

were little interested in the countryside as the Federal
column sadly moved along.

One Coloradoan maintained that

the men were "half glad to escape the renewal of yesterday
yet revolting at the idea of backing out before. . .^/the^/
4
were well whipped."
At San Jose the next day, some Mexicans from the
"upper Tecolote country" (across the mountains to the
northwest) arrived at Slough's camp to report that they
were being endangered by Texas foragers.

With a force of

eighty men from the different mounted companies, Captain
Walker of the Second Cavalry was sent out to investigate.
Nothing came of the matter and Walker's command returned
without mishap.5
On March 31* Slough's column left San Jose and arrived at Bernal Springs and set up camp.

While encamped,

Captain William Nicodemus, Canby's adjutant general,
galloped up with orders from the departmental commander
to fall back to Fort Union.

4Ibid.
5Ibid.,

77.

6lb id.,

78.

As yet Canby had not left
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Fort Craig, but he would notify the northern department
as soon as he did.

There was nothing Slough could do

but return to Port Union as he now had definite orders
from his superior officer.^

At dusk on April 2, the

column arrived at the post.

The Colorado infantry oc

cupied its old campsite, and the mounted Coloradoans
were quartered in a log house located below the fortifi
cation.

Slough's force had been gone eleven days, had

traveled a distance of seventy-five miles, and had
fought two battles.

After this brief, but arduous
O
campaign, the men were glad of a chance to rest.
In his official report to the adjutant general,

Slough maintained that his action at Glorieta had been
done solely for the purpose of annoying and harassing
the enemy as ordered by Colonel Cariby.^

The departmental

commander, however, considered Slough's action to be a
breech of his orders.

This could mean a court-martial.

When Slough arrived at Port Union, he relinquished his

^Connelly to Seward, April 6, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 659^Hollister, A History of the First, 78.

9siough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862,
o. R. A., IK, 535•
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command, and Colonel Paul re-assumed the headship of the
northern district.' 1 ' 0

No doubt Paul rejoiced at finally

winning out over his rival.
* * * *

The day after the battle was a hard one for
Scurry's men, for they had not eaten since the morning
before.

Some hungrily picked up kernels of corn, which

the horses and mules had wasted in the corral, and
parched them over camp fires.

Tired, hungry, and with

their ammunition nearly exhausted, the Texans were in no
condition to follov/ up their shallow victory
The morning was spent burying the dead and caring
for the wounded.

The Confederates had no picks and

shovels, so when the Federals finished interring their
dead, they graciously loaned their tools to the Texans.
That evening the bugle called the troops into line, and
Scurry addressed his men to inform them of the situation.
All their wagons and supplies had been burned, and the
sick that had remained behind with the wagon train had

• L0 Canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862,
ibid., 658; Hollister, A History of the First, 7^.
• L1 Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927, "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 318.
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"been taken prisoner.

For two days his men had gone

unfed and blanketless.

Since Santa Fe was the only

place where supplies and transportation could be ob
tained to replace what had been destroyed by the enemy,
Scurry decided to fall back to the capital.

After mak

ing certain that the wounded were taken care of as
satisfactorily as possible in the hospital established
13

at Pigeon's Ranch, Scurry's command set out for Santa Fe.
A few Texans remained behind at the hospital to care for
the wounded.^

Scurry reached Santa Fe, a distance of

about twenty-two miles, early the next morning.^

The

men came into town in squads of different sizes.

"Some

rode, some walked and some hobbled in."^

12lbid.,

Quarters and

318-319.

•^scurry to General, March 30, 1862, 0, R. A.,
IX, 5^2; Scurry to Jackson, March 31* 1862, ibid., "5^5.
l^Wright to Greer, September 7, 1927> "Confeder
ate Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 323.
•^scurry to General, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A^.,
IX, 5^1j Halcomb to Greer, August 5* 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 319•

-^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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food were soon secured for the exhausted and destitute
command.^7
Soon after entering the capital, Scurry dis
patched a message to Sibley informing him of the events.
The colonel urged that supplies of ammunition be sent as
soon as possible, for as quickly as he could. Scurry
"wlsh/ed/ to get after them again."

Scurry also told the

general that three different sources, all of whom were be
lieved to be reliable, had informed him that Canby had
left Fort Craig on March 24.

When Major Pyron had first set out to meet the
Federals on March 25, Mrs. Canby urged all "loyal women"
to make preparations for the receiving of any wounded that
might result from the impending clash.

She set the example

by "having beds filled, hospital rooms set in order, lint,
soups and everything she could think of," prepared for the
comfort and aid of the suffering.

When some of the Union

ladies protested that "rebel wounded might be the ones"
which had to be cared for, Mrs. Canby snapped, "No matter
whether friend or foe, our wounded enemy must be cared for
and their lives saved if it is possible, they are sons of

•^Scurry
XX, 5^1; Halcomb
Reminiscences of
•1 O
AOScurry
IX, 542.

to General, March 30, 1862. C>. R. A.,
to Greer, August 5, 1927* Confederate
1862," loc. c i t 3 1 9 .
to General, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~
~
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some dear mother."^

when the Confederate wounded were

brought in, Mrs. Canby nursed and cared for them as if
they were her own sons.

Her large home was filled with

sick and wounded, and she personally saw that no one
suffered from lack of care.

In the absence of ambulances

to bring in the wounded, Mrs. Canby contrived the idea of
nailing tent cloths across the wagon beds, so as to form
hammocks.

This made the rough trip to Santa Fe much
20

easier for the suffering.

The wounded who could not be

brought to town became Mrs. Canby's special charge.
Every day on the road her carriage could be seen bearing
either her, or some needed items for the suffering men at
Pi
the field hospital.
Needless to say, Mrs. Canby's
loving care endeared her to the Confederates.

One Texan

maintained that that Christian lady "captured more hearts
of Confederate soldiers than the old general /Colonel
22
Canb^7 ever captured Confederate bodies."
Several

•^ty/illiams, Three Years, 20.
20Halcomb

to Greer, August 5> 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 320; Wright to Greer,
September 7, 1927# ibid., 323.

21williams, Three Years, 25.
22Halcomb

to Greer, August 5# 1927* "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 320.
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months later when a group of the sick and wounded had
convalesced sufficiently to leave, the following
resolution was unanimously passed by them:
RESOLVED, That we should be doing violence to
our feelings were we to leave this place without
expressing to the ladies of Santa Fe and, through
them, to those who have aided them in their mission,
our proformed /fi-o/ gratitude for the delicate kind
ness which has oeen shown to many of us in suffering
and sickness, and the attention and courtesy which
has been extended to all.^3
Although every effort was made to care for the
men, privations and hardships, intensified by a climate
much colder than their own, caused many Texans to fall
prey to disease.

Pneumonia particularly "gave the grave

as many as the fight."

Day after day the hospital wagon

with its silent load wended its way along the mountain
side to inter its contents on the lonely plateau.

Only

a few months before these men had been hale and hearty,
and filled with optimism as they left the sunny soil of
24
Texas to begin the New Mexican campaign.
On March 31> Captain W. H. Lewis of the Fifth
Infantry and Captain James H. Ford, Colorado Volunteers,

23santa

Fe Gazette, May 31# 1862.

24wiHiams, Three Years, 25-26.
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came into Santa Fe under a flag of truce to negotiate
an exchange of prisoners.

Scurry and the Federals could

reach no agreement, so the two captains left that after
noon without accomplishing their mission.
That same day the Confederates had the good
fortune to discover a large amount of government property
which belonged to the Indian agency.

These goods were

intended for distribution among the Indians, but because
of the hostile attitude of the Navajos, the supplies had
been accumulating for the past four years.

Before leaving

Santa Fe, Superintendent James L. Collins had placed the
supplies in a storeroom at the superintendency.

26

The

door to the room was carefully closed up, plastered over,
and then whitewashed. 271

The Texans had suspected that

property of this nature was at the agency and had made
frequent investigations in reference to it.

Undoubtedly

someone told the Confederates of its whereabouts.

As a

result the Texans gained a valuable supply of blankets
and other articles in which they were sorely in need.

2 %anta

Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.

26Ibid.

27lbid., May 17, 1862.
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Some goods were of no value to them, and these the Con
federates attempted to sell at nominal prices to the
28

people of the town.

Meanwhile the six companies of Green's Regiment
which had remained temporarily behind in Albuquerque
were doing a great deal of patrol duty in the neighbor-

29

hood of Albuquerque and the mountains to the east.

When the Fifth's transportation was ready, Sibley order
ed Green to move on to Santa Fe.

The general remained

behind in Albuquerque and was to follow later behind the
main body.^0

On March 28, the day of the battle of

Glorieta, the Fifth was encamped at the ranch of Manuel
Armijo, a strong Southern sympathizer.

31

As previously

related, he and his brother had turned over for Sibley's
use some $200,000 worth of supplies.

While the battle

of Glorieta was getting under way, Sibley was still in
Albuquerque, being shaved by his barber and completely

^ibid., April 26, 1862.
29Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 137.

3°Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,

ix, 509.

~ ~ ~

3^Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc. cit., 137.

ix,

32sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
511.
- - -
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unaware of the developments

ahead

.33

Green's Regiment

remained in camp at Armijo's ranch on March 29, and it
was only during the next day that news arrived of the
engagement ahead.

At three o'clock in the morning of

March 31* Green's men started out.

For two days the

force traveled up the Rio Grande valley, camping at
Indian pueblos each night.

On April 2, the Fifth left
34
the river and the next day camped in sight of Santa Fe.
Sibley hastened ahead to the capital where he
found his "whole exultant army assembled."

The sick and

wounded had been cared for, and the loss of clothing and
transportation had been made up from Federal supplies
and confiscations.

Sibley observed that Scurry had taken

35
care of everything "which should have been done."
The Confederates had occupied the capital for
nearly a month, and the forage and supplies in the general

33Hayes states that Sibley was only twenty miles
from the battle. Sibley's report of March 31* however,
was written in Albuquerque. On this basis it is reason
ably safe to assume that the general had not yet left for
Santa Fe. Hayes, New Colorado, 169.
Oil

Faulkner (contrib.), "With Sibley in New
Mexico," loc . cit., 140-141.
35sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, £. R. A.,
ix, 509.
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area were becoming exhausted

While in Santa Fe

Sibley issued an order for the seizure of all the funds
in the territorial treasury.
the brigade quartermaster.

The act was executed by

The amount of money which
•37

was taken is unknown, but apparently it was not great.

Regardless of what materiel and money had been seized in
and around Santa Fe, the loss of Scurry's wagon train
had caused irreparable damage.
true in regard to ammunition„

This was particularly
As a result, the plan to

move upon Fort Union now had to be temporarily set aside.
The great question of "what to do" now pressed heavily
upon Sibley and his staff.

Santa Fe was untenable, the

brigade was suffering from lack of supplies, and rumors
reported Canby's advance from Fort Craig.
was critical.

The situation

Anxiously Sibley wrote to the adjutant

general and begged for reinforcements.3®

It was obvious

that only with additional materiel and men could the
campaign be successfully concluded.

36Ibid.,

509-510.

•^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
3®Sibley to Cooper, March 311 1862, _0. R. A., IX,
5^1. Canby reported that Colonel Steele with a force of
500 men had attempted to reinforce Sibley about March 20,
but had been prevented from doing so. Canby to AdjutantGeneral, May 18, 1862, Ibid., 673.
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After due consideration, Sibley and his staff
decided that the whole brigade should occupy the village
of Manzano which lay on the eastern side of the Manzano
mountains.

Intermediate between Fort Union, Albuquerque,

and Fort Craig, this position would enable the Texans to
keep a watch on the movements of the Federals at Fort
Craig and Fort Union.

Since Manzano was on the road to

Fort Stanton, communication lines could be kept open with
39
the Mesilla Valley.
While awaiting the anticipated re
inforcements, the brigade could live off the land in and
around the village, and send out patrols to keep the
staff informed of any Union activity.

When reinforce

ments arrived, Sibley could then move upon Fort Union and
bring the New Mexican campaign to a glorious conclusion.
Should the hoped for aid not arrive, however, and if
evacuation became necessary, the road from Manzano to
Fort Stanton and the Mesilla Valley would be an advan
tageous route, for there would be little danger of an
attack upon the retreating brigade from either of the
Federal armies.
Hardly had the Confederates made the decision to
move to Manzano when the plan was completely upset by the

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510.
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arrival of "rapid and continuous" dispatches from Albu
querque.

Canby had advanced from Fort Craig as rumored,
40
and was now attacking Albuquerque I
The two companies
under Coopwood and Hardeman were putting up a stout de

fense of the town, but they could not hold out for long.
Quickly orders were issued for the whole brigade to rush
to Albuquerque to relieve the beleaguered garrison and
protect the supply depot.

Green's Fifth Regiment, camped

just below Santa Fe, was ordered to set out immediately.
The dismounted Fourth and the battalion of the Seventh
soon followed, while Pyron's command remained behind in
Santa Fe. After forced marches, Green and Scurry arrived
in town only to learn that Canby had withdrawn from the
area.

For his defense of Albuquerque, Captain Hardeman

was promoted to lieutenant colonel.^ Pyron's command
42
came into Albuquerque on April 12.
After leaving be
hind several hundred sick and wovinded soldiers, the Con43
federates had abandoned the capital.
Upon his arrival

40Ibid.

^•kEbid.; Noel, A Campaign, 25, 118.
^2Noel, A Campaign, 25.
^3wright to Greer, September 7 > 1927# "Confederate
Reminiscences of 1862," loc. cit., 324.
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in Santa Fe, Sibley had found many people who espoused
the Southern cause and when the Confederates abandoned
the capital, some of these citizens left with them.
William Pelham and Alexander P. Wilbar, both ex-surveyors
general of the territory, and a Mr. Clemens were among
those who chose to cast their lot with the Confederacy.

24.it

When Governor Connelly returned to the capital to resume
his duties, the Santa Fe Gazette caustically remarked that
the "only memento. . ./the Texans]7 left for our worthy
Chief Magistrate was some of Sibley's proclamation's ^•ic/
and empty champagne bottles."
The crisis had come.

The "Army of New Mexico"

was caught between two better equipped and better sup
plied Federal forces which would shortly unite, giving
the enemy numerical superiority.

The Texans were fairly

well-clothed, but they had only fifteen days' full
rations.

Possessing from thirty-five to forty cartridges

^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.

^5jbid. A Federal Indian agent at Maxwell's
Ranch reported on March 19, 1862, that the Texans es
tablished their own territorial government in Santa Fe
and selected ex-surveyor general William Pelham as
governor. Pelham was supposed to have appointed Indian
agents and a superintendent of Indian affairs. The
Federal agent also asserted that he had heard that Pelham
had issued a proclamation requiring all citizens of New
Mexico to swear allegiance to the Confederate States under
the penalty of the confiscation of their property. Arny
to General, March 19* 1862, Records of the Bureau of
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per man, they might have enough ammunition to engage one
Union army, but not both.^

Under these circumstances,

the great decision which Sibley now faced was "whether
to evacuate the country or take the desperate chance of
fighting the enemy in his stronghold ^/Ejnion/, for scant
rations at the best.

47

It did not take the general and

his staff long to decide.
The Confederates' nearest base of supply was
hundreds of miles away.

But they had not maintained a

line of supply, for Sibley had been adamant in his belief
that he could capture all that he needed from Federal
depots and posts once he entered New Mexico.

The state

of Texas had been unable to fully equip and maintain
Sibley's army in the field, so even if Sibley had had a
supply line, very little materiel would have reached him
from Texas.

What few supplies Colonel Steele might send

from the Mesilla Valley would be stopped by the Federals
at Fort Craig.

Sibley's grand strategy had been based up

on seizing what he needed from the enemy.

When such sup

plies and equipment were not forthcoming, the general found

Indian Affairs. I have found no other evidence concerning
the setting up of a Confederate territorial government for
New Mexico. It is quite possible that the Federal agent
was reporting only a fallacious rumor as he did not have
first hand information.
^Noel, A Campaign, 25.
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 510.
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himself stranded and destitute.

Engulfed in a barren and

hostile country, and faced with a superior enemy, rapid
withdrawal from the territory was the only alternative to
certain disaster.
At a council of war Sibley and his staff agreed
to the evacuation of the territory.

The Texans hoped to

withdraw as rapidly as possible in order to avoid another
encounter with the main Federal army.

Knowing that Port

Craig was now garrisoned by a small force of volunteers,
the Confederates planned, as a parting gesture, to attack
and destroy that post on their way down the Rio Grande.
The retreat began on April 13.

48

Since there was

not enough ammunition for all the howitzers, Sibley con
sidered it expedient to abandon some of these pieces.

This would lighten the load on the draught animals and
the carriages would serve as needed transportation for
baggage.

In order to keep them from falling into the

hands of the Federals, eight brass howitzers were secretly
buried in the town.

Sibley kept the six guns his men had

captured—"The Valverde Battery"—for there was great
sentimental value attached to them.^9

By ferry and ford,

^9whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 130, 137-138.
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the Fourth Regiment, the battalion of the Seventh, Pyron's
command, and part of the artillery crossed over to the
west bank of the Rio Grande.

The Fifth Regiment and the

brigade commissary train were to follow, but Green found
that there was too much quicksand in the ford for his
heavy wagons.

He decided to camp for the night on the

east bank and then move down the river the next day to

50

find a better crossing.

In the meantime, Sibley and

the bulk of the brigade continued down the west bank of
the river eighteen miles to the village of Los Lunas.
Here they halted and made camp to await the arrival of
the Fifth.51
Hearing that the ford between Peralta and Los
Lunas was a good one, Green set out the next morning
down the east bank.

For about five miles the regiment

passed through very heavy sand and the progress of the
column was slowed considerably.

That evening Green ar

rived at Peralta, which was opposite Los Lunas and
Sibley's camp.

Instead of crossing over that night,

Green decided to make his camp at Governor Connelly's
ranch.

The heavy commissary wagons which were bringing

5°Noel, A Campaign, 25-26.
510.

53-Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX,
- - -
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up the rear, failed to arrive, so Green sent back some
empty wagons to lighten their loads to speed their pace.
The wagon master had explicit orders to bring his train
into camp, but having already turned his mules out to
graze, and believing that there was no danger, he dis
obeyed Green's order.

He remained that night where he
•52
was—about six or eight miles north of Peralta.
* * * *

Canby was deeply upset when a dispatch from
Colonel Slough arrived informing him of the skirmish in
Apache Canyon and the intention of the Coloradoan to move
against the Texans with his entire force.

Canby viewed

Slough's actions as a definite breech of orders.

Slough's

impetuosity could easily lead to serious consequences,
not only by jeopardizing the army in the northern district
but by endangering the territory as a whole.^3

indeed,

at the battle of Glorieta Slough had been driven from the
field, and the defeat would have been disastrous had not
54
Chivington's party succeeded in burning the supply train.
In view of this situation, Canby decided to leave Fort

5 2 Noel, A Campaign, 26.
53canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862,
0 . R. A., IX, 658.
^Anderson, "Canby's Services," loc. cit., 699.
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Craig as soon as possible to form a junction with the
forces in the north.^5

Hastily he dispatched Captain

William Nicodemus, his adjutant general, to order Slough
to fall back to Port Union and await further word con56

cerning the uniting of the Union forces.

There were two main routes which Canby could take
in his northward march.

One ran through Abo Pass and up

the eastern side of the mountains to Anton Chico.

The

other was the river route which could be followed to
Albuquerque and from there eastward through Carnuel Pass
to San Antonio, and up the eastern side of the mountains
to Galisteo.

Canby chose the river route because it was

"the boldest," for he believed that the Texans would
least suspect that he would use it.

Furthermore, if

Albuquerque could be occupied without serious loss, Canby
intended to hold the town until a junction could be ef
fected.

By uniting his troops below the Confederates,

reported to be concentrated at Santa Fe, Canby's united
force would be in a strategic position to cut off any
contemplated retreat by the Texans.

Should Albuquerque

prove to be too heavily defended, Canby planned to make a

55canby to Adjutant-General, March 31> 1862,
0 . R. A., IX, 658.
^Connelly to Seward, April 6 , 1862, ibid., 659.
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demonstration against the town.

This feint might draw

the bulk of the Confederate army from Santa Fe.

While

the Confederates were being deceived, Canby could quietly
move out and unite his column elsewhere without fear of
opposition.^
Once the forces of the department were combined,
Canby was confident that he could drive the Texans from
New Mexico, at least from the area north of Fort Craig.
If adequate reinforcements from the East arrived, a suf
ficient occupation force could be left in the north while
the bulk of the army could proceed down to the Mesilla
Valley.

The New Mexican Volunteers, of course, could not

"be relied on for any purpose of this kind."-^

Marching

orders were posted at Fort Craig and preparations were
made to move out.

Each man and each company was allowed

a limited amount of baggage.

All property which was over

the weight limit was left behind to be stored in one of
the stone buildings of the post.^9

on April 1, with a

force of 860 regulars and 350 volunteers (including
"Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company), and two 24-pounders, Canby
set out from Fort Craig.

5^Canby to Adjutant-General, March 31* 1862,
ibid., 658.
5®lbid.
59Las Vegas Gazette, September 1$, 1877*
6°Canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 549-550.
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Colonel Christopher "Kit" Carson was left in
command of Port Craig, charged with the duty of holding
that post "to the last extremity."

Carson's garrison

consisted of seven companies of his First Regiment, two
of the Second, and one of the Fourth Regiment New Mexico
Volunteers.

As the convalescents from the hospital be

came fit for active duty, they were counted upon to add
to Carson's strength.

How Carson would carry out his

duty was left to his own "judgment and discretion," for
Canby placed great reliance upon the ability of this
frontiersman.

Before leaving, the departmental commander

warned that the Confederates in the Mesilla Valley were
not strong enough to attack the fort openly, but that
they might attempt to take it by surprise.

In order to

guard against such a possibility, Carson was to "exact
from all of. .
vigilance."

./his/

command the most unremitting

Canby also stressed that the sick and wound

ed at the hospital were to receive careful attention.
Any expenditures which Carson considered necessary for
their comfort were fully authorized.^
As Canby's column proceeded northward, the road
became very soft and sandy.

It was only with the greatest

6%icodemus to Carson, March 31* 1862, ibid., 659.
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difficulty that the men were able to keep the heavy
field pieces and the transportation wagons, which were
loaded to the brim, rolling.

In order not to tire out

the draught animals, rest stops were numerous, and at
best the march was tedious and tiring.

When Canby ar

rived just below Socorro, "Doc" Stracham, a resident of
Albuquerque, galloped up to deliver a dispatch from the
northern district.

In the meadow below the town, the

column formed in a hollow square and the letter was read
aloud to the assembled men.

This was the first that

Canby had heard about the battle of Glorieta.

The dis

patch stated that with the burning of the Confederate
supply train, the Texans considered themselves routed so
badly that they had begun their retreat toward Texas.
After the reading of the message, the whole Federal
column, "from the commanding officer down to the lowest
private in the rear rank," gave three rousing cheers

62
which reverberated throughout the countryside.
The Texans in charge of the hospital in Socorro
had seen the approach of the Federals, and when they heard
the cheers, they erroneously assumed that Canby was plan
ning to storm the town.

Quickly they hoisted a hospital

^2Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877.

374
flag and a delegation was sent to tell Cariby that the
few Confederate soldiers in town were serving only as
guards and nurses for the sick and wounded.

After as

suring the Texans that he did not plan to attack them,
Canby reformed his men and continued his advance.^3
Shortly before reaching the sandhills above
Socorro, some of the infantrymen who had been drinking
whiskey, got out of hand.

One in particular was acting

up, so he was seized and tied behind a wagon.

Many were

the curses which were emitted by this unfortunate.

The

sergeant of the guard took pity on the fellow when he saw
that he was too drunk to stand on his feet.

The sergeant

offered to untie the soldier's hands and let him lie down
in the feed trough to sober up, if he promised to behave
himself.

The soldier quickly agreed, but no sooner were

his hands free, than he jumped up, jerked out the
sergeant's pistol and shot him through the breast.

The

drunken infantryman was quickly overpowered, and at camp
that night he was tried by a field court-martial.

The

next day the column formed in a three-sided square and
the sentence was read.

The prisoner, his eyes bandaged,

was seated in a chair which had been placed at the open

63Ibid.
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end of the square.

At the command of "fire!" a squad of

mounted riflemen pierced his body with six bullets and
"sent him into eternity for his rash act."
On the afternoon of April 8, Canby arrived at
Los Barelas, the southern suburb of Albuquerque.
reported a large force of Texans in the town,

J

Scouts

so in

order to determine their strength and to locate their
batteries, Canby, as planned, ordered a demonstration
against the town.

Captain Graydon's Spy Company, sup

ported by the regular cavalry, headed the attack.

The

Texans opened fire with their howitzers which were
located near the mill at Rancho Seco.

Sharp skirmishing

ensued and Confederate six-pound shot threw sand in the
eyes of the support of Canby's batteries.

As these

cannon balls harmlessly bounced over the Federal artillery,
they kept rolling, forcing the cavalrymen in the rear to
take refuge near some buildings.

In trying to dodge one

of these missiles, Major Duncan lost his balance in the
saddle and fell to the ground, seriously injuring his
head.

As the cannon duel continued, some of the citizens

of Albuquerque came into the Union lines to report that
the Texans wou.ld not allow the women or children of the

lb id.
6 5ibid.
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town to seek refuge.

Since the townspeople were ap

parently suffering more from the attack than the Texans,
f>£>

Canby ordered his cannoneers to cease firing.

Sharp skirmishing, less the cannonading, con
tinued throughout the next day.

Canby, convinced that

Albuquerque was too strong to be captured by his force,
decided to keep up the attack as a ruse to draw the main
Confederate army from Santa Pe .67

<phe Federal commander

held a council of war and at sundown on April 9, large
campfires were built and when darkness set in, the
Federals silently began loading their baggage wagons.
Leaving behind only buglers, drummers, and fifers, the
whole force steathily made its way toward Carnuel Pass.
At eight o'clock that night, with the campfires still
burning, the musicians played tattoo, and then mounted
their horses.

In company with a small escort, they soon
/TQ

caught up with the column.

The Texans in Albuquerque

had been completely deceived by Canby's wily maneuver.

66canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862,
0, R._A.j IX, 550; Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877.
67canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862,
_0. R. A., IX, 550; Roberts to Thomas, April 23, 1862,
ibid., 553.

^^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877.
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Canby's column marched that night and part of the
next day.

Passing through Carnuel Pass between the Sandia

and Mansanito Mountains, Canby continued on until he
halted at the village of San Antonio, about twenty miles
east of Albuquerque.

The commander was now in communi

cation with Colonel Paul, and a junction could be accom
plished at any point.

Canby's feint had worked well, for

his spies reported that the entire Confederate army had
left Santa Pe and was moving rapidly to the relief of
Albuquerque.

Canby planned to remain in San Antonio in

order to watch the movements of the Texans and to await
the arrival of Paul's column from Port Union.

Prom all

indications, it appeared that the Confederates were
planning to evacuate the territory.^
* *

* *

On the morning of April 5j Colonel Paul informed
the troops at Port Union to prepare to march within an
hour.

The order "came like a dash of cold water," and

"letters were cut short in haste, poker took wings and
vanished, blankets and effects were bundled, the herd
brought in, adieux said."

Major Chivington briefly ad

dressed the Colorado infantry to explain the marching

^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 11, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 550.
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order.

He informed his men that Canby had left Fort

Craig and the troops at Fort Union were to march south
ward to divert the enemy's attention and to unite with
Cariby to drive the Texans from the land.

Though still

weary and sore from the previous campaign, the infantry
men assembled and set out about dusk.

They marched as

far as the Lome and encamped there for the night.
Company F, mounted Colorados, and Claflin's battery left
Fort Union the next day and overtook the main force at
Las Vegas.

That night Colonel Paul, escorted by Captain

Lord's company of the First Cavalry, arrived at the camp.
The weather during the day had been very cold and windy,
and the men were happy to bed down in their warm blankets.
Before leaving Las Vegas the next day, Corporal Sampson
was sent back to the Lome with a squad of men to see if
he could find five Colorado Volunteers who "had dropped
TO

behind in such a way as left no doubt of their desertion."
At three o'clock in the afternoon of April J,
Paul's force arrived at Bernal Springs and set up camp.
For several days Paul's main body remained here while
cavalry detachments were sent out to check the whereabouts
of the enemy.

Company F was ordered to proceed toward

7°Hollister, A History of the First, 79-80.
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Kozlowski's ranch where the Union hospital was.

On ar

rival at their old campsite, the Coloradoans were at
tended by about 100 paroled Texas prisoners who had
recently been released from Port Union and were on their
way to rejoin their commands.

Conversations between the

two groups naturally developed.

One Coloradoan was so

exasperated by the Texans' defensive arguments that he
came to the conclusion "that a war of extermination is
all that will ever restore American unity.

Kindness is

accepted only as their due and as food for their haughti
ness.

Nothing can cure their insane prejudice against

Northern men, whom they habitually stigmatize with every
base epithet known to the vocabulary of abuse.

All they

want is the power to inflict a worse servitude on us than
that which the unfortunate negro suffers.
On April

9,

Paul left Bernal Springs.

At San

Jose he was met by Colonel Green and Lieutenant Colonel
McNeill who had ridden up in a carriage bearing a white
flag.

They had come to propose an exchange of prisoners,

but since they would consent only to an even exchange
"between Mexicans and Whites," Paul refused to negotiate.
Both Green and McNeill were under the influence of liquor
and acted in an "insolent and threatening" manner.

^ibid., 80-81.
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was forced to be "somewhat peremptory" with them, and
when the Texans realized that they could not deal with
this Union commander, they turned back toward Santa Pe.
The two officers stopped at Kozlowski's ranch on their
return and stayed part of the night for rest and refreshments.

72

Early the next morning they left for Santa Fe.

A few hours after leaving San Jose, Paul received
intelligence directly from Santa Pe that the Confederates
had evacuated the capital and were retreating to Albu73

querque.

During the late afternoon of April 10, Paul

and the main column reached Kozlowski's ranch.

Captain

Howland was sent to Santa Pe to check on the validity of
the report while Company P continued toward Galisteo,
about twenty miles equidistant between Santa Pe and
Kozlowski's Ranch, for purposes of reconnaissance.

The

day was miserable, for it was snowing and the v/ind was
blowing directly into the faces of the men of Company F
as they plodded along.

Shivering from the cold and

dampness, the company finally reached Galisteo, but there

72lbid., 82-83* Connelly stated that one of the
Confederate officers was Major Alexander M. Jackson. The
governor, however, was not present when the Texans arrived
and received this information from someone else. Connelly
to Seward, April 11, 1862, 0. R. A., DC, 661.

73connelly to Seward, April 11, 1862, £. R. A_.,
DC, 662.
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was no sign of the Texans. Prom all appearances it
seemed that the Confederates were evacuating the country.
A trooper candidly observed that "As they have bought up
with Confederate scrip all the army supplies in this
section, the soundness of their judgment in not returning
here is evident."

Captain Nicodemus came into town on

his way to contact Paul.

At first the captain did not

know whether to take the Coloradoans for "cowboys or
skinners," but the men soon convinced him that they were
Union soldiers.

Nicodemus informed the company that

Canby had made a feint against Albuquerque and was now
74

encamped at San Antonio, some forty miles away.

Company P was ordered to continue on to Pino's
ranch, twenty miles west of Galisteo, for further scout
ing.

The command, starting out at two o'clock in the

afternoon, had gone eighteen miles when a messenger over
took them with an order to fall back to Galisteo.

"Ten

hours in the saddle for nothing," cried the disgusted
volunteers.

This incident, plus the real or imagined

preference given to the regulars, caused a member of
Company F to sarcastically state that "if there is a dis
agreeable task to be performed, or danger to be encounter
ed, they call on us; but if a town is to be occupied after

^Hollister, A History of the First, 83-84.
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the enemy has gone, the regulars come in.

Howland's

company went into Santa Fe yesterday and had their spree
while we were marched out twenty miles across the prairie
and back as if we needed exercise."75
Colonel Slough had accompanied the column from
Port Union, but on April 12, he resigned his commission.
In his parting address, which was read to the assembled
regiment on parade, Slough claimed that his motives had
been pure, and he referred to the engagement in Apache
Canyon as proof of his earnest effort to save the country
for the Union.

He expressed regret wherever he had failed

to give satisfaction.

Slough was a man of undoubted

ability and bravery, but his personal contact with his men
was never of the sort to make him beloved.

The former com

mander of the First closed his remarks by asking the men
to remember that they "were Colorados, men and Americans,
and could not afford to do anything to dishonor" them
selves.

In the morning he set out for Canby's camp at San

Antonio to talk with that officer personally.

In company

with two other officers who had resigned their commissions,
Lieutenants Roath and Sanford, Slough left New Mexico for
Denver City.^

75 Ibid.,

85.

76 Ibid.,

86, 89
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On April 12, Captain Howland returned by way of
Pino's ranch to Paul's command at Kozlowski's.

He re

ported that on entering Santa Fe his company was received
with "public demonstrations of joyand that the Con
federates had evacuated the capital and had fallen back to
Albuquerque.

Howland estimated that there were still about
78
250 sick, wounded, and deserters in the town.
After
hearing this report, Paul wrote to Governor Connelly in
Las Vegas to inform him that Santa Fe was once again in
Union hands and that the governor could return to the
capital whenever he desired.^
With the southern column only sixty miles away,
dispatches between Paul and Canby were sent and received
nearly every hour.

Since the Confederates had now

Ibid., 87J Paul to Connelly, April 12, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 664.
78Hollister, A History of the First, 87.

79Paul to Connelly, April 12, 1862, _0. R. A.,
IX, 663-664. Connelly reported that when the Texans
abandoned Santa Fe they left behind one surgeon and a
few attendants to care for the sick and wounded. He
received this information from a man who left the
capital the day after the Confederates evacuated the
town. Connelly to Seward, April 11, 1862, ibid., 662.
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concentrated at Albuquerque and were giving every indi
cation of leaving the country, the way was now clear for
Paul to rapidly move southward to unite with Canby.

The

stillness of the morning of April 13 was rudely broken by
the drum and bugle calling Paul's men to rise and prepare
for the hard march ahead.

At two o'clock, before the men

had even time to eat breakfast, the column started moving
out.

For the first few miles the road passed through

hills covered with scrub pine.

Soon the trail led through

a cactus covered plain which stretched out in every
direction except in the west where it was bounded by a
broken chain of mountains.

Through occasional gaps in

these mountains "the blue and hazy peaks of other and more
distant ranges" could be seen.

Thirty miles from Galisteo

the road approached the mountains and then passed up a
canyon toward the head of Carnuel Pass.

About dark Paul's

column reached the village of Tijeras where Canby had his
camp "snugly embosomed among the densely timbered hills
of the Pass."

Canby had moved his force from San Antonio

at the head of the canyon to Tijeras which was about five
or six miles below.

The column from the north had been

on the road for fourteen hours, traveling a distance of
some forty miles without food.

Some of the horses were

in such jaded condition that they had to be led into
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camp.

Footsore and weary, Paul's men were happy to make
Oq
camp and rest from the long, arduous march.
Slough's resignation had gone into effect on
April 9.

Lieutenant Colonel Tappan "generously waived

his rank," and a petition, asking that Chivington be
promoted to succeed Slough, was signed by all the officers
of the First Regiment and presented to Canby.

On April 14,

that officer designated the popular Major Chivington
colonel of the First.

This appointment, however, was

subject to the approval of the governor of the territory
of Colorado.®- 1 With his forces.now united, Canby was ready to
strike against the enemy which was now reported to be
moving down the river from

Albuquerque.^

on the after

noon of April 14, the Federals came down Carnuel Pass to
the mouth of the canyon where they briefly halted to eat.
From this point the men could see the Rio Grande which,
at that distance, appeared "like a silver thread glisten
ing under the slanting beams of the setting sun."^

When

®^Hollister, A History of the First, 85, 88-89.
^Ibid., 89; Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 130.
82canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 550-551.

83nollister, A History of the First, 89.
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the troops finished eating, the wagons were reloaded and
the column moved silently out "without the cracking of a
Oh
whip, or the lighting of a pipe." OH After emerging from
the canyon, Canby veered southward and followed a course
which angled toward the river.
march of about thirty-six

At midnight, after a

m i l e s , Federals

struck

the Rio Grande about one mile above the village of
Peralta.®^
Encamped at Peralta, Green's Regiment was totally
unaware of the approach of Canby's men.

The Texas pickets

were taken prisoner and, through spies, the condition of
the "Sibley Brigade" was learned.

The Texas officers

were "carousing" at a fandango while their men were badly
demoralized by "ill usage and bad management."®''' To be
sure, in the distance Canby's ears "were saluted with the
'sounds of revelry by night.'

The violin was in full

blast, accompanied by other and more noisy instruments. 1

®^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15* 1877•
85canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
86nollister, A History of the First, 89.
8 ?Ibid.,

91.

®®Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 665.

QO
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Undoubtedly the Texans were celebrating their leaving
hated New Mexico.
Many of Canby's men expected to attack immedi
ately, and they impatiently awaited

orders .^9

Cariby had

other plans, however 1 , and the wagons "were corraled" and
camp made.9°

Chivington offered to capture or disperse

the Texans with his Colorado regiment alone, but Canby,
knowing that Green had made his camp in a strong de
fensive position, did not want to risk an engagement.
During the remainder of the mild, moonlight night, the
troops watched and waited, hoping to surprise the Texans
in the morning.9^ •

89Hollister, A History of the First, 91.

9°Las Vegas Gazette, September 15* 1877•
9%ollister, A History of the First, 91-92;
Canby to Adjutant-General, ApriT~23, lbb2, 0. R. A_.,
IX,. 551.

CHAPTER XIII
THE SKIRMISH OP PERALTA AND THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT
PROM NEW MEXICO

The first sound which startled the Federal and
Confederate troops the next morning was a "thrilling"
reveille from Canby's bugles.

This was soon followed by

the stirring strains of Dixie which was "thrust upon the
deathly quiet by the brazen throats of Sibley's Brass
Band."

All thoughts of a surprise attack were now at an

end, and by daylight, both camps were in motion.

A group

of Union soldiers were in the process of making some
coffee to warm their chilled bodies when they saw a Con
federate wagon train approaching unsuspectingly along the
road from Albuquerque.

These were the wagons which

Green had ordered into camp the night before.

Through a

spyglass, the Federals observed that the train, now
equidistant from the Confederate and Union camps,con
sisted of seven wagons and a small escort of thirty-four
men commanded by a lieutenant.

Canby immediately dis

patched Paul and his column and three companies of
2
cavalry under Captain Morris to capture the train.

^Hollister, A History of the First, 92.
2 Cariby

to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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When the Confederates saw the enemy coming to
ward them, a few fled "with more speed than was neces
sary to ensure their safety or vindicate their bravery."
The Texans, of course, were overwhelmingly outnumbered.
The small escort could have abandoned their overloaded
wagons and easily made it to the safety of their own
camp.

Instead they chose to defend the train.

While

several unlimbered their brass howitzer, the others took
cover under the wagons. . With their artillery piece in
position and leaning on their "trusty rifles for sup
port, " the Texans awaited the attack.3

perhaps they

thought that the men of their camp would see their
plight and come to their aid.
The mounted Union troops galloped to within two
hundred yards of the train and quickly dismounted to
deploy as skirmishers.

As they advanced, the Texans

fired, but the Federals "hit the dirt," fired back, and
rose to advance further.

These tactics were continued

until they were within fifty yards of the Texans when,
with a loud yell, the Federals rushed the train.

At

that moment abotft a dozen Texans stepped out in sight,

^Hollister, A History of the First, 92.
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dropped their arms, and hoisted a dirty handkerchief on
a ramrod.

The others took "leg •bail" and were either

shot down, captured, or allowed to escape.

Perhaps the

Confederates could have held out longer, but two compa
nies of Union infantry were rapidly coming to the sup
port of the cavalry.

With no help in sight from their

own camp, the Texans considered it useless to resist
further.

The Union infantry arrived in time to witness
2i
the surrender.
In this brief encounter, Canby reported

that six Confederates were killed, three wounded, and
twenty-two captured.^

One Union soldier was wounded so
fi

severely that he died within a few days.

The wagon train contained quartermaster and com
missary supplies,^ and the household goods of Judge
Baird.

Baird was leaving the territory with Sibley's

army, and though his possessions were captured, he and
O
his family managed to escape unhurt in their ambulance.

4 Ibid.,

92-93.

5canby to Adjutant-General, April 23# 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551. Hollister maintained that several of
T^he Texans managed to escape. This conflicts with
Canby's report which accounts for the whole escort being
killed, wounded, or captured. Hollister, A History of
the First, 93•
^Hollister, A_ History of the First, 93.
?Ibid.
8"Notes on the Affair at Valverde," Stanley, Fort
Union, 179•
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Judge Baird and his family were not alone, for when the
Confederates began to evacuate, Rafael and Manuel
Armijo abandoned "luxurious homes and well-filled store
houses" to join their fate to the Southern Confederacy
Seven wagons, one howitzer, seventy mules, and from ten
to fifteen horses and equipment were taken. ' The Federals
limbered up the howitzer and made the prisoners haul it
in.

On the way back, the party met Captain Claflin on his

way to another part of the field.

That artillery officer

took charge of the cannon and was "soon testing its
functions against its late owners."" 1,0
The Texans were greatly surprised to discover that
Canby's column had moved up during the night.
whole force numbered only about 550 men.

Green's

Supported by

his four howitzers,he occupied, however, a strong, de
fensive position.

In fact, Canby maintained that it was

the strongest in the territory outside of Port Union.I 2
The village of Peralta was for two miles a series of

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 511.
l°Holllster, A History of the First, 93> 9^.
11

Noel, A Campaign, 26.

12 Canby

to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
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adobe houses, thick adobe fences, raised ditches (which
could serve as well as common field works), and groves
of large cottonwood trees.^3

Governor Connelly's

residence, where Green had set up his headquarters, was
particularly strong since it was surrounded on all sides
for half a mile by a low, heavy growth of trees.

Only

the main road leading to the house could be used for
wagons or artillery.

Numerous wide and sloughy irri

gation canals ran parallel to, and across, the road and
adobe walls, enclosing the cultivated fields, "crossed
and recrossed" the area.^
When Canby ordered the detachment after the wagon
train, Captain "Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company began feel
ing out the enemy by galloping into Peralta and firing a
few shots.^5

on the return of this unit, Canby opened

16
a "furious, but harmless," cannonade on Green's position.
Hardly had his first 24-pounder shell burst over the
Texans than there appeared white smoke from the muzzles

•^Hollister, A History of the First, 97.
•^Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, 0. R. A_.,
IX, 665.

•^Hollister, A History of the First, 93.

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 510.
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of the Confederate 6-pounders

It was here that the

"Valverde Battery" was tested for the first time." 1 '®

The

first ball the Texans fired fell short and bounced over
the enemy and buried itself in loose sand near their
rear.

The second shot was in range.

After making a

high arc in the air, the ball came whizzing in, and
crashed among a pair of battery wheel mules. The ball
tore "away the whole face of the saddle mule and. . .
^nocked/ the off wheeler on the head just under and be
hind the ear."

Both animals fell to the ground not know

ing what had struck them." 1 "^

With the Federals in their

sights, the Texans rapidly began pouring shells into the
midst of Canby's ammunition and supply train.

Hastily

Canby ordered his wagons to pull back further to the rear
to get out of range, for they were killing his mules
"three or four at a shot."

Canby's guns continued to

return the fire, but since their shots were ineffectual,
20

they were ordered to cease firing.

ITLas Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877.
•^Noel, A Campaign, 26.
•^Las Vegas Gazette, September 15, 1877.
90

Hollister, A History of the First, 93.
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The column sent after the wagon train had now re
turned, but before the men could get back to their
PI

coffee, they were on the move again.

Canby ordered

22
the bosque in front of Peralta cleared of the enemy.

Two columns under Paul and Chivington, with a section of
artillery in the center of each, started toward the river.
The objective was to approach Peralta from the protective
shelter of the trees on the river.

This position would

allow them to command the ford and prevent reinforce
ments from coming to Green's aid from across the Rio
Grande.

On the way, the columns halted several times to

fire their artillery to sound out the Texans.

The Con

federate battery was located in a good position, for it
was on higher ground and was sheltered by the bank of a
large canal.

A Union soldier maintained that one of the

Confederate gunners had been captured at Apache Canyon and,
though released on parole, was now "paying his respects."
The Texans had the Federals' range exactly, and the two
columns had to keep moving.

The Union cavalry was "here,

there and everywhere; now preparing to charge, now on

2lIbid.
pp

Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
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foot advancing as skirmishers; always about to do some
thing but never doing it.
Paul and Chivington were under the impression
that Canby, with a portion of the army and a section of
artillery, was assaulting the other side of town while
they were attacking from the river side.

Paul was

anxious to close in and take Peralta by storm, so he
planned to send Major VJynkoop's battalion forward while
the cavalry charged on the right.

Chivington's column

was to support Wynkoop when necessary. Before Paul could
put his plan into operation, Canby arrived on the scene
and forbade it.

He knew that the nature of the terrain

and the well-entrenched position of the Texans would
make such an attack too costly.

The horses of the Union

cavalry were weak and jaded, and they would have bogged
down in the muddy ditches.

In this position, well-con-

cealed Texas sharpshooters could easily have picked off
their riders.

An infantry charge might have met with

24
more success, but only at a heavy cost.

At any rate,

Canby's objective had been accomplished for the moment,

23Hollister,

lbid., 94.

A History of the First, 93-9^•
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for the bosques in the front and rear of the town were
cleared and occupied by the Federal forces
When Sibley was notified of Green's critical
position, he ordered Colonel Scurry to take the whole
disposable force, including the artillery, across the
river to bolster the Fifth.

Only a "sufficient" guard
o fw

for the supply wagons remained behind.

Near nine

o'clock Green's men heard the shouts of their comrades as

they came from the river.

The ford was nearly 800 yards

wide and averaged four feet deep.

Although mush ice was

floating in the water, the Texans waded up to their arm

pits, holding their guns in their right hands and their

27

cartridge boxes in their left.
cross.

Not all were willing to

It was later reported that 250 positively refused

to follow Scurry into action, and openly threatened his

28

life if he forced them to do so.

2 5canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510.
2 ^Noel,

A Campaign, 26-27.

2®Hollister,

A History of the First, 97-98.
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With a portion of his staff, Sibley followed
shortly to assume immediate command.

He had just

crossed the river when a group of officers which had
preceded him several hundred yards, galloped back to
inform him that a large force of enemy cavalry was ap
proaching.

Finding himself completely cut off, Sibley

was forced to recross the river "amid a shower of
balls."2^

Once again the Confederate commander did not

lead his troops into battle.
The skirmishing increased somewhat when the
30
Federals made one last effort to dislodge the Texans.
After that the fighting died down to nothing more than
"ineffectual firing" on both sides

Cariby's soldiers

had been twenty-four hours, some as long as thirty-six
hours, without eating.

To allow his troops to obtain

food and rest, Canby decided to cease his attack for the
time being.The men, though many were sleeping, re
mained in line of battle.

Near noon some hungry

2 ^Sibley to Cooper, May b, 1862, jO. R. A.,
IX, 510.

3°Noel, A Campaign, 27«
^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 510.
_ _ _
32canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
ibid., 551.
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Coloradoans who saw no "likelihood of getting any secesh
to eat, . . .knocked over a dozen of their beeves."

The

meat was broiled over the coals of their fires and made

33
a fine meal.
While his men were resting and eating, Canby sent
out scouting parties to thoroughly reconnoiter the ap
proaches to Peralta.

When the scouts made their reports,

the points and direction of attack were decided upon, and
Canby moved the command camp nearer the town.

The wagons

were also moved to an area where they could be guarded by
a smaller number of men.About two o'clock that after
noon a high wind sprang up and, as is typical in New
Mexico, the air became a solid cloud of moving sand and
dust.

It was difficult to breathe, let alone see.

As

further operations were impossible while the sand storm
continued, the Federals abandoned their advanced positions
and retired to the shelter of their camp.

The men had

been on the battle line—just beyond rifle range of the
Texans—for six hours.^5

so ended the skirmish of

Peralta.

33Hollister, A History of the First, 95•
3^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
35Hollister, A History of the First, 95*
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Canby gave his losses as one killed and three
wounded.other accounts, particularly the records of
the Colorado adjutant-general's department, mention four
deaths among the Colorado Volunteers alone.

In one

instance during the skirmish, Colonel Chivington and one
of his captains barely escaped being hit by a cannon ball.
The missile, after skipping along the ground toward them,
bounded a few inches over their heads and fatally struck
•37
two soldiers who were walking nearby.-" There are no
available records for Confederate losses, aside from
those reported by Canby concerning the capture of the
oQ
wagon train.
After nightfall, with the wind still blowing
furiously, Sibley ordered his forces to the west bank of
the Rio Grande.

Again the men of the Fourth and Seventh
40
Regiments had to wade the icy waters.
With the

3^canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
^whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 132, 150.
38canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
^^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 510.
^°Noel, A Campaign, 27.
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exception of the supply wagons, the brigade made it
across without "interruption or casualty.n^"1"

Green's

teams were weak and run down and with the river swollen
by spring thaws, the Fifth had to abandon three of its
wagons.

The mules were unhitched and taken across to
ijo
help pull the rest of the brigade's transportation.

At daylight the next morning the "Army of New Mexico"
quietly resumed its march down the riverThe sick
and wounded, "without attendance, without medicines, and
almost without food," were left behind to the mercy of

44
the Federal army.
Canby incurred much ill feeling for allowing the
Texans to escape so easily.

Many accused him of being

lenient toward the enemy because he and Sibley were
4c
brothers-in-law. J One Union soldier cynically remarked

^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 510. :
^Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862. Connelly re
ported that the Fifth abandoned its whole train of sixty
wagons. Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, _0. R. A.,
IX, 665.
^Noel, A Campaign, 27.
^Cariby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.

^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 131.
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that the skirmish of Peralta was the "most harmless
battle on record, putting one in mind of two gamblers
colleagued to do a greeny, betting and bluffing together
with perfect recklessness to bait him, but suddenly find
ing their judgment when he put his foot into it."

He

went on to say that "As if by mutual understanding, . . .
/The Texans/ 7 commenced crossing the river when we drew
off the field, and morning saw them all over, snapping
their fingers at us.

As Sibley waved his farewell from

the opposite bank he seemed to say, 'Thank you, gentle
men, for your hostile intentions.

Doubtless they are
46
sincere, but Canby and I understand each other."
These criticisms were, of course, unfair for the
Federal commander had good reasons for not attacking more
vigorously.

Had he launched a full-scale assault against

the Texans in their entrenched positions, the casualties
would have been heavy.

And the colonel considered an

"honest man's life worth ten" of the enemy.^
casualties, what would have resulted?

Aside from

Victory would

probably have meant the capture of the entire Confederate
army.

That might have been glorious, to be sure, but it

^Hollister, A History of the First, 94-96.
^flbid., 102.
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would not have been practical.

The territory v*as

stripped of provisions of all kinds, and even the Union
troops were on short rations.

If the Confederates were

captured, Canby would not only have to use the bulk of
his array to guard them, but he would also have to feed
them.

This he was not in a position to do.

His only

alternative was to let the Texans slip away, and then
follow closely behind to make certain that they were
evacuating the country and would not pillage villages on
48
the way.
Since leaving Carnuel Pass, Canby knew that
Sibley was abandoning New Mexico, so he probably intended
the skirmish at Peralta to be no more than a threat to
49
hasten the Texans' departure.
Canby's course of action
caused a great deal of discontent within his own army,
and the Union men of the territory never forgave him.^°
In retrospect, however, his decision was undoubtedly a
wise one.

^Anderson, "Canby's Services," loc. cit., 699;
Canby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 671.
~ ~
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 550-551.
50pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New
Mexico and Arizona," loc. cit., 110.
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The Texans1 abandonment of their strong position
at Peralta was ample evidence that they did not care to
engage the Federal forces again.

Since it was obvious

that they were getting out of the country as fast as
ci
possible,
Canby decided to send his departmental staff
officers to Santa Fe and Port Union so they could make
arrangements for future operations.-^

These officers,

plus the small force of volunteers which would accompany
them, would not weaken Canby®s strength to any degree.
Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts was ordered to Santa
Pe to take command of the Central, Northern, and Santa
Pe Districts.

He was charged with the duty of reestab

lishing garrisons, securing public property, and re
storing order to those areas which had recently been
evacuated by the Confederates.

His command consisted of

one company of the First, three of the Second, and one
of the Fifth Regiment New Mexico Volunteers.

The chief

commissary was instructed to make the "necessary provision"
for the food supplies of the department.

The senior

quartermaster, Captain J. C. McPerran, was instructed to
go to Port Union to superintend the operations of the

5lHollister, A History of the First, 98.
5 2General Orders, No. 30, April 16, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 664.
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department, and to collect and send supplies to Canby's
column.

Surgeon E. I. Baily, the medical director of

the department, was to proceed to Santa Pe and Fort
Union to establish general hospitals and to purchase
any supplies which he deemed necessary to "secure the
comfort and speedy recovery of the wounded."

He was to

be assisted in these duties by Surgeon J. M. Whitlock
of the First New Mexico Volunteers.

The senior paymaster

was to make immediate arrangements for the payment of
the troops and those men who had gone the longest with
out pay were to be paid first.53
Roberts set out from Peralta with his command and
the staff officers on April 16. He reoccupied Albuquerque
and after leaving a small garrison he continued on to
54
Santa Fe, arriving there on the evening of April 20.
Northern New Mexico was once again securely held by the
Union army.
With the departure of Roberts and the staff of
ficers, Canby was ready to move after the Confederates.
But the cavalry and draught animals on both sides were so

53 Ibid.

5^Connelly to Seward, April 20, 1862, ibid., 665;
Roberts to Thomas, April 23, 1862, ibid., 666.

405
completely broken down that Canby was aware that neither
a retreat nor a pursuit could be carried out with "any
degree of rapidity."
into three columns.

55

The Federal command was divided

Colonel Paul was to head the first

column and Colonel Chivington was to command the second.
With the exception of Graydon's Spy Company, all the
cavalry was placed in charge of Captain R. M. Morris of
the Third Cavalry.

Though he was certain that the

Texans had abandoned Peralta, Canby left nothing to
chance, and he cautiously circled the town before enter
ing it.

As his men observed the natural strength of the

Confederates' former position, they were convinced that
Canby had exercised sound judgment in not storming the
town the day before.

Through a captured assistant

surgeon, the Federals learned that the Texans were "much
disaffected" and were complaining that they had been
"misled, misused and not paid."57
The wind continued to blow throughout the day,
filling the sky with moving sand as the Union army
58

started down the east bank of the river.

Canby

55connelly to Seward, April 13, 1862, ibid., 663.
^General Orders, No. 30, April 16, 1862, ibid.,

664.
57Hollister, A History of the First, 97-98•
58ibid., 98.
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maintained that the road on the east bank was shorter
than the one the Confederates were following across the
river.

If he had not already overtaken the enemy,

Canby intended to cross to the west bank at La Joya,
CO
Polvadera, Sabino, or Port Craig. ^ During the remainder
of the day, the road ran "through towns and across in
numerable acequias, the whole seeming one endless farm,
supporting adobe houses, swarthy, blanketed Greasers,
goats and burros, besides thousands of cattle and sheep."
Some of the ground was heavily turfed, but in other areas
it was nothing but drifting sand or akalki-crusted wastes.
As the men passed below Los Lunas they saw the smoking
remains of some of Sibley's heavy baggage.

After a march
60
of from ten to twelve miles, Canby's men made their camp.
fil

They were now five miles behind the Confederates.

To

add to the excitement that night, a commissary wagon
caught fire.

Apparently the sergeant, who had been

reading, knocked over his candle, and being too drunk to
»
do anything, both he and the wagon were consumed by the

6P

flames.

59canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., 551.
^°Hollister, A History of the First, 98.
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., 551.
f\0

Hollister, A History of the First, 98-99.
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Many of the men still did not understand Canby's
reasons for not overtaking and capturing the Confederates.
As one soldier remarked: "Sixty miles per day to catch
the traitors and ten to let them go.

Of course it is all

right .we do not want to take any unfair advantage of them.
We would be chivalrous like them.

God grant they may

never get the same advantage of us. "^3
The next day Canby's men had been on the road but
a short while when they sighted the Texans three or four
miles ahead on the opposite bank.

"Sibley's Brigade,"

which did not exhibit unseemly haste in its march, apfill

peared to be as large as the Federal column.

Canby's

army moved closer—almost within easy cannon range—and
only the river intervened to separate the two belliger-

65
ants.

When one army halted, no matter how short, the

other did the same.

Neither force showed any disposition

to engage in combat, though occasionally sharpshooters
exchanged "compliments" across the Rio Grande.

In this
f\fs

manner, both armies marched along throughout the day.

6 3lbid.,

98.

64lb id., 99.
^5canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.

66jyoel, A Campaign, 27.
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The road on the Federal side passed through poor
country and, except for a few scattered areas, it was
practically desert. Sand banks up to fifteen feet high
were common, making it exceedingly difficult to keep the
wagons rolling.

In the afternoon the Texans halted to

eat supper, and the Federals passed slightly ahead of
them to camp at the village of La Joya.^

At four

o'clock the Confederates arrived near the narrow pass
through the mountains by La Joya, and near where the Rio
Puerco empties into the Rio Grande.

Here the Texans made

their camp which was in full view of the Federals across
the river.^

With the aid of a spyglass, the Federals

observed that the Texans appeared to be preparing to
march again, but they did not move out while it was still
daylight.^9
Canby's men had marched twelve miles that day and
had made their camp in a bed of deep, loose sand. The
camp ground was a barren area with not a "spire of grass
nor a green thing around." Soon after dark the wind be
gan to rise again, blowing furiously throughout the night

^THollister, A History of the First, 99•
^^Noel, A Campaign, 27.
69Hollister, A History of the First, 99.

409
and filling and covering everything with sand.

"Men who

had grown gray in the Service swore they never spent a
worse night.

Eating, drinking, talking, seeing or sleep

ing were alike impossible.
buried."

Tents were prostrated and

The men gave little thought to the Texans

across the river, for they were too busy cursing the
"unpardonable stupidity" which would locate a camp in a
70
sandbank. 1
Across the Rio Grande Sibley was pondering his
next move, and, no doubt, bolstering himself with alcohol.
He knew that a clash with the Union forces would be in
evitable if he continued to follow his present route.^
His original plan had been to retreat down the river well
ahead of Canby, and attack and destroy Port Craig as a
parting gesture.

Green's failure to cross over at Albu

querque had thwarted this, for the brigade was delayed
long enough to allow Canby to catch up with him at
Peralta.
river.

Ahead lay Fort Craig on the west bank of the

Surely "Kit" Carson's garrison would contest the

brigade's passage.

While thus engaged, Canby's force

could cross over and attack from the rear. To add to his

7 °Ibid.,

99-100.

7lNoel, A Campaign, 27.
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troubles, the road over which he had been traveling was
very poor.

Heavy sand made it difficult for the weary

draught animals to pull the wagons and artillery.

All

along the route forage and grass had been scarce and
the animals had been suffering more than ever as a re
sult.

With his animals too weak to pull both the wagons

and the caissons, it was obvious that, if he was to con
tinue to keep moving, he would have to abandon one or
the other.? 2

Paced with these tremendous problems, the

old general called a council of war to determine the
course of action.73
At the council Colonels Green and Scurry, and
several other "practical" officers, expressed their
views.

They suggested that in order to avoid Port Craig

and avert another clash with the Federals, they should
take an old trail around the mountains and strike the
river below the fort.7^

Though it would be a difficult

route, with water frequently only at points thirty to
thirty-five miles apart, the council decided that the

7 2 Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 510.
- - 7%oel, A Campaign, 27-28.
7^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 510-511.
- - -
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brigade should follow it.^

Major Bethel Coopwood was

familiar with the country and he was given the respon
sibility of guiding the army through this "mountainous,
trackless waste.

Several officers suggested that the

artillery should be destroyed,?7 but Scurry stepped for
ward and pledged his services and that of his regiment
to push the artillery through "at all hazards and at any
expenditure of toil and labor."

This detour, Sibley

mused, would have two advantages.

It would "mystify"

the Federals and prevent another engagement with them,
and there would probably be more grass for the animals
7

along this route than the river road.

fit

Orders were issued that each man of the brigade
should wear what he could—above all to carry his gun
and ammunition—and to pack seven days 1 rations.

All

the wagons which could possibly be dispensed with were
abandoned and the provisions packed on the backs of the
mules.

At one o'clock in the morning, with the sand

75Noel, A Campaign, 28.
f^Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0, R. A.,
IX, 511.
^Noel, A Campaign, 28.
f^sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 511.
~ ~
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blowing furiously, the retreat through the mountain be
gan.

The infantry led the advance of each party, and

following them came the few remaining wagons and the
artillery.

The cavalry brought up the rear.^

When the Federals gazed across the Rio Grande- on
the morning of April 18, nothing but an abandoned camp
met their eyes.

"Paddy" Graydon's Spy Company crossed

over to reconnoiter, and discovered that, aside from some
sick and disabled soldiers,^ 0 the Confederates had
81
abandoned thirty-eight wagons and their contents.
Graydon observed that the Texans had taken an old trail
through the mountains which passed twenty miles ..west of
Port Craig and struck the river thirty miles below that
Rp
post.
Canby made arrangements to secure the abandoned
property,ancj

after providing for the unfortunates the

Texans had left behind, he set out for Polvadera, fifteen
Oh
miles away.

79l\foel, A. Campaign, 27.

^^Hollister, A History of the First, 100.
^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23> 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
82Hollister, A History of the First, 101.
83canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.

S^Hollister, A History of the First, 100-101.
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Colonel Canby was usually seen near the head of
his column, attended by his staff and escorted by a few
mounted troopers.

"Tall and straight, coarsely dressed

in citizen's clothes, his countenance hard and weatherbeaten, his chin covered with a heavy grizzly beard of
two weeks' growth, a cigar in his mouth which he never
lighted/''—using a pipe when he wished/ to smoke—he
certainly. . .^FTad/ an air of superiority, largely the
gift of nature, though undoubtedly strengthened by long
habits of command."

Canby's portly and commanding ap

pearance, and his dignified and self-possessed manner,
usually inspired confidence and respect from his of
ficers and men alike.

"Patient, prudent and cautious,"

the colonel exhibited not only foresight and sound
judgment, but also great moral and physical courage.
Canby was a regular army officer and many of the Con
federates he was now fighting had been his comrades a
short twelve months before.

Undoubtedly this influenced

his feelings, but it did not swerve him from what he be
lieved to be his duty.

Canby was as "true to the Govern-

85

ment as any man in existence."

The Federals arrived at Polvadera®^ in the after
noon and made their camp in a large "bottom" which,

85 Ibid.,

101-02.

86canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
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unfortunately, had "little water and less wood."

The

wagon train did not get into camp until late that night.
Lack of forage along the way and the sandy road had
weakened the draught animals to such an extent that they
could not keep pace with the main column.Cariby re
mained in camp the following day to rest his stock and
to make certain that the Confederates were actually re
treating behind the mountains and were not trying to
deceive him with a feint.

He was also informed that a

supply train from Port Union was not far behind, and he
wanted to wait until he was sure that it would arrive
safely.^
While at Polvadera, William Pelham, the former
surveyor general of the territory, came into camp with
thirty other Texans to

surrender.^

Pelham had not

formally joined the Confederate army, but when Sibley
began his retreat, he "shouldered his gun to fight for
Southern independence."

Pelham was paroled, but because

he was a civilian, he was made a political prisoner.
such he was not eligible for exchange.

As

On February 8,

87Hollister, k History of the First, 101, 102.
S^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
89Hollister, A History of the First, 102-103.
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1863 j the speaker of the House of Representatives of

the state of Texas wrote to General J. B. Magruder to
ask his aid in securing the exchange of this "brave,
true and valuable citizen."9®

The remainder of the men,

after taking the oath of allegiance, left, presumably
for Texas, where, according to numerous letters found
in the abandoned wagons, the young Texas ladies "would
fain wear Yankee ears for necklaces."

One displeased

Union soldier cynically observed that these oaths of
allegiance meant nothing, and that these parolees would
be met again whenever there was another engagement.9 1
On learning that the supply train was proceeding
safely, and assured that Sibley's men were retreating
behind the mountains, Canby set out again.^

After a

march of three miles, the Federals crossed the Rio Grande
to the west bank at the ford opposite Limitar.

The river

was about "belly-deep" to a horse and the men and the
wagon train were able to cross without mishap.

At sun

down the troops went into camp two miles south of the

9°Burnley to Magruder, February 8, 1863, 0. R, A.,
Series II, V, 827-828.
^Holllster, A_ History of the First, 103.
9 2 canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., DC, 551.
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village.

That night the commissary train arrived from

Port Union.

Eagerly the soldiers anticipated the new

supplies, for they were thoroughly tired of "rotten
,.9-5
bacon and bread without soda, salt, coffee or sugar.
"Paddy" Graydon had been sent out to reconnoiter
the area over which Sibley was retreating. He reported
that the Texans had buried all their artillery, except
two pieces, had burned all but fifteen of their wagons,
and were going through the mountains to Mesilla by way
of Cook's Springs.

The Texans were suffering im-

measureably and it is significant that even a Colorado
Volunteer who bitterly hated the "rebels" felt disposed
to express his sympathy:
Poor fellows! The climate and Uncle Sam's boys
have sadly wasted them. They are now flying through
the mountains with a little more than a third of the
number with which they first assaulted us at Fort
Craig. Many, very many, 'softly lie and sweetly
sleep low in the ground. 1 Let their faults be buried
with them. They are our brothers, erring it may be,
still nature will exact a passing tear for the brave
dead. And doubt not there are those who will both
love and honor their memory if we cannot. Any cause
that men sustain to death becomes sacred, at least
to them. Surely we can afford to pay tribute to the
courage and nobleness that prefers death to even
fancied enthralment.94

^^Hollister, A History of the First, 103.
9^ibid., 103-104.
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The following day, Canby came into Socorro.

The

Texans still maintained their hospital here and about
seventy-five stragglers and convalescents were taken
prisoner.

The oath of allegiance was then administered

to allow them to return home to Texas.

That night the

command camped about ten miles south of town^5 and the
following afternoon, April 22, the Federal column reached
Port Craig.^

With the Texans in full flight, the men

hoped for a period of rest and relaxation.

For nearly a

mile the next day the river bank was lined with men who
were bathing and washing their clothes.9?
Canby wrote the adjutant general on April 23, to
inform him of the latest developments.

The Texans were

still in the mountains to the west and the colonel stated
that if they took the route by the Mimbres river, it
would be impossible for him to overtake them.

If they

took the one by Canada Alamosa, however, he was "not
without hopes" of intercepting them. 9^

The colonel issued

95ibid., 104.
9^canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
97Hollister, A History of the First, 116.
^^Canby to Adjutant-General, April 23, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 551.
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a general order which placed Paul in command of the field
force which was to operate in the district, and Captain
Morris of the cavalry was instructed to report to Paul
for duty as soon as possible.

The companies of the

Seventh Infantry and Claflin's battery were to form part
of the garrison of Port Craig.^

That afternoon all the

mounted troops were instructed to pack two days1 rations
and be prepared to start down the river.

This order was

soon modified, and instead of just the cavalry, the
whole command moved three miles down the valley and en
camped for the night.

Canby dispatched pickets to watch

the region where he thought the Texans might be coming
to the river from the mountains.

"Paddy" Graydon, like

"the vulture over the carrion," had advanced further and
was to use signal fires to keep the pickets informed of
^

100

the enemy's movements.

If Canby had intended to continue pursuing the
Confederates, he now changed his mind.
realistic commander.

Canby was a

He knew that his draught animals

and cavalry mounts were in a broken-down condition.

But

99oeneral Orders, No. 34, April 23, 1862, 0. R, A.,
IX, 666-667.
lOORollister, A History of the First, 116.
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of more Importance was the fact that he was sorely lack
ing needed supplies .-^l

ip Q h ave continued down the

valley in this condition, and perhaps engage in another
battle, would have been dangerous, if not fatal.

In the

Mesilla Valley the Confederates had fresh troops under
the command of Colonel Steele, and undoubtedly that of
ficer had been busy gathering materiel to resupply
10?
Sibley's approaching forces.
After taking these
matters into consideration, and even though Morris,
Chivington, and Paul were anxious to continue after the
103
Texans, Canby abandoned the pursuit for the time being.
Canby requisitioned all the available transpor
tation in and around Fort Craig and sent it north to
bring back supplies.

The nearest depot was 300 miles

away at Fort Union. Spring thaws had swelled the Rio
Grande and parts of the road were flooded.

These facts,

coupled with the poor condition of the stock, would mean
that it would take a supply train a long time to get
through." 1 " 0 ^

Meanwhile the troops were placed on short

101 Ibid.,
102 Canby

118.

to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862,

0. R. A., IX, 669.
•^^Hollister, A History of the First, 118.
l0 ^Ib id.
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105
rations and would have to make out the best they could.
"Cooking utensils, saleratus, tobacco, etc., were
absolutely 'non est.1"- Some men were fortunate enough
to secure tents and make themselves comfortable.

Most

passed the while resting, playing cards, mending their
clothes, or engaging in various other pursuits.

A few,

however, spent their time reading, for a "bushel" of
books had been captured from the Texans1 abandoned

106
wagons.
On the night of April 24, fifty men were ordered
south to reconnoiter.

Within a day or so they returned

to report that they had gone as far as where the trail
taken by the Texans came out to the river.

Dead stock,

broken wagons, and "camp refuse of every description"
107
attested to the Confederates' flight.

Through scouts

and from prisoners, Canby was kept informed of the
"greatly demoralized" state of Sibley's army.

The

Texans were leaving behind everything that slowed them
loft
down—even their sick and wounded.
"Paddy" Graydon

105canby

to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 671.
10 ^Hollister,

A History of the First, 118.

1Q7lbid.

^•®®Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4, 1862,

0. R. A., IX, 669.
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was ordered to bring in the abandoned unfortunates and
to gather up any valuable property which was found.
The Texans still held as prisoners about thirty

110

Union officers and men.

On March 26, Cariby sent

Captain W. H. Lewis with an escort under a flag of truce
to negotiate an exchange-1--1-1 "grade for grade and man for
man."

Lewis carried with him a list of officers and non

commissioned officers which had been either paroled by
the Confederates or were still held as prisoners.

The

Federal commander proposed that Union Surgeon Gray and
Assistant Surgeons McKee and Alden be exchanged for Con
federate Surgeon Covey and his two assistant surgeons.
E. N. Covey, Sibley's chief surgeon and medical director,
had been taken prisoner at the hospital in Socorro.
Canby stated that he did not regard these medics as
combatants and, therefore, as legitimate prisoners of
war.

Since the Texans had considered them as such, how

ever, he felt it only just that they be exchanged with
the others.

In his note to Sibley, the Federal commander

10^Graydon

to Paul, May 14, 1862, ibid., 671-672.

^'-'Cariby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862,
ibid., 671.
^^Cariby to Sibley, April 26, 1862, ibid., Series
XI, III, 498.
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asked that one or more medical officers from Sibley's
command be sent back for the purpose of taking care of
112
the Confederate disabled.
The hospital in Albu
querque alone had about one hundred sick and wounded
Texans." 1 ^
numbers

At Santa Fe and Socorro were even greater
Canby, faced with the caring of his own

sick and wounded, simply did not have enough medical
personnel, for his own medical officers were "actively
employed" and could not be disturbed from their "appro
priate duties."

In conclusion, the Union commander

stated that he hoped that the exchange would be complete
and effective within thirty days.5

Captain Lewis, how

ever, was unable to overtake the fleeing Confederate
troops, so he returned to Fort Craig without accomplish
ing his mission.-*--^

•^^Cariby to Sibley, April 26, 1862, ibid.,
478-479.
•^3Nicodemus to Commanding Officer, April 29,
1862, ibid., 506.
Upright to Greer, September 7, 1927j "Con
federate Reminiscenses of 1862," loc. cit., 324.
•'•'^Canby to Sibley, April 25* 1862, _0. R. A.,
Series II, III, 479-

•^Canby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862,
ibid., DC, 671.
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With all danger from the enemy now removed, Canby
decided to return to departmental headquarters in Santa
Fe.

As soon as possible, he planned to move his army

down the Rio Grande to drive the Confederates from the
Mesilla Valley.

Lack of materiel had prevented him from

continuing beyond Fort Craig.

At the capital he would

be in a better position to expedite the gathering of
supplies, not only for the contemplated offensive, but
also for the immediate needs of his troops.

Though it

would involve a great deal of difficulty, Canby hoped to
stockpile enough materiel at Peralta and Fort Craig to
be ready to move against the Texans by June l.1^
. On April 27 > the departmental commander left for
lift
Santa Fe,
leaving Colonel Chivington in charge of the
Southern Military District with his headquarters at Fort
Craig.Canby arrived at the capital on the night of
May 3*^® and the following day he issued a congratulatory
proclamation to his army:

•^Tcanby to Adjutant-General, May 4 , 1862, ibid.,
669; Canby to Adjutant-General, May 10, 1862, ibid., b71.
•'-•^Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4 , 1862,
ibid., 669.
•^•^chlvington to Canby, June 11, 1862, ibid., 677*
12°Canby to Adjutant-General, May 4 , 1862,
ibid., 669.
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GENERAL ORDERS
No. 41.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO
Santa Fe, N. Mex., May 4, 1862.

The colonel commanding desires to express his
grateful appreciation of the conduct and services of
the troops in this department, tested as they have
been in the past four months by two general battles,
many skirmishes, and much toilsome and laborious
service.
Daring and energetic in action, patient and
reliant when policy dictated a different course;
enduring with equal constancy and fortitude pri
vations of food, of clothing, and of rest; forced
marches; snow-storms of the mountains and the sand
storms of the plains, they have driven a superior
force of the enemy into the mountains, forced him to
abandon his trains, his supplies, and his plunder;
to leave his sick and wounded by the wayside without
care, and often without food, and finally to abandon
a country which he has entered to 'conquer and
occupy,' leaving behind in dead and wounded and in
sick and prisoners one-half his original force.
These results have not been attained without
serious losses, and the laurels won at Valverde and
Apache Canon, hallowed by the blood of many brave
and noble men, will ever be a bond of union and
friendship between those who have struggled together
to free New Mexico from the domination of an ar
rogant and rapacious invader.
By order of Col. E. R. S. Canby:
GURDEN CHAPIN,
Capt. Seventh Infantry and
Acting Assistant AdjutantGeneral.121
* *

* *

After all preparations had been made, and un
daunted by the howling sandstorm, the "Army of New

!21(jeneral Orders, No. 41, May 4, 1862, ibid.,
LI, 523-524.
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Mexico" marched off in a southwesterly direction toward
the Magdalena Mountains.
halted to rest.

Near daylight the command

At sunrise the army resumed its march

until it arrived at Salada about ten o'clock that morn
ing. Here there was a mountain creek, and though the
water was brackish, it was refreshingly welcome to the
122
thirsty men and animals.

While at Salada the Confederates realized that the
rough and nearly impassable road would necessitate the
abandoning of more wagons and equipment.

Rather than

leave the materiel behind for the Federals to seize, it
was decided to render it as useless as possible. Forty
shells were buried in one place and 38 in another, six
one hundred pound barrels of powder were destroyed, and
one 12-pounder and two howitzers were buried.

Nineteen

wagons, ten ambulances, six caissons, and three carriages
were

burned,^3

most of the supplies from the

abandoned wagons were packed on the backs of the mules.
After all encumbrances had been reduced to a few wagons,
belonging principally to brigade headquarters, and the

122Moel, A Campaign, 28.
12 3Graydon

ix, 672.

to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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"Valverde Battery," the army set out toward the south
124

over "mountain, valley and plain."

Farther down the

trail, another caisson was blown up, thise more wagons
125
were burned, and some hospital supplies were destroyed.
What had started out to be a relatively orderly retreat
had now become a veritable flight.
Many of the men were still sick with smallpox.

In

the mornings when the army would first set out, the column
would be about a mile long, but toward the end of the day
it would be stretched out for at least ten miles.
duty was especially heavy for the cavalry.

Picket

Since grass

was scarce, the men would turn their horses loose at
night so they could roam about to find enough to eat.

In

the mornings the troopers would often have to walk long
distances to round up their mounts before going on duty.
Food, of course, was poor and scanty and "baked bread in
a frying pan" and meat from "some poor broken down
draught oxen" was the main bill of fare.

Sibley dis

patched messengers to Colonel Steele in the Mesilla Valley
to send every available wagon loaded with everything he

12^Noel, A Campaign, 28.
12 ^Graydon

IX, 672.

to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0, R. A.,
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had to eat.

The train was to meet the "suffering

humanity" when they came out on the Rio Grande.126
The road the Confederates were following was
little more than a trail and the going was extremely
difficult. 12 '''

Coopwood led the brigade southward to

the west of the Magdalena Mountains and when the trail
passed through the Sierra de San Mateo, the most trying
part of the route was encountered.

"Descents into and

ascents out of the deepest canyons" bore heavily upon
the endurance and fortitude of the command.128

Frequent

ly the cavalry would halt while the artillery was pulled
through some deep canyon, or up and down the sides of
mountains.

In these areas, the horses were unhitched and

the men of the Fourth tied long ropes to the cannon and,
with "great perseverance and endurance," pulled them
over.

Sometimes members of the other regiments who were

nearby would also lend a hand.129

12 ^Noel,

A Campaign, 29, 32.

127Graydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, C). R. A.,
IX, 672.
12 ^Sibley

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 511.
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On the evening of April 25* the brigade failed to
reach water and the men had to bivouac without food or
water.

Early the next morning the command struck out

for Alamosa Creek and arrived there at nine o'clock that
morning.

After satisfying their thirst, the men set

about fixing breakfast which consisted of flapjacks and
broiled beef (probably oxen).

The destitute and de

moralized command remained on Alamosa Creek until near
sunset, and after carrying the artillery and wagons up
the last high hill before the creek, the brigade made
camp.

At nine o'clock that night Colonel William Steele

came into camp with his battalion of the Seventh Regi
ment. He brought the heartening news that a large supply
train was on the way and that the Rio Grande eould be
easily reached the next day.

This was glorious news,

indeed—"No enemy now between us and our supplies and
friends."

Steele also brought dispatches and letters

"from home and loved ones" which had been accumulating
while the brigade was away.

It was truly a night of

rejoicing as the men read their mail from those whom
they had not heard in months.

Steele's men carried four

full days' rations with them and before reaching the
river the next day, they had divided their food "to the
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last mouthful" with their hungry

comrades .-^O

On April 27* the brigade proceeded down Alamosa
Creelc and struck the river.

"As the broken down 'foot

pad1 hove, in sight of the Rio Grande ana its fertile
valley, he was led to exclaim 'how beautiful.1"

Five

miles below Alamosa, at the mouth of Sheep Canyon, the
"Army of New Mexico" made its camp.

It was a pathetic

sight to behold the "Weary, tired, sore-footed, . . .
sick. . .and half-starved" men.

"Some washing, some

sleeping, some caring for the sick, and some dying,
while but a few were cooking the ribs of some work
oxen."

For nine days, with only seven days' poor

rations, the brigade had struggled through a most diffi
cult and rugged terrain.

The purpose of the march had

been accomplished, however, for there had been no clash
with the enemy, and the army was now safely below them.
Only a small body of cavalry near Fort Craig had been
reported by the scouts.^31

The detour of a little over

a hundred miles had been extremely costly, and all along
the trail was strewn "old harnesses, iron ovens, and in
fact everything but small ammunition."

13°Ibid.,

29-30.

^libid., 30-31.

Sixty or seventy
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horses and mules were left dead on the route.

Near the

Magdalena Mountains three partially buried bodies, and
in another place the "bones of a man's arm, half eaten
nop
by wolves" attested to the tragic events of the march. D
A year later a Union officer passed over this route and
"not infrequently /Re/ found a piece of a gun-carriage,
or part of a harness, or some piece of camp or garrison
equipage, with occasionally a white, dry skeleton of a
man."^33
After the failure of the campaign and the dis
astrous retreat, the men of the brigade would, no doubt,
have been cynically amused had they heard of the follow
ing resolution passed by their government in Richmond:
- Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States
of America, That the Thanks of Congress are hereby
tendered to Brigadier General H. H. Sibley, and to
the officers and men under his command, for the com
plete and brilliant victories achieved over our
enemies in New Mexico.

Approved, April 16, 1862.^^

•^SQraydon to Paul, May 14, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 672.
~ ~
^•33pettis, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico
and Arizona," loc. c i t 1 1 1 .
1 34Ri

c j iar cl son (comp.), Messages and Papers of the
Confederacy, I, 231.
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On April 28, Colonel Scurry delivered a farewell
address to his men and then departed for the Lone Star
State."*"35

Apparently Sibley had ordered him to proceed

to headquarters in Texas to personally report the state
of affairs and to make arrangements for the future.
In the neighborhood of Port Thorn on the night of
April 28, the army met Steele's commissary train.

Great

was the joy of the half-starved soldiers as they ate
their first good meal.

The next morning, after their

hunger had been "duly appeased," the men set out from
Fort Thorn.Under the direction of Colonel Green, the
brigade began crossing to the east bank of the Rio Grande
that evening at San Diego.^37
scene was presented."

"Here another grand wading

Green had rafts built to carry the

ammunition and the few remaining wagons which contained
the brigade's "archives."

The artillery had marched in

advance that morning and had reached the ford considerably
ahead of the "foot pads" ivho were taking their time.
Throughout the march, the gunners had kept their pieces

"^Noel, a Campaign, 30.
136ibid., 31-32.
137sibley

IX, 511.

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
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loaded with shotted charges.

Fearing that if the guns

got wet in the crossing it would be difficult to remove
the charges, the artillerymen attempted to pull them
out.

But the charges were stuck fast, and with the con

sent of headquarters, the gunners decided to clear the
pieces by firing them.

As the six howitzers boomed out,

their thunderous roar echoed throughout the valley.

This

caused a great deal of excitement among the uninformed
infantry following behind, for they thought the Yankees
were attacking.

Most of the men reached a decision on

one point, however.

They would "rather fight twenty

Yankees (apiece) than to try another one of Coopwood's
cut-offs. nl 38
When the command had safely crossed the river and
was out of danger, Sibley left for Port Bliss on April 30.
He was accompanied by Colonel Reily (who had come up to
meet the army on Alamosa Creek) and Judge Baird and his
"interesting and patriotic" family.

Colonel Green was

left in charge of the brigade .^39
Since no part of the Mesilla Valley could support
the whole army, it was decided to quarter parts of it in

^®Noel, A Campaign, 32.
139lbid., 32.
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the various villages from Dona Ana to Port Bliss.

The

morning that Sibley left for Fort Bliss, Green marched
the brigade twenty-three miles to Robledo.

Part of the

Seventh Regiment--Steele's fresh troops—remained behind
here as an advance guard to check against any Federal
movement down the valley.

The next day the rest of the

brigade marched through Dona Ana, where another portion
of the Seventh was quartered, and to Las Cruces where
part of the Fifth was garrisoned.

The remainder of the

army camped three miles below Las Cruces on a high
acqueduct.

During the night someone—probably a Mexican—

cut the bank and flooded the camp.

Leaving the rest of

the Fifth at Mesilla, the next day the Fourth Regiment
marched to Willow Bar, its old camp.

After a general

muster on May 1, the Fourth continued on, most of the
regiment being left in Franklin, while four companies
made their camp one mile below Fort Bliss.With the
whole force now quartered in villages extending from Dona
Ana to Fort Bliss, the men were at last able to relax and

141
rest after a most harrowing and devastating campaign.

l4 °Ibid.,

32-33.

1 ^ 1 Sibley

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
-

IX, 511.
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Little organized activity took place.

Captain

A. S. Thurmond's Company A of the Seventh Regiment set
out to reconnoiter at San Augustine Springs and beyond.
Before returning, the men of the command were forced
"to eat snakes and insects to keep soul and body to
gether.
Since the Texans were in dire need of horses, at
least one raiding party was sent out for the purpose of
capturing mounts from the Federals.

During the month

of May, a small force under the command of Captain
Joseph G. Tilford, U. S. Third Cavalry, was stationed
at Paraje about eight miles below Fort Craig.

The Union

spies in this instance were completely negligent, for the
party of Texans under Lieutenant Bowman-^3 were able to
approach the town at night without detection.

A few

days before Bowman's arrival, a group of Confederates

•^Noel, A Campaign, 33 •

-*-^3captain Tilford was not at all certain of the
name of the commander of the Texas party. It is quite
possible that this was Captain Thurmond f s company. When
the bearer of the flag of truce informed Tilford of his
commander's demand for the surrender of the town, it is
conceivable that he may have said "Thurmond" in his
Texas drawl which was understood by Tilford to be "Bow
man." Tilford to Anderson, May 30* 1862, 0. R. A.,
DC, 608.
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under a Lieutenant Taylor had come into Paraje Tinder a
flag of truce and had then departed southward.

They had

probably come in to take the oath and then were allowed
to leave.

Captain Tilford was of the opinion that

Taylor and his men had noted that there were only twenty
Federal soldiers at Paraje and that the command's horses
were herded at night on the river bottom some distance
from town.

Taylor had apparently informed his superiors

of this situation, and the result was Bowman's raid.

In

the meantime, however, Tilford's command had been in
creased to forty-five men, and instead of leaving their
horses out at night to graze, they were now brought into
town.^*
When Lieutenant Bowman and his men came up to
Paraje and discovered that the horses v/ere not in their
reported location, they must have been sorely disappointed.
Instead of attacking the town, Bowman drew his command up
under the bluff on the river,^5 and about sunup of the
morning of May 21, he sent one of his men to demand a
surrender of the garrison.

A Union guard brought the

Confederate, who was carrying a flag of truce, to Captain

l2^Ibid.

•^^Hollister, A History of the First, 122.
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Tilford's quarters.Had the Texans stormed the town
instead of waiting, they probably would have been
successful, for the Union commander was still in bed,
and neither he nor his men were aware of the approach
of Bowman's force.

The guard awakened Tilford and in

formed him that a Texan was waiting to see him.

While

in the act of dressing, the captain sent word to his
command to prepare for immediate action.

The messenger

was then ushered in and allowed to deliver his ulti
matum.1^^

Tilford informed the Texan that compliance

with Bowman's demand "depended altogether on his ability
to enforce it."

When the Confederate left, the captain

took immediate steps to station his men in the best
positions to resist the impending attack.

About the

time that the demand for the surrender had come in,
Tilford later learned that a smaller party of Texans
had been in the vicinity where the horses had formerly
been herded day and night.

The commander believed that,

had the herd still been there, the Texans would have
attacked the town while simultaneously running off with
the herd.-^8

l46 T iiford to Anderson, May 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 608.
3-47Hollister, A History of the First, 122.
I48ipi3.f 0r d. to Anderson, May 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 608.
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When Bowman received Tilford's message of refusal
to surrender, he considered it inexpedient to attack.
After a few "straggling shots at long ranges," the Con
federates withdrew southward down the Jornada del
Muerto, completely failing in their mission.

Tilford's

spies reported that the Texans' numbered about one
hundred, but with his horses in a weakened condition,
the Union commander did not pursue the enemy.

Tilford

feared also that had he followed the retreating Con
federates, a larger force might have been waiting to
ambush him.

149
At any rate, Tilford "saw no more of them,"

and what was probably the last "skirmish" between the
Confederates and Federals in New Mexico came to an end.
* * *

*

•*•49 lb id. On May 25# Canby reported from Santa
Pe that a superior force of the enemy had attacked an
outpost eight miles below Fort Craig. He stated that
there were no Union casualties, but the Confederates had
suffered the loss of four men. Since Paraje is eight
miles below Fort Craig, Canby was undoubtedly referring
to Tilford's affair on May 21. Tilford's report was
written on May 30. Since that officer made no mention
of casualties, and definitely stated that there were no
further hostilities, it is safe to assume that Canby had
received unreliable information concerning this incident.
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Sibley established his temporary headquarters at
James Magoffin's residence at "Magoffinsville11 near Port
Bliss.

On May 4, the Confederate commander wrote to

Samuel Cooper, the adjutant general, and gave a brief,
but full account of the whole campaign.

Par less

exhuberant than he once had been, the general expressed
the conviction, "determined by some experience, that, ex
cept for its political geographical position, the Terri
tory of New Mexico. .. .^was/7 not worth a quarter of the
blood and treasure expended in its conquest."

Numerous

defensible positions were apparently about the only
aspect the country could offer in regard to military
operations.

Sibley discovered, of course, that the land

could not be relied upon for food or other supplies.

The

entire campaign had been carried out without a dollar in
the quartermaster's department, for Captain H. II. Harrison,
the brigade paymaster and quartermaster, had not yet ar
rived from San Antonio.

Sibley had found it almost im

possible to obtain specie and one thousand dollars was
all he could secure for the use of the hospitals and for
his secret service.

The general maintained that his

chief regret in making the "retrograde" movement from
New Mexico was the necessity of leaving hospitals at
Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Socorro, though everything had
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been provided for the comfort of the sick and wounded.
In order to meet additional needs, adequate funds in
Confederate currency had been left with the hospitals.
But such money would be of little use if the natives
refused to accept it."^0

Sickness and battle casualties had taken a heavy
toll of the brigade.^51

Canby stated that he had taken

480 Confederate prisoners3-52

an( j[

it was reported that of

the 2,600 men that had formed the Confederate invading
force,- 1 - 53

only 1,250 came back to the Mesilla Valley.
155
Of the 327 wagons which had started out on the campaign,

seven returned.

The captured "Valverde Battery" of six
156
guns alone remained with the brigade.
All the other

•^Osibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 511-512.
^libid., 511.
-l-520 a riby to Adjutant-General, May 12, 1862,
ibid., 671.
I53cariby to Adjutant-General, March 1, 1862,
ibid., 488.
"'•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862,
ibid., 678.
^^Brown to Wife, April 30, 1862, Hollister,
A History of the First, 169.

156canby to Adjutant-General, May 18, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 673.
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artillery pieces had been buried, captured, or destroyed.
The campaign, indeed, had been a most disastrous one.
In summing up his operations to the adjutant
general, Sibley toned down the true condition of his
army.

Perhaps he thought that if he gave an accurate

picture of the brigade's state, he might suffer not only
loss of prestige in Richmond, but he might be severely
censured and reduced in rank.

According to Sibley, his

army was now "comfortably11 garrisoned in the small towns
from Dona Ana to Fort Bliss.

Though his brigade had

reached Port Bliss that winter blanketless and in rags,
the general now claimed that his men were "well clad and
well supplied in other respects."

In fact, Sibley went

so far as to assert that his forces were now the best
armed in the country 1

But even if the Texans were in

such good shape, and even if they had beaten the enemy
in "every encounter," the general could not speak "en
couragingly" for the future.

His men had suffered in

tensely during the campaign and they naturally manifested
a "dogged, irreconcilable detestation" of New Mexico and
her people."^7

His troops were eagerly awaiting the time

•^Tsibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., 512.
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when they would take up the line of march for San
Antonio, for it was known that that was their "sure
destiny.Sibley believed that the prevailing dis
content, backed up by the distinguished valor displayed
on every field, entitled his men to "marked consideration
and indulgence."

These factors, combined with the

scarcity of supplies in the area, and the rapid depreci
ation of Confederate currency, made it clear to the
general that his stay must be short.

The brigade com

mander notified the adjutant general that, without wait
ing for orders, it might be necessary for his army to move
by slow marches back to San Antonio.

At that base of sup

ply, Sibley could remount and re-equip his forces, and
recruit new men to fill the thinned ranks of his regi
ments.1^
At Fort Bliss on May 14, 1862, Sibley addressed
the following valedictory proclamation to his men:
Port Bliss, Texas, May 14, 1862:
Soldiers of the Army of New Mexico:-It is with
unfeigned pride and pleasure that I find myself
occupying a position which devolves upon me the duty
of congratulating the Army of New Mexico upon the
successes which have crowned their arms in the many

•^Noel, A Campaign, 3^.
159sibley

IX, 512.

to Cooper, May 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
~
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encounters with the enemy during the short but
brilliant campaign which has just terminated.
Called from your homes almost at a moment's
warning, cheerfully leaving friends, families and
private affairs, in many cases solely dependent
upon your presence and personal attention,
scarcely prepared for a month's campaign, in the
immediate defence of your own firesides, you have
made a march, many of you over a thousand miles,
before ever reaching the field of active operations.
The boasted valor of Texans has been fully
vindicated. Val Verde, Glorietta, Albuquerque,
Peralto, and last, though not least, your success
ful and almost unprecedented evacuation, through
mountain passes and over a trackless waste of a
hundred miles through a famishing country, will be
duly chronicled, and form one of the brightest
pages in the history of the Second American
Revolution.
That I should be proud of you—that every partici
pant in the campaign should be proud of himself—who
can doubt?
During the short period of inaction which you are
now enjoying, your General indulges the hope that
you will constantly bear in mind that at any moment
you may be recalled into activity.
God and an indulgent Providence have guided us in
our councils and watched our ways: let us be thankful
to Him for our successes, and to Him let us not for
get to offer a prayer for our noble dead.

160
H. H. Sibley, Brig. Gen. Commanding

l^ONoel, A Campaign, 38-39-

CHAPTER XIV
THE CONFEDERATE OCCUPATION OP TUCSON AND THE
ADVANCE CP THE "CALIFORNIA COLUMN"

While Baylor was engaged in his "lightning"
campaign in the Mesilla Valley of New Mexico dviring the
summer of 1861, action was taking place in California
which would eventually influence the situation in the
Southwest.

By terms of Abraham Lincoln's "Act to

authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in en
forcing the laws and protecting public property,"1
California set about raising one regiment of infantry
and five companies of cavalry.

These troops were to be

used in protecting the Overland Mail route between
California and the East by way of Salt Lake City.2
Brevet Major James H. Carleton, First Dragoons, U. S.
Army, was given command of these volunteers and re
ceived the rank of colonel.3

The regiments rendezvoused

^McNulty to Hammond, October
L, i, 136.
2 Thomas

1863, 0. R. A.,

to Sumner, July 24, 1861, ibid., 543•

3sumner to Carleton, August 6, 1861, ibid., 555 •
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at Oakland and during the months of August and September,
1861, the units acquired nearly their full complement of
men.

Active preparations were made to train the raw

recruits into reliable soldiers.^

During the middle of

August, California's volunteer quota was raised, the
Secretary of War requesting Governor John G. Downey to
muster into service four regiments of infantry and one
regiment of cavalry.^
General Edwin V. Sumner, the military commander
of the Department of the Pacific, had replaced Albert
Sidney Johnston on April 25, 1861.^

Meanwhile in

Washington, D. C., the military high command decided that
the volunteers raised in California could be put to better
use than guarding the mail route.

Sumner was instructed

to outfit an expeditionary force in San Francisco which
would proceed by water to Mazatlan, Mexico.

Once at that

debarkation point, Sumner was to lead his men across
Mexico to western Texas.

The object of this movement was

^McNulty to Hammond, October —, I863, ibid., 136.
^Cameron to Downey, August 14, 1861, ibid., 5^9*
^Orders, No. 5* April 25, 1861, ibid., 469.
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to "regain the public property in that State (Texas) and
draw off insurgent troops from Arkansas, Missouri," and
elsewhere.7

The United States government had already

secured.permission to cross the foreign soil from the
governors of the states involved, as well as from the
Central Mexican government.®

Sumner's force was to in

clude one regiment of volunteer cavalry, four regiments
of volunteer infantry, two batteries of regular artil
lery, and ten companies of regular infantry.9
Sumner was beset by domestic troubles in Cali
fornia.

Up to the time of the first battle of Manassas,

matters had been relatively quiet in his department, but
since the Union defeat, the commander was finding it
difficult to raise volunteers.

A state election would

soon be held, and Sumner estimated that there were
between 25,000 and 45,000 "disunionist" voters in the

?Townsend to Sumner, August 16, 1861, ibid., 572.
^Richard H. Qrton (comp.), Records of California
Men in the War of the Rebellion, I8bl-lfcfo7 X^" acr>amento #
TBiJoTT S3T
^Townsend to Sumner, August 16, 1861, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 572.
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state.

Under these circumstances the general deemed it

necessary to take strong measures to repress any attempt
on the part of those who would "thwart the Government."
Sumner promised to raise the troops as soon as possible
in order to carry out the western Texas campaign.
Though he approved of this expedition, he suggested to
his superiors in Washington that he believed Guaymas,
Sonora, would be a better port of debarkation. 10

Later

Sumner changed his mind about Guaymas, for the surveyor
general of California pointed out to him that the
scarcity of water from Guaymas to Texas made that route
impractical.

Sumner now suggested that San Bias be the

debarkation point. 11
On September 4, 1861, the "union" party triumphed
in the California elections.

Nevertheless, a count of

the ballots revealed that there were about 20,000
"secession" voters.

Sumner reported that the "dissolute

and loose portion" of this party was congregating in
force in the southern counties of the state. The general
feared that the "great and unaccountable success" of
Baylor's Confederates in Arizona and New Mexico would

l°Sumner to Townsend, August 30, 1861, ibid.,
593-594.

^Sumner to Townsend, September 7# 1861, ibid.,

610.
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embolden this element.

He reported that these "Rebels"

were not only organizing, but also collecting supplies
apparently with the idea of receiving a military force
from Texas.

Should the Confederates send an army into

California, Sumner warned that it would serve as a
rallying point for all the secessionists and would inevitably inaugurate a civil war within the state.

The

commander pointed out that the most alarming feature of
the whole affair was that the secessionists had "se
duce/fly7 the native Californians by telling them that
they. . ./would/ be ruined by taxes to maintain the
war.
In order to meet the crisis in the southern
counties, Sumner was compelled to send reinforcements
into the area immediately.

A strong garrison was to be

established at Warner's Ranch, which was located on the
road to Fort Yuma.

Adequate military contingents at

that place would not only serve to support Port Yuma,
the key to entering California from Arizona, but it
would also prevent the gathering of secessionists in the
vicinity.

In addition such troops would be in a relative

ly convenient position to challenge any invading force

12Ibid.

•^Sumner to Townsend, September 17, 1861,
ibid., 623.
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coming from Arizona should Fort Yuma fall or be by
passed.

Sumner created the military District of

Southern California which included the "disaffected"
counties, and.Colonel George Wright was placed in com
mand.

Meanwhile the Pacific commander continued his

preparations for the western Texas campaign.
The plan to send California troops out of the
state to fight in Texas caused considerable excitement
among those of Union sentiment.

Just a few days before

the state election, sixty-five business men and firms
signed a protest which was forwarded to the Secretary of
War.

These Unionists maintained that a majority of

their present state officers were avowed secessionists,
in addition to about three-eighths of their population
being composed of men of Southern birth.

And in this

crisis, they were almost a unit in their sympathies.
The "Knights of the Golden Circle," a secret secession
organization, purportedly had a membership of nearly
16,000 and was still organizing, even in loyal districts.
Because of this alarming situation, the Unionists in

l4 Ibid.

•^special Orders, No. 180, September 23, 1861,
Ibid., 633.
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their letter advised the necessity of keeping their
troops at home in order to uphold the authority of the
United States government and to keep California firmly
in the Union.^
Exactly how much effect, if any, the above letter
had is not known.^7

At any rate, General Winfield Scott

and the Secretary of War ordered a suspension of the
expedition, and Sumner was ordered East for duty.

All

the regular troops in the department, except four compa
nies of artillery, were to be collected and transported
by steamer to New York as fast as possible

As the

regulars began to withdraw from their posts, they were
replaced by volunteers.

Early in October, California

troops began moving south from their northern training
camps and a new base called Camp Latham was established
near Los

Angeles."^

On October 14, three companies of

volunteer cavalry, commanded by Major Edward E. Eyre,

•^Rogers, et al. to Cameron, August 28, 1861,
ibid., 589-591.
17Latham to Sumner, September 17, 1861, ibid.,
624.
•^Townsend to Sumner, September 16, 1861,
ibid., 620-621.
•^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863,
ibid., 137.
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were ordered to relieve the regulars stationed at San
20
Bernardino.
It was important that some army contingents
be sent to this town for San Bernardino was "the hot-bed
21
of secessionism.11

The same day Lieutenant Colonel Joseph

R. West received instructions to take three companies of
22
California infantry to replace the regulars at Port Yuma.

With the exception of the Ninth U. S. Infantry, whose de
barkation orders had been cancelled,2^ and four companies
of the Third U. S. Artillery, all regular troops soon de-

24
parted for the eastern theatre of operations.

The

stationing of the volunteer forces in key positions in the
southern counties apparently had the desired effect, for
their presence served to restrain any overt secessionist

activity. 2 ^

On October 20, 1861, Colonel George Wright,

Ninth U. S. Infantry, became the new commander of the De-

26
partment of the Pacific.

Colonel James H. Carleton, First In

fantry California Volunteers, assumed Wright's former position

20 General

Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid.,

21 McNulty

to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 137*

22 General

Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid.,

2 3Special

Orders, No. 309 > November 19, 1861,

660.

659.
ibid., 730.
2 ^0rton

(comp.), Records of California Men, 32.

2 5wright to Thomas, October 21, 1861, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 667-668.
2 ^General

666.

Orders, No. 28, October 20, 1861, ibid.,

451
as commander of the District of Southern California. 2 ^
Reports of Confederate activity in southern New
Mexico continued to cause concern among the military in
California.

The state was more accessible through

Arizona by way of Port Yuma than from any other point.
Confederate successes in New Mexico and Arizona might
result in the sending of an invading army to capture the
pQ

west coast.

Wright was fully aware of this possibility

and shortly after he assumed command of his department,
he suggested a new offensive plan.

He proposed to send

a force from southern California to recapture the forts
in Arizona and New Mexico since all the troops needed for
such a campaign, about 1,500, were already in the south
ern part of the state.

At first the commander believed

that Guaymas should be his base of operations, but after
careful consideration he concluded that Port Yuma would
be better.

At any rate, he believed that Guaymas should

be occupied to prevent the possibility of its falling
into the hands of the Confederates. 2 ^

2 7General

Orders, No. 2, October 14, 1861, ibid.,

2 ®McNulty

to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid.,

659.
137.
2 9wright

752-753.

to Thomas, December 9* 1861, ibid.,
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Wright reasoned that his plan, if carried out
successfully, would accomplish three main purposes.
First, he believed that the best defense was a good of
fense.

By sending this column eastward, it would serve

to prevent an invasion of California from that quarter.
Secondly, and probably of greater importance, the
Callfornians would attack the rear of the Confederates
who were now reported to be on their way to northern
New Mexico.

With Canby's men attacking in front and the

California volunteers falling upon their rear, the Con30
federates would undoubtedly be defeated.
Thirdly,
after having driven out the Texans and reoccupied the
forts in Arizona and New Mexico, the southern mail route
could be reopened.31
In anticipation of approval from Washington,
Wright chose Colonel Carleton to lead the expedition,
and then he set about making the necessary arrangements
for the campaign.

Confidently Wright exclaimed that his

men were "fine troops and well officered, and under the
command of Colonel Carleton, an officer of great ex
perience, indefatigable and active, the expedition must

3 °McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid., 137.
3^Wright to Carleton, January 31, 1862, ibid.,

836.
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be

successful."32

on

December

18, 1861,

General George

B. McClellan approved of Wright's plan, 33

so

the stage

was set for Californians to achieve glory in the South
west.
* * *

*

In pursuance of orders to relieve the regulars
at Port Yuma,*^ Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. West left
Camp Wright on October 26 with three companies of the
First California Infantry.
November 3.35

He arrived at Port Yuma on

Th e post was located on the Colorado
36

River and was surrounded on all sides by a vast desert.
Prom a strategic point of view, Port Yuma was the out
post of all southern California, for it was on the route
over which Confederate troops would have to march in
order to attack the state.

3 2 Wright to Thomas, December 9* 1861, ibid., 753.

^Endorsement by McClellan, December
ibid., 753.
3^"Carleton

to West, October

16, 1861,

^^West to Cutler, November 7,
3^McNulty

18, 1861,

1861,

to Hammond, October —,

ibid.,

ibid.,

1863#

662.

714-•

ibid.,

137.
•^Carleton to West, October

16, 1861,

ibid.,

662.
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Because of the importance attached to the post,
Carleton gave West specific instructions.

Not only was

it necessary to keep a constant vigilance against the
approach of an enemy force, but also measures had to be
taken to prevent the passage of spies to and from the
"disaffected" districts of California.

West was ordered

to seize all the ferryboats on the Colorado River and
all crossings were to be made "under the guns of the
fort."

If he considered it necessary, West was also

authorized to assume control of the river steamers.

All

persons going to Sonora or Arizona from California, and
vice versa, were to take the oath of allegiance before
being allowed to continue on their way.

The commander

was to keep an exact record of the name, place of
residence, age, occupation, destination, and place of
origin of each person crossing the river.

West was in

structed not to hesitate in arresting anyone who was an
avowed enemy of the Union government, or who would not
subscribe to the oath of allegiance.

In case he should

be attacked by the enemy, West was to call upon the com
manding officer near Warner's Ranch for assistance.

The

new commander was instructed to see that his command was
well drilled.38

38Ibid.,

when the colonel assumed command of

662-663.
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Port Yuma, he immediately set about improving its de
fenses. In an effort to keep his men in fighting trim,
one hour daily was devoted to company drill.39
Rumors from Arizona soon came to West's ears.
Baylor was reported to be at Tucson with 200 men, while
Van Dorn was at Mesilla with a still larger force.

West

sent out four scouts to check the validity of these
stories as well as to get more accurate information.^®
The new post commander had been at Port Yuma scarcely
three weeks when, on November 26, Carleton ordered him
to return to Los Angeles.

Carleton had been called to

San Francisco to discuss matters with Wright and West
was to command the District of Southern California in
his absence.

Major Edward A. Rigg, commander of Camp

Wright, near Oak Grove, received orders to report to
Port Yuma to relieve West.^
While maintaining a constant vigilance, Major
Rigg continued the work of strengthening the defenses

39west to Carleton, November 4, 1861, ibid., 699*
40lbid., 698.

^Carleton to Rigg, November 26, 1861, ibid.,
742; General Orders, No. 1, January 12, 1862, ibid.,

802.
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of Fort Yuma.

The decision to send an expeditionary

force against the Confederates in Arizona and New
Mexico greatly increased Rigg's duties since Port Yuma
was to be the base of supply.

Though materiel from
hp
California was being stockpiled,
Rigg's instructions
were to make local arrangements for forage and food
supplies along the line of march.

Contracts were let

at the fort to have hay cut and stored at various
points between Port Yuma and the Pima Villages
Pima Indians were an agricultural people who raised
large quantities of wheat.

Ammi White, an American of

decided Union sentiments who owned a flour mill at the
Pima Villages, was contracted to buy up all the wheat
the Indians had and to grind it into flour for the
illL

eventual use of Carleton's expeditionary force.

While Rigg was busily preparing for the coming
of Carleton's troops, rumors of Confederate activities
to the east continued to pour into his post.

Baylor

^2Wright to Thomas, December 19» 1861, ibid.,

771.
^Carleton to Rigg, December 21, 1861, ibid.,
780-781.
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863 > ibid.,

139.
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reportedly wrote to Colonel Palatine Robinson of Tucson
that just as soon as Sibley arrived, he would march to
Tucson with a force of 900 men.

Citizens of the town

were betting freely as to whether or not the troops
lit;
would arrive. ^ Baylor's letter stated in part:
Hold on to the willows a little while longer.
General Sibley's command is in a few days' march of
this place, and as soon as he arrives I will march
for Tucson. I want you to talk to the chiefs of
the Papagos and Pima Indians to help me clean out
the Apache Indians. I will hang White for his un
lawful trading with the Indians .46
According to the terms of the Confederate
sequestration act, the "estates, property and effects
of alien enemies" was to be confiscated.^

Colonel

Baylor, as governor of the Confederate territory of
Arizona, appointed a Tucsonian to be the receiver of
confiscated property in that area.^®

^ciymer to Rigg, January
811-812.

9,

Palatine Robinson

1862, ibid.,

46walker to Rigg, March 1, 1862, ibid., 899*
47Mesilla Times, January 15* 1862.
^Clymer to Rigg, January 9, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 811.
- - -
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lost no time in posting notices at Arivaca and at Tubac,
declaring confiscated the property of Samuel Colt, a
Union man.^9

Robinson and another named Washburn went

to Colt's Sierra Colorado mine and proceeded to take
possession.-^0

Van Alstein, Colt's agent at Arivaca,

objected, and pistols were drawn.

The usual compliments,

"sons of bitches; damned sons of bitches," were exchanged,
but both parties separated without bloodshed.^

A large

amount of property was removed from the mine and carried
to the Patagonia mine which belonged to a loyal South
erner, Sylvester Mowry.

Two men were killed by Apaches

while engaged in removing the boiler from the Sierra
Colorado to the Patagonia mine.

After the seizure of

Colt's property, Van Alstein left for Magdalena to see
Major F. T. Lally, the new superintendent of the Poston
mine.

Apparently Lally was remaining in the safety of

that place while observing the turn of events.53

^9srady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824.

5°White to Rigg, February 9» 1862, ibid., 867.
53-Brady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824.
52white to Rigg, February

9>

1862, ibid., 867.

^^Brady to Yager, January 1, 1862, ibid., 824.
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Robinson reportedly wrote to Lally to inform him that if

54
he dared come to Tucson he would be mobbed.
Rigg was quite upset over these current repox-'ts.
He wrote Carleton that a force of mounted men could come
to the Colorado and harass his post without his being
able to prevent it, since all he had was infantry units.
The commander was also aware of the fact that a large
number of Baylor's soldiers were well acquainted with the
country and with the people.

Since it was widely known

that Ammi White's sentiments were pro-Union, Rigg pointed
out that he would probably be one of the Confederates'
first victims.

This would particularly be the case since

it was common knowledge that he had a large quantity of
wheat at his mill.

Rigg felt certain that by now Baylor

had arrived in Tucson.

Undoubtedly he would learn of

the hay which was being stored at the various stations
along the route from Port Yuma to the Pima Villages.
The Union commander reasoned that Baylor would send a
detachment to destroy it, and he would be helpless to
prevent it.-^

•^White to Rigg, February 9> 1862, ibid., 867.
55Rigg to Carleton, January 17, 1862, ibid.,

809-811.
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In a further effort to gain an accurate picture of
the state of affairs to the east, Rigg dispatched an
agent to Tucson.

The spy was to communicate with S.

Warner in Tucson and bring back information concerning
56
the ntunber and movements of Baylor's troops.
The agent
went by way of Altar and Sonoita, Sonora, and returned
after twenty-two days.

He reported that Baylor had not

as yet arrived in Tucson, though there were twelve men
in town who claimed that they belonged to Baylor's army.
The Confederate commander had planned to come to Tucson
earlier, but upon learning of the large Union force
congregating at Fort Craig, he had been forced to change
his plans.

After defeating the Federals, Baylor

promised to come to Tucson to protect the people from
57
the Apaches.Protection from the Indians was sorely
needed, and the prevailing opinion seemed to be that any
58
troops, whether Union or Confederate, would be welcome.

56-[bid., 810.
5?Rigg to Carleton, February 14, 1862, ibid.,
865.

5&Warner to Hinton, January 31* 1862, ibid.,

867.
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Meanwhile Rigg reported that friendly Indians
(probably Pimas and Papagos) were keeping a good lookout
along the river, and with the assistance of Ammi White
at the Pima Villages, it would be impossible for an
enemy force to surprise his post.

Being thus warned

ahead of time of a Confederate approach, Port Yuma's
commander had no fear of having to evacuate or sur
render.59
These reports of Confederate activities in
Arizona were relayed to the District of Southern Cali
fornia.

Carleton, of course, was greatly concerned

about the safety of Port Yuma, so he sent additional
instructions to the post commander.

Rigg was to keep

his scouts out along the Gila River in the direction of
Tucson.

All boats, large and small, were to be kept on

the California side of the Colorado and under a heavy
guard.

Should Port Yuma be attacked, Rigg was to defend

it to the last extremity.

But if forced to fall back,

he was to destroy the post, fight his way across the
desert, filling in the wells as he retreated.

Carleton

pointed out that since Rigg had command of the river,
he should be able to "whip any force that. . .^Tould]7

-^Rigg to Carleton, February 14, 1862, ibid.,

866.
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menace" him.

In concluding his letter, Carleton

promised to send some artillery ammunition and a detach
ment of cavalry.^ 0
On February 8, Carleton ordered Captain William A.
McCleave, First California Cavalry, and thirty picked
men of his Company A to proceed to Rigg's post. DX
McCleave left Camp Carleton, San Bernardino, on February
62
11 and arrived at Fort Yuma five days later.
These
cavalrymen were to act as scouts, and it would be their
special duty to see that no Confederate force would
surprise the garrison at Fort Yuma.
* * * *

Meanwhile over on the Rio Grande, as previously
described, Sibley's "Army of New Mexico" was at Fort
Thorn preparing to leave on the campaign for the con
quest of the northern part of the territory.

Before

departing, Sibley ordered Captain Sherod Hunter of
Company A, Second Regiment Mounted Rifles (Baylor's old

6°Carleton to Rigg, February 5> 1862, ibid., 847.
^Carleton to Eyre, February 8, 1862, ibid., 851.
^McCleave

871-872.

to Eyre, February 171 1862, ibid.,
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command), to take post at Tucson, some two hundred and
fifty miles to the west.

The general sent this small

occupying force "with a view to the protection of the
important and growing interest, chiefly mineral, in
Western Arizona, and for the further purpose of opening
communications with Southern California, whose people. . .
^were]7 favorably inclined to. . ,^/Ehe Confederate^
Government.
Following close behind Hunter's Company A was
Colonel Reily and his escort of twenty men.

As Sibley's

diplomatic agent, Reily was on his way to see Governor
64
Pesqueira of Sonora.
Hunter's and Reily's combined
forces, including civilian employees, did not exceed 105
men.

All the troops, however, were mounted and well-

armed.

Only three wagons accompanied the column and no

artillery was brought along.^
Violently stormy weather occurred during part of
the trip, but there were no accidents or misfortune,

^Sibley to Cooper, January 27, 1862, ibid.,
IV, 170.
64sibley to Governor of Sonora, December 27#
1861, ibid., L, i, 1031.

^Fergusson to Drum, October 4, 1862, ibid.,
ii, 152.
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save the loss of one man who died at San Simon.

On

February 28, 1862, Captain Hunter arrived in Tucson and
occupied the town for the Confederacy.

His timely ar

rival was hailed by a majority, if not the entire popu
lation, of the "Old Pueblo.

The following day,

Colonel Reily, his two subalterns, and his escort of
twenty rank and file came into town.

In a special cere

mony, the Confederate flag was raised in the plaza, and
Reily delivered a patriotic address.^7

Two days after

his entrance, Reily and his escort commanded by
Lieutenant James H. Tevis, set out for Sonora. °
Rumors were rife in Tucson when Hunter arrived.
According to the various reports, the town was about to
be attacked by a large body of Indians, great quantities
of Federal military supplies had been landed at Guaymas,
and Union troops from California were on the march up the
Gila River to Tucson.

These stories were so well be

lieved that a few citizens who were more "ultra" in their
Southern feelings were preparing to leave before Hunter

6%unter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., IX, 707.
^carleton "to Wright, March 22, 1862, ibid.,
L, i, 944.
^^Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., IX, 708.
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came with his men.

These individuals preferred to

sacrifice all their interests in the town and "look for
69
safety among their Southern brethren on the Rio Grande."
On March 3> immediately after Reily's departure,
70
Hunter and his command started out for the Pima Villages,
a distance of ninety-three miles

True to Rigg's

prediction. Hunter had heard of White's activities.
Hunter's march to the Pima Villages took White by com
plete surprise and he was captured and placed under ar
rest.

All of his property was confiscated in the name of

the Confederate government.^

Aside from numerous farm

animals,^3 the Texans captured 1,500 sacks of wheat.
Since Hunter had no way of transporting the grain back
to Tucson, he decided to distribute it among the Pimas.
The captain was interested in negotiating friehdly re
lations with these Indians, and the gift of wheat would

6 9lbid.,

707-708.

7°Ibid., 708.
f-'-White to Rigg, February 9, 1862, ibid., L, i,
8b7.

708.

"^Hunter to Baylor, April 51 1862, ibid., IX,

f^Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, ibid.,
L, i, 966.
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undoubtedly strengthen his position with them.

At any

rate, he decided that this was a much better policy than
to destroy it or leave it behind to fall into the hands
of the enemy.

While at White's mill, Hunter heard a

report that a Federal train of fifty wagons was en route
to that place to pick up the wheat.

Rather than return

immediately to Tucson, Hunter decided to wait and capture
74
the train.
On arrival at Fort Yuma, Captain McCleave and his
men were assigned to guard the hay which was stored at
Mission Camp, about twenty miles away.

It was necessary

to have a guard there to prevent travelers coming from
Sonora from using the forage.

After several days of

this duty, Major Rigg ordered McCleave to proceed toward
the Pima Villages to look for an overdue express rider
whom he feared might have been attacked by hostile
Indians.

Since the country from Tucson to the Colorado

River was supposed to be thoroughly picketed by friendly
Indians, it was thought that there was no danger of any
Confederates being in the area.

With nine men McCleave

set out on a rapid march.^

f^unter to Baylor, April

1862, ibid., IX, 708.

75william A. McCleave, Recollections of a
California Volunteer (MS., Bancroft Library, University
of California).
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On the third night out, March 6, McCleave f s
scouting party reached the Pima Villages.7^

Though it

was quite late McCleave knocked at the door of White's
house to see if the owner was in.

The person who opened

the door, after affirming that White was home, asked
where McCleave and his men were from.

The captain

promptly replied that he and his men were United States
soldiers from the Colorado.

With that the man retired,

ostensibly to inform White of their presence.

Actually

White was being held a prisoner elsewhere.77 The Con
federate soldier went into the room where Hunter was
sleeping, awakened his captain and told him that a
Federal officer and two troopers were at the door.^®
Hunter quickly dressed and came out, representing
himself as Ammi White.

He asked McCleave if these were

all the men he had with him.

The captain replied, "No;

I have six more at the next station."79

Meanwhile about

76 ib id.
77sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
7®Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 966.
- - 79ibid.
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thirty of Hunter's men appeared, and the Confederate
captain drew his pistol, leveled it at McCleave's breast
and stated, "I am Captain Hunter of the Southern army.
Consider yourselves prisoners.

„80

Lay down your arms."

McCleave, of course, was taken completely by surprise
since none of the Confederates wore uniforms.

Thinking

that he was among friends, he had taken off his sidearms while his men were engaged in putting up their
horses.^

At first the Union captain was reluctant to

surrender, but Hunter remarked, "if you make a single
motion, I'll blow your brains out—you are in my power—
surrender immediately."

Under the circumstances,

8P

McCleave decided upon the expediency of capitulation.

All eight of McCleave's party were also taken prisoner?^

®°Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
^Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 966.
^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
83Rigg to Carleton, March 30, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 966. A Union officer stated that he had"Tieard a
report that McCleave and his men were tied hand and foot
after they were captured. Barrett to Rigg, March 19,
1862, ibid., 940.
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While at White's mill Hunter learned that at
every Overland Mail station between the Pima Villages
and Port Yuma, hay had been stockpiled for the use of
the Federals.

The Confederate leader later sent out a
84
party which destroyed the hay at six of these stations.

Hunter did not destroy White's mill.

Some essential

parts of the mill machinery, however, were hidden so
85

that it could not be operated.

After learning that there was no Federal wagon
train on the way, Hunter returned to Tucson.®^

The

Federal captain and White were to be held until the re
turn of Colonel Reily from Sonora.

Reily soon arrived,

and McCleave observed that it was plainly evident by his
manner that his mission had not been successful.

The

^Hunter to Baylor, April 5* 1862, ibid., IX, 708.
®5carleton to West, May 3, 1862, ibid., L, i,
1049.
86nunter to Baylor, April 5.> 1862, ibid., IX,
708. McCleave maintained that there were many northern
men in Hunter's company. They told him of the speeches
Sylvester Mowry and his "rebel" friends had made to them
at the various mines in Arizona. Mowry and others set
"forth the miserable condition of the Union army and that
the South was only awaiting a favorable opportunity to
capture Washington and take control of all the States
and by changing the Govt, bring prosperity and happiness
to the people such as they have never known." McCleave
said he gave these men a true statement of facts, and this
caused many of them to desert—some to Mexico, others to
New Mexico. Hunter makes no mention of any desertions,
if there were any. McCleave, Recollections of a Cali
fornia Volunteer; Hunter to Baylor, April
1862,
0. R. A., IX, 707-708.
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captured enlisted men were paroled at Tucson and allowed
to do as they pleased, but McCleave and White were sent
to the Rio Grande under guard.

On the way to the river,

the small command halted at the abandoned post of Fort
McLane.

Here news was received of the battle of

Valverde.

The Confederates were formed in line as the

dispatch setting forth the great gallantry of the Texans
over the Union troops was read to them.
were shouted for the heroes of Valverde.

Three cheers
At that moment

an officer approached McCleave and remarked, "You are
not cheering, Captain."

"No, sir," answered McCleave,

"My time to cheer will come by and by."

In addition the

captain asserted that he did not believe the report that
had just been read.

At these comments a general scowl

spread over the faces of the Texans, some of whom
menacingly snarled that no prisoner should be allowed
to talk that way about their victory.

From Fort McLane

the party continued on to Mesilla where McCleave and
White were imprisoned.®'''
During the Confederate occupation of Tucson,
Hunter's troopers were neither formally drilled nor

^^McCleave, Recollections of a California
Volunteer.
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disciplined.

The company's horses were kept in the

corral of the Overland Mail Company, and the men slept
anywhere in town they pleased.

Hunter's company was

not reinforced, either from the Mesilla Valley or from
Reily's escort when that officer passed through Tucson
on his return from Sonora.
QO
exceed seventy-five men.

At no time did Company A

* * * *

The Confederate occupation of western Arizona was
a source of irritation which the pompous Colonel Carleton
was determined not to allow to continue. Since small
groups of his expeditionary force were now beginning to
arrive at Fort Yuma, he instructed his subordinate, Major
Edwin A. Rigg, the post commander, to send forth a de
tachment to engage Hunter's company.

When, and if, this

force defeated the Confederates, Carleton stipulated that
Colonel Reily should be captured on his return trip from
Sonora, and that every secessionist in Tucson should be
arrested and brought to Fort Yuma.

To accomplish these

objectives, the colonel considered one company of
infantry and two of cavalry a sufficient force.

88pergusson to Drum, October 4, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, ii, 151-152.
^9cutler to Rigg, March 17 t 1862, ibid., i, 937.
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It fell upon Major Rigg to devise a plan to carry
out Carleton's instructions.

Aside from attacking

Hunter's command, the expedition now had the added pur
pose of rescuing Captain McCleave and his men.

After due

consideration, Rigg selected Captain William P. Calloway
of Company I, First California Infantry, to lead the of
fensive.

Calloway's force, numbering 272 men, consisted

of the following units:
His own Company I, First California Infantry, 97 men.
Company A, First California Cavalry (McCleave's com
mand, now officered by First Lieutenant Benjamin F.
Harvey), 83 men.
Company D, First California Cavalry (Captain
Nathaniel J. Pishon), which included a detachment
of Company K, First California Infantry, with two
12-pounder mountain howitzers (Lieutenant
Jeremiah Phelan), 92 men. 90
Rigg's strategy called for Company A to set out for
Stanwix Station, a distance of eighty miles from Fort
Yuma, followed somewhat later by Calloway's infantry.
When the footsoldiers arrived at the station, Company A
was to scout ahead, keeping a sharp lookout for the enemy.
In an effort to obtain reliable intelligence concerning
the whereabouts of the Confederates, Rigg engaged the
services of Pauline Weaver, a noted scout and trapper.

9°Rigg to Carleton, March 25* 1862, ibid., 950;
Orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 4T~»
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Weaver was to proceed in advance of all the military
units and to inform them-'whether or not the Confederates
were still in the vicinity of the Pima Villages.

If

they were, when Pishon's cavalry arrived at Stanwix, the
infantry was to march directly to the Pima Villages.
Rigg hoped that this maneuver would "draw them out," and
if all went according to plan, the cavalry, in the mean
time, would circle around to the south and fall upon the
enemy's rear, thus catching Hunter's men in the jaws of
a trap.

If the Confederates were not at the Pima

Villages, Calloway was instructed to move his command to
that point.

Weaver was to continue on to Tucson where,

"by means of Indian messengers, he was to inform Calloway
of Hunter's position.

After receiving such information,

Calloway was to move rapidly upon Tucson, rescue
McCleave, and then fall back and entrench his command at
the Pima Villages.91
Rigg's plan appeared feasible.

In addition, the

moral of the troops involved was high: McCleave's company
was "pawing for advance," Pishon's men were "full of

92
fight," and Calloway's infantrymen were "in fine order."

9^Rigg to Carleton, March 25, 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 950.
92lb id.
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At nine o'clock p. m. on March 22, Captain Callo
way's infantrymen formed in two lines in front of their
quarters at Port Yuma.

After roll call the men marched

to the Colorado River where they were ferried to the
Arizona side.

Once on the opposite bank, the troops

were called to attention and Major Rigg addressed them
on the importance of their mission:
Men, you have now crossed the Rubicon and emerged
into the great field of labor spread out before you.
The first duty of the soldier is obedience. Un
aided by the vigilance and cooperation of his men, a
commander is powerless. There is work for you to
accomplish and you can never return without glory or
disgrace.93
After a few more remarks, the old major returned to Port
Yuma, and the soldiers set out by the light of the moon
"in anticipation of the glory spoken of."

Since the

daytime heat was so intense, the company made the march
to Stanwix Station during the coolness of night.

On

March 28, the infantrymen reached their destination.9^
Company A of the cavalry had already arrived at the
station twelve days before.95

93sacramento Daily Union, May 23# 1862.

9^ibid.
95orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 69.
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The following day, while Calloway was awaiting
the arrival of Pishon's cavalry, a party of the enemy
shot at two pickets posted on the Gila River about six
miles north of Stanwix Station.

The Confederates at

first had attempted to take the two prisoner, but failq6
ing in this, they opened fire on them.
Though one
picket, Private William Semmilrogge,97 was severely
wounded in the shoulder, both managed to escape and came
galloping back to the Federal camp to give the alarm.
According to the two the enemy party consisted of about
Q8
forty men.-7
Captain Pishon's Company D had just arrived in
camp.

Since they were still mounted, Calloway ordered

them to pursue the Confederates.

Though they set out at

a fast gallop, the approach of night and the jaded con
dition of their horses prompted Captain Pishon to give
up the chase.99

On April 4, the detachment of Confeder

ate scouts returned to Tucson to report to Captain Hunter

96sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
9?0rton (comp.), Records of California Men,
98sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
99ibid.

69.
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the coming of the Union troops to Stanwix Stat ion.• L0 °
Calloway's united command set out from Stanwix
Station on April 8.^®^

Pour days later the Federals

arrived at the Pima Villages,

but there were no Con

federates to be

a two-day delay at the

found.After

Villages, Calloway decided the time was ripe to advance
upon Tucson.The first day the men marched a
distance of twenty-four miles.
be found.

The enemy was nowhere to

On April 15—the same day that the skirmish

of Peralta was fought over .on the Rio Grande—Calloway's
men arose early and started on their way.~®^

As the

column neared Picacho Pass that afternoon, Indian scouts
brought back the intelligence that a small force of the

-'•^Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, 0. R. A_.,
L, i, 978.
• L °l0rton (comp.), Records of California Men, 14.
102 Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific (Glendale,
1951), 88.
103orton

(comp.), Records of California Men, 47.

104nunt, The Army of the Pacific, 88.
•*-°5sacrainento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
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enemy was ahead.These advance Confederate scouts
107

were under the command of Lieutenant Jack W. Swilling.
Calloway hastily devised a two-prong cavalry
flanking movement.

Lieutenants James Barrett and

Ephraim C. Baldwin were ordered to move forward with
their cavalry detachments until near the pass where they
were to leave the main road.

Baldwin was to turn off to

the left, circle around and close in on the enemy from
the west while Barrett was to detour around in a circular
maneuver and close in from the east through an opening
to the left in the mountain.

Calloway's plan was for

these two cavalry units to strike the enemy simultaneously
on the flank, thereby cutting off their retreat,while
his main body of infantry attacked from the front.'1'0^
No Confederates were encountered as Calloway ad
vanced cautiously down the road.

But after a march of

several miles, the sounds of rapid firing were heard

106orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
"'•^Wyllys, Arizona, 148.
10^Sacramento

Daily Union, May 23, 1862.

l^Orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
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a h e a d . A s it turned out, the impetuous Lieutenant
Barrett had disregarded his commander's instructions to
await the approach of Baldwin and attack simultaneously.
Barrett, after moving eight miles in advance of the main
column, discovered that the Confederate pickets were
concealed in a thicket.

The lieutenant did not even

dismount his men so they could deploy and surround the
i

enemy.

Instead he decided to charge them.

Barrett dis

charged his pistol and ordered the enemy to surrender.
Lieutenant Swilling and his eight men immediately re
sponded with a volley which cut down four Federals.

The

firing soon became general and three of the Confederates
threw away their arms and surrendered.
mounted to help tie them up.

Barrett dis

As he was getting back

into his saddle, a ball struck his neck and broke it.
Ill
The overzealous lieutenant tumbled to the ground dead.
Shortly the remainder of the Confederates made good
their escape.Captain Calloway soon arrived at the
scene, but the brief skirmish of Picacho, the westernmost

HOlbid.
^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23# 1862.

112carleton to West, May 3# 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 1049.
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battle of the War for Southern Independence, was over.
Calloway did not pursue the enemy, but remained on the
field that night.H3
Had it not been for the rash behavior of Lieu
tenant Barrett, doubtlessly the skirmish would never
have taken place.

One of the captured Confederates as

serted that had Barrett called upon them to surrender

Hit
before he started firing, they would have done so. ^
Federal losses were three killed and three wounded.^5
Private George Johnson of Company A was shot near the
heart and died within a few minutes.

William S.

Leonard of Company D was hit in the back, the ball con
tinuing upward and out his mouth.
morning.

He died the following

William C. Tobin of Company B was struck in

the forehead, but the brasses of his hat caused the ball
to glance upward.

not fatal.

Though it left an ugly wound, it was

Two other Federals were shot in the arm and

116
shoulder, but their wounds were not reported as serious.

•^3sacramento Daily Union, May 23* 1862.

•^Carleton to West, May 31 1862, 0. R. A.,
L, i, 1049.
~ ~"
115orton

(comp.), Records of California Men, 47.

•'••^Sacramento Daily Union, May 23, 1862.
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The Confederates were listed as having two men wounded
and three prisoners

Lieutenant Barrett and those

who died with him were buried side by side, a few feet
from where they fell."^®
The morning following the skirmish, Calloway,
against the protests of his officers, ordered his com
mand to turn

back.

9

Several factors prompted the

captain to discontinue the advance toward Tucson.

He

was convinced that the Confederates were too great in
number for his party to successfully combat.
three days 1 provisions remained.

Only

Furthermore, the road

from Picacho Pass to Tucson led through thickets and
passes where small bands of the enemy could lie in wait
to pick off his men as they passed.

Prom the prisoners

it was learned that McCleave had already been sent to
the Rio Grande.

Thus, one of the principal reasons for

attacking Tucson was now gone.- 1 - 20
Calloway arrived at the Pima Villages on April
24, but he did not stop.

Apparently he had decided to

H7orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
H^sacramento Daily Union, May 23> 1862.
•^Qrton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
^'-'Sacramento Daily Union, May 23* 1862.
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return to Fort Yuma.

Near Stanwix Station, however, he

met Colonel West with the advance of the California
army.

Both parties then proceeded to the Pima Villages

where an earthwork was thrown up around White's mill,
and a permanent camp was established.

It was named

Port Barrett in honor of the young lieutenant who had
fallen in the skirmish of Picacho.-*- 2 ^
Meanwhile Carleton was finally assembling his
army at Port Yuma.

Unforeseen difficulties had prevented

his getting into the field earlier.

Not for twenty years

had a winter of such severity occurred in California.
Heavy rains had inundated the country, and for weeks it
had been almost impossible to move a vehicle of any kind.
Commissary stores and forage were sent by sea to Fort
Yuma.

As the rains subsided and the ground became

firmer, the troops were gradually moved out.

The men

marched across the desert by companies, one day apart,
but the ground was not dry enough for the movement of
Shinn's artillery until April 13. By that time nearly
*L?P

all the command was at, or on the way, to Port Yuma.

^•^Orton (comp.), Records of California Men,
47, 69.
^^McNulty to Hammond, October
L, i, 138-139.

1863, 0. R. A.,
- - -
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On April 28, Carleton was promoted to brigadier general
of volunteers, and Joseph R. West became colonel of the
First California Infantry.
Carleton arrived at Port Yuma on April 29.-^4
"General Order Number One" specified that "the forces
belonging to the United States which are now moving from
the Department of the Pacific toward Arizona and New
Mexico will hereafter be known as the Column from Calif
ornia."125

Carleton's expeditionary force consisted of

the following:
First California Cavalry, five companies, commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Eyre.
First California Infantry, ten companies, under
Colonel Joseph R. West.
Battery A, Third U. S. Artillery, two 12-pounder
howitzers and two 6-pounders, First Lieutenant
John B. Shinn commanding.
Later Colonel George W. Bowie's Fifth California Infantry,
five companies, was sent to reinforce the "Column."
This made an army of nearly 1,800 men.•'•27

• L2 3orton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
•^^McNulty to Hammond, October
L, i, 139.

1863, 0. R. A_.,

125General Orders, No. 1, May 15, 1862,
ibid., 1075.
126o r ton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.
•^^Whitford, Colorado Volunteers, 140.

484
The definite news that a sizeable Union army would
soon be marching into Arizona was ample reason for Hunter
to decide to evacuate western Arizona.

On May 4, the

captain called his company into line, and the small force
marched out of Tucson for the Rio Grande.

The Confeder

ate occupation of what is now Arizona had lasted for
slightly over two months.

Near Dragoon Spring Hunt

er's company was attacked by Apaches.

Pour men were

killed in the skirmish and the Indians managed to run off
thirty mules and twenty-five horses.^ 2 9

company A reached

the Mesilla Valley shortly after* Sibley's army had come
back from the disastrous New Mexican campaign.

Hunter's

intelligence of the coming of the "California Column"
certainly did nothing to bolster the morale of the weary
and demoralized "Army of New Mexico."
On May 15* Colonel West, with the advance detach
ment of the "California Column," set out from Port
Barrett for Tucson.

The command moved up the Gila River

to old Port Breckenridge where, amid the cheers of the
1*^0
men, the Federal flag was raised once again. J

On May

20, Tucson was occupied and western Arizona was securely
in the hands of the Union army." 1 ^!

1088.

128west to Cutler, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., L, i,
- - 129carleton to Drum, May 25> 1862, ibid., 1095.
•^Oorton (comp.), Records of California Men, 47.

1088.

^Iv/est to Cutler, May 21, 1862, 0. R. A., L, i,
- - _

CHAPTER XV
THE END OP THE CAMPAIGN

While the "Army of New Mexico" was retreating down
the Rio Grande, the Confederacy was suffering reverses
elsewhere.

The month of April witnessed the bloody

battle of Shiloh and the fall of New Orleans.

Even

with these great disasters attracting his attention,
General Paul 0. Hebert, Confederate commander of the De
partment of Texas, had not forgotten about the New
Mexican campaign.

When he received urgent pleas from •

Sibley for reinforcements, he ordered two regiments of
cavalry to march to his support." 1 '

But communications were

slow, and apparently Hebert had not received notice that
Sibley had already evacuated New Mexico.
In faraway Richmond, though McClellan had begun
his Peninsula campaign and was pressing upon the capital,
there were others who were worried about the "Army of New
Mexico."

On the very day of the opening of the battle of

Seven Pines, May 31* 1862, Robert E. Lee, general in

iLee to Hebert, May 31* 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 716.
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chief under the President, wrote to Hebert, informing
him that Jefferson Davis had received communications
which reported the "very destitute and critical con
dition" of Sibley's army.

The general asserted that

Hebert was "perfectly right" in reinforcing Sibley with
the two regiments which had been intended for service
in Little Rock.

Lee also advised that the "very remote

and isolated position of General Sibley's command" made
it necessary that Hebert should promptly send to the
western frontier of Texas all the supplies for Sibley's
vise that he could.

In this matter, Lee suggested that

the departmental commander should call upon the governor
of Texas for assistance.2
Jefferson Davis, of course, was also very much
interested in the New Mexican campaign.

Captain Thomas

P. Ochiltree, Sibley's aide-de-camp, had earlier
journeyed to Richmond to personally report the condition
of the brigade to the President.

When Davis considered

the field of operations, the superior number of the
enemy, and the many other obstacles which Sibley faced,
he considered that officer's conduct, and the army under
his command, as most "praiseworthy."

2Ibid.

Through Ochiltree,
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the President rejoiced "in being able to congratulate
. . .^Bible;^

on

^Kis/ command."

the distinguished successes of. . .
He hoped that the two regiments which

were being sent to bolster his army would enable him to
meet the "more immediate and pressing exigencies."
Ochiltree was to inform the general of the state of af
fairs in the East.

This, the President believed, would

be a sufficient explanation as to why Sibley's command
had not been more quickly reinforced and supplied.
Though the enemy in New Mexico was superior in numbers
and in supplies, Davis expressed the fond hope that
Sibley's own ability and military resources, and the
valor of the troops under his command, would offset any
such disparity.

Davis had not yet learned of the dis

astrous results of this southwestern campaign when he
wrote this congratulatory letter to Sibley on June 7*
1862.3

undoubtedly, Sibley must have been greatly

embarrassed when Captain Ochiltree later delivered this
communication to him.
Sibley first learned of the coming of reinforce
ments from unofficial reports. During the latter part
of May, the week's mail brought information from "various"

3Davis to Sibley, June

J,

1862, ibid., 717-718.
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sources that the government Intended to reinforce the
brigade with one or more regiments.

In fact, Colonel

X. B. Debray was supposed to be already on the march.
The postmaster at San Antonio also informed the general
that Hamilton Bee, the commander of the Western
District of Texas, said that New Mexico and Arizona
were to be held at "all hazards."^

But neither Sibley

nor his men were desirous of engaging in another New
Mexican campaign I
On May 27> Sibley dispatched a letter to Bee
through Captain Wager, his volunteer aide.

In this

communication, the general gave a far more accurate ac
count of the condition of his army than he had done In
his report to the adjutant general.

Sibley pointed out

that he had been forced to evacuate New Mexico because
his provisions, forage, and ammunition had been com
pletely exhausted.^

Any force sent to operate in New

^Sibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, Ibid., 71^•
5lbid. During the retreat from New Mexico,
Canby had captured the official papers of Major Brownrigg, Sibley's chief commissary. Canby offered to
exchange these for the records of the U. S. Third
Cavalry which were reported to be in the possession of
the Texans. Canby to Sibley, May 24, 1862, ibid.,
Series II, III, 589.
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Mexico, the general warned, should not depend upon the
country for siipplies, except,. perhaps, the single
article of flour.

In the vicinity of the Mesilla Valley

and Port Bliss, Sibley found himself "but little better
off."

There were no provisions in the area to be had.

Sibley had already confiscated all the spare supplies in
the vicinity, and he now had ordered that all the trans
portation and provisions which could be obtained should
be taken from the villages below Port Bliss.

The brigade

was subsisting on a limited supply of poor meat and
bread.

It was reported that the men were at the point

of starvation and were receiving as a ration one pound
and a quarter of beef and twelve ounces of flour.7

"Of

sugar and coffee. . .^/Ehe army had/ scarcely a pound;
all other small rations. .

./yievof

alike deficient;

whilst of salt meat. . ./They had/7 not an ounce."

Cloth

ing for the troops was completely gone and there was no
way of replenishing the stock.

The ammunition was nearly

exhausted, and there was only about a hundred rounds re
maining for the heavy guns.

The brigade's sick and

^Sibley to Bee, May 2 7 , 1862, ibid., IX, 714.
?Canby to Adjutant-General, June 2 1 , 1862,
ibid., 678.
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wounded were suffering from lack of medicines and other
necessities.

To be sure, with specie some supplies

could be purchased on the Mexican side of the river.
O
But of hard money, Sibley had none.
Confederate cur
rency was selling at the rate of twenty cents on the
dollar, and large amounts could have been bought for less
g

if there had been any purchasers.

Sibley's confiscations, individual acts of forag
ing, and other "outrages" committed by soldiers upon the
inhabitants engendered the bitter hatred of the native
Mexican population.

An observer on the Mexican side of

the Rio Grande noted that no army would be able to sub
sist in the valley that year unless the necessary sup
plies were brought with them.

The wheat crop of that

year would be "scanty" at best, and since the Texans had
been so thorough in their confiscations, it was believed
that there would be a famine among the people at Mesilla,
Las Cruces, Dona Ana, and Picacho.^"0
Sibley lamented to Bee that he had sent "report
after report" to the Confederate authorities during the

%ibley to Bee, May 27, 1862, ibid., 714.
^Canby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862,

ibid., 6 7 8 .
10Ibid.
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recent campaign.

To date he had not received a "single

line of acknowledgment or encouragement," either from
Richmond or from military departments closer at hand.
In the absence of all official communication, Sibley had
been forced to rely entirely upon his own judgment.
Since he believed that the safety of his brigade depended
upon its moving to a base of supply, the general informed
Bee that he had already given the order for the bulk of
his forces to withdraw to San Antonio.As.far as
Sibley was concerned, the New Mexican campaign was at an
end.
On or about May 20, the evacuation began when
Major Pyron and his command set out on the road to San
Antonio.The morning of June 5* saw Companies A, B,
D, E, G, I, and K of the Fourth Regiment called into
line preparatory to leaving.

Colonel Hardeman addressed

his men and informed them that, though their rations
were short, undoubtedly a supply train from San Antonio
would meet them at Port Lancaster.

At the conclusion of

his remarks, the seven companies set out on the 750 mile

1•'•Sibley

to Bee, May 27, 1862, ibid., 714.

•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862,
ibid., 6784
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journey.

The following day Major Hampton led the next

division of the Fourth."1^

Green's Fifth Regiment, which

was now scattered in parties of fifteen to twenty along
the road between Dona Ana and Franklin, was preparing to
take up the line of march shortly.

By the morning of

June 10, General Sibley and his staff were ready to
leave.Though the bulk of the Confederate forces were
evacuating, Sibley ordered Colonel William Steele, who
was then at Dona Ana, to stay behind with his force of
about 400 men to hold the territory of A r i z o n a . u n 
doubtedly Sibley meant this to be a rear guard holding
operation.

Surely he could not have seriously enter

tained the thought that Steele could have held the terri
tory for long against Canby's impending invasion from the
north.

With the withdrawal of the greater part of the

brigade, all hopes for the conquest of New Mexico and
the West, temporarily at least, came to an end.
Sibley's men had endured a great deal during the
New Mexican campaign.

Their suffering, however, was not

•^Noel, A Campaign, 34.
•^Cariby to Adjutant-General, June 21, 1862,
0. R. A., IX, 678.

15steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722.
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yet over.

Lack of adequate transportation and food, as

well as the broken-down condition of the men, would make
the long journey back to San Antonio a most difficult
one.

The ordeal which the first division of the Fourth

Regiment experienced was probably typical of the others.
When this unit set out, it was the month of June, and
the weather was oppressively hot in the Rio Grande Val
ley.

One eyewitness reported that the sickness occa

sioned by the first few days' march was "truly painful
to behold."

It was not an unusual sight to see some of

the men "giving out" along the road after they had
marched but a few miles.

To make matters worse, the

division had no surgeon to care for the suffering.

When

the command reached Fort Quitman, the exhausted men
rested for a day.

Eagle Springs, thirty-six miles away,

was the next watering place.

Lieutenant John Barns, in

command of a small party, was ordered to proceed ahead
to make certain that the springs were cleaned out and
ready for the use of the main command.
At daylight the division set out from Fort Quit
man and proceeded up Eagle Canyon.

^Noel, A Campaign, 34-35*

There was no orderly
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marching in line.

It was every man for himself, and

"the wagons take the hindmost."

The advance members of

the "foot pads" arrived at Eagle Springs about two
o'clock that afternoon.^

Eagle Springs had been an

Overland Mail stage station, but the building was now
in r u i n s . T w o days' rations of beef and unsalted
bread were cooked here.

After the water barrels were

filled, the march was resumed at sundown.

At

daybreak,^

twenty-two miles later, the command reached Van Horn's
Wells.

The wells here were similar to the ones at Eagle
20

Springs,

but the Indians had filled them in with dirt

and the carcasses of sheep.

Lieutenant Barns' advance

party had not attempted to clean them out.

It was about

thirty-eight miles from Van Horn's Wells to the next
water at Dead Man's Hole.2-1-

Great must have been the

men's disappointment as they thirstily resumed their
march.

ITibid., 35.
•^Noel, Autobiography, 64.
•^Noel, A Campaign, 35.
20Noel,

Autobiography, 64.

2lNoel, A_ Campaign, 35.
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The road to Dead Man's Hole ran through a
relatively flat "boundless prairie."

The weather con

tinued to be excessively hot as the unmerciful sun bore
dovm upon the command.

22
The teams were "fast caving,"

and the weary soldiers were strung out along the road
for miles,23

Many of them were so exhausted that they

gave out completely and threw themselves down by the
side of the road to die.

Many kept plodding onward, but

their tongues were so swollen that they were unable to
articulate a word.

"More crazed than rational, they

looked like frantic mad men."

As the sun was setting,

the reeling men could clearly see the foothills at whose
base lay Dead Man's Hole.

This was a heartening sight

for it seemed just a short distance away.

But the clear

air of the West is deceiving, and the command was still
fourteen miles from the water.

The men kept up the march

' for another six miles when, to their great joy and re
lief, they were met by Lieutenant Barns.

He had come

.24
from Dead Man's Hole with a wagon containing water!
As each Individual quenched his thirst, he would go back

22Ibid.

23Noel, Autobiography, 65.
S^Noel, A Campaign, 35.
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and lie down in the road.

This was the only place the

men could find to rest, for the area outside the road
' 25
bed was covered with sage brush, cats-claw, and cactus.
At Dead Man's Hole, .the division rested for a day before
setting out again for Barrel Springs.

On arrival at

Port Davis, a part of the command's supplies was met, and
2.6
the soldiers hungrily feasted upon fat beef.
fort there was plenty of wood.

At the

The men kneaded unbolted

flour, wound the dough around their iron ramrods, and
baked it over camp fires.

There were some scales at the

fort, and some men whose ordinary.weight had been 185
pounds, now weighed less than 115*

After resting for a

27

day and a night, the division resumed its march.

The weather continued to be hot, and the barren,
cactus-covered terrain was exceedingly dry and dusty.
Wearily, the men plodded along from Fort Davis to Port
Stockton, to Port Lancaster, and to Howard Spring.

Prom

Howard Spring the command marched forty-five miles to
the next water at Beaver Lake at the head of Devils

25Noel,

Autobiography, 6 5 .

2^Noel,

A Campaign, 3 6 .

^T^oel, Autobiography, 66.
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River.

Undoubtedly the most momentous event of the long

march occurred twenty-two miles west of Beaver Lake.

At

daylight on the morning of July 3j the men met a supply
train of six wagons which had come to their relief.
Friends and relatives had sent clothing, soap, combs,
fresh corn meal, sugar, salt, bacon, coffee, tobacco,
and other luxuries.

Some soldiers received nothing.

Those, however, who had received goods freely divided
.them with those "whose friends had forgotten them in
their hour of need."

From this point on, all progressed

well.

At D'Hanis friends and more supply trains met the
28
brigade. • At last San Antonio was reached.
"Straggling back on foot, broken, disorganised,
and in an altogether deplorable condition,the men
were home again after a ten month absence. For a while,
at least, the hardships of the New Mexican campaign were
forgotten.

The soldiers received sixty-day furloughs,

though they were still subject to call "at a moment's
notice."

While at home they were ordered to remount and

reoutfit themselves.3°

Though the campaign in New Mexico

28

Noel, A_ Campaign, 36.

29williams,

With the Border Ruffians, 201.

3°Noel, A Campaign, 36,
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had ended, the war was not over for the "Sibley Brigade."
* * *

*

Colonel William Steele, who had been ordered to
stay behind with his force of 400 men to hold the terri
tory of Arizona, found himself in a most unenviable
position.

The colonel had formerly been at Dona Ana as

Sibley's rear guard, but he now moved his headquarters
to Port Fillmore. Prom a purely military standpoint,
Steele's condition was critical.

He had less than thirty

days' supply of food, his ammunition was low, and his
transportation facilities were highly inadequate.

The

Confederate commander realized that something would
have to be done soon, or his men would be faced with
starvation.

Steele had been sick for several days.

Though "scarcely able to be about," he wrote to Sibley
to ask that some of the supplies which Green and Harde
man had taken with them be left on the road for the use
of his men.

To compensate Green and Hardeman, Steele

suggested that supplies be sent from San Antonio to meet
them on the way.

Though the country would soon be pro

ducing flour and cornmeal, the colonel did not believe
that he would be able to stay in the Mesilla Valley long
enough for the crops to be harvested .3^-

3^-steele to Sibley, June 26, 1862, 0. R. A.,
IX, 720.
- - -
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Of great concern was the native Mexican popu
lation in the valley.

After Sibley had left with the

bulk of the brigade, the Mexicans correctly reasoned
that Confederate tenure was "frail and uncertain."

As

such they were unwilling to sell anything for Confeder
ate currency.

Since Steele had no specie, he was com

pelled to authorize his men to seize needed supplies
from the natives^

and to force them to accept Confeder

ate script as payment.33

Food, wagons, and draught

animals were the main items which were requisitioned.
These foraging operations, which were even more thorough
than Sibley's had been, aroused greater ill feeling.

The

Mexicans had little interest in the present war between
the states.

They were only concerned with their own

welfare, and when the Texans began seizing their goods,
they attempted to defend their property.
stances they offered armed resistance.

In many in

In the various

skirmishes which took place, one captain and several men
of the Seventh Regiment were killed.3^

it is, indeed,

32steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, i b i d 7 2 2 .
33Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., L, 125.
34steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., IX,

722.
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not difficult to understand the attitude of the Mexicans.
While it had been the policy of Baylor and Sibley to
treat the people with "kindness and justice," many of
the soldiers had acted otherwise.^

Since the days of

the Revolution, Texans in general had held Mexicans in
low regard.

When the whole brigade had been in the

valley, the Mexicans had been powerless to resist.
Against Steele's small force, however, the Mexicans were
able to express in deeds their hatred of the "Tejanos."
In addition to the Mexicans, Steele was confronted
with the attitude of his own men.

They were completely

disgusted with the campaign and were anxious to return to
Texas as had the rest of the brigade.

So strong was this

feeling that, in one or two instances, the soldiers were
on the point of open mutiny.

Unless they were "speedily"

marched back to San Antonio, they threatened to take
matters into their own hands.3^
Meanwhile Carleton's "California Column" had
reached Tucson where it momentarily halted in order to
pacify the area and to make repairs and to secure supplies

35Reminiscences of H. C. Wright.

3^steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862,
IX, 722.

R. A.,
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from Sonora.37

While at the "Old Pueblo," Carleton at

tempted to contact Canby.

Twice before, his messengers

had failed to get through.^

The third time he sent

two soldiers and a Mexican guide.
on the evening of June 15.

The men left Tucson

Three days later they came

into Apache Pass39 which was midway between Tucson and
the Rio Grande.

The pass was about three and a half to

four miles long and ran through a spur of the Chiricahua
Mountains.

Extending around this spur was a plain which

fanned out from thirty to forty miles.

Apache Pass con

tained a fine spring, but it was also a favorite haunt
of the Apache Indians.

Approaching parties could be

seen miles away, and as they entered the pass, the
40
Indians would lie in wait at the spring to ambush them.
Such was the case with Carleton's three riders.

In the

3?McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid.,
599.

3®Carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., L, i,
92-93.

39carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89.
^McNulty to Hammond, October --, 1863* ibid.,
IX, 601.
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attack two of the men were killed.

The survivor, ex

pressman John Jones,211 was pursued for nearly forty
miles, but he made good his escape
evening of June 20,

J

At sunset on the

Jones reached Picacho, about six

miles above Mesilia.^

Exhausted and in a half-

delirious state after his perilous ride, the express
rider arrived at the Rio Grande only to be captured by
a party of Texans.^

Jones was brought before Colonel

Steele who interrogated him and then confined him to
jig
jail.
News of his capture was brought to Port Craig
by a friendly Mexican who was present when Jones was
hi1

taken.

All the dispatches which Carleton endeavored

to send to Canby fell into the Confederate commander's
hands.

From them Steele was able to learn the exact

^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i,
89.
^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid.,
IX, 600.
^3carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., L, i,
93.
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89.
^5carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862, ibid., 93.
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., 89.

^Eyre

Cutler, July 6, 1862, ibid., 123.
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strength of the "California Column" as well as Carleton's
hO
intended movement.
A perusal of these documents con
vinced Steele that his stay in the Mesilla Valley would
be "very short.
On June 21,

Carleton's advance guard of 140 men

under Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Eyre left Tucson for
SI
the Rio Grande.

These two companies of cavalry leached

the river near Santa Barbara on July 4; immediately after
making camp, and since it was Independence Day, the Union
flag was raised "amid the loud and continued cheers of
the assembled command."

This was the first time that the

"stars and stripes" had floated over the area below Port
Craig since the occupation of the territory by the Con
federate forces.

The following day Eyre's command moved

52
three miles down the river and occupied Port Thorn.

^McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid.,
IX, 600.
Steele to Sibley, June 26, 1862, ibid., 719.
5°Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i,

89.
53-McNulty to Hammond, October —, 1863, ibid.,
IX, 600-601.

52Eyre to Cutler, July 6, 1862, ibid., 589.
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On the morning of July 6, an express came from
Fort Craig v;ith communications from Colonel Chivington.
Accompanying these was a letter addressed to Colonel
Steele and empowering Eyre to negotiate an exchange for
Captain William McCleave and the other men who had been
captured with him in Arizona.

Shortly after the express

had arrived, the Californians saw a party coming up from
Mesilia.

One of the men proved to be Captain McCleave.

Though still on parole, he was on his way to Port Craig
with a letter from Steele which proposed his exchange
for Captain Gardner of the Confederate army.

The express

man who had just come from Fort Craig informed the men
that Gardner had died only a few days before.

In view

of this, Eyre dispatched Captain Emil Fritz, First
California Volunteer Cavalry, to Fort Fillmore.

He was

to inform the Confederate commander of Gardner's death
and to request that some other captain be exchanged for
McCleave.

In addition he was to ask that those who had

been captured with McCleave, the expressman, John Jones,
and a John Lemon also be exchanged.
of Mesilla.

Lemon was a citizen

During Jones' confinement Lemon had been

very kind to him.

In fact, he had horses saddled and

hidden out for Jones' escape.

The Texans apparently
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discovered the plot in time, and Lemon was ordered to be
hanged.

He and a Mr. Marshall were taken to a tree to

be executed, but after Marshall was hanged, Lemon's
sentence was postponed for some unknown reason. ^
The Rio Grande was still at flood stage and almost
the entire bottom between Fort Craig and Mesilla was in
undated.

It was impossible to approach Mesilla from the

west bank, for the river had washed a new channel on that
side of the town.^

Shortly after reaching the Rio

Grande, Eyre sent a scouting party down as far as the
ford at San Diego.

Since he was anxious to fall upon

Steele's command, the party had the dual purpose of look
ing for enemy pickets and to see if the river could be
crossed at that point.

The scouts returned to report

that it would be impossible to get to the crossing with
wagons.

However, the flood level was rapidly falling

and, perhaps, in a week's time the river could be forded.
In view of this situation, Eyre decided to remain a"t
Port Thorn for the time being.

Meanwhile his men and

animals would receive a needed rest.

53gyre to Cutler, July
5^lb id., 590.

In addition, he

8, 1862,

ibid.,

589-590.
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planned to await the reinforcements from Fort Craig
which he had asked for while on his way to the Rio
Grande.
On July 8, Captain George W. Howland of the U. S.
Third Cavalry, in command of a squadron of 100 men, arrived from Fort Craig and reported to Eyre for duty.-'
Howland's horses were in a "shocking" condition.

In

fact, they were so jaded that Eyre believed that should
his command meet Steele's and a mounted charge be made,
it would have to be done by his California squadron
alone.^

With the river falling, Eyre hoped to be able

to move soon against the Texans in the Mesilla Valley.
Two days after Howland's arrival, though, the Californian
received a communication from Colonel Chivington which
upset his plans for achieving laurels on the battlefield.
The commander of the Southern Military District reported
that Canby did not favor an advance from Fort Thorn
until the arrival of a larger force.

This would not be

55Eyre to Cutler, August 30, 1862, ibid., 592.
From Cow Springs on June 28, 1862, Eyre had sent an
express to Fort Craig asking for reinforcements. Ibid.
56 lb id.

57syre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., 590.
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long for Chivlngton was under orders to advance to Santa
Barbara with sixteen companies of infantry., a force of
cavalry, four 6-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers.
This column was to support Carleton's advance and to
cooperate with his troops in the reoccupation of the
Mesilla Valley.

While awaiting Chivington's force,

Eyre was instructed to learn all he could concerning the
enemy's strength, position, and plans.
* * * *

The seasonal rains had already begun to fall and
Colonel William Steele knew that Canby would soon be
able to cross the Jornada del Muerto with the large in
vading force which he had been preparing.

Prom Carle-

ton's captured dispatches, Steele learned that the
"California Column" had nearly 1,500 men and would
shortly set out in force for the Rio Grande.

Steele's

intelligence also brought reports that Canby had re
ceived additional reinforcements.
come 500 more volunteers.

From Colorado had

The paymaster from Kansas had

arrived with an escort of 250 soldiers and six rifled
cannon.

Not counting these 750 additions, and even after

leaving sufficient garrisons behind, Steele believed that

5&Eyre to Cutler, August 30, 1862, ibid., 722.
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the Federals would be capable of sending a force of 3j000
men against him.

Under these circumstances the evacuation

of the territory of Arizona would have to be carried out
as rapidly as possible.59
Since the actions of the Texans—particularly the
foraging operations—had caused such great feelings of
bitterness on the part of the Mexican population, Steele
feared that they might take their wrath out on the white
people who were remaining behind.^

All those Americans

who had sided with the Confederacy had either left with
Sibley or were preparing to leave with Steele

Those

whites, some of whom had families, who were staying had
taken no part in the struggle between the Confederate
and Union governments.

To insure their safety, the Texas

commander entered into a covenant with the principal
Mexicans of Mesilla who bound themselves to protect these
Americans.

The consideration was the release of a Domingo

Cebeno who was Steele's prisoner "under circumstances
which would ordinarily cost him his life."

Before leaving

59steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722.
6oIbid.

63-Canby to Adjutant-General, July 20, 1862, ibid.,

687.
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the area, the colonel addressed a letter to the Federal
commanding officer to inform him of the arrangement.
"For the sake of humanity," Steele hoped that the Union
officer would "inquire into the manner" in which the
f.o

agreement had been kept. ^
Confederate government in the territory of Arizona
naturally received a death blow with Steele's decision
to leave.

Sibley's disastrous campaign in the north had

already been reflected in the court record,

"in con

sideration of the disturbed condition of the County," the
regular session of the court which had been scheduled for
May, 1862, was adjourned until the following June.

On

June 2, 1862, Charles A. Hoppin wrote the final sentence
in the records of the Confederate judiciary in Arizona:
The Honl. J. Peter Deus having filed his notice
Resignation of the Judgeship of the Court, this
is adjourned to the next Regular July term 1862
the Probate Business and to September term 1862
the Trial of Civil Cases ."3

of
court
for
for

On the same day that Howland's squadron united
with Eyre's command, July 8, 1862, Colonel Steele gathered

^Steele to Commanding Officer United States
Forces, July 5, 1862, ibid., 687.
/To
•^Walker, "confederate Government in Dona Ana
County," loc. cit., 260-261.
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together his forces and marched from Port Fillmore to
6k

Port Bliss.

With his evacuation the Confederate

territory of Arizona ceased to exist.
Twenty miles below Port Fillmore, Captain Emil
Fritz overtook Steele's retreating column. Under a flag
6R
of truce, J the Confederate commander agreed to exchange
Captain McCleave and the others that Colonel Eyre had
requested.

Since Steele maintained that he knew of no

captured Texas captains, two lieutenants were exchanged
for McCleaveOne of these lieutenants was Steele's
adjutant.Eyre maintained that there were a number of

Confederate captains available, but Steele wanted of/TO

ficers from his own Seventh Regiment only.

^Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, 0. R. h_.,
IX, 722.
^Carleton

to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., L, i,

90.
^Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., IX, 6 9 1 .
^Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, ibid., IX,

89-90.
^^Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, ibid., 591*
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At Port Bliss Colonel Steele made hasty arrange
ments to leave for San Antonio.

All public property at

the post which was too bulky to haul or not worth trans
porting, was ordered to be sold for specie or for food.
Though there was a large amount of material which could
not be disposed of—items such as horse and mule shoes,
cannon ammunition, tents, etc.—the sale resulted in $830
in specie.

This was turned over to Dr. M. A. Southworth

for the use of the military hospital in Franklin.

Credit

69
to a larger amount was also left with parties in Mexico.
With very limited means of transportation, with an
insufficient supply of breadstuff and beef, and with his
troops "in many instances almost naked," Steele was ready
to leave for San Antonio by July 12.7°

Accompanying the

69steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722.
ten Carleton's Union forces later occupied Franklin in
August, 1862, -they found a surgeon of the Confederate army
and twenty-five sick and disabled soldiers. Twelve wagonloads of hospital and quartermaster supplies were located
in storerooms connected with the custom house in El Paso,
Mexico. Carleton managed to recover these supplies, and
the remaining Confederates were made prisoners of war.
Carleton to Drum, September 20, 1862, ibid., L, i, 101.
The Texas prisoners, furnished with provisions, trans
portation, and an escort, were sent to San Antonio on
September 1, 1862. Carleton to Canby, September 9> 1862,
ibid., IX, 696.

7°Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, ibid., 722.
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force were the remaining whites in and around Franklin
who had not already left with Sibley.

When Steele

abandoned Fort Bliss, the northwestern frontier of the
state of Texas and its line of military posts was left
exposed to the oncoming Federal forces.?1

confederate

military operations in the west Texas, Arizona, and New
Mexico areas now came to an end.

f^Hebert to Chief of Staff of Major-General
Holmes, August 26, 1862, ibid., 732.

CHAPTER XVI
SUMMING UP AND SOME "IPS11

The "Army of Ne\v Mexico" had been victorious over
the Union forces in both major engagements of the
campaign.

But success on the battlefield obviously had

not been enough.

Lack of supplies of all kinds was the

major factor which, in the end, had defeated the Con
federates. From the outset the Texans had been ill
equipped and poorly provisioned."1"

The outfitting of the

three regiments of the brigade had been entrusted virtu
ally to Texas alone and, as it turned out, the state's
O
resources were limited.
This did not worry Sibley
greatly, however, for he planned to capture all needed
materiel from the Federal garrisons and depots.

One of

Sibley's officers maintained that the general did not
bring as many supplies with him as he could have.

Count

ing upon capturing all that he needed, he carried along

^-Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit.,

700.
686

_

2Bancroft,

History of Arizona and New Mexico,
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just enough to sustain the army en route.3

Had Sibley

waited until he had a properly provisioned army, the New
Mexican expedition doubtlessly would never have come
4
about.

The only hope that the Texans had for winning

was to march quickly into New Mexico and defeat the
5
Union forces before their provisions gave out/
Sibley was not a good administrative officer.
Though he knew his army was poorly equipped, he made
little effort to husband what supplies he did have.

As

one of his officers later attested, he was "too prone to
let the morrovr take care of itself."^

Apparently the

Confederate commander believed that conditions in New
Mexico had not materially changed since he had left the
department.

In this respect, he grossly underestimated

3Noel, A Campaign, 12.
^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit

700.
5canby to Adjutant-General of the Army, January
25, 1862, 0. R. A., IX, 89.
^Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc. cit.,

700.

515
the ability of his opponent.

Failing to capture the

amount of supplies which he had anticipated, Sibley soon
found himself in the heart of a hostile country hundreds
of miles from any possible base of supply.7
After the battle of Valverde, Sibley lost the
O
confidence of his soldiers.
Most members of the "Army
of New Mexico" were of frontier stock, and the individual
ism which v.Tas a characteristic of that section did not
lend itself to rigid discipline.

When the men lost faith

in their commander, both discipline and morale reached a
low ebb.

Throughout the campaign, Sibley had been a

shadowy figure, and it was his aggressive subordinate of
ficers like Green, Scurry, and Pyron who inspired their
troops to victory on the battlefield.
Failure to secure readily the necessary equipment
and men in Texas resulted in Sibley's reaching the New
Mexican theatre of operations much later than he had
anticipated.

Winter weather made a difficult campaign

even more difficult.

Diseases such as smallpox and

7Ibid.

^Steele to Cooper, March 7> 1862, 0. R. A.,
LIII, 7 9 3 .
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pneumonia thinned the Confederate ranks more than did
the battle casualties.9

These losses were permanent, as

far as the immediate campaign was concerned, for Sibley
could not replace them.

When reinforcements were on the

way, it was too late, for the campaign was over.
The country and people were important contributors
to Sibley's defeat.

New Mexico proved to be no store

house, and the army could not live off the land.

Barren

and desolate, the territory was barely able to support
its native inhabitants."1'0

The Confederates had counted

upon the New Mexicans to be pro-Southern, or at least
apathetic.

But the Texans failed to take into con

sideration the underlying hatred which the Mexicans had
for them."1""1"

The undisciplined behavior of the invading

army only served to increase this feeling.
The role of the territory of Colorado was of the
utmost importance in saving New Mexico for the Union.
Governor Gilpin's quick action in suppressing the

9sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, ibid., IX, 507*
•L0Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign," loc.
cit., 700.

686.

•^Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico,
—
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secession element eventually enabled him to send a regi
ment of volunteers to New Mexico's defense.

Had this

force not arrived at the opportune moment, Port Union
undoubtedly would have fallen.

Cut off from all out

side support, Canby's garrison at Port Craig would have
been forced to surrender.
It is true that Slough's troops were driven from
the field of Glorieta, thus nearly upsetting Canby's
plan to unite his forces.

But the fortune of destroying

the Confederate wagon train proved to be the decisive
event of the campaign.

The loss of these invaluable and

irreplacable supplies stopped at once the Confederate
advance.

If Chivington's men had not accomplished this

act, it is entirely conceivable that the Texans would
have successfully continued their march upon Fort Union
and would have conquered the territory.

Though a very

minor action, Chivington's rear guard movement resulted
in the subversion of the whole Confederate plan of
campaign.

There were parallels elsewhere.

The relatively

small battle of Pea Ridge gave the Union control of
Missouri, while McClellan's skirmishes in western
Virginia resulted in the Federal control of that area
for the duration of the war.
have momentous results.

Small engagements often
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The New Mexican campaign had been virtually an
independent effort of the state of Texas.

But if

Sibley had been successful in New Mexico, the Confeder
ate government undoubtedly would have taken a greater
interest and would have sent more supplies and men to
bolster Sibley's march to California.

The advantages

of acquiring California for the Confederacy go without
saying.
Assuming that Sibley was successful in conquer
ing the territory, the "Army of New Mexico" would have
been confronted by the arrival of Carleton's "California
Column."

This was not a great threat for it was a

smaller force composed of green troops.

The Texans,

particularly after gaining new recruits and supplies
from Colorado and Utah, probably would have had little
difficulty in defeating the "Column."

The Union govern

ment undoubtedly realized the inadequacy of the
California expeditionary force, for an army of five
thousand men was being prepared in the Department of the
Mississippi to be sent to Canby's aid.IP
formidable force with which to cope.

This was a

If Sibley had been

^Halleck to Pope, March 21, 1862, 0. R. A.,
VIII, 629.
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able to gain men and materiel from Colorado and Utah,
and if the two regiments sent to his relief had arrived
in time, he might have succeeded in defeating this new
army.

Once this was accomplished, the path to

California would have been open.

Needless to say, the

obstacles which Sibley would have faced before this was
realized were great, indeed.

But granted that he was

able to overcome them all and march into California, the
course of the war possibly might have been altered.

If

the capture of New Mexico would have rendered the con
quest of California probable, then the New Mexican
campaign of 1862 was one of the most important military
operations of the war. "*"3

"^Anderson, "canby's Services in the New Mexican
Campaign," loc. cit., 698.
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